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Sultan Ahmad al-Mu'azzam Shah ibni Bendahara Wan Ali Bendahara
1863—1882: Sultan of Pahang August 1882—1914

Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society

Monograph No. 18

PAHANG
1880 — 1933
A POLITICAL HISTORY

by
Aruna Gopinath

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To the memory of Rollins Bonney

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June 1990

A NOTE ON SPELLING

In this study the Rumi spelling of Malay place names, personal names, designations and words quoted directly from Malay texts follows the traditional system of spelling. For example, Melaka, Johor, Atjeh, Riau, Lingga and Bintan have been used in preference to Malacca, Johore, Acheh and the variant spellings that occur for Riau, Lingga and Bintan. As far as possible, I have retained the singular form of Malay and foreign terms even when the plural is meant.

PREFACE

This study attempts to examine the major political developments in Pahang between 1880 and 1933 and, in particular, to trace the events which occurred during the reign of one of her renowned rulers — Wan Ahmad. Ahmad's rise to power and his attempts to maintain that power both political and economic, during a phase of growing British encroachment are also studied. Ahmad's political survival was undermined by several forces at play which are also examined within the limitations of available source materials. Submitted originally as a M.A. thesis to the Department of History, University of Malaya in 1977, I have since then examined the period 1915 and 1933 during the reigns of Sultan Ahmad's successors, and the several changes that occurred in the political history of Pahang.

Chapter I is basically introductory in nature outlining the geographical environment. An understanding of the historical background is essential and entered into tracing Pahang's traditional ties with the Melaka Sultanate and the inherent complex court craft of the Johor-Riau-Lingga empire and her assertion of being an "independent" state controlled by her Bendahara. This is seen to have operated within the fortunes of the changing balance of power relationships in the Southeast Asian region in general and the Malay Peninsula in particular. It also traces the rise of Bendahara Wan Ahmad and his consolidation of power following the civil wars of 1857—1863; Pahang's involvement in the Selangor Civil War (1867—73) and Ahmad's eventual emergence as the 'sovereign' ruler of Pahang.

The political structure and the administration of the state during the traditional period is examined in Chapter II. It is to be observed that Ahmad's policy in elevating his favourites to high position in the political system and its attendant economic and political privileges resulted in rivalry with the earlier entrenched hierarchy.

Chapter III which encompasses the period 1880—1888 deals with the internal crisis which came to the fore as a result of the dissatisfaction and dissension between the older and new chiefs. It also traces Ahmad's efforts at gaining recognition of the title of Sultan — a move which was initiated for the first time by a Bendahara in Pahang's political history. The course of events reveals a close relationship to developments to Johor whilst Pahang's own internal weaknesses led to discontented personalities to turn towards the British to come to their rescue which was to precipitate British inter-

vention. In this chapter, Ahmad's economic policy which ultimately became a factor in the erosion of his power is also examined. Emphasis is given to his abortive attempts at maintaining his independence in the face of British pressure.

The inauguration of British rule and Western concepts of power and administration forms the basis of chapter IV. It also examines how these changes infringed on the independence and political-cum-economic powers of the Malay hierarchy which was to lead to discontent.

Chapter V discusses how the above-mentioned discontent led a major attempt to oust the British. This rebellion gradually gained the popularity and support of all the major and minor chiefs including Sultan Ahmad himself. Sultan Ahmad's attitudes and the measures which he adopted to conform to British counter-measures, so as not to be branded as a supporter of the rebellion are also studied.

Chapter VI traces Sultan Ahmad's attempts to avoid being completely deprived of his prerogative as the fount of traditional power. His agreement to enter the proposed Federated Malay States; Pahang's boundary disputes with Johor and Trengganu; the establishment of the Federal Council in 1909 and Sultan Ahmad's age itself, it is argued became the major political constitutional and personal obstacles to the realization of his cherished ambitions to return to the days of old.

Finally, the epilogue appraises the primary features of Pahang's political history between 1915 and 1933. An attempt is made to compare the reigns of Sultan Ahmad's successors with the latter's political machinations during the earlier period.

WEIGHTS AND CURRENCIES

One pikul	=	133.33 lb
One bahara	=	400 lb
One Koyan (40 pikul)	=	5,333.33 lb

Spanish Dollar

100 Spanish Dollar	=	224½ Company Rupees
	=	£20 16s 8d (Intrinsic value)
	=	208.325 florins

For further details on currencies of the Malay Peninsula, see C. M. Turnbull, *The Straits Settlements 1826—67*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1972, pp. 204-9 and 392-409.

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES CHART

The principal local measures of weight and capacity used in British Malaya, with their relationships to English standards:

Chupak	...	1 quart
Gantang	...	1 gallon
Gantang of padi	...	5 lbs approximately
Gantang of rice (milled)	...	8 lbs approximately
Tahil	...	1 1/3 pounds
Pikul (100 katis)	...	133 1/3 pounds
Koyan (40 pikul)	...	5,333 1/3 pounds

Source: Li Dun Jen, British Malaya — An Economic Analysis (First Edition, The American Press, New York).

MAPS

ILLUSTRATIONS

ABBREVIATIONS

A.R.K.D.O.	—	Annual report of Kuantan District Office
A.R.P.	—	Annual Report of Pahang
B.R.O.F.	—	British Resident's Office Files
B.R.O.S.U.F.	—	British Resident's Office Sungei Ujong Files
C.O.	—	Colonial Office
F.O.C.P.	—	Further Correspondence respecting the affairs of Siam, Great Britain Foreign Office
F.M.S.	—	Federated Malay States
G.B.W.O.I.D.	—	Great Britain War Office Intelligence Division
H.B.M.S.	—	Her British Majesty's Service
H.C.O.D.	—	High Commissioner's Office Despatches
H.C.O.F.	—	High Commissioner's Office Files
J.I.A.	—	Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia
J.M.B.R.A.S.	—	Journal of the Malayan Branch Royal Asiatic Society
J.S.B.R.A.S.	—	Journal of the Straits Branch Royal Asiatic Society
J.S.E.A.H.	—	Journal of Southeast Asian History
J.S.S.S.	—	Journal of South Seas Society
K.D.O.F.	—	Kuantan District Office Files
n.p.	—	No pagination
P.G.G.	—	Pahang Government Gazette
P.P.	—	Parliamentary Papers
S.S.F.	—	Selangor Secretariat Files
S.S.R.	—	Straits Settlements Records (India Office)
T.D.O.F.	—	Temerloh District Office Files

PAHANG AND THE MALAY PENINSULA

Source: R.G. Cant, An Historical Geography of Pahang, JMBRAS, Monograph IV, 1973, p. 16

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Geographical Notes

The river basin state of Pahang[1] with an area of fourteen thousand square miles is the largest state in the Malay Peninsula.[2] Territorially, it lies along the eastern side of the Peninsula[3] facing the South China Sea.

The earliest reference to Pahang is found in the Chinese chronicles — *Min Shih, Hai-lu* and *Tao-i Chi-lioh* of the Ming period which made various references to the country, such as *Peng heng, Pang heng, Peng keng, Panghang* or *Pong fong*. Wang Ta-yuan, author of *Tao-i Chi-lioh*, described Pahang in A.D. 1349 in the following manner:

> It is surrounded by rocky mountains of a rugged and precipitous nature which in the distance appear like a level-topped rampart... The inhabitants of Peng Keng boil sea water to obtain salt and ferment the juice of coconuts to distil spirits. They are ruled by a chieftain...[4]

The Arabs[5] and the Portuguese referred to it as Pan, Pam, Phaan, Pahan and Paon.[6] However, the proto-Malays claimed that the country was known to them as Mahang. According to Malay oral tradition, a huge Mahang tree extended across the river at Kampong Kembahang and it is believed that the river and the state derived their names from this tree.[7] Nevertheless, the most likely origin of the state's name can be traced from the Khmer language where Pahang is the Khmer word for tin.[8] Tin was mined around Sungei Lembing and from the seventh century A.D. onwards, it has been speculated, the Khmers had vassal kingdoms in the Malay Peninsula, where gold and tin were mined on a considerable scale. Historians have accepted this to be the most feasible theory for the origin of Pahang.

Much of the land was covered with uninhabited forests. However, along the eastern coast there was a fine, sandy shore in contrast to the mangroves and muddy shores of the Western coast states.[9] Moving inland, flat lands were visible only in the vicinity of Pekan, while on higher ground patches of scrub merged with the mountain barriers forming the long folds such as the Benom Range in the centre, the Main Range further to the west and the Coastal range on the East. [10]

PAHANG



Source: W. Linehan, A History of Pahang, JMBRAS XIV, II (1936), p. 257

From these mountain ranges originated the rivers which formed the main watersheds and highways, around which the centres of power were located during the pre-British era. Their importance was described in accounts by travellers such as Hugh Clifford, F. A. Swettenham, J. T. Thomson, Munshi Abdullah, F. W. Douglas and W. Davison.[11]

Running through the central core of Pahang and claiming to be the longest river in Peninsular Malaysia is the Pahang river.[12] The main river begins at the confluence of the Jelai and Tembeling rivers, flows southwards and around Temerloh takes an easterly direction; and before reaching its mouth at Kuala Pahang, widens to about one and a half miles.[13] W. B. Roberts, during his travels in Pahang, made the observation that the Pahang river was "the great artery which serves to keep Ulu Pahang in touch with the outer world."[14] He described further in an optimistic tone:

> ...up it in large numbers pass the Malay and Chinese boats laden with supplies for the shops of Kuala Lipis, P[e]njum, and S[e]lensing; machinery for the mines and from time to time those Europeans, whose business takes them into the ulu.[15]

Besides W. B. Roberts, both F. A. Swettenham and Hugh Clifford acknowledged the fact that the Pahang was the most navigable river in the Peninsula. Swettenham added that "it carries more water than the Perak main stream",[16] while Clifford noticed that the traffic down-stream consisted of large bamboo rafts which carried passengers and goods to their destination.[17] Despite its usefulness, navigation and travel along the Pahang river were hampered during the North-East monsoon when the shores were unapproachable.[18]

Tributaries of the Pahang include the Jelai,[19] Tembeling and Tekal,[20] Lipis and the Semantan. The Semantan is formed by the union of the Klau and Bentong rivers, while the Klau river is formed by the intersection of the Klau Ketchil and Bilut rivers. Of the Semantan river, W. B. Roberts commented that:

> ...along it most of the heavy stores and machinery for the mines and town of Raub passes and which with its tributaries tap a large belt of country, including the Bentong tin bearing districts.[21]

Other notable rivers are the Bentong, Kuantan, Bebar, Rompin, Bera, Chenor and Endau rivers.[22]

The economic importance of these rivers could be seen by the fact that they served as important lines of communication with the interior. For instance, the Lipis and Jelei rivers linked the Penjum

mines, the Tras, Bilut, Klau with the Raub gold mines, while the Bentong and Perting connected the Bentong tin mines. Apart from linking the interior, they also provided routes to the adjacent states.[23] W. Linehan, for instance, noted that "the highway of inland communication between Pahang and the Northerly countries had always been the Tembeling".[24] He added:

> As early as 1511, for instance, Sultan Mahmud Shah of Malacca and Sultan Ahmad, after being defeated by the Portuguese used the Sungei Serting and Sungei Jempul as escape routes to Muar. The same route was used by Sultan Ali of Singapore (son of Sultan Husain Shah) when he visited Bendahara Wan Ahmad in Pahang in 1863. In the fifteenth century, the Siamese being defeated by the Malays retreated up the Tembeling.

Likewise, following the Sungei Tanum, Kelantan could be reached. Trengganu was connected via the Sepia and the Cherating while Perak was adjoined by the Bertam and Lipis tributaries and the Jelai. Selangor was linked by the Semantan. Similarly it was possible to go to Muar via the Serting and Bera rivers.[25] Johor could be reached via the Endau which also became the boundary between Pahang and Johor as noted by W. Lake in his diary of 2 August 1891. He wrote:

> On the Northern bank of the kuala there is a police station flying the Sultan of Pahang's flag, whilst on the opposite bank is Kampong Padang, the residence of the Sultan of Johore's Naib or officer-in-charge.[26]

Apart from the major rivers, the shallow tributaries were equally important to the aborigines who used them as tracks into the interior. The indispensability of rivers as a means of internal communication for the Malays was clearly indicated by Clifford:

> ...these rivers... form the principal and often the only highways, many of them being navigated for nearly three hundred miles of their course. When they become too much obstructed by falls to be navigable even for a dug-out, they still serve the Malays to the interior as highways. Where they are very shallow indeed they are used as tracks... A river bed is a path readily cleared through the forests and to the Semang, Sakai and jungle bred Malay, it is Nature's macadamized road.[27]

Many of the European travellers who visited Pahang in the nineteenth century entered the state via the estuary because of the

absence of roads[28] except for Hugh Clifford, C. Gray and F. A. Swettenham who each used an overland route to go to Pahang. Only two well-known "roads" to Pahang existed before 1888. One was via the Genting Bidai pass from Selangor which led to the Bentong river and the mines surrounding it and the other was a cart track which led to Ulu Selangor and extended as far as Raub and Pekan.[29]

During their travels, the European visitors observed that the rivers, as commercial highways and a stimulus to settlement,[30] washed the shores of important villages situated along the focal points. Each of these villages was supervised by a chief who exacted duties on the passage of goods along the respective rivers. Pekan, the first "town" was located about seven miles from the mouth of the Pahang river.[31] Rodger in 1888 described Pekan as:

> ...a village containing a single street on one side of which adjoining the river there is a row of about one hundred Chinese and Malay huts chiefly used as shops built of bamboo and thatched with ataps, whilst on the other side are situated a brisk mosque, two or three brick houses belonging to the Sultan and some fairly large plank houses roofed with corrugated iron, low attaps and occupied by the Sultan's wives or his immediate attendants.[32]

It may be deduced that Pekan's history began when it was founded as the seat of royalty as early as the thirteenth century and hence came to be regarded as the capital of Pahang. Pekan, then, was known as Pura.[33] It was divided into Pekan Lama[34] and Pekan Bharu,[35] otherwise known as Kampong China, because of the presence of Chinese settlers.

Two hundred miles up the Pahang river was Kuala Lipis. It was chosen as the administrative capital by the British in 1897 because it was closer to the west coast and easily accessible by river.[36] A cruise along the Sedili and Pahang rivers revealed other important villages such as Endau, Pontian, Rompin, Bebar and Merchong.[37] At the mouth of the Kuantan river was the town of Kuantan[38] noted for its production of tin, while along the Tembeling lay Kampong Roh, a village peopled by Malays, "but also several Chinamen were seen among them."[39]

The Lipis river similarly had important villages situated along its banks notably Permatang Linggi. J. E. Nathan observed that it was "an extensive Malay kampong ruled by a headman named To' Bakar".[40] He added:

...the land was abandoned by Malays some fifteen years ago, but the stretch of secondary jungle along the river is still known as Belukar Tok Bakar.[41]

Further inland was situated the district of Trusang observed by Swettenham as being one of the richest gold districts in Pahang.[42] Another important district which was a focal point along the Lipis river, close to the gold mines of Jelai in the 1880s, was Penjum. Its central position enabled the paths from Budu, Raub and Ulu Lipis to converge at this point. The following was Clifford's brief description of Penjum in 1887:

...it was inhabited at that time by more Chinese than Malays. It was at the nearest point on the river to the gold mines of Jalis [Jelai] and at the back of the squalid native shops, that lined the river bank, a well worn foot path led inland to the Chinese alluvial washings. Almost in the centre of the long line of shops and hovels which formed the village of Penjum stood the thatched house in which To' Kaya S[e]tiawangsa (Chief of Lipis) lived.[43]

Two other important towns were Temerloh, Chenor[44] and Triang; the last two mentioned being noted for the manufacture of mats, while on the other hand, Bentong and Raub along the Semantan river were noted for their tin and gold production.[45] It was only in the late 1880s that these villages achieved the status of towns and Swettenham deduced that their development was hindered by the insignificant numbers of Chinese who had settled in Pahang, prior to 1880.[46]

With its natural resources such as tin and gold, the state could have attracted a large population, but Pahang's population was scanty in the 1880s. Prior to the 1880s, statistical accounts gave conflicting estimates of the size and composition of population. In 1834, Begbie estimated the figure to be around 59,000;[47] in 1839 T. J. Newbold thought it to be around 40,000;[48] while in 1851 J. T. Thomson assumed that it was around only 14,110.[49] In 1875 F. A. Swettenham quoted the figure as around 60,000,[50] while Rodger in 1888 estimated it to be about 35,000[51] — the population comprising mainly Malays, Chinese and aborigines who resided in the interior.

The Malays being a riverine and maritime race were found along rivers which were favourable to settlement, but a denser concentration could be seen along the banks of the Pahang, Jelai, Lipis and the Tembeling rivers. They also resided in Ulu Pahang and W. B. Roberts observed that:

... from the junction of the Telom and Seram rivers, few Malay

houses were found at long intervals, but above that there are none whatever, the whole of it being Sakai country.[52]

Clifford estimated the Malay population in Pahang to be around 30,500 in 1888.[53] Except for the town of Pekan, the Malay population was predominantly rural. They practised agriculture and in the more densely settled areas, they grew wet padi, albeit on a subsistence level.[54] In addition to padi, they grew fruits which were commonly found in other parts of the Peninsula. These included bananas, mangosteens, rambutans, pulasan, durians, sago and sugar cane.[55] Some Arabian coffee plants were grown at Temerloh but the Malay owners "were quite ignorant of the use of the berries, using only the leaves to make tea."[56]

Besides agriculture, the Malays were engaged in traditional occupations such as the rearing of cattle (especially buffaloes), sheep, poultry, and the manufacture of mats and silk cloths.[57] Fishing was a seasonal occupation as evidenced by the presence of several fishing settlements around Beserah, Penor, Kuala Pahang and Rompin.[58] Prior to the entry of the British into Pahang, the Malays (along with the Chinese) had also mined gold and tin at Bentong, Selensing, Trusang, Jelai and Raub[59] using primitive techniques. D. D. Daly made the observation that:

> ...the Malays around Sungei Lui got gold at the bottom of wells that were dug, in bunches and nests; and the gold, after the dirt is crushed and washed in a crude way with pestle and mortar, is brought up in a coconut shell and must be sold to the Bendahara of Pahang.[60]

The Malays hardly used any form of machinery and "...gold [was] most imperfectly worked.[61] It was only with the arrival of the Europeans that the mines, for instance, at Raub, Kuantan, Penjum and Selensing introduced modern crushing machinery.

Compared to the Malays, the Chinese were considerably smaller in number. They had concentrated around the trading and mining areas such as Pekan, Penjum, Ulu Pahang, Ulu Kuantan, Raub and Bentong which slowly grew into Chinatowns. Furthermore, the number of Chinese who had settled in Pahang was far less than those who had settled along the Western Malay states.[62] This was because many of the Chinese were forced to flee to the more prosperous Western Malay states due to the lawlessness that prevailed in Pahang. Economically, the Chinese who chose to remain in Pahang were comparatively poorer than their counterparts in the Western Malay states. In 1838, Munshi Abdullah, during his visit to Pahang,

described their conditions as follows:

> Shahdan maka ada-lah darihal China yang ada dalam negeri Pahang itu, saya lihat semua-nya China Kheh sahaja di-kampong China itu. Maka ada-lah rumah-rumah mereka itu sakalian-nya atap; ada masing-masing manaroh sadikit-sadikit barang dalam rumah-nya saperti kain dan makanan dan sa-bagai-nya. Maka kalau orang hendak membeli pergi-lah tanya kapada-nya. Maka masing-masing ada-lah berbinikan perempuan Bali dan Melayu. Maka ada-lah anak-anak mereka itu sakalian saya dengar di-pergunakan-nya bahasa China terlebeh daripada bahasa Melayu. Maka ada-lah pula sa-buah rumah kechil, atap juga, rumah tempat menaroh berhala-nya.[63]
>
> [I found that all the Chinese in Kampong China were Khehs. Their houses were all thatched and each man kept some goods such as foodstuffs in his house. All of them had married Balinese or Malay women and their children preferred to speak Chinese rather than Malay. The Chinese had a small house which they used as a temple.][64]

In the 1840s and 1850s the Chinese began to monopolize the mining of tin at Kuantan, Semantan, Pekan Lama and Lepor,[65] but their numbers decreased over the years due to the heavy taxation policies and continued lawlessness which prevailed till the 1880s. Swettenham, for instance, said that:

> ...if ever they [the Chinese] import from outside, or buy in the interior anything of value, it is removed by some chief who forgets to pay for it.[66]

Thus in 1885, Swettenham estimated the Chinese mining community to be around one hundred,[67] while the general Chinese populace did not exceed two or three hundred.[68] He observed that near Kuala Trusang, about twenty Chinese were engaged in gold mining, at Raub another twenty had worked for Raja Ismail; while at Pekan the Chinese population was around eighty.[69] In 1888 Rodger figured the Chinese community in Pahang to be around 1,500 out of the total population of 35,000.[70] It was only after 1888, with the beginnings of British rule, that there was a great influx of Chinese from the Western Malay states into Pahang.

Besides mining, the Chinese were also engaged in timber extraction in areas which were easily accessible from the coast. They regularly used the Pahang river and Swettenham had also noted a number of small Chinese sugar mills between Pulau Tawar and Temerloh on the left bank of the Pahang river.[71] Furthermore,

many of the Chinese traders had slowly integrated with the Malays and this was especially so in the Tembeling valley.

Apart from the two main groups, the aborigines constituted a small component in Pahang approximating 3,500 in the 1880s. Those who had integrated with the Malays were classified as Orang Sakai Jinak, spoke the Malay language and cultivated hill padi. Maclay the Russian ethnologist wrote that:

> These Orang Sakai Jina generally speak Malay and their children for the most part forget their original language. They visit the huts and the kampongs of the Malays (in small parties with their wives and children) and this is one important reason of the mixture of the two races, the Orang Sakai giving their daughters as wives to the Malays...[72]

The Sakais who inhabited the upper reaches of most of the rivers especially the Jelai and Telom were similar to the Sakais in Selangor, in terms of language and characteristics. The wilder tribes known as Orang Pangan were found along the borders of Kelantan and spoke an entirely different language from that of the original Sakais. They used bows and arrows instead of the usual blowpipes and poisoned darts.[73] The more "civilized" group known as the Senoi was found along Kuala Chenor and Kuala Buntu. J. E. Nathan observed that:

> ...they have been settled at this spot for at least fifteen years and have a number of coconut trees in bearing. One or two of them actually own mosquito nets. They do not tatoo or disfigure themselves in any way and the younger men and women are quite possessive. They do a certain amount of carrying tin ore for the Chinese miners.[74]

The difference among Sakais in various localities in Pahang revolve around their different work habits and peculiar ways. F. W. Douglas differentiated the Kuantan Sakais from those in other areas from the way they made their blowpipes. According to him:

> ...they split a piece of wood bore out the half sections and then bound the two pieces together with rotan and a covering of gutta percha.[75]

Although cultivable land in Pahang was ample, it had not been well developed and the supply of rice was insufficient for local needs. Clifford presumed that the low standard in agriculture was due to the fact that the Pahang Malays were less industrious than their counterparts in Kelantan and Trengganu,[76] while Swettenham had attributed the use of slow and primitive methods which the

Pahang Malays employed as the reason for the low productivity in rice. In Pulau Tawar, for instance, he observed that:

> ...buffaloes were ploughing the slightly undulating plain of dry but not hard soil and more strange to be told that the rice grain is then sown as wheat is in the West, the ground harrowed and no irrigation done whatever, the harvest depending simply on the rain.[77]

Despite the low agricultural output in rice, other crops such as sago, sugar cane, coconuts[78] and gambier[79] were cultivated but, on a small scale. Pahang also produced timber especially in the districts adjoining the Rompin and Kuantan rivers where white teak, ebony and camphor wood were found in small quantities. The main exports of the state were gutta, gharu wood, rattan from the Pahang rivers and edible birds nest from Pulau Tioman,[80] while race and silk sarongs were imported from Kelantan.[81]

Traditionally, the economy of the state was in the hands of the ruling class.[82] Exorbitant prices were levied on goods travelling up the river and even gold had to be sold to the Bendahara at a low price. Clifford in his journal of 1887 mentioned that gold had to be sold at $22 per ounce, whereas in Kuala Lumpur a price of $30—$40 could be fetched.[83] Most of the necessities cost double their price in Pahang. The cost of a pound of Java tobacco, for instance, was known to be around a dollar whilst in Perak it could be obtained at a price of 40—45¢ per pound.[84] In 1885, Swettenham observed that the prices of essential commodities were as follows:[85]

1 tin of kerosene	..	$2.00
tobacco	..	$1.00 a kati
40 bits of gambier	..	0.8¢
6 gantangs of salt	..	$1.00
1 ball of opium	..	$22.00

The highest price for rice was $1.00 for 12 gantangs. Swettenham assumed that the exorbitant prices were a result of the monopolistic structure of the Pahang economy during the pre-colonial days. He added:

> ...holding a monopoly the farmers of course charge any price they like and it is perhaps in consequence of this that the Chinese miners in Pahang are said to number about one hundred and all the Malays wretchedly poor.[86]

Labour was not cheap[87] and due to the severe economic conditions, smuggling became part of the layman's daily life. The main currency used in economic transactions was tin and gold.[88]

However, with the entry of the British administrators in 1888, the socio-economic character of Pahang was to undergo a transformation that would have a major impact on the political fortunes of the native ruling elite, as well as on the living conditions of the masses.

Early History

The earliest reference to Pahang as a political entity could be traced from the Chinese records of the eleventh century where it is stated that the Chinese recognized Pahang as a tributary state of the Srivijayan empire. In 1225 the Chinese writer Chao-Ju-Kua wrote in his chronicle, the *Chu-fan-chi,* that among the several states which owed allegiance to San-fo-tsi was Peng-keng.[89] Similarly, the Chinese claimed that during the Ming dynasty Pahang acknowledged China's supremacy as a major power from whom she sought protection.[90] This was especially seen between the years 1378 and 1416 when the rulers of Pahang, then known as Maharaja Tajau (1378) and Pa-la-mi-so-la-ta-lo-si-ni (1411) being aware of their unstable positions sent envoys to the Chinese Emperor to seek recognition.[91] China's protection was guaranteed with the subsequent visits of Cheng Ho in 1412 and 1416.

On the other hand, the *Nagarakertagama,* written in 1365 by Prapanca, claimed that Pahang was a dependency of the Majapahit empire.[92] On the basis of literary evidence early Pahang could be said to have developed political and economic links[93] with the Srivijayan, Chinese, Majapahit and the Johor-Riau-Lingga empires from the fourteenth till the seventeenth centuries and its ties were largely dictated by its geographical proximity to these states.

The European writers, however, do not place much emphasis on Pahang's political ties with, or dependence on the Srivijayan or Majapahit empires. The Portuguese writer, Godinho de Eredia, for instance, regarded Pahang as the second Malay kingdom in succession to Patani, prior to the founding of the Melakan empire.[94] Other European historians like W. Linehan do not associate Pahang with any empire, but rather consider it as an independent political unit with its capital at Chini or at Pulau Tawar.[95] From various accounts that are available, it cannot be denied that Pahang was important politically either as an independent unit or a vassal — until it was subjugated by the Thais in the fourteenth century.[96] From then on Pahang's history was a chronology of intermittent warfare between "foreign powers" and the Malay rulers of the Malay peninsula. In the fifteenth century, Thai suzerainty was challenged by Melaka,[97]

which emerged as the pre-eminent local power in the Malay peninsula. The refusal of the Melakan ruler, Sultan Mudzaffar Shah (1445/46—56 A.D.)[98] to pay homage to Siam resulted in the latter embarking on a series of land attacks on Melaka.[99] Thai ambitions were soon checked by Sultan Mansur Shah (Sultan Mudzaffar's son) who ascended the Melaka throne in 1456.[100] He defeated the Thais after a successful attack on the Thai vassal state of Pahang.[101] The victory released Pahang temporarily from Thai clutches but had the greater effect of subordinating Pahang to Melakan control. Accordingly, Sultan Mansur Shah appointed the Panglima Perang with the title of Seri Bija di-Raja[102] to rule over Pahang, thus indicating Melaka's dominance over her new vassal.

The *Sejarah Melayu* states that the first Sultan of Pahang from the Melaka line was Sultan Muhammed Shah, the son of Sultan Mansur Shah. Due to a *sepak raga* incident,[103] Muhammed Shah was deprived of his succession to the Melaka throne. He was then exiled to Pahang where he was installed by the Seri Nara di-Raja, the Panglima Bendahara Melaka, as the new ruler of Pahang in 1470. The installation was sanctioned by Sultan Mansur Shah and the new ruler's kingdom extended from Sedili Besar to Trengganu.[104]

Sultan Muhammed Shah's reign (1470—5) in Pahang as well as that of his successor's was interspersed with court intrigues and power struggles. The events during this period are obscure, but from the *Bustan-al-Salatin*, it is known that Sultan Muhammed Shah was succeeded by his brother Raja Ahmad, who took the title of Sultan Ahmad Shah in 1475.[105] Raja Ahmad's eligibility to the Melaka throne was in question; hence the next rightful heir, Raja Husain (Raja Ahmad's half-brother) was crowned as Sultan Alaudin Riayat Shah I (1477—88) of Melaka.[106] Ahmad deeply resented the new appointment and the fraticidal struggle between Pahang and Melaka continued. During this period the Bendahara Seri Amar Di-Raja acted as the right-hand man for Sultan Ahmad.

However, Sultan Ahmad's reign was unsatisfactory. His acts of cruelty[107] created dissension and fear in his subjects and the Bendahara.[108] His unstable position being threatened, he abdicated in favour of his younger son, Mansur,[109] but Mansur's tender age worked against him. Pahang hence came under the leadership of Raja Jamil (son of Muhammed Shah I of Pahang) whom Sultan Mahmud Shah of Melaka had appointed around 1495.[110] Raja Jamil's experience and mature personality overshadowed that of

Mansur's. The reign of Sultan Jamil Shah is significant for Pahang as it ushered in a new policy. A conciliatory relationship between Pahang and Melaka was established. Pahang-Melaka co-operation in defeating the Raja of Ligor in 1500 testified to the mutuality of interests and the cordial relations between the two states.[111] Sultan Jamil's strategy in 1500 was to defend Pahang against further Thai depredations. He was, therefore, forced to seek support from the local power which could prevent him from moving into the Thai orbit — Melaka. The Thais had not forgotten the surprise attack by Melaka in the fifteenth century. The Raja of Ligor was thus instructed by the Thai king to attack Pahang via the Sungei Tembeling and Kelantan,[112] but Sultan Jamil's strategy of forging a defensive alliance with Melaka brought about the failure of Siam's attempts to subdue Pahang. The defeat of the Ligor ruler represented the last of Siam's attempts to invade Pahang.

Unfortunately for Pahang, the Thai defeat did not put an end to foreign political ambitions in the Southern Malay Peninsula. Her quest for local supremacy ended when Melaka fell to the Portuguese in 1511. The Portuguese entry forced Sultan Mahmud and his son Sultan Ahmad of Melaka to flee to Muar and then to Pahang[113] where they were cordially received by Sultan Jamil. As far as Pahang was concerned, its political relationship with the Portuguese was very tenuous.[114] The Portuguese recognized Pahang as a tributary state of Melaka and demanded tribute[115] from its ruler, Sultan Mansur (1512—19) who suceeded Sultan Jamil. To the Portuguese, the payment of tribute did not have the same kind of political significance as it had to the Malay rulers. Rather, they viewed it as a system that guaranteed their economic interests and monopoly of trade in the Straits of Melaka.[116] Sultan Mansur's and his successor Sultan Mahmud's (1519—30)[117] refusal to pay the annual tribute to the Portuguese resulted in open warfare between the two parties. Sultan Mahmud sought the services of the ex-Sultan Mahmud Shah[118] of Melaka who was at Bentan. Together they succeeded in defeating the Portuguese at the Muar river,[119] but it proved only a temporary success. In 1526 the Portuguese retaliated: Bentan fell while the ex-Sultan Mahmud Shah of Melaka retreated to Kampar (in Sumatra) where he died in 1528.[120] He was succeeded by his son Sultan Alaudin Riayat Shah II who established himself as the first ruler of Johor in 1530,[121] which was tantamount to the continuation of the Melaka Sultanate.

The establishment of Sultan Alaudin at Johor was in Pahang's

THE RIAU-LINGGA ARCHIPELAGO

Source: L.Y. Andaya, The Kingdom of Johore 1641 – 1728. Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1975, p. xiii.

interests as its aim, at this point, was to oust the Portuguese from the Malay Peninsula. Its only recourse hence lay in allying with "native powers" namely Johor, and it was in this direction that it turned. After the entry of the Portuguese, there was a transfer of the centre of traditional Malay political hegemony from Melaka to Johor whereby the Johor dynasty could exercise its sanction over succession in Pahang.[122] As such Pahang decided to join forces with Johor to expel the Portuguese. Two attempts were undertaken — in 1547 at Muar and in 1551 at Melaka — but Portuguese superiority in arms and vessels proved to be crucial in the retreat of the combined forces of Pahang and Johor.[123]

The only period when Pahang was known to have established a harmonious relationship with the Portuguese was during the reign of Sultan Abdul Khadir Shah (d. 1590) the tenth ruler of Pahang,[124] but it proved to be only a temporary affair. His successor Raja Ahmad was not interested in continuing the relationship. Being a minor, he abdicated and a distinct change in Pahang's external relations was once again effected with the ascension of Sultan Abdul Ghafur (1591—1614), the last ruler from the Melaka line. His rule witnessed the entry of another Western power into the Malay Peninsula — the Dutch. Ghafur's policy did not differ from that of his predecessors. He tried to overthrow the Portuguese and simultaneously challenged the Dutch presence in the Straits of Melaka. Paradoxically, however, in 1607 Pahang not only had to tolerate the Dutch presence, but, in fact, co-operated with the Dutch[125] to achieve a more permanent objective — the overthrow of Portuguese power in the Malay Peninsula. Sultan Ghafur tried hard to forge a joint alliance with Johor in order to assist the Dutch, but Johor's co-operation was interrupted by a quarrel between the two native rulers.[126] As a result, Johor proclaimed war on Pahang in 1612; Kampong China was attacked and piracy became rampant. Johor's belligerence was finally crushed in 1613 with the intervention of the Raja of Brunei, whose help Sultan Abdul Ghafur had solicited. With the Raja of Brunei's aid, Sultan Abdul Ghafur finally returned to Pahang in 1614.

Brunei's victory over Johor coupled with the rise of another native power, Acheh, contributed to the decline of Johor's power. In June 1613, as part of his imperial policy, Iskandar Muda Mahkota Alam of Acheh attacked Batu Sawar (Johor) and its ruler, Sultan Alaudin Riayat Shah III, was taken captive to Acheh.[127] He was allowed to return to Johor in the middle of 1614, with the promise

that he would aid the Achehnese in their attacks on the Portuguese, while at the same time denying the Dutch the right to reside at Johor. Sultan Alaudin Shah III's promise, however, did not carry any weight. His close affiliation with the Portuguese encouraged him to secure a treaty with them at Melaka in 1615. In return the former appointed Sultan Alaudin's son, Raja Bujang as the new ruler of Pahang, replacing the son of Abdul Ghafur whose name is unknown.[128] Subsequently the Achehnese retaliated owing to the breach of promise and Sultan Alaudin Shah III was once again taken into custody to Acheh where he died in 1617. The Achehnese appointed his half-brother, Raja Abdullah (the Raja Bongsu), as the new Sultan of Johor with the title of Sultan Abdullah Maayat Shah. Meanwhile, Raja Bujang's appointment in Pahang was not acknowledged by the Achehnese, for it was a Portuguese appointment. Acheh thus launched its savage attacks on Pahang which forced Raja Bujang to flee to Pulau Lingga. He was soon joined by Sultan Abdullah Maayat Shah who also had antagonised the Achehnese.[129] The Achehnese continued their attacks on Pulau Lingga and both Sultan Abdullah and Raja Bujang fled to Pulau Tambelan, where the former died in 1623. His death was timely for Raja Bujang, for he was then accepted by the Achehnese as the new ruler of Johor-Pahang. He was crowned as Sultan Abdul Jalil Shah III with his capital at Makam Tauhid. From 1629—35 Pahang's determination to oust the Achehnese could be seen in its distinct shift of policy towards the Dutch and Portuguese. It helped them whenever it was expedient. This was the situation until the rise of Iskandar Thani (a son of the former Sultan Ahmad of Pahang) who succeeded Iskandar Mahkota Alam Shah in 1637. With the appointment of a Pahang prince to the Achehnese throne, a treaty of peace was concluded by the two warring parties at Pulau Bulang in the Riau-Lingga Archipelago in 1637.[130] That year was also significant for Sultan Abdul Jalil Shah III of Johor. Regarding himself as the new ruler of Johor-Pahang, he decided to exert his control over the Johore empire. To be successful, he had, firstly, to challenge Achehnese claims over Pahang. He therefore decided to attack Pahang in 1638. Meanwhile, he aided the Dutch in their attack on the Portuguese at Melaka.[131] Sultan Abdul Jalil's hopes materialized when Melaka fell to the Dutch in 1641.[132] At the same time Acheh abandoned its claim over Pahang.[133] From then on Johor was free from further Achehnese aggrandisement.

With the decline of Acheh, Johor gradually extended its suze-

rainty and influence. It became the overlord of the Riau-Lingga islands — namely Bengkalis, Siak and Kampar. Sultan Abdul Jalil Shah III was recognized as the Sultan of Johor-Pahang, while Raja Bajau (Sultan Abdullah Maayat Shah's son) the regent of Johor, ruled Pahang as the Yam Tuan Muda (1641—76). Pahang thus began to establish trading relations with Jambi in Sumatra but it soon culminated in a domestic crisis[134] which ultimately led the Jambinese to sack Johor in 1673. Sultan Abdul Jalil Shah III fled to Pahang where he died in 1677.[135] Raja Bajau of Pahang also died in 1677 and he was succeeded by his son Raja Ibrahim (1677—85) [136] who chose to establish himself at Riau, because of its strategic position. Meanwhile in Johor, Tun Habib Abdul Majid claimed the title of Bendahara Seri Maharaja.[137]

Raja Ibrahim's rule over Pahang ended in 1685 A.D. because his son, Mahmud, was a minor, the latter's mother became the new ruler. She was guided by her father Tun Abdul Paduka Raja who apparently was not a favourite[138] among his subjects. Under his guidance, the Johor-Pahang empire was politically weak, while the *orang besar,* headed by the Bendahara, exploited the situation to strengthen their own positions. Bendahara Habib Abdul Majid ousted the Paduka Raja from Riau in 1688 and the minor king, Sultan Mahmud Shah II, was removed from Riau and brought to Johor. He was duly recognized as the Sultan of Johor-Pahang,[139] but his rule was not effective. He was known to be a pervert and was murdered in 1699 at Kota Tinggi (Johor). His death marked the end of the Sultans from the Melaka royal family in Johor.

The end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth century witnessed the consolidation of power by the Bendaharas. They were able to undermine even the Sultans' powers. In 1699 when Sultan Mahmud II died, the Bendahara Tun Abdul Jalil[140] became the new Sultan of Johor-Pahang with the title of Sultan Abdul Jalil Riayat Shah IV. His appointment was unanimously supported by the *orang besar* of Johor, for it was in accordance with the Constitution that if the Sultan died without any heirs, the Bendahara as *wakil mutallak,*[141] would succeed to the throne.[142] Bendahara Abdul Jalil's children were upgraded from the rank of Tun to that of Tengku to signify their royal status.[143] His brothers Tun Mahmud became the new Yam Tuan Muda while Tun Mas Jiwa was appointed the Temenggong and later became the Benda hara Seri Maharaja.[144] In 1708, on the advice of the Yam Tuan Muda Tun Mahmud, Sultan Abdul Jalil IV moved his capital from

BENDAHARAS AND TEMENGGONGS OF THE XVIIIth CENTURY



Note — B.S.M = Bendahara Sri Maharaja B.P.R = Bendahara Paduka Raja
B.S.R = Bendahara Siwa Raja I-XII = Bendaharas

Source R. O. Winstedt "A History of Malaya", *J.M.B.R.A.S.* Vol. 13. Part 1. March 1935, p. 150

Panchor to Riau which hence became the new centre of administration and power. He remained there till 1716,[145] when he was forced to return to Panchor (Johor) due to hostility by the Minangkabaus at Riau. Sultan Abdul Jalil's return to Johor did not bring any peace. Between 1717—18, Johor suffered savage attacks from the Minangkabau prince, Raja Kechil, who claimed to be the son of the late Sultan Mahmud Shah II of Johor-Pahang.[146] As a result, Sultan Abdul Jalil IV had to abdicate his throne in 1718 and he was reappointed with the former title of Bendahara by Raja Kechil, while the latter became the new ruler of the Johor-Pahang-Riau empire, with the title of Sultan Abdul Jalil Rahmat Shah,[147] but not for long.

The early eighteenth century marks a new phase in Johor history with the arrival of the famous Bugis brothers.[148] Their presence was favourable to Abdul Jalil IV's interests. He realized that he could get rid of the Minangkabaus only if he could enlist Bugis' support. Accordingly, Raja Sulaiman, the son of Abdul Jalil, signed a treaty with the Bugis, whereby it was agreed that the latter would eject the Minangkabaus from the Johor-Pahang-Riau empire. In return one of the Bugis brothers was to be appointed as the Yam Tuan Muda of Johor. Sultan Abdul Jalil IV gave his consent to the secret convention.[149] Between 1719—22 the Bugis, supported by Raja Sulaiman, invaded Johor and succeeded in driving Raja Kechil from Riau. The victory brought about a change in government. The Bugis installed Raja Sulaiman as the new Sultan of the Johor-Pahang-Riau empire in 1722, while his brother Tun Abbas, became the new Bendahara Seri Maharaja. In accordance with the secret convention, Daing Merewah (also known as the Upu Kelana Jaya Putera) became the new Yam Tuan Muda of Johor[150] and from then on the Bugis dominated Malay politics. Their influence in Pahang and Johor was considerable and from 1760 onwards were the *de facto* rulers.[151]

After the death of Sultan Sulaiman in 1760, his son Raja Ahmad ruled for a year and following his death, was succeeded by a brother who assumed the title of Sultan Mahmud Shah III. But he was a minor, so the Bugis Yam Tuan Muda, Daing Kemboja, became effectively the ruler. As the power behind the throne, the Bugis were supreme in matters of war and peace. This was the situation until 1778 when Raja Haji became the new Yam Tuan Muda. Bugis ascendancy was resented by the Malay nobility who regarded the former's participation in the government as an usurpation of Malay power. They were opposed to the system of indirect rule and to

Bugis domination in the administration of the empire. They saw the Bugis as a threat to their sovereignty (although the latter did not at any time oust the Malay rulers). This sparked off antagonism between the local Malays and the Bugis chiefs. The locals turned to European powers such as the Dutch and the British[152] to remove Raja Haji from Riau. They succeeded to a certain extent when, in 1784, the Dutch captured Kuala Selangor and Riau. Raja Haji was killed at Teluk Ketapang near Melaka. Sultan Ibrahim of Selangor fled to Pahang, while Raja Ali (the son of Daing Kamboja) fled from Riau to Mampawah in Western Borneo.[153] The fall of Riau and Kuala Selangor to the Dutch was significant since it terminated Bugis political domination in the Johor-Pahang-Riau empire. From 1784, the Bugis were banned from Riau. Meanwhile, the Dutch allowed Sultan Mahmud Shah III to reside at Riau, but he was to be under Dutch protection.[154]

Sultan Mahmud Shah III, with the help of Bendahara Tun Abdul Majid,[155] decided to sign a treaty with the Dutch in February 1787 in the hope that they would be restored to their former positions. According to the treaty, Sultan Mahmud Shah would hand over the administration of Riau to the Dutch, while he would be free from the control of the Raja Tua, the Raja Bendahara, the Raja Temenggong and the Raja Indera Bongsu. Furthermore, Chinese trading vessels had to pay taxes to the Dutch and were not allowed any trading rights in Pahang.[156] The treaty was unfavourable to Sultan Mahmud Shah III, for it signified Dutch supremacy in local waters. Bendahara Abdul Majid also realized that Pahang would inevitably fall into Dutch hands. He therefore supported Sultan Mahmud Shah III in his effort to seek aid from the Lanuns[157] of Tempasuk (North Borneo) to defeat the Dutch at Riau. The attack launched in May 1787 was successful. The Dutch fort was captured, while the Dutch Resident David Rhude and his garrison retreated to Melaka. Fearing that the Dutch might retaliate, Sultan Mahmud Shah III shifted his headquarters to Lingga and sought British support,[158] while Bendahara Tun Abdul Majid returned to Pahang.

Sultan Mahmud's absence from Riau did not prove beneficial to the Dutch. They realized that in order for trade to thrive at Riau, Mahmud's presence was needed; hence they decided to persuade him to return. Sultan Mahmud made his demands and emphasized that he would return only if the Dutch gave him full power in Riau and prevented a Bugis restoration for which he was prepared to pay a sum of $60,000.[159] The Dutch agreed to the terms in 1795, but

were not able to implement them since in that year the British occupied Melaka. The British presence at Melaka was largely due to events which had occurred in Europe. In 1795 Revolutionary France occupied the Netherlands, as a result of which the oligarchy of Prince William V of Orange was replaced by the Democrats. The British acted on the authority of the Dutch Stadhouder (who was then in exile in England) to occupy Melaka and other Dutch possessions on the West Coast of Sumatra. This was a war measure to forestall the French from exercising their control over the Dutch colonies in the East Indies. The British Government in return promised that the Dutch colonies would be returned to the Dutch when the political situation in the Netherlands had been restored.[160]

The Dutch transfer of authority to the British seemed to be favourable to Sultan Mahmud Shah III and the Bugis. Riau was returned to the former (although he preferred to remain at Lingga) while the latter were allowed to return to Riau. The Bugis, however ceased to be a major force in the politics of the Johor-Pahang-Riau empire. Sultan Mahmud Shah III appointed Engku Muda Muhammad (a son of Temenggong Abdul Jamal) to safeguard Riau, but he was challenged by Raja Ali who returned to Riau in 1801. Both wanted to exercise their control over Riau,[161] but eventually Engku Muda Muhammed was forced to retreat to Bulang.[162] A conciliation between the two was effected only in 1802 with the intervention of Bendahara Abdul Majid of Pahang.

Meanwhile in Pahang, the period 1801—2 was marked by a power struggle among the four sons of Bendahara Abdul Majid — Tun Abdul Mutalib, Tun Muhammed, Tun Kuris and Tun Da. The court intrigues forced Temenggong Tun Abdul Jamal (a brother of Bendahara Abdul Majid) to murder his nephew, Tun Abdul Mutalib, in 1802.[163] Subsequently Bendahara Abdul Majid too died in the same year and his successor, Tun Muhammed, was apppointed by Sultan Mahmud of Riau-Lingga, but he was drowned during his journey from Riau to Pahang. Thus the Bendaharaship passed to Tun Kuris[164] who was regarded as one of the most cruel Bendahara that ever ruled Pahang.

The growth of the power of the Bendahara in Pahang was visible when Sultan Mahmud Shah of Riau-Lingga appointed Temenggong Abdul Rahman (a son of Daing Kechil) in 1806 as the Temenggong Seri Maharaja to administer Peninsular Johor, Singapore and the islands surrounding it,[165] with his capital at Bulang.[166] The Bendahara continued to hold Pahang as a fief. Tun Ali was the new Ben-

dahara Seri Maharaja in 1806. From here on, one sees the growing independence of the Bendahara and the Temenggong and their nominal allegiance to the Sultan of Riau-Lingga. The year also marked the beginning of the dismemberment of the Johor-Pahang-Riau-Lingga empire. The constant strife among the ruling members of the aristocratic class and the growing influence of the Dutch and the British[167] were factors which led to its eventual disintegration. Sultan Mahmud Shah of Riau-Lingga wanted to maintain a balance of power between the Bendahara[168] of Pahang and the Yam Tuan of Riau, but his strategy failed. He died in 1812 leaving no male heirs by his royal wives, but had two sons Abdul Rahman[169] and Hussein by his commoner wives. At the same time, Raja Ja'afar as the sixth Yam Tuan Muda, took over the administration of Riau and Abdul Rahman was elected the new Sultan.[170] Hussein was away in Pahang when the election took place, but a succession dispute followed[171] and continued until 1822, because the Tengku Putri[172] refused to hand over the sacred regalia which had been kept for Hussein. According to Malay royal custom, the regalia which was the insignia of royalty, was required for the installation of a new ruler. Both Abdul Rahman and Hussein threatened war against each other, the latter seeking the services of Bendahara Ali of Pahang. Ali refused (on the advice of the British) to involve himself in the internal affairs of Riau-Lingga.

The quarrel between the two brothers further complicated matters for Yam Tuan Muda Raja Ja'afar as he found himself at the mercy of the Dutch and British who were at war with each other over the rivalry for trade. In July 1818, Raja Ja'afar received a letter from Stamford Raffles stating that the Dutch had intentions to subjugate Johor and thus it was advisable for the Yam Tuan Muda to seek British aid. In effect Raja Ja'afar signed a treaty with the British (Major Farquhar) in August 1818, granting them freedom of trade throughout the empire, but the situation took a different turn for the British and Raja Ja'afar. In November 1818 the Dutch admiral Wolterbeek signed a treaty with Raja Ja'afar which allowed Riau and Lingga to be free ports but "all other harbours in the Sultan's kingdom were to be free only to Dutch and local vessels".[173] Soon a Dutch garrison occupied Riau and eventually helped Abdul Rahman to seize the regalia from the Tengku Putri. In November 1822 Sultan Abdul Rahman was formally invested with the regalia and installed as the Sultan of Lingga.[174] From thenceforth both Bendahara Ali and the Temenggong Abdul Rahman, acknowledged

Sultan Abdul Rahman as their overlord.

But Temenggong Abdul Rahman was seen to play a decisive role in the partitioning of the Johor-Pahang-Riau-Lingga empire. In January 1819, he permitted Raffles to establish a trading settlement at Singapore. In return he received an annual sum of $3,000 and British protection which was vital to safeguard his position.[175] Raffles had earlier acknowledged Sultan Abdul Rahman as the Sovereign of Johor, Pahang and its dependencies; but since both the sultan and Raja Ja'afar, the Yam Tuan Muda, were under Dutch control, Raffles decided to recognize Hussein as the new Sultan of Johor in February 1819.[176] This recognition marked the beginning of British occupation of Singapore. The British had the right to build a factory at Singapore and Major Farquhar was appointed as the Resident and "all persons are hereby directed to obey Major Farquhar accordingly".[177] Meanwhile Sultan Abdul Rahman's attempts to regain control over Johor were closely watched. By March 1824 the Anglo Dutch Treaty[178] was signed and this further restrained Abdul Rahman from exercising his control in the Malay Peninsula. He was confined to the Riau-Lingga island as a Dutch vassal.[179] As for Sultan Hussein, he had to sign a new treaty with John Crawfurd (Resident of Singapore 1823—6) in August 1824, thereby enabling the British to gain full sovereignty over Singapore.[180] The spheres of influence between the Dutch and British had been defined by the Anglo Dutch Treaty. It further split the Johor-Pahang-Riau-Lingga empire into principalities. The Malay rulers in the respective states thus had to adjust themselves to the new reality.

Bendahara Ali was one of the first few rulers to adjust himself to the new situation and gave Sultan Hussein of Singapore his due recognition. In 1841, Sultan Hussein appointed Temenggong Abdul Rahman's son, Ibrahim, as the new Temenggong of Johor at Teluk Blanga.[181] Ali hence decided to establish his control in Pahang and to exercise independence. As the oldest chieftain of the former Johor-Pahang-Riau-Lingga empire, he decided to maintain peace with his neighbours. His first step lay in effecting a conciliatory relationship with Sultan Muhammed of Lingga[182] by marrying his son Wan Mutahir (whom he had elevated to the position of Engku Muda in 1832)[183] to Tengku Chik (daughter of Sultan Ahmad of Trengganu).[184] To further strengthen his followers' confidence in him, he conferred new titles upon his sons and grandsons. Wan Ismail was given the title of Engku Panglima Raja. His grandsons

(Tun Kuris) was designated the Panglima Perang, while both Wan Aman and Wan Sulaiman became the state ministers. By employing these tactics, Bendahara Ali ensured that no court intrigues would wreck the stability of Pahang. His major chiefs[185] during his rule included the Orang Kaya Indera Maharaja Perba of Jelai, the Orang Kaya Indera Pahlawan of Chenor and the Orang Kaya Indera Shahbandar. With the aid of these officers, Bendahara Ali was able to rule his state peacefully. Pahang then, in comparison with the other states was relatively free from internal disturbances.[186] His popularity with his subjects and his tactful relationship with his household members were factors which enhanced his reputation and position, but this did not last long. In 1856 Bendahara Ali died[187] and his death brought about a civil war between his sons Wan Mutahir and Wan Ahmad which was to divide Pahang into factions. It also saw the rise to power of a new ruler – Wan Ahmad.

The crux of the dissension centred around a will which Bendahara Ali had drafted prior to his death. It stated that his favourite son, Wan Ahmad, would have control over the Kuantan and Endau rivers. Wan Mutahir, on ascending to the throne in 1857, professed ignorance of this clause.[188] Wan Ahmad decided to retalite and Wan Ahmad the opportunity to exercise his rights. Moreover, Wan Mutahir's mother was a concubine, whereas Wan Ahmad's was a legitimate wife of the late Bendahara Ali. Wan Ahmad, therefore, felt that he had a better claim to the throne, basing his argument on his superior legitimacy. At the same time, the political alignments in the Malay Peninsula after 1824 worked in his favour. He was able to gain strong support from the ex-Sultan Mahmud Mudzaffar Shah[189] of Lingga who had been deposed by the Dutch in 1857. The latter had tried to establish himself as the Sultan of Pahang, but these pretensions were not recognized by Wan Mutahir. With a negative response from Wan Mutahir, Mahmud Shah decided to support Wan Ahmad. Furthermore, Wan Ahmad was supported by Sultan Baginda Omar of Trengganu who was a relative of Sultan Mahmud Shah. Sultan Omar's interest during the 1850s was to check the ambitions of Temenggong Ibrahim of Johor.[190] He saw Wan Ahmad as a tool to counteract Ibrahim's rising fortunes. Sultan Mahmud of Lingga was also supported by Siam who intended to install him as the Sultan of Trengganu. This was because Sultan Baginda Omar had refused to do homage in person at Bangkok nor acknowledge Siam's overlordship, except by the customary gift of the Bunga Mas.

His attitude instigated Siam to favour Mahmud as the new ruler of Trengganu.[191] Siam's support for Sultan Mahmud was evidently in Ahmad's interests. On the other hand Temenggong Ibrahim having watched the growing tension in Pahang decided to support Wan Mutahir. He regarded Wan Ahmad as an obstacle to his schemes. At the same time, he was afraid of Wan Mahmud's attempts to assert his claims over Pahang and Johor. Siam's intervention in Pahang shocked Ibrahim who had a great desire to extend his commercial interests to that state. He could emerge as victor if he could support the weak Wan Mutahir.[192]

With strong support from various quarters, Wan Ahmad decided to attack Pahang. In July 1857 he was known to be at Pulau Tekong in Singapore to launch his attack on Pahang, but his plans were foiled by Temenggong Ibrahim who informed the British of the former's moves. Temenggong Ibrahim also wished to prevent Ahmad from proceeding with his plans. However, Temenggong Ibrahim was deterred by the British from intervening in Pahang's internal affairs.[193] He was warned that his intervention would be contrary to the principles of the 1824 Treaty. The British were interested in localizing the dispute and forestalling outside interference. Temenggong Ibrahim thus failed in his attempt to stop Wan Ahmad from embarking on his attack on Pahang. The latter moved to Kemaman in July 1857 and was able to gather men for his army. Sultan Omar of Trengganu issued an order to his *Orang Besar* that they should aid Wan Ahmad,[194] otherwise they would be hanged. The large army enabled Wan Ahmad to launch an attack on Pahang by sea in November, using Kemaman as a base for his operations. The attack known as the War of the Kemaman men[195] saw Wan Ahmad emerge as the victor, for he was able to overrun Kampong China which was under the jurisdiction of Engku Saiyid (brother-in-law of Mutahir). The victory strengthened enthusiasm and he decided to attack Ganchong, Wan Mutahir's headquarters. It fell easily into his hands while Wan Mutahir fled to Chenor. During the first attack which lasted till February 1858, Wan Ahmad's forces comprised Inche Koming, Imam Perang Raja, Inche Endut, Panglima Raja, Inche Talib Panglima Laut, Hitam Pengasoh, Panglima Dalam, Panglima Kakap Bahaman, Panglima Tunggal, Panglima Hitam and Panglima Muda. The Kemaman contingent was led by Saiyid Idrus, Raja Muda and Wan Dagang.

Wan Mutahir, realizing that his position was weak decided to recruit more men. To increase their confidence in him, he conferred

titles[196] on several of his chiefs. He was further supported by the Maharaja Perba To' Jelai and his sons Wan Embong and Wan Muhammed. This combined effort succeeded against Wan Ahmad and his men at Pulau Manis. The latter was forced to retreat to Kemaman. Wan Ahmad's first attempt to gain the Bendaharaship by force failed. It was largely due to the indiscipline of his men who were more interested in their spoils than in consolidating their position.

Despite failure, Wan Ahmad was determined to overthrow Mutahir. In 1858 events in Pahang turned out in his favour. Wan Embong (Maharaja Perba's son) refused to surrender Jelai to the Panglima Raja. This brought about tension between Wan Mutahir and the Maharaja Perba.[197] The Panglima Raja then convinced Bendahara Mutahir that Wan Embong had plotted against him (the Bendahara), who then had Wan Embong killed. The incident was a turning point in the Maharaja Perba's relationship with Wan Mutahir. He decided to support Wan Ahmad to avenge Wan Embong. Meanwhile Wan Embong's death created apprehensions among the people of Jelai. Wan Abdul Rahman, Bendahara Mutahir's second son, began to fine the people of Ulu Jelai, Lipis, Tembeling and Semantan. Those who were unable to pay were branded as debt slaves.[198] The tyranny and injustice that prevailed forced the inhabitants of Pahang to switch their loyalty to Wan Ahmad.

In March 1861 with the support of the Maharaja Perba Wan Idris, Dato Setia Muda Wan Muhammed, Tuan Mandak Imam Perang Raja, Panglima Raja, Panglima Kakap Bahman and Baginda Omar of Trengganu, Wan Ahmad decided to launch his second attack on Pahang after residing at Paka (Trengganu) till April 1861. He committed acts of plunder at Kuantan, carried off the prisoners and later fortified some stockades at Endau, "the country which he claimed under his father's will."[199] Wan Ahmad's activities were relayed to the British by Temenggong Ibrahim. In effect, Wan Ahmad was warned by Governor Cavenagh that if he continued attacking Pahang, he would be expelled. He was told that his grievances would be handled directly by the British. Bendahara Mutahir far favoured British arbitration. Thus on 25 May 1861, he signed an agreement[200] with the British and promised to abide by British rules in settling the dispute with his brother. He also promised a sum as maintenance for the revenue which Wan Ahmad was entitled to. Cavenagh arrived at Endau to mediate with Wan

Ahmad, but the latter had abandoned the stockade and returned to Kemaman. A copy of Wan Mutahir's agreement[201] was sent to Wan Ahmad, but he rejected the offer of a maintenance allowance. He asserted his rights over Endau and Kuantan and expressed his determination "to seize Pahang dead or alive".[202] Due to the overwhelming power of Wan Mutahir and his men, Wan Ahmad was forced to seek refuge in the territory of the Sultan of Trengganu. At this critical point Wan Ahmad was known to have been supported by the ex-Sultan Mahmud of Lingga who was then residing at Trengganu. The British requested Sultan Baginda Omar of Trengganu to persuade Wan Ahmad to leave Kemaman, while a letter was simultaneously sent to the Siamese Government imploring them to remove Sultan Mahmud from Trengganu. With these measures, it was hoped that the disturbances would cease, but a different turn of events prolonged the war in Pahang. Wan Mutahir, by then disillusioned at the outcome of the war decided to hand over the Government to his son Wan Kuris. The latter was supported financially by William Paterson of Singapore. In return Wan Kuris signed an agreement with Paterson on 5 November 1861, whereby the financier was granted a monopoly to mine tin on the Kuantan river.[203]

Wan Ahmad, on the other hand, had gained the support of the Rawa men[204] of the Raub district and the people of Jelai led by Wan Daud and Khatib Rasu who had opposed Mutahir for having killed Wan Embong. They captured To Busu Dollah, the son of the Orang Kaya Temerloh, and took control of Kuala Tembeling in August 1861. They further overran Tebing Tinggi, Kuala Tekai and Tanjung Batu, Kerdai. Wan Mutahir's force was led by Wan Aman. Meanwhile, the Orang Kaya of Lipis who had a strong hatred for the Rawa men backed Wan Mutahir. The Jelai men, however, supported Maharaja Perba and Wan Ahmad whole-heartedly. At this juncture Wan Ahmad and his supporters appeared to have the edge.

Fearing a critical situation whereby Pahang might fall into Wan Ahmad's hands, the Pahang chiefs embarked upon a new plan. They realized that the leadership had to be changed. There was an urgent need to remove Wan Kuris and his brothers from the forefront. Thereupon Haji Hassan, the Orang Kaya of Temerloh, and the Orang Kaya Shahbandar entreated Bendahara Mutahir to remove the leaders, to which the latter agreed. But it was too late. Distrust in their leaders influenced the inland chiefs to defect to Wan Ahmad's side. The Orang Kaya Lipis was won over by the To'

Raja of Jelai. Even the Shahbandar and Orang kaya Temerloh were suspected of having switched loyalty. With his large number of supporters, Wan Ahmad was ready for a wide-scale invasion of Pahang. His plans were temporarily suspended owing to insufficient funds, but this was overcome when he won some money from the sport of cockfighting at Kelantan.[205] He was further replenished with arms and men by Baginda Omar of Trengganu. From Kemaman, Wan Ahmad crossed the border to Ulu Tembeling in August 1862. He was given a tumultous welcome by his Pahang followers under the leadership of the To' Raja, Wan Daud, Panglima Perang, Wan Muhammad, Imam Perang Rasu, Orang Kaya Lipis, Imam Perang Raja and the Panglima Raja.

Sultan Baginda Omar's alliance with Wan Ahmad upset British policy. Despite their warnings, the Sultan continuously aided Wan Ahmad with men and material. He even clamped an embargo on the supply of rice to Pahang. In addition, he still harboured Mahmud, ex-sultan of Lingga, at Trengganu. On 3 November 1862, Governor Cavenagh issued an ultimatum to Sultan Baginda Omar to recall Wan Ahmad and to expel Mahmud from that state. Sultan Omar's refusal to abide by it resulted in the bombardment of Kuala Trengganu in July 1862.[206]

At the same time, Temenggong Abu Bakar of Johor who succeeded his father Temenggong Ibrahim in 1862 was all the more determined to defeat Wan Ahmad. In 1862, to strengthen his position, Wan Kuris of Pahang had signed a treaty with Temenggong Abu Bakar.[207] The latter was obliged to assist Wan Kuris and his successors in their bid to overthrow Wan Ahmad. In January 1862, Temenggong Abu Bakar was given the assurance by Governor Cavenagh that the British Government acknowledged the validity of the treaty. British approval further encouraged Temenggong Abu Bakar to support Wan Mutahir and his party. In August 1862, Temenggong Abu Bakar proclaimed that Pahang had been entrusted to his care and offered a reward of $500 for Wan Ahmad's head.[208] He also entreated Sultan Baginda Omar to discontinue his relations with Wan Ahmad. He was able to recruit Bugis mercenaries to fortify Temerloh. Temenggong Abu Bakar's initiative to strengthen the Pahang forces was not appreciated by the inland chiefs. They were disturbed over Temenggong Abu Bakar's claim over Pahang and the fear encouraged them to ally with Wan Ahmad. Chiefs such as the To' Tunggal of Sa Gumpal and his sons deserted to Wan Ahmad's side. Their lack of confidence in

Mutahir's leadership and their hatred for Temenggong Abu Bakar were factors that induced them to switch their support.

At the beginning of 1863, Wan Ahmad successfully overran Wan Mutahir's positions at Temerloh, Batu Gajah and Chenor. Practically all the Bendahara's men joined forces with Wan Ahmad except for the Orang Kaya Chenor who retreated up the Bera river. With reinforcements coming from Rembau, Wan Ahmad defeated the Johor contingent at Bera and Tenai. The subsequent victories encouraged him to attack Pekan with the asistance of the Imam Perang Raja, Imam Perang Pasu, Panglima Raja, Panglima Kakap Bahaman and Tuan Embong. The town fell easily into the hands of the invaders and Bendahara Mutahir's position at Tenai was endangered. He fled in May 1863 and died at Kuala Sedili along with Kuris. Upon their deaths Wan Aman was nominated by the Shahbandar as the Bendahara designate, but he was a ruler without a country. Pahang had fallen to the powerful Ahmad. He was formally installed as the ruler of Pahang by the chiefs with the title of Bendahara Sewa Raja on 10 June 1863.[209] Thus ended the civil war and Pahang saw the emergence of Bendahara Ahmad as its new ruler.

On his ascension, in order to win his subjects' loyalty, Bendahara Ahmad offered an amnesty[210] to those chiefs who had aided his enemies. For instance, he recalled them and restored their former ranks but with reduced powers. He also rewarded the wealthy Chinese who had rendered him financial assistance by leasing the salt and chandu monopolies of Pahang and the privilege to mint tampang.[211] In October 1863 he informed Governor Cavenagh of his ascension to the throne. As there was a reconciliation between Ahmad and his subjects, the British Government decided to recognize him as the *de facto* ruler of Pahang. With this recognition, it was hoped that peace and harmony would prevail, but the quarrels between Temenggong Abu Bakar and Bendahara Ahmad over the boundary treaty of 1862 continued for a long time. Bendahara Ahmad declined to recognize the validity of Wan Kuris' cession of Pulau Tioman and the surrounding islands to Temenggong Abu Bakar. His refusal to abide by the treaty resulted in frequent seizure of Pahang subjects and confiscation of property by Johor. With Sultan Baginda Omar's persistence, Bendahara Ahmad finally agreed to Harry Ord's arbitration of 1868 in the boundary dispute.[212]

Meanwhile, the ex-Sultan Mahmud of Lingga had influenced Bendahara Ahmad to attack the Dutch and to subjugate Lingga.

Bendahara Ahmad did not entertain the former's request, for he had no desire to meddle in Pahang's external affairs. Bendahara Ahmad's negative answer was to consolidate his position in Pahang and in 1864, with the death of ex-Sultan Mahmud of Lingga, the political complications came to an end. In 1866 Bendahara Ahmad believing that the fratricidal war in Pahang had come to a close was surprised when he learnt that the sons of the late Bendahara Mutahir Wan Aman, Wan Da and Wan Abdul Rahman were planning to overthrow him. The plan failed since both the Orang Kaya Temerloh and the Chenor chief were aware of it. The Orang Kaya's success in checking the plot was appreciated by Bendahara Ahmad who rewarded him by appointing the former's son as a designate to the Temerloh chieftaincy.

The new invaders were not discouraged by the failure. In 1868 Wan Da harrassed Bendahara Ahmad by attacking Raub. He was assisted by his followers such as Saiyid Deraman, Imam Perang Mat Aris and Tuan Kechut.[213] Temenggong Abu Bakar was also suspected of aiding Wan Da, but the latter failed to capture Raub because of the heavy resistance put up by the Rawas. Thereupon, Wan Aman and Wan Da transferred their activities to Klang, where a civil war[214] between Raja Abdullah and Raja Mahdi was in progress. The Pahang subjects initially supported Raja Abdullah, but a quarrel between the two parties forced them to support Raja Mahdi. The latter promised to help them to conquer Pahang, but it was postponed temporarily due to lack of funds.[215] In early 1870 an attempt was made to invade Pahang, but Raja Mahdi's forces were repulsed by Bendahara Ahmad's men led by the Imam Perang Rasu. The struggle dragged on inconclusively for seven months. Meanwhile Wan Aman and his followers retreated to Selangor. Peace once more returned to Pahang and Bendahara Ahmad was strongly supported by his chiefs.

Wan Aman, dissatisfied with Raja Mahdi's efforts to restore him to the throne of Pahang switched sides and supported Tunku Dziaudin (Kudin)[216] who, in 1868, emerged as the new figure in the struggle against Raja Mahdi. In November 1871, Wan Aman was captured by Saiyid Mashur, one of Raja Mahdi's supporters. Wan Da thereafter proceeded to Pahang, made peace with Bendahara Ahmad, and produced a letter from Tunku Dziaudin in which the latter solicited pahang's assistance in the Klang war. Bendahara Ahmad agreed to help, subject to British approval. Wan Da thereupon returned to Klang accompanied by Bendahara Ahmad's chief sec-

retary Muhammed Nor. At Klang, Muhammed Nor received another proposition from Raja Asal (an ally of Raja Mahdi) who implored Bendahara Ahmad for help. In return, he promised to pay a sum of $30,000 and in the event of a victory, a perpetual allowance of $1,000 per month. Muhammed Nor thereby informed Tunku Dziaudin of Raja Asal's offer. Bendahara Ahmad, it appeared, preferred to help Tunku Dziaudin. He wanted to get rid of the Rawa and Mendeling men, who, after being chased into Selangor, continued to use that state as a base to launch further attacks on Pahang. Peace could only be restored if the free-booters were crushed. On the basis of this argument, the British government supported Bendahara Ahmad. He then embarked upon his war programme.

In Selangor, the Rawas and Mendelings attacked Tunku Dziaudin's forces at Kuala Lumpur. The latter urged the Pahang ruler to hasten his attack and further promised Bendahara Ahmad the revenues of the Klang district for the supply of arms and men to be carried out under the supervision of the Lipis and Jelai chiefs. The Pahang forces were sent and on reaching Ulu Klang were split between the Orang Kaya Chenor and Haji Mohammed Nor.[217] They proceeded towards Kuala Lumpur. Another force led by Rasu attacked Ulu Klang. The split among the forces temporarily gave the enemies the upper hand, but they were checked by the Chenor chief's forces. Meanwhile, Raja Mahdi was able to capture Kuala Lumpur, but his victory was shortlived as the Pahang forces were being reinforced at Petaling. Raja Mahdi subsequently fled to Ulu Selangor in March 1873. Kuala Lumpur was finally subjugated by the Pahang forces. After the victory, the Imam Perang Rasu returned triumphantly to Pahang and as a reward for his victories, Ahmad conferred on him the title of Orang Kaya Imam Perang Indera Gajah of Pahang with jurisdiction over Pulau Tawar.[218] The Orang Kaya Semantan remained in charge of Ulu Selangor while the Imam Perang Raja was promoted to the rank of Imam Perang Indera Mahkota.

The Rawas finally submitted to Haji Muhammed Nor. In November 1873, the Klang War came to an end and the Pahang men returned to their homeland. Haji Muhammed Nor was left in charge of Ulu Selangor while the Orang Kaya Semantan controlled Ulu Klang. Tunku Dziaudin further made an arrangement with Bendahara Ahmad to allow Haji Muhammad Nor to collect the revenues of Ulu Selangor.[219] He would then hand it to Bendahara Ahmad,

THE MALAY PENINSULA IN 1988



Source: R.G. Cant, An Historical Geography of Pahang, JMBRAS, Monograph IV, 1973, p. 27

but it was realized that very little reached into the Bendahara's pockets. In 1875 Bendahara Ahmad asked Tunku Dziaudin for $20,000 and a share in the state revenue of Selangor. On consultation with the British at Singapore, Dziaudin agreed to send Bendahara Ahmad a cargo of tin valued at $3,000 and to hand over six baharas of tin until the debt was liquidated.[220] With Frank Swettenham's persuasion, Bendahara Ahmad finally agreed to the terms.[221] During this period British interests in Pahang were quite clearly noticeable. They had already established themselves in Perak, Selangor and Sungei Ujong and now turned their attention to the rest of the Malay states.[222]

After sixteen years of turmoil Bendahara Ahmad was able, eventually, to rule Pahang with confidence. At times his administration was affected by disputes which necessitated British intervention. For example, in August 1874, Temenggong Abu Bakar of Johor complained to Governor Sir Andrew Clarke that one of his headmen Inche Jawa had been murdered by Pahang men at Endau.[223] Bendahara Ahmad still refused to accept the validity of the 1862 Treaty between Johor and Pahang. He, however, agreed to a Commission of Enquiry to be headed by W.H.M. Read. Read, after investigation, found no proof and Pahang was not held responsible for the murder.[224] In July 1875, Sir William Jervois accompanied by Frank Swettenham and Lieutenant McCallum, visited Pahang, where the Governor was cordially received by Bendahara Ahmad and his chiefs. During his conversation with Jervois, Bendahara Ahmad expressed his contentment over the Selangor indemnity. It was then that the *first* British attempt to persuade Bendahara Ahmad to accept a British advisor was made.[225] Jervois also conveyed his desire to develop the natural resources of the state. Bendahara Ahmad, suspicious of British intentions, gave a negative answer — to Jervois' disappointment. Bendahara Ahmad insisted that the matter had to be referred to his chiefs. The British Governor thus failed to establish a footing in Pahang.

CHAPTER I
NOTES

1 R. G. Cant, "A Historical Geography of Pahang", *MBRAS*, Monograph N.4, 1973, p. 9.

2 R. G. Cant, ibid., gives an accurate figure of 13,820 square miles. See also W. Cameron, "Exploration of Pahang — Extract of a letter from W. Cameron to H. E. the Acting Governor, 14 September 1885", *SBRAS*, 15 (1885),

p. 155; W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang," *MBRAS*, XIV, ii (1936), Reprint No. 2, 1973, p. 1.

3 An earlier reference by T. J. Newbold in 1830 states that Pahang lay between the latitudes 2° 15'N to about 4° 15'N. See T. J. Newbold, *Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca*, Vol. I, London, 1839, p. 55. See also "Precis of information concerning the Straits Settlements and Native States of the Malay Peninsula", Great Britain War Office Intelligence Division, London, 1892, p. 156. (Henceforth referred to as *GBWOID*).

4 See P. Wheatley, *The Golden Khersonese*, Kuala Lumpur, 1961, pp. 78—9.

5 G. R. Tibbets, "The Malay Peninsula as known to Arab Geographers", *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography*, Vol. IX (1956), p. 38. The most famous Arab traveller who wrote about Pahang in the year A.D. 943 was Masudi. For this account on Pahang, see P. Wheatley, The Golden Khersonese, p. 228.

6 Godinho de Eredia, "Description of Malacca, Meriodinal India and Cathay" (translated by J. V. Mills), *JMBRAS*, VIII, i (1930), p. 95; see also W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 31.

7 W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 2.

8 See Gedinho de Eredia, "Description of Malacca & c", p. 95. See also Stewart Wavell, *The Naga King's Daughter*, Longon, 1964, p. 13. For a study of the rise and fall of the early Southeast Asian kingdom, see G. Coedes, *The Indianized States of Southeast Asia*, Kuala Lumpur, 1968; G. Coedes, *The Making of Southeast Asia*, London, 1967.

9 *GWBOID*, "Precis of Information & c", p. 156.

10 R. G. Cant, "A Historical G eography of Pahang", p. 9.

11 See Bibliography.

12 R. Braddell, "Further Notes upon a Study of Ancient Times in the Malay Peninsula", *MBRAS*, XV, i (1937), p. 26.

13 *GBWOID*, "Precis of information & c", p. 158.

14 W. B. Roberts, "An Unexplored Corner of Pahang", *SBRAS*, 32 (1899), p. 1.

15 Ibid., see below.

16 F. A. Swettenham, *Footprints in Malaya*, London, 1942, p. 90. The Dutch writer Nieuhoff writing much earlier describes the Pahang as "a very broad river but not navigable by galleys, except at high water". See W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 31.

17 Journal of Clifford's mission to Pahang, 11 April 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 28 April 1887, C.O.273/144, f.522. H.J. Kelsall and H. N. Ridley observed that the bamboo rafts were dismantled and sold at Pekan where a good price was fetched. Bamboo was scarce in the lower reaches of the river. See H. J. Kelsall and H. N. Ridley, "Account of a trip up the Pahang, Tembeling and Tahan rivers and an attempt to reach Gunong Tahan", *JSBRAS*, 25 (1894), p. 55.

18 H. Norman, *The Peoples and Politics of the Far East*, London, 1894, p. 60. See also F. A. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, London, 1908, p. 270.

19 For further details see, W. B. Roberts, "An Unexplored Corner of Pahang", pp. 2—3. He also mentioned that the Jelai met the Tanom river on its right and it was at this position that the To' Raja of Jelai resided.

[20] Although the Tekal and Tembeling rivers commence from the same hill, the latter runs north and then bends west before it finally runs south to join the Tekal. See F. W. Douglas, "Through an unknown corner of Pahang with Hugh Clifford in 1897", *SBRAS*, 85 (1922), pp. 137—8.

[21] W. B. Roberts, "An Unexplored Corner of Pahang", p. 1.

[22] J. T. Thomson referred to the Endau as the last river of importance in Pahang. See J. T. Thomson, "Description of the Eastern coast of Johore and Pahang and adjacent islands", *JIA*, V (1851), p. 84.

[23] The demarcation of states by rivers which was introduced by the British often posed problems in the political relations between Pahang and her neighbours, viz. Johor and Trengganu. For details, see Chapter VI.

[24] See W. Linehan, "Discoveries on the Tembeling", *MBRAS*, VI, iv (1928), p. 76. During the Pahang disturbances in August 1892, the To' Gajah, Mat Kilau and his brothers used the Tembeling to get across to Kelantan. See W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 154.

[25] For details on the Serting and Bera, see H. D. Noone, "The Penarikan and Bernam Land Routes", *MBRAS*, XVII, i (1939), p. 144. See also P. Wheatley, "Panarikan", *JSSS*, X, i (1954), pp. 1—16.

[26] W. Lake, "Journey to the source of the Indau", *SBRAS*, 25 (1894), p. 2. For further details on the river Endau, see D. F. A. Hervey, "The Endau and its tributaries", *SBRAS*, 8 (1881), pp. 93—124.

[27] H. Clifford, "The East Coast", *In Court and Kampong*, London, 1927, p. 11.

[28] F. A. Swettenham during his visit to Pahang in 1885 described the state as a mass of jungle without any roads. See F. A. Swettenham, *Footprints in Malaya*, p. 89.

[29] *GBWOID*, "Precis of Information & c", pp. 157—8.

[30] This is a typical scene in the Malay Peninsula where conglomeration of the population was common along the rivers. See J. M. Gullick, *Indigenous Political systems of Western Malaya*, London (reprinted 1969), pp. 27—8.

[31] Rodger to Colonial Secretary report, 13 October 1888, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 15 Oktober 1888, C.O.273/155, f.69.

[32] Ibid., f.72. However, F. A. Swettenham in comparison to Rodger described the busiest part of Pekan in duller colours. See F. A. Swettenham, "Journal kept during a journey across the Malay Peninsula", *SBRAS*, 15 (1885), p. 31. For details of other travellers' impressions on Pekan, see H. Clifford, *In a Corner of Asia*, London, 1899, p. 14; see also F. W. Douglas, "Through an Unknown Corner of Pahang with Hugh Clifford", p. 139; T. J. Newbold, Political and Statistical Account &c, p. 290.

[33] The old court name for Pahang was Inderapura. The capital of the country had always been referred to as Pura; the 'town' in Malay being Pekan. The people of Endau, Rompin and Bebar described the capital as Pekan Pahang. See W. G. Shellabear (ed.), *Sejarah Melayu*, Singapore, 1961, cerita 13, p. 99; see also W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 2.

[34] From Matelief's account (Portuguese) in 1607, Pekan Lama was known to be "the exclusive abode of the Malay nobility". See S. Durai Rajasingam, "Pekan — Gateway to the Past", *The Malay Mail*, 23 April 1960, n.p. Although Pekan Lama had been the seat of royalty for the Pahang rulers, occasionally the place of residence for the Sultan of Pahang during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was at Pulau Tawar. See H. J. Kelsall

and H. N. Ridley, "An Account of a Trip up the Pahang Tembeling and Tahar Rivers", p. 38. Pekan today is still the royal capital.

35 W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 2; *GBWOID*, "Precis of Information &c", p. 158.

36 S. Durai Raja Singam, "Pekan — Gateway to the Past"; see also *ARP*, 1898, p. 75.

37 For further details, see T. J. Newbold, Political and Statistical Account &c, p. 55.

38 S. Durai Rajasingam, "Bygone Kuantan", *Malayan Historical Journal*, III, i (1956), pp. 21—5.

39 A. M. Skinner, "Geography of the Malay Peninsula", *SBRAS*, 1 (1878), p. 61.

40 J. E. Nathan, "A Journey over the main range from Perak to Pahang", *SBRAS*, 69 (1915), p. 3.

41 Ibid.

42 F. A. Swettenham, "Journal kept during a journey across the Malay Peninsula", p. 7.

43 H. Clifford, "In the days when the land was free", *In Court and Kampong*, p. 225. Words in brackets are mine. Penjum was an important district in the nineteenth century for both the local Malays and the foreigners due to its proximity with the gold mining district of Jelai.

44 Chenor has been described by C. Gray as a large village on the banks of the Pahang river. See C. Gray, "Journal of a route over land from Malacca to Pahang across the Malayan Peninsula", *JIA*, VI (1852), p. 373.

45 W. B. Roberts, "An Unexplored Corner of Pahang", p. 1.

46 For details on why the Chinese were reluctant to settle in Pahang, see F. A. Swettenham, "Journal kept during a journey across the Malay Peninsula", p. 32.

47 P. J. Begbie, *The Malayan Peninsula Embracing the History, Manners and Customs of the Inhabitants' Politics, Natural History from its Earliest Records* (Madras 1834; rep. Kuala Lumpur, 1967), p. 272.

48 T. J. Newbold, Political and Statistical Account &c., p. 55.

49 J. T. Thomson, "Description of the Eastern Coast of Johore &c", p. 138.

50 F. A. Swettenham, "Some account of the independent native states of the Malay Peninsula", *SBRAS*, 6 (1880), p. 199.

51 *ARP*, 1888, p. 2. (Rodger was then the Resident of Pahang — see below).

52 W. B. Roberts, "An Unexplored Corner of Pahang", p. 3.

53 Clifford's estimate in the 1888 Annual Report of Pahang; see *ARP*, 1888, p. 2.

54 R. G. Cant, "A Historical Geography of Pahang", p. 34. J. E. Nathan however observed that at Batu Talam there were extensive padi fields which were worked by the Malays. See J. E. Nathan, "A Journey over the Main Range from Perak to Pahang", p. 3.

55 H. J. Kelsall and H. N. Ridley, "Account of a Trip up the Pahang, Tembeling and Tahan Rivers", p. 55.

56 Ibid.

57 F. A. Swettenham, "Journal kept during a journey across the Malay Peninsula", p. 33. The weaving and making of mats were solely a feminine enterprise.

58 R. G. Cant, "A Historical Geography of Pahang", p. 40.

59 Isaac Teoh, "Pahang mines date back to Bronze Age", *The Malay Mail*, 27 July 1959, n.p.

60 D. D. Daly, "The Metalliferous formation of the Peninsula", *JSBRAS*, 2 (1878), p. 196.

61 Ibid.

62 For details, see J. M. Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems &c. pp. 23—4.

63 Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir Munshi, *Kesah Pelayaran Abdullah*, Singapore, 1961, pp. 13—4. See also Clifford's account in "At the Court of Pelesu", W. R. Roff (ed.), *Stories by Sir Hugh Clifford*, Kuala Lumpur, 1966, pp. 40—4.

64 Translation from a review article entitled "Pahang like an Orchard", *The Malay Mail*, 28 July 1957, n.p.

65 Isaac Teoh, "Pahang Mines Date Back to Bronze Age", n.p.

66 F. A. Swettenham, "Journal kept during a journey across the Malay Peninsula", p. 32. Words in brackets are mine.

67 Ibid., p. 10.

68 Ibid., p. 32.

69 Ibid., pp. 9, 16, 32.

70 *ARP*, 1888, p. 2

71 F. A. Swettenham, "Journal kept during a journey across the Malay Peninsula", p. 24.

72 N. Von Miklulo Maclay, "Ethnological Excursions in the Malay Peninsula, November 1874 to October 1875", *SBRAS*, 2 (1878), p. 212.

73 *GBWOID*, "Precis of Information &c.", p. 159.

74 J. E. Nathan, "A Journey over the Main Range from Perak to Pahang", p. 2.

75 F. W. Douglas, "Through an Unknown Corner of Pahang &c.", p. 136. In the other areas, the Sakais made their blowpipes from bamboo slits. For a study on the aboriginal race of Malaya, see J. Anderson, "Political and commercial considerations relative to the Malayan Peninsula and the British settlements in the Straits of Malacca", *MBRAS*, XXXV, iv (Rep. 1962), appendix 10, pp. xxvii-xlvii. For a further account of Sakai culture, see H. W. Lake and H. J. Kelsall, "A journal on the Semberong river — from Kuala Indau to Batu Pahat", *SBRAS*, 26 (1894), pp. 1015.

76 H. Clifford, "The people of the East Coast", *In Court and Kampong*, p. 17. It is interesting to note that in 1413, when Cheng Ho visited the country, he noted that Pahang was abundant in rice. See P. Wheatley, The Golden Khersonese, p. 90.

77 F. A. Swettenham, "Journal kept during a journey across the Malay Peninsula", p. 21.

78 In Pekan small quantities of copra were produced but the natives preferred to grow coconuts than attempt to grow the coconut for the fruit. H. J. Kelsall and H. N. Ridley, "Account of a Trip up the Pahang, Tembeling and Tahan Rivers", p. 55.

79 It was purely for domestic needs and was the only crop of any commercial value. See R. G. Cant, "A History Geography of Pahang", pp. 36—7. It was usually found on the upper Tembeling district. *ARP*, 1890, p. 92.

80 *GBWOID*, "Precis of Information &c.", p. 158. Pulau Tioman belonged to Pahang. It lay off the coast of Pahang abounding in lofty pinnacles and served as a landing place for pirates. See J. T. Thomson, "Description of the Eastern Coast &c.", pp. 136—8. See also H. Goring Dalton, "A visit to some islands off the east coast of Johore and Pahang", *MBRAS*, VI, iii (1928), p. 79.

81 F. A. Swettenham, "Journal kept during a journey across the Malay Peninsula", p. 11.

82 See Chapter II.

83 Journal of Clifford's mission, 11 April 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, confidential, 28 April 1887, C.O.273/144, ff.469—70; *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887* account for Friday, 4 February 1887; see also D. D. Daly, "The Metalliferous Formation of the Peninsula", p. 196.

84 Ibid.

85 See F. A. Swettenham, "Journal kept during a journey across the Malay Peninsula", p. 10.

86 Ibid.

87 Journal of Clifford's mission, 11 April 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 28 April 1887, C.O.273/144, f.487. He observed that coolies' wages ranged from $14—$16 per month, while tindals received a sum of $25—$30 per month. The transport of goods from Penjum to the mines (3¼ miles) cost around $1 per picul; ibid., f.488.

89 The following weights, measures and rates were used:

1 *Itan tengko* = 4 cents of a dollar
1 *Kaneri* of gold = 2 *Itan tengko* = 8¢
1 *Buso* = 2 *kaneri* = 2 *saja* = 16¢
1 *suku* = 1 *kupang* = 2 *Buso* = 33 1/3¢
3 *kupang* = $1.00
4 *kupang* = 4 *suku* = 1 *mas* = $1.33 1/3¢
16 *Mas* = 1 *Bungkal* = $24

See F. A. Swettenham, "Journal Kept During a Journey &c.", p. 10. The tin ingot money known as *tampang* was used until 1893. For further details, see W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 62. W. Linehan, "Notes on Tampang", *MBRAS*, IX, i (1931), pp. 131—3.

89 P. Wheatley, *The Golden Khersonese*, p. 70. See also W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 5.

90 W. P. Groeneveldt, *Historical Notes on Indonesia and Malaya from Chinese Sources*, Djakarta, 1960, pp. 136—7.

91 K. E. Southwood, "Lake Chini — A Lost Settlement in Pahang", *Malaya in History*, VI, i (1960), p. 27. It was a customary practice among rulers who were uncertain about their positions to seek recognition from the major powers. See also Wang Gungwu, "The opening of relations between China and Malacca 1403—5", J. Bastin & Roolvink (ed.), *Malayan and Indonesian Studies*, Great Britain, 1964, pp. 87—104; Syed Naguib Al-Attas, "Note on the opening of relations between China and Malacca 1403—5", *MBRAS*, XXXVIII, i (1965), pp. 260—4. The term *pala-mi-so-la-ta-lo-si-mi* has been identified as the Chinese term for Parameswara Telok China. There have been speculations as to whether Maharaja Tajau and Parameswara Telok China were the same ruler or whether they were two different rulers living at different

places. For details, see Wang Gungwu, *Opening of Relations between China and Malacca, 1403—5*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1964.

92 P. Wheatley, *The Golden Khersonese*, pp. 301—2.

93 In the fourteenth century the Chinese regarded Pahang to be self sufficient in rice. The state was known to have exported jungle aromatics, camphor, gharuwood and perfume. See R. G. Cant, "A Historical Geography of Pahang", p. 9.

94 Godinho de Eredia, "Report on the Golden Chersonese or Peninsula 1597—1600 (translated by J. V. Mills), *MBRAS*, VIII, i (1930), p. 233. See also W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 7.

95 K. E. Southwood, "Lake Chini & c", p. 24. Chini has some legendary tales connected with it. See ibid., p. 24—30.

96 The Thais with their headquarters at Sukhotai began their expansion into the Malay Peninsula from about 1280. See P. Wheatley, *The Golden Khersonese*, p. 301. For details on how Pahang became a vassal state of the Ligor kingdom, see W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", pp. 9—11. The usage of the term Thai is preferred to "Tai" or "Siamese" in the present work.

97 For further details on its economic and political strength, see M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofsz, *Asian Trade and European Influence*, The Hague, 1962, pp. 35—40. See also C. C. Brown, "Sejarah Melayu or the Malay Annals", *MBRAS*, XXV, ii & iii (1952), pp. 58—9; R. J. Wilkinson, "The Malacca Sultanate", *MBRAS*, XIII, ii (1935), pp. 22—67. P. E. Josselyn de Jong and H. C. A. Wan Wijk, "The Malacca Sultanate", *JSEAH*, I, ii (1960), pp. 23—7.

98 For details about his reign, see R. O. Winstedt, "Malay rulers of Malacca", *Malaya in History*, VII, ii (1962), p. 6. See also R. O. Winstedt, "Sejarah Melayu", *MBRAS*, XVI, iii (1938), pp. 92—3; R. J. Wilkinson, "The Malacca Sultanate", p. 37.

99 G. E. Marrison, "The Siamese wars with Malacca during the reign of Muzaffar Shah", *MBRAS*, XXII, i (1949), pp. 62—3; C. C. Brown, "Sejarah Melayu of the Malay Annals", pp. 64—6; R. O. Winstedt, "Sejarah Melayu", pp. 92—7.

100 R. O. Winstedt, "Malay rulers of Malacca", p. 6.

101 J. Anderson, "Political and commercial considerations relating to the Malay Peninsula and the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca", *MBRAS*, XXXV, iv (rep. 1962), pp. 36—7. See also W. Shellabear (ed.), *Sejarah Melayu*, Singapore, 1961, pp. 99—102. There are various versions with regard to the Melakan attack of Pahang. In the "Sejarah Melayu" edited by R. O. Winstedt, it is stated that Mansur Shah launched his attack on Pahang during his return journey from Majapahit. See R. O. Winstedt, "Sejarah Melayu pp. 98—100. W. Linehan, however, states that the attack occurred during the reign of Mudzaffar Shah in 1454. See W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 12. According to Shellabear, it was carried out after Sultan Mudzaffar's death. Local historians like Haji Buyong Adil tend to support Shellabear's view, because Mansur Shah was aided by Pahang subjects who had earlier on experienced the Thai onslaught in 1445. The Thai records further state that the Thais were defeated by Melaka between the years of 1457 and 1459. It was only with the defeat of the Thais that Puteri Orang Seri, daughter of the Thai ruler, Maharaja Dewa Sura, was brought to Melaka to be married to Mansur Shah. See Haji Buyong Adil, *Sejarah Pahang*, Kuala Lumpur, 1972, p. 30.

102 He was later recalled to Melaka when Sultan Muhammad Shah became

the new Sultan of Pahang. (See below).

103 For details, see R. O. Winstedt, "Sejarah Melayu", Chapter XI.

104 Ibid., pp. 124—5; W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 14.

105 R. O. Winstedt. "The geneology of Malacca's Kings from a copy of the Bustanu Salatin", *JSBRAS*, 81 (1920), p. 44 (henceforth referred to as the "Bustan-al-Salatin").

106 W. Shellabear (ed.), "Sejarah Melayu", p. 171, Chapter 23. See also R. O Winstedt, "Malay rulers of Malacca", p. 6.

107 He ordered one of his *hulubalang*, Seri Akar Raja, to kill Tenali of Trengganu for having paid homage to Sultan Alaudin of Melaka. For further details, see R. O. Winstedt, "Sejarah Melayu", pp. 141—2, cerita XIV.

108 The Bendahara's daughter, Tun Teja, was noted for her beauty, and the new ruler of Melaka Sultan Mahmud (Sultan Alaudin's son) yearned to have her as his wife. With the aid of Hang Nadim, one of the *orang besar* of Melaka, the plot materialized and Tun Teja escaped to Melaka and was married to Sultan Mahmud. For further details see W. Shellabear (ed.), "Sejarah Melayu", cerita 29, pp. 226—33.

109 R.O. Winstedt, "Bustan-al-Salatin", p. 44.

110 Ibid., p. 45; W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 17. He ruled Pahang till the year 1511.

111 R. O. Winstedt, "Sejarah Melayu", Chapter XXI, pp. 180—1; see also J. Anderson, op. cit., p. 24.

112 For further details see R. J. Wilkinson, "The early Sultans of Pahang", *MBRAS*, X, i (1932), p. 51.

113 For a detailed discussion of the peregrinations of the two rulers after a Portuguese conquest of Melaka in 1511, see I.A. MacGregor, "Johor Lama in the Sixteenth Century", *MBRAS*, XXVIII, ii (1955), pp. 48—114. Finally Sultan Mahmud established himself at Bintan and murdered his son. See R. O. Winstedt, "Sejarah Melayu", p. 193.

114 W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", pp. 19—24 and appendix VII, pp. 252—6.

115 W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 19; see also I. A. MacGregor, "Notes on the Portuguese in Malaya", *MBRAS*, XXVIII, ii (1955), p. 36.

116 For a study of later Portuguese interests in the Straits of Malacca, see L. Y. Andaya, *The Kingdom of Johore 1641—1728*, Kuala Lumpur, 1975, pp. 20—8.

117 Both of them were known to be on the side of the Portuguese till 1522.

118 He was also the father-in-law of Sultan Mahmud.

119 R. O. Winstedt, "Bustan-al-Salatin", p. 46.

120 R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", *MBRAS*, X, i (1932), p. 18.

121 It is not known where exactly Sultan Alaudin chose to establish his capital — whether it was at Pasir Raja, Batu Sawar, Makam Tauhid, Pekan Tua or Sayong Pinang. See R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", pp. 15—17. In 1535 he was known to be at Sayong Pinang. See footnote 122.

122 This was especially seen when Sultan Mudzaffar, son of Sultan Mahmud Shah of Pahang went to Sayong Pinang (Johor) in 1535 to be crowned by Sultan Alaudin of Johor.

123 R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", pp. 19—21.

124 On Sultan Mudzaffar's death in 1532, the throne passed to Sultan Zainal Abidin, Sultan Mansur Shah II, then Sultan Abdul Jamal and Sultan Abdul Kadir. For details see R. O. Winstedt, "Bustan-al-Salatin", p. 46. For details

on Melaka-Portuguese relations see Godinho de Eredia, "Description of Malacca & c", p. 234.

125 The Dutch admiral Matelief came to solicit help from the Pahang ruler. He left Pahang in 1607. See W. Linehan, op. cit., p. 30; J. J. Sheehan, "Seventeenth Century visitors to the Malay Peninsula", *MBRAS*, XII, ii (1934), pp. 81—3.

126 In 1612 Sultan Alaudin Shah III of Johor attended the marriage of one of his sons to Abdul Ghafur's daughter in Pahang. During the feast, the Johor ruler desired to take possession of a pearl ring which Abdul Ghafur's son-in-law, the Raja of Brunei, was wearing. The latter refused to part with it. Alaudin was furious and the marriage was called off. For details on Raja Hasan, the Raja of Brunei, see H. R. Hughes Hallet, "A sketch of the history of Brunei", *MBRAS*, XII, ii (1940), p. 31.

127 C. A. Gibson Hill, "Johore Lama and other ancient sites", *MBRAS*, XXVIII, ii (1955), pp. 157—8; C. A. Gibson Hill, "On the alleged death of Sultan Alaudin of Johore in Acheh", MBRAS, XXIX, i (1956), p. 126; R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Malaya", MBRAS, XIII, i (1935), p. 114; R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", p. 34. It is known that Sultan Alaudin escaped to Bintan while the Raja Bongsu was taken as captive to Acheh. Finally, Sultan Alaudin was captured by Iskandar Muda's forces. For details, see C. A. Gibson Hill, "Johore Lama and other ancient sites", pp. 157—8; C. A. Gibson Hill, "On the alleged death of Sultan Alaudin in Acheh", pp. 126—7. For a further and good account on the rise of Achenese power, see D.G.E. Hall, *A History of South-east Asia*, London, 1964, pp. 321—6.

128 C. A. Gibson Hill, "Johore Lama and other ancient sites", pp. 145, 158; R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Malaya", p. 115.

129 C. A. Gibson Hill, "On the alleged death of Sultan Alaudin of Johore in Acheh", p. 134. Abdullah divorced his wie who was the sister of Iskandar Mahkota Alam Shah of Atjeh.

130 R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", p. 39. See also R. O. Winstedt, "The early rulers of Perak, Pahang and Acheh", MBRAS, X, i (1932), p. 38.

131 R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Malaya", p. 37.

132 R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Malaya", p. 117; R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", p. 36. See also MacHobian (trans.), "The siege and capture of Malacca 1640—41", MBRAS, XIV, i (1936), p. 50.

133 After the death of Iskandar Thani, a woman called Taj-al-alam succeeded the Achenese throne. See R. O. Winstedt, "The early rulers of Perak, Pahang and Acheh", p. 39.

134 The Yam-tuan Muda Raja Bajau wished to marry a princess of the pangeran of Jambi, but the marriage was opposed by Sultan Abdul Jalil of Johor. The engagement was dissolved in 1664.

135 R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Malaya", p. 145; C. A. Gibson Hill, "Johore Lama and other ancient sites", p. 159; R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", p. 43.

136 C. A. Gibson Hill, "Johore Lama and Other Ancient Sites", pp. 142, 145, 159; Anon, *Hikayat Pahang*, p. 46; R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", pp. 44—5.

137 Anon, *Hikayat Pahang*, p. 164; R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", p. 46; C. A. Gibson Hill, "Johore Lama and Other Ancient Sites", p. 159; R. O.

Winstedt, "The Bendaharas and Temenggongs", *MBRAS*, X, i (1932), p. 58.

138 R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", p. 47; Anon, *Hikayat Pahang*, p. 164; See also Kalthum Jeran (translated version) *Hikayan Pahang*, Fajar Bakti, Petaling Jaya, 1986, pp. 1—4; C. A. Gibson Hill, "Johore Lama and other ancient sites", p. 45.

139 R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", p. 47. See also L. Y. Andaya, *The Kingdom of Johor*, pp. 182—3.

140 When Bendahara Habib Abdul Majid died, Tun Abdul Jalil was accepted as the new Bendahara Paduka Raja. See R. J. Wilkinson, "Mahmud II and Abdul Jalil III", *MBRAS*, IX, i (1931), p. 29. See also L. Y. Andaya, *The Kingdom of Johor*, Ch. 6.

141 Translated, it means "accredited representatives of the Sultan". They exercised capital punishment and delegated the same authority to their headmen. See W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 53.

142 W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 45. The *Hikayat Pahang* gives a different version. It states that on Sultan Mahmud's death, the Bendahara Abdul Jalil deliberately killed all the Sultan's wives who were pregnant. He thus assumed power as the new Sultan. See Anon, *Hikayat Pahang*, p. 164.

143 W. Linehan, "Royal modes of address in Pahang", *MBRAS*, IV, iii (1926), p. 339.

144 R. G. Wilkinson, "Mahmud II and Abdul Jalil II", pp. 32—3.

145 In 1716 the Bendahara Seri Maharaja Mas Jiwa died and his brother Temenggong Tun Abdullah was appointed as the new Bendahara. He was later succeeded by Tun Abdul Jamal. See R. G. Wilkinson, ibid., p. 32.

146 Joao Tavaras (trans. by D. T. Hughes), "A Portuguese account of Johore", *MBRAS*, XIII, ii (1935), p. 128; C. A. Gibson Hill, "Johore Lama and other ancient sites", pp. 163—4. See also L. Y. Andaya, "Raja Kechil and the Minangkabau conquest of Johore in 1718", *MBRAS*, XLV, ii (1972), pp. 51—75; L. Y. Andaya, *The Kingdom of Johor*, pp. 262—66.

147 Jaoa Tavaras, ibid., pp. 111—39; C. A. Gibson Hill, op. cit., pp. 163—6. Anon, *Hikayat Pahang*, p. 165; R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", p. 55; D. K. Bassett, "European influence in the Malay Peninsula, 1511—1786", *MBRAS*, XXXIII, iii (1960), p. 25. In Pahang, Sultan Abdul Jalil's brother, Tun Jamal, succeeded Tun Abdullah as the Bendahara. For details on the Bendahara's geneaology, see W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", pp. 47—9.

148 By the end of the seventeenth century, the Bugis had begun to establish enclaves in the Malay Peninsula. The famous Bugis brothers were Daing Perani, Daing Menambun, Daing Merewah, Daing Chelak and Daing Kemasi. For further details, see D.G.E. Hall, *A History of Southeast Asia*, pp. 328—9; R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", pp. 51—70; R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Selangor", *MBRAS*, XII, iii (1934), pp. 1—34; R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Malaya", pp. 150—63; L. Y. Andaya, *The Kingdom of Johor*, Ch. X.

149 R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", pp. 55—6. It was also known as the "Atoran Setia Antara Melayu dan Bugis".

150 For further details, see R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", p. 56. Anon, *Hikayat Pahang*, pp. 167—8.

151 Daing Merewah was succeeded by Daing Chelak and later by Daing Kemboja and Raja Haji. See L. Y. Andaya, *The Kingdom of Johor*, Ch. X.

152 The evolution of British and Dutch economic and trading interests in the East

Indies has been well studied and documented. As far as the British were concerned, they tried to evade political commitment with the local chieftains because they wanted to attain their objectives through direct Anglo-Dutch negotiations in Europe. See N. Tarling, *Anglo Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World 1780—1824*, Cambridge, 1962, pp. 11—46 and below.

153 D. K. Bassett, "Anglo Malay relations 1786—1795", *MBRAS*, XXXVIII, ii (1965), p. 184. Bassett states that Raja Ali was Raja Haji's son, but according to the *Tuhfat-al-Nafis*, Raja Ali was the son of Daing Kemboja. See Ali bin Raja Haji Ahmad, Raja Haji, *Tuhfat-al-Nafis* (romanised by Munir Ali), Singapore, 1965. [Jawi version ed., R. O. Winstedt, *MBRAS*, X, ii (1932)], pp. 212—3; see also an annotated translation of Raja Ali Haji ibn Ahmad's *Tuhfat an-Nafis* by Virginia Matheson & Barbara Watson Andaya, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1982, pp. 81, 172, 363; R. O. Sintedt, "A History of Johore", p. 62. Sultan Ibrahim together with the Pahang forces was finally able to expel the Dutch from the Kuala Selangor forts in June 1785.

154 Anon, *Hikayat Pahang*, pp. 169—170; R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", pp. 64—6.

155 Tun Abdul Majid, the son of Tun Abbas was the Bendahara of Pahang in 1770. He succeeded Tun Hassan who was the Bendahara from 1748—70.

156 R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", p. 66.

157 For further details on the Lanuns (Ilanuns) and their roles, see N. Tarling, *Piracy and Politics in the Malay World*, Singapore, 1963, Ch. IV.

158 For further details, see D. K. Bassett, "Anglo Malay Relations 1786—1795", pp. 197—201. See also R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", p. 68.

159 D. K. Bassett, "Anglo-Malay Relations 1786—1795", p. 203.

160 B. H.M. Vlekke, *Nusantara, A History of Indonesia*, The Hague, 1965, pp. 233—7.

161 Raja Ali bin Raja Haji Ahmad, *Tuhfat-al-Nafis*, p. 236. Virginia Matheson & Barbara Watson Andaya (annotated translation), *Tuhfat-al-Nafis*, pp. 177—9.

162 Raja Ali bin Raja Haji Ahmad, *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, p. 245.

163 Tun Abdul Mutalib visited Riau in 1802 and he was entertained by Sultan Mahmud Shah of Riau-Lingga. According to the traditional custom of the Johor-Pahang-Riau-Lingga empire, a Bendahara's son who had been given a warm reception by the Sultan would be proclaimed the regent. At the time when Mutalib visited Riau, his uncle Tun Jamal was also present, but the latter did not get any attention from the Riau ruler. For further details, see R. O. Winstedt, "Abdul Jalil, Sultan of Johore (1699—1719), Abdul Jamal, Temenggong (c. 1750) and Raffles founding of Singapore", *MBRAS*, XI, ii (1933), pp. 163—4.

164 W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang, pp. 54—5.

165 Raja Ali bin Raja Haji Ahmad, *Tuhfat-al-Nafis*, pp. 259—60.

166 He remained at Bulang till 1811 when the British took over Java from the Franco-Dutch. Java then came under the Lieutenant Governorship of Stamford Raffles and the English East India Company. For a study on the events that led to the British control of Java, and the attitudes of Lord Minto and Raffles with regard to this, see B.H.M. Vlekke, *Nusantara;* H.J. Marks, *The First Conquest of Singapore 1819—1824*, The Hague, 1959; Emily Hanh, *Raffles of Singapore — A Biography*, New York, 1946; C. E. Wurtzburg, *Raffles of the Eastern Isles*, London, 1954; Sophia Raffles, *Memoir of the Life*

and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, London, 1930, Vols. I and II. J. Bastin, "Sir Stamford Raffles and John Crawfurd's Ideas of Colonizing the Malay Archipelago", *MBRAS*, XXVI, i (1953). From 1811 onwards, Temenggong Abdul Rahman stationed himself along the Singapore river and from here he exercised his control over the dependencies. He visited Singapore often but did not settle there permanently until 1819. See R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", p. 81. See also C. B. Buckley, *An Anecdotal History of Old Times Singapore 1819—1867*, Rep. Kuala Lumpur, 1965, p. 20.

167 For a study of British and Dutch policies, see N. Tarling, "British policy in the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago 1824—1871", *MBRAS*, XXX, iii (1957); N. Tarling, *Anglo Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World 1780—1824*, Cambridge, 1962; H. J. Marks, *The First Conquest for Singapore 1818—1824*, The Hague, 1959; D. K. Bassett, "Anglo Malay relations 1786—1785", *MBRAS*, XXXVIII, ii (1965).

168 Mahmud Shah III's son, Tungku Hussein was married to Esah, a sister of Bendahara Ali.

169 The other spelling include Abdurrahman, but in the present work the spelling Abdul Rahman is used.

170 R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", p. 77.

171 For further details on the succession dispute, see C. M. Turnbull, *The Straits Settlements 1826—1867*, Kuala Lumpur, 1972, pp. 272—3. See also A. C. Baker, "Anglo-Dutch relations in the East at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century", *SBRAS*, 64 (1913), pp. 50—4.

172 Tunku Putri Hamidah was Sultan Mahmud Shah III's fourth wife and was the daughter of Raja Haji.

173 R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", p. 77.

174 Ibid., p. 84; see also M. C. Sheppard, "A short History of Trengganu", *MBRAS*, XXII, iii (1949), pp. 24—5.

175 Raffles' deeds precipitated a major controversy in Anglo-Dutch relations. See footnote 167; H. J. Marks, *The First Conquest of Singapore & c*, and below.

176 H. J. Marks, *The First Conquest of Singapore & c.*, pp. 39—41; see also L. A. Mills, *British Malaya 1824—1867*, Singapore, 1925, p. 58; T. S. Raffles, "The founding of Singapore", *SBRAS*, 2 (1878), pp. 175—82.

177 C. D. Cowan, "Early Penang and the rise of Singapore 1805—1832", *MBRAS*, XXIII, ii (1950), pp. 89—90.

178 L. A. Mills, *British Malaya 1824—1867*, pp. 71—81. For details on the clauses of the 1824 Treaty see John Bastin and Robin W. Winks (ed.), *Malaysia, Selected Historical Readings*, Kuala Lumpur, 1966, pp. 133—6. See also H. J. Marks, *The First Conquest of Singapore & c.*, pp. 252—62.

179 An attempt to revive the Riau empire was only undertaken in the 1850s when Mahmud Shah IV came into power.

180 L. A. Mills, *British Malaya 1824—1867*, pp. 66—7.

181 C. M. Turnbull, *The Straits Settlements 1826—1867*, p. 275.

182 Sultan Muhammed succeeded his father Abdul Rahman of Lingga who died in 1832. Sultan Muhammed became the second ruler of Riau-Lingga.

183 In 1832 Sultan Muhammed of Lingga appointed his son Raja Mahmud as Tengku Besar. Bendahara Ali also conferred the title of Engku Muda on his son Mutahir.

184 For details on Sultan Ahmad's family see M. C. ff Sheppard, "A Short History of Trengganu", pp. 25—6.

185 For details on this group, see W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", Appendix III, pp. 188—200.

186 W. Linehan, "The Bendaharas of Pahang", *MBRAS*, VI, iii (1926), p. 336.

187 Many historians give various dates as to when Bendahara Ali died. On the controversies, see W. Linehan, "The Chronology of Pahang's Bendaharas", *MBRAS*, XII, ii (1934), p. 70.

188 Secretary, Government of India to Sir C. Wood, 8 December 1862, copy of papers connected with the attack upon Trengganu in November 1862 (hereafter referred to as the *Trengganu Papers 1862), SSR*, India Office, 28 July 1863, p. 1.

189 Mahmud Shah succeeded his father Muhammed Shah in 1841. Being extravagant and dissolute, he did not win Dutch favour. He desired to assert his claims over Pahang and became involved in the internal affairs of that state, thereby contravening Dutch rules and the treaty regulations of 1824. The Dutch deposed him in 1857. See Colonel Cavenagh to Secretary, Government of India, No. 121, 19 July 1861, enclosure in the *Trengganu Papers 1862, SSR*, India Office, 28 July 1863, p. 4.

190 Temenggong Ibrahim was backed by wealthy commercial parties in Singapore. For further details, see C. M. Turnbull, *The Straits Settlements*, pp. 276—90.

191 The British were alarmed over Siam's interference in Pahang and Trengganu, since the political relations with the Northern Malay states had been defined by Burney's Anglo Siamese Treaty of 1826. However arrangements with regard to Trengganu and Kelantan were ambiguous and not clearly defined. Until 1862 Siam did not make any open attacks on the independence of Kelantan and Trengganu, but "tried to gain her ends by intrigue". After 1862 she abandoned this policy in an attempt to seek control over Trengganu and Pahang. The British reacted and Governor Cavenagh who had viewed the 1826 Treaty in a different light was disturbed when Siam began to involve in the political affairs of Pahang and Trengganu. For details on Anglo Siamese relations between 1824—1867, see L. A. Mills, *British malaya 1824—1867*, pp. 128—70.

192 The bond was further strengthened when Mutahir's son, Wan Kuris married Temenggong Ibrahim's daughter.

193 R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", pp. 94—5.

194 M. C. ff Sheppard, "A Short History of Trengganu", p. 31.

195 Ibid., see also W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 68.

196 Ibid., p. 70.

197 Ibid.

198 Ibid., pp. 73—4.

199 Secretary, Governor of India to Sir C. Wood, 8 December 1862, *Trengganu Papers 1862, SSR*, India Office, 28 July 1862, p. 3.

200 ibid., p. 2.

201 According to W. Linehan, Mutahir's promise to grant Ahmad an allowance as compensation for the revenues of Kuantan and Endau *was not* implemented by a written agreement; hence the Governor was unable to prosecute a settlement. See W. Linehan, op. cit., p. 75. According to the *Trengganu Papers 1862*, an agreement was signed, a copy of which was sent to Ahmad. See *Trengganu Papers 1862*, pp. 2—3.

202 *Trengganu Papers 1862*, op. cit., pp. 2—3.

203 For details on the agreement, see Appendix A. See also C. M. Turnbull, "The Origins of British Control in the Malay States before Colonial Rule", in John Bastin and R. Roolvink (ed.), *Malayan and Indonesian Studies*, Great Britain, 1964, p. 176.

204 For further details see Messrs Patterson Simons and Company to Lieutenant Colonal Macpherson, Secretary to Governor of Straits Settlements, 23 October 1862, enclosure in the *Trengganu Papers 1862*, *SSR*, India Office, 28 July 1863, p. 28.

205 W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 82.

206 For details on the attack, see Lieutenant J. M. Protheroe, Deputy Secretary to Government of Straits Settlements to Colonel R. Macpherson, Resident Councillor Singapore, 3 November 1862, enclosure in the *Trengganu Papers 1862*, pp. 32—7; see also C. M. Turnbull, *The Straits Settlements 1826—1867*, p. 295.

207 See Chapter VI.

208 W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", pp. 82—3; see also R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Malaya", p. 227.

209 R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Johore", p. 105.

210 Maharaja Perba Letters, Document 5, enclosure in W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", Appendix 4, p. 213.

211 W. Linehan, "The Bendaharas of Pahang", p. 338.

212 For text of the Treaty of 1868, see Appendix B.

213 R. O. Winstedt, "A History of Malaya", pp. 227—9. *Tampang*, tin ingot money of ancient Malaya, was the currency of Pahang till 1893. In their original form *tampang* were solid slabs of tin, valued at their tin content and were used as media of exchange in pre-Portuguese Malacca. D'Albuquerque suppressed all Malay currency when he conquered Malacca in 1511, but this form of coinage persisted in Pahang and Selangor. For further details, see W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 62.

214 For details on the war, see Khoo Kay Kim, "Origins of British Administration in the Malay States", *MBRAS*, XXIX, i (1966), pp. 55—59; *The Western Malay States 1850—1873: The Effects of Commercial Development on Malay Politics*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1972, pp. 151—158.

215 S. M. Middlebrook, "Yap Ah Loy (1837—1885)", *MBRAS*, XXIV, ii (1951), p. 48.

216 Ibid., p. 68.

217 Ibid., p. 76.

218 W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 97; S. M. Middlebrook, "Yap Ah Loy", p. 81.

219 For further details, see Sir W. J. Jervois to Earl of Carnarvon, 5 June 1875, *Parliamentary Papers*, No. 36.

220 Ibid., see also Anon, *Hikayat Pahang*, cerita 36; *Swettenham Papers*, account for 17 April 1875.

221 W. J. Jervois to Earl of Carnarvon, 5 June 1876, *Parliamentary Papers*, No. 36. See also W. J. Jervois to Earl of Carnarvon, 23 July 1875, *Parliamentary Papers*, No. 5.

222 For details on the background to British intervention in the Malay states, see Khoo Kay Kim, "The Origins of British administration in Malaya", *MBRAS*, XXIX, iii (1966), pp. 52—91. See also J. M. Gullick, *Malaya*, London, 1964, Ch. 3; C. D. Cowan, *Nineteenth Century Malaya: The Origins of Political*

Control, London, 1961; C. N. Parkinson, *British Intervention in Malaya, 1867—1874*, Kuala Lumpur, 1964; W. D. MacIntyre, "Britain's Intervention in Malaya", *JSEAH*, II, iii (1961); and E. Chew, "The reasons for British intervention in Malaya: Review and reconsiderations", *JSEAH*, VI, i (1965).

223 Governor Andrew Clark to Earl of Carnarvon, 16 October 1874, *Parliamentary Papers*, No. 69.

224 C. N. Parkinson, *British Intervention in Malaya 1867—1874*, p. 187.

225 W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 102.

CHAPTER II
THE TRADITIONAL SOCIO-POLITICAL SYSTEM[1]

In 1864, Bendahara Ahmad, after his victory in the civil war "summoned a Council of Chiefs, framed laws and prescribed punishments for crimes such as robbery".[2] The basis for a neo-indigenous system of government was thus laid. This rudimentary system continued to function until 1888 when a "colonial" system of administration under the British was introduced in Pahang.

It can be deduced that Melaka was the source of early Pahang's governmental and social structure since Pahang was once its vassal state.[3] The political framework of Pahang was very similar to that of the Western Malay states. It was based on the Hindu-Islamic concept of a hierarchy of officials below the ruler, with society being divided into a descending order of classes.[4] However, important variations did evolve in Pahang, especially with respect to the role and position of the ruler.

The ruler was generally termed as the Bendahara[5] in recognition of his *de facto* powers in the state. As the title carried implications of kingship, he was "the paramount authority and all power emanated from him".[6] In the other Western Malay states, the ruler was a mere figurehead, and in terms of power was only a district chief and a symbol of the unity of the state;[7] in Pahang, however, the Bendahara signified a "personage [over] whose actions none had control".[8] The reign of Bendahara Ahmad, who was described by Hugh Clifford as "one who was able to rule a turbulent people in such wise that no man in all that lawless state dared think above a whisper without his leave. He so impressed his will upon his subjects that for them his highest words, his merest whim, his hinted desire was law"[9] is a good illustration of this fact. These characteristics were attributed to his impetuous personality which enabled him to consolidate his position and prevented any abuse of his power by his chiefs.[10] Hence he was more domineering than his contemporaries in the Western Malay States. Accordingly, his functions as one above his chiefs were "to exercise the limited powers of a central government, to conduct external relations, to provide the leadership in foreign wars and embody and symbolise the unity and welfare of the state" [11]

Succession to the throne had been hereditary and according to the patrilineal system was vested in members of his household, namely a son or in the absence of a son, a brother. The law of succes-

sion was very similar to the Anglo Saxon system where succession was confined to members of the royal lineage. Their appointments were largely decided by the electors who had far reaching powers accepted by the chiefs and *rakyat.*[12]

The heir's title was the Tengku Besar,[13] but the title Raja Muda[14] or Engku Muda was widely used instead of the former. Agnatic distinction was important for the status of an heir-apparent, but if the case existed whereby the latter was unfit to rule, the title was passed on to another member of the ruling family. This selection was usually at the discretion of the Chiefs in Council.[15]

The Chiefs in Council formed the initial bureaucracy in the traditional government of Bendahara Ahmad. An early reference to this governmental set-up was made by Jervois in 1875 when he visited Pahang.[16] The close relationship between the Bendahara and his Chiefs in Council was an acknowledged feature accepted by the Malays. They observed the fact that "...no ruler however great his kingdom and understanding shall prosper or succeed in doing justice unless he consults with those in authority under him. For rulers are like fire and their ministers are like firewood and fire needs wood to produce a flame".[17] In Pahang, the division of the state offices ranked in multiples of four. In 1885, F.A. Swettenham had illustrated this division among the territorial chiefs in the political structure:[18]

New Creation	(Raja Muda
	(Dato Bendahara
	(Dato Temenggong
Orang Besar Empat	(Toh Bandar
(Class I)	(Toh Kaya Cheno[r]
	(Toh Kaya Temerloh
	(Maharaja Perba
Orang Kaya di-lapan	(Toh Muda Tunggal
(Class II)	(Toh Jabe
	(Toh Bangan
	(Toh Omar
	(Toh Penggawa
	(Toh Lela
	(Orang Kaya Lipis
	(Orang Kaya Jelai

Despite the hierarchy in the governmental structure, the government was not entirely despotic. In practice the structure represented a diffused decentralized delegation of authority.

In theory the Orang Besar Berempat,[19] as the Chiefs in Council, had the privilege of discussing important matters of state with the ruler. Unlike the major chiefs of Kedah, these chiefs were of royal descent.[20] They had hereditary titles and the powers of appointing subordinates as headmen to their following. They were the Orang Kaya Indera Shahbandar, the Orang Kaya Indera Maharaja Perba (To' Raja) of Jelai, Orang Kaya Indera Segera of Temerloh and the Orang Kaya Indera Pahlawan of Chenor. The areas which they controlled were demarcated by the rivers in those areas. For example, the Maharaja Perba of Jelai's boundaries extended from "Kuala Jelai up to the end of its source together with all the tributaries of the Sungei Jelai on its left and right (on both banks) upstead to its source as far as the waters trickling into the water (as far as the terminus)".[21] The Orang Kaya Indera Segera of Temerloh exercised his control from the river Triang to the boundaries of the Rembau and Selangor, while the Orang Kaya Indera Pahlawan of Chenor had jurisdiction over the areas of the Bera and Kuala Luit. Similarly, the Orang Kaya Indera Shahbandar controlled the areas between the Luit and Bebar. The four Chiefs wielded considerable power as representatives of the Bendahara. The delegation of powers by the ruler enabled them to have a hand in the functioning of the government machinery. They performed legislative duties and also played an important role in the installation of the Bendahara. Constitutionally, the Bendahara's authority rested upon the Orang Besar Berempat and the lesser Chiefs.

Next in rank came the Orang Besar Berlapan or the Secondary Chiefs. They had hereditary titles and their powers varied in proportion to the distance from the capital of Pekan. In the more remote areas, for instance, they were treated with semi royal honours. As an illustration, this feature was particularly marked in the district of Ulu Pahang, where the Orang Kaya Semantan gained the respect of the Malays dwelling there. He was duly treated as an overlord.[22]

Theoretically, both the chiefs of the first and second classes had similar powers as entrusted to them by the Bendahara. They had the right to enforce sanctions on other minor chiefs. They were not as powerful as the Orang Besar Berlapan in Perak, since many of them did not have long established tradition of rule. Therefore, in Pahang their powers were only nominal. This was partly because Bendahara Ahmad, after the civil war, bypassed the traditional divisions of chiefs in the political system. He elevated the positions and status of

several men who had rendered him their services during the war and who, henceforth, came to be regarded as more powerful than their counterparts. Their new positions were soon recognized and new titles conferred upon them. Wan Daud was granted the Lipis district. At Chenor the To' Kaya Chenor was hailed as the Orang Kaya Indera Pahlawan, while a son of Mutahir was designated as successor to the Temerloh chieftain. The Shahbandar was similarly elevated to the title of Imam Perang Rasu.[23]

Of all the chiefs, the Maharaja Perba was classified as the most important. The title was conferred on Wan Muhammed by Bendahara Ahmad and he had control over the Jelai district in 1884.[24]

In the Council of Eight on the other hand, only two chiefs, the Orang Kaya Setia Wangsa of Lipis, whose title dated back as far as the eighteenth century, and the Orang Kaya Setia Perkasa Pahlawan of Semantan were predominant and they ranked as equal to the chiefs in the Council of Four.

The third group of important vassals who exercised wide territorial powers were those who held the title of Orang Besar Raja. Usually a Court favourite and of non-aristocratic birth, they would have been elevated due to their efficiency or military skill. In this category were placed the To' Gajah and Tuan Sheikh Kechil. To' Gajah[25] had been described by Clifford as "...an exceedingly powerful man and though he has risen from a mere *ra'ayat* he has a great deal of influence, is very much feared by his people and was the Sultan's right hand man in all matters connected with Ulu Pahang, that is to say all that position of the country which lies up the river from Pulau Tawar."[26] Similarly, Tuan Sheikh Kechil, who professed to be the Raja Mentri's had often acted as the To' Kaya of Lipis and thereby enjoyed the revenues of that district.[27] Kinship, therefore, did not constitute a criterion for members to be admitted into Pahang's traditional bureaucracy, although it subsequently became a factor in the other Malay states.

As a necessary adjunct to political authority and power, the chiefs were issued the *surat kuasa*[28] or letter of authority, in which their rights, powers and duties were clearly stated. It was a symbol of prestige and authority. For instance, on his return to Pahang in 1887, the Engku Muda Wan Mansur, insisted that he get a letter of authority from the Sultan, as he feared that otherwise, he would not earn the respect of his counterparts or the subjects.[29] Similarly the districts under a chief's control were also nominated to indicate his

rights over them. Thus, to name a few chiefs dwelling in the upper country, the Orang Kaya controlled Lipis; Maharaja Perba the Jelai district; To' Gajah the Pulau Tawar area and To';' Bahaman the Semantan district. In Lipat Kadjang on the other hand, To' Muda Dollah complained that no boundaries were defined in his *surat kuasa*.[30]

Besides complaints, frequent clashes also occurred among chiefs over the absence of their districts in their *surat kuasa*. Such quarrels would inevitably lead one chieftain to assert his autonomy from the other, as seen in the case of Tuan Saiyid Ali who disputed with Tuan Chik over the question of the boundaries of their respective districts.[31] Besides these purposes, the *surat kuasa* was also utilized as a tool in the declaration of wars among the territorial chiefs,[32] but the *kuasa* was deemed invalid when the chief to whom it had been issued died.

Also of importance was the *titah* or chop which carried the same authority as the *surat kuasa*. It was delegated by the ruler to his chiefs as an authority to sanction orders or transfers, or to gain, the respect of the *rakyat* class. A proclamation in 1889 by Sultan Ahmad issuing a *titah* to his son Mahmud, thereby transferring his own authority to the new regent,[33] provided early evidence of such a transfer of power.

With authority sanctioned by the ruler and with the above instruments, these chiefs of rank could carry out their political activities in the localized areas and have them accepted as a customary regulation. W. Linehan describes this custom in the Lipis district:

> ...the Honourable Dato Bendahara Sewa Raja confers upon Wan Daud ibni Wan Pahang the title of Maharaja Setia Raja with jurisdiction over the river Lipis... And upon his representative of Teh... We confer the title of Orang Kaya Setia Lela. Now all the people in the Lipis must observe and obey the instructions of the two chiefs... Whosoever refuses to observe and obey the instructions of those two chiefs shall be guilty of treason towards His Highness the Sultan and an offence against Us, and We shall inflict the severest punishment upon them: confiscation, or, in the case of resistance, death.[34]

The next office in the political hierarchy was held by the minor headmen known as the Orang Enam Belas. They were subordinate headmen to the principal chiefs and were generally called *To' Muda* or *Ketuan*.[35] They were entrusted with looking into affairs pertaining to a village. Usually appointed by the major chiefs, their offices

were not hereditary. The most important chief in this category was the Dato Panghulu of Kuala Pahang.[36]

At the lowest level, official duties were undertaken by the *Penghulu* who was appointed as head of the *mukim* or *kampung*, which constituted the smallest territorial unit in the administration.[37] Although their duties did not differ from those of the *Ketuan*, they were considered to be the key links between the chiefs and the villagers. They were also considered to be impeccable embodiments of tradition and religion. Having been appointed by the Bendahara, they owed him full allegiance although they were under the nominal control of the major chiefs.[38]

Apart from the chiefs, another group which had a direct influence on the government was the Syed clan. Being descendants of the Prophet, they were held in high esteem by the commoners. They were addressed as nobles, with the honorific titles of *tengku*, and they had the privilege of marrying into the aristocratic class.[39] From this group rose two prominent personalities, Tuan Itam and Ungku Andak. Ungku Andak in comparison to Tuan Itam wielded considerably greater power over the *rakyat*, but did not exert any influence at the Court level.[40]

It is clear that the political set up and the political relations between the chiefs were similar to those of European nation states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as observed by Clifford. Apart from the "feudal" system he mentioned that there the relationship between the chiefs and the subjects ran a close parallel to that between members of an old Scottish clan.[41] Both F. A. Swettenham[42] and Hugh Clifford[43] noted that the *rakyat* obeyed their chiefs and were prepared to accept severe punishments inflicted by them.[44]

The chiefs were, therefore, regarded as omnipotent in their respective districts. They became a power group in their own right[45] but their loyalty to the Bendahara was absolute to the extent that none would dare speak against his authority in public.[46] The strength of one chief vis-a-vis another depended on his ability to gather a large following, as this signified power. In order to exercise his privileges he had a large retinue in the form of slaves. Every important chief had his quota of slaves to indicate his power. Desertion by slaves was strictly prohibited.[47] Slaves were often divided into classes, such as *orang berutang*, debt bondsmen or *abdi*, but the two important classes in Pahang were debt slaves or *anak emas* and the ordinary slaves or *abdi*.[48] While there was

no difference in the nature of work which the two classes performed for their masters, the debt slaves were less degraded in the eyes of society, because they were able to redeem themselves by paying off their debts. This, however, was not possible in the case of the ordinary slaves.

The Perak system was very much similar to that of Pahang. Although in the former, the two classes which comprised the institution of slavery were the *abdi* and *orang berutang*,[49] the functions of the slaves were, nevertheless, similar in both states. They were often at the mercy of the chiefs. They often contended with the drudgery of agricultural labour and other household work. In contrast, H. Clifford commented that "there was no special hardship in this bondage as the children grew up as dependents on the sons of the house and were fed and clothed by their masters".[50] It was, however, undoubtedly true that the slaves and their descendants were often confined to perpetual slavery under the traditional system of human bondage,[51] which was greatly abhorred.

Wealth was measured not only in terms of the number of slaves, but also in the form of money. This became a common ingredient for the basis of power, since it provided the means to attract a following. Similarly, the Bendahara's power and wealth were reflected in his followers, which consisted of the *Budak Raja* "a lawless rabble of male followers".[52] Being favourites of the royal household, they had an apparent sense of exclusiveness which they achieved in several ways. The ability to purchase royal honours enabled them to escape court penalties with impunities.[53] These members, then, stood as a group apart from the rest of the society. They terrorized the peasantry in a trivial way. The power of life and death which the chief and his followers wielded over members of his household and peasantry is depicted by Clifford in his short stories.[54]

Although the various chiefs, whether in the country surrounding the capital, or in the upper country, competed for prestige and political influence, they united as part of a larger political system for certain activities, especially in affairs affecting the state.[55] Their proceedings in the workings of a central government were acknowledged by convention.[56]

For the day to day business of the government machinery, the Bendahara used a small group of advisers on whom he leaned heavily, instead of having all the chiefs working with him. They comprised the Imam Perang To' Gajah, Orang Kaya Bakti, Tuan

Itam and Haji Muhammed Nor. They formed the nucleus of the Sultan's Council, although they were not recognized constitutionally. However, they exerted their personal influence and power over the Bendahara[57] and relieved him from the mundane affairs of the state. According to Pahang custom, the advisors should have comprised his younger brother, the Engku Muda, his cousin Che Wan Ngah and his nephew Che Wan Mahmud. They were however left out, due to jealousy that existed between them and the Bendahara.[58] Of the Council of Four (comprising chiefs from the first class) only three members were consulted, namely the To' Bandar,[59] To' Kaya Chenor and the To' Raja of Jelai. These chiefs were usually consulted to determine matters of importance. The other territorial chiefs were ignored and in due course began to show their dissatisfaction and disillusionment.

Being men of non-aristocratic birth, these advisors had determined the legislation of policies. The Orang Kaya Bakti for instance, was a Tamil[60] who was appointed Chief Financial Officer, and who regulated the labour force throughout the district around Pekan. He was given the task of collecting the taxes which should be handed over to the Bendahara. In reality, however, he managed to replenish his own coffers by taxing the subjects doubly. He thus enjoyed a revenue of 2—40% of the total sum of $50,000 which was collected annually. Similarly, Tuan Itam was the Bendahara's secretary. Being illiterate, the Bendahara was heavily dependent upon him, and did not realize effects which this dependence was to bring about. Yet, Tuan Itam was a favourite.[61] By contrast, Haji Muhammad Nor was the only native of Pahang and the only one equipped with a knowledge of European affairs, but his vaulting ambition often inspired him to seek affluence, and he began henceforth to gain the upper hand in the dealings with concessionaires during the later decades of the nineteenth century. He stood to gain personally from these concession mongers[62] and he was supported by the Bendahara in all his deeds.

Bendahara Ahmad was hence seen to be under the guidance of advisers who owed him political loyalty, but who largely manoeuvred the functioning of the bureaucracy in accordance with their own whims. The only restraint which the Bendahara could impose on them was that of *droit du seigneur* which was the Raja's unquestioned prerogative since time immemorial, and which the others did not have access to. It was the right to compel all women in the village to pass through his harem.[63]

Political power, then, was ultimately resident in a central government comprising the Bendahara and his chiefs; in practice, however, the decision making power lay in the hands of his chief advisers. They were even superior to the Bendahara and the Raja Muda and it was noted by Hugh Clifford in 1887 that "in the consultation that continued, neither the Temenggong nor the Raja Muda would in all probability be asked even to give their opinion in matters".[64] Although the Bendahara imposed the laws, he was only able to sanction them with the consent of his officials.[65] The only areas in which these chiefs of rank displayed their functions and were on par with the Bendahara were in internal matters of government, namely in the collection of revenue and in judicial matters.

Political power, in due course, came to be largely determined by the extent to which revenue was procured. It became a key factor in the political set up and it was in this sphere that the various chiefs competed to exact their rights and thereby gain economically. The greater part of the revenues of the state were collected as import duties on goods entering by way of the royal capital, at Pekan, situated at the mouth of the Pahang river. The rivers being the life-blood of trade, all duties imposed were a royal right. The taxes imposed on boats passing along the rivers helped to augment the income of the territorial chiefs who controlled the various districts.[66]

It was a state right for the Bendahara, being an autocratic ruler, to have an access to a larger share of the revenue than his chiefs, whom he had raised to a higher status in the political hierarchy. Yet, the Bendahara's revenue at the end of 1888 only amounted to $3,000 per month, while that of his advisors, namely the Orang Kaya Bakti, the To' Gajah and Tuan Itam, was slightly more.[67] This situation came about because it was possible as they had undefined privileges in the levying of tolls on goods exported through or from their districts.

The imposition of duties and taxes on necessities such as onions, needles, thread and tobacco formed another aspect of the revenue collection. Monopolies were also granted to farmers by the Bendahara on articles such as tobacco, salt, oil and opium. In return, the farmers had to pay a monthly amount to the Bendahara for having had the sole right to sell these articles.[68]

For the Bendahara then, wealth was derived from the royal rights which he had over the monopoly system.[69] In the 1889 Annual Report of Pahang, it was stated that both gambier and spirit formed

the main items of revenue and reaps from these farms were sold by the Bendahara in 1886 for a period of six years at a nominal rent of $250 monthly.[70]

Another source of revenue which was of interest to the ruling classes was taxation. This took the form of *banci*, which was a royal right when a tax of one *anna* was paid by every circumcized male Malay or adult Chinese in the state. Respective *banci* were also collected by the territorial chiefs. For example, the *hasil banci To Kaya* was a similar tax levied by To Kaya of Lipis on every circumcized male at a rate of one dollar per head.[71] It was mainly collected when the Orang Kaya had to go to Pekan to pay homage or when he was in debt.

In addition to these, there was the *kerah* system run by the chiefs. This was a system whereby labour needs that could not be provided within the household were met by means of forced labour. The victims were generally male, and in return for food and clothings, performed their services without being paid.[72] A milder form was the *serah* tax from which the chiefs stood to gain and which was disliked by those who had to pay.[73] The above systems were often brought to the attention of the British Colonial Office in the later decades and contemporary European observers of the nineteenth century were critical of these systems.

Taxes were not exacted only from the peasant class.[74] The granting of concessions to outsiders, namely to foreigners, helped to improve the financial status of both the Bendahara and the major chiefs. The Bendahara, for instance, stood to gain from the issue of *kuasa* and *titah*, either pertaining to concessionaires or to minor chieftains.[75] The chief advisers also looked upon these concessionaires as a means of enriching themselves. The Kuantan Company, for example, had to pay a sum of $20,000 to the Bendahara for an extension of its lease. Similarly, Hae Sing, a concessioner, paid $10,000 to To' Gajah to gain a footing in Pahang.[76] The only threat used was the cancellation of the concessions if the payments were evaded.[77] Often the advisers could be bribed without the knowledge of the Bendahara.

The above-mentioned methods were some of the sources from which the Bendahara and his chiefs earned their revenue. The other outlet which appeared to be lucrative was in the administration of justice, as seen in the enforcement of the traditional *kanun*, which being a legitimate source of revenue bound anyone with a fine or not less than two ounces of gold.[78] Murderers were also fined from a

range of $50 to as much as $300 depending on the type of offences committed.[79]

Besides the duties of land administration, the chiefs and the Bendahara exercised their powers in the administration of justice, which formed another aspect of the government machinery. Since no court of justice existed, the customary *kanun* was accepted. The procedures were largely determined by the chiefs in Council (of the first and second classes) who also conducted important matters of state. The *kanun* was therefore considered to be the code of law which existed in Pahang during the pre-colonial era. It also contained provisions which laid down the scale of fees for the restoration of absconding slaves found at various places in the state.[80] Since there was no method of checking the abuses or excesses of an office holder, sentences were normally passed according to the chief's discretion without any discerning inquiries being made. Assassination was the usual procedure by which administrative and financial questions were dealt with.[81] The whole judicial system was corrupt and was generally used as a means to squeeze revenue from the *rakyat*.

The justice, that existed within the state was a mere mockery, the decisions made depending merely on the relative wealth or influence of the litigants.[82] Clifford, during his visit in 1887 made two observations at two different levels of the state. In cases of disputes among the subjects, if one of the parties concerned was a favourite of either the *Raja* or his advisers, he had only to state his side of the case to His Highness and without any inquiries being made, sentence was passed on the party complained against. At the other end of the scale, i.e. at the Court level, Clifford observed that justice was a mere farce. An incident occurred in which Tengku Mahmud, the Bendahara's eldest son, killed a boy in the street because he had mislaid his top. The prince was not reprimanded for his act, and the Bendahara even stated that a man could never be a real *Raja* until he had killed a man or two.[83]

The Bendahara's power was only seen in his judgment over trials of cases, although this judgment was not usually adhered to. The chiefs in the remote areas formally exercised their unlimited jurisdictional powers in the absence of the Bendahara, both in civil and criminal cases.[84] Punishment was also exercised against powerful vassals, although the manner in which it was implemented was different from the systems used in the other Malay states. In Pekan, for instance, when any vassal attempted to rise against the Bendahara,

he was usually deprived of the right to speak in public and the accused "was declined to leave Pekan".[85] The procedures employed were galling and humiliating, leaving the prisoners in isolation. Punishment was not just confined to murders and thefts. Elopement was also considered a serious crime and was subject to punishment.[86] In addition, the prison conditions and gaol systems were disgusting. One crude method of punishment was to place the prisoners in stocks and starve them. The unhealthy environment in which the prisoners were kept often led to them being afflicted with diseases.[87]

The administrative system of Bendahara Ahmad coupled with the social conditions prevailing at that time were soon to trigger off dissension between members of the ruling class and the peasantry. The Bendahara's bias towards appointing his favourites as his chief advisers and the benefits which they derived from exercising their privileges of carrying out revenue collection and administrative duties, brought about rivalry among the various chiefs.

The 1880s, then, witnessed a breakdown in the traditional pattern of government. The very chiefs from whom Bendahara Ahmad had sought help and advice were now showing antagonistic feelings towards him. Ahmad's favouritism towards one faction was the genesis of internal feuds directed against the Ruler. This finally paved the way for Ahmad to "seek" foreign intervention, at the instigation of *his* advisers, to resolve these domestic problems. It is to this then that attention must now be directed.

CHAPTER II
NOTES

1 An understanding of the traditional political system and administration is necessary as a prelude to understanding the origins of internal and external developments which occurred during the later decades of the nineteenth century. The dynamics of this system itself formed the basis of conflict between the ruler and the various chiefs. This is discussed in the following chapter. Owing to a paucity of source materials for the period prior to 1880, the study of the traditional socio-political system is based primarily on source materials of the 1880s and 1890s. See also Chapter I.

2 W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", *MBRAS*, XIV, ii (1936), p. 90.

3 For further details see "Early History", Chapter I.

4 For an elaborate study on this see J. M. Gullick, *Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya*, London, Rep. 1969, pp. 21—2 and Chapter IV.

5 After the civil war of 1857—63, Bendahara Ahmad took the title of Dato Bendahara Sewa Raja. In 1881 he assumed the title of Sultan, although it was not recognized by the British till 1887. See J. de Silva, "British relations with Pahang

1884—1895", *MBRAS*, XXXV, i (1972), p. 1.

6 Hugh Clifford, "The East Coast", *In Court and Kampong*, London, 1927, p. 4.

7 J. M. Gullick, *Indigenous Political Systems*, pp. 44, 95.

8 T. J. Newbold, *Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca*, Vol. II, London, 1839, p. 312. It is to be noted that although Newbold was writing at a much earlier period, this idea continued to exist in the minds of the Malay subjects throughout the Malay Peninsula until modern times the institution of kingship was sacrosanct. This ideal conditioned the relationship between the ruler and his subjects. For further details see C. C. Brown, "Sejarah Melayu or Malay Annals", *MBRAS*, XXV, ii & iii (1952), pp. 26—7.

9 Hugh Clifford, *Bushwhacking and Other Asiatic Tales and Memories*, London, 1929, pp. 202—3. In his correspondence to the Colonial Office, Clifford also described Bendahara Ahmad as "an autocratic ruler, an absolute monarch, whose wish is law, whose power over his subjects is absolute". See Clifford to Colonial Secretary, report, 1 October 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 15 October 1887, C.O.273/148, ff. 227—8.

10 Dr. Eunice Thio mentions other factors such as Bendahara Ahmad's policy in elevating his favourites to higher positions which enabled him to safeguard his supremacy over his chiefs. Furthermore, the power relationships between Ahmad and his chiefs were not upset, as in the case of the West Malay States, by the development of tin mining. See E. Thio, *British Policy in the Malay Peninsula 1880—1910*, Vol. I, Kuala Lumpur, 1969, pp. 62—3.

11 J. M. Gullick, *Indigenous Political Systems*, pp. 21, 44—51. These functions were similar to the rulers in the other Malay states. This view was also held by Emily Sadka who pointed out that sovereignty was not necessarily expressed in the exercise of political power, nor in any concentration of government machinery, but it was venerated as a sacred symbol of group unity. See E. Sadka, *The Protected Malay States 1874—1895*, Kuala Lumpur, 1968, pp. 8, 10.

12 Weld's memorandum, enclosure in Smith to Earl of Derby, Confidential, 23 June 1884, C.O.273/128, f.154.

13 The title was used only in 1897 (in preference to the title of Raja Muda) when it was conferred by the ruler on his eldest son, Mahmud. See F. A. Swettenham to High Commissioner FMS, report, 15 April 1895, *HCOF* 327/97. The implications of the term were similar to those of the Raja Muda, the only difference being that he would be appointed first as ruler rather than Raja Muda. As late as 1929 there was controversy over the Pahang law of succession when Tengku Suleiman, a son of the late Bendahara (Sultan) Ahmad was denied the right to the throne although he had been appointed as the Tengku Besar in 1920. See High Commissioner to Passfield, 11 July 1929, C.O.717/67, ff. 6—19.

14 The title was usually conferred by the ruler and was in terms of royal status, second in authority. It was equivalent to the rank of the Raja Muda in Perak. See Bendahara Pahang to Smith, letter 6 November 1884, *SSF* 746/85. See also Weld's memorandum, enclosure in Smith to Earl of Derby, Confidential, 23 June 1884, C.O.273/128, p. 155. The origin and significance of the title Raja Muda is discussed by W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 106.

15 Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 3 August 1887, C.O.273/146, f. 88.

16 W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 102.

17 C. C. Brown, "Sejarah Melayu or Malay Annals", p. 124.

[18] F. A. Swettenham, "Journal kept during a journey across the Malay Peninsula", *MBRAS*, 15 (1885), p. 21.

[19] For further details on this class, see W. Linehan, op. cit., pp. 188—97. Furthermore their districts were also larger than those of the Perak chiefs. See E. Sadka, op. cit., p. 16.

[20] R. Bonney, *Kedah 1771—1821: The Search for Security and Independence* (M.A. thesis), p. 12. In Kedah the major chiefs were of royal descent.

[21] See Proclamation of Sultan Ahmad, enclosure in Sir James Alexander Swettenham to Dato Maharaja Perba, 23 July 1928, C.O.717/61, f. 34.

[22] Resident Pahang to Acting Colonial Secretary, report, 25 January 1892, *SSF*, 103/92.

[23] For further details on chiefs of the second class was W. Linehan, op. cit., p. 197. See also, Clifford to Rodger, instructions, 1 October 1888, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 15 October 1888, C.O.273/155, ff. 104—113.

[24] See H. Clifford, *In Court and Kampong*, p. 113. It was Sultan Abdul Ghafur Shah (1592—1613) the twelfth and last ruler from the Kelantan line who granted the Jelai district to the Maharaja Perba and his descendants. See W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 33. Clifford also made the observation that the Jelai chief had virtually absolute powers in the Jelai district and its environs. See Clifford to Rodger, instructions, 1 October 1888, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 15 October 1888, C.O.273/155, f.106. See also Loh Fook Seng, *The Malay States 1877—1895*, Kuala Lumpur, 1969, p. 92.

[25] He was conferred the title of Imam Perang Indera Gajah and was given jurisdiction over the districts of Lipis and Budu. This caused great friction between the Lipis chiefs. (See following Chapter). F. A. Swettenham also noted that To' Gajah ranked as one of the Orang Besar Berempat or chief of the first class. See F. A. Swettenham, "Journal kept during a journey across the Malay Peninsula", p. 20. See also Anon, *Hikayat Pahang*, p. 126.

[26] Journal of Clifford's mission to Pahang, 11 April 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 28 April 1887, C.O.273/144, f.524. See also *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, account for Monday, 11 February, p. 3.

[27] *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, account for Thursday, 17 February, p. 20.

[28] Or *surat tauliah*, as it was sometimes called.

[29] Journal of Clifford's mission to Pahang, 11 April 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 28 April 1887, C.O.273/144, ff.449—50.

[30] Acting Resident Pekan to District Officer Temerloh, Minute, 3 April 1896, *TDOF* 184/96. For further details on the *surat kuasa* and the areas which the chiefs controlled in the respective districts of Pahang, see District Officer Temerloh to British Resident, 24 April 1896, *TDOF* 155/97; see also Acting Collector Kuantan to British Resident, 30 April 1891, *KDOF* 70/91.

[31] Collector Temerloh to Acting British Resident Pahang, report, 3 October 1893, *TDOF* 441/93.

[32] In the declaration of armed resistance between Wan Lingga and To' Raja, the Bendahara gave a letter of authority to Wan Lingga to declare war against the To' Raja. See H. Clifford, "In the days when the land was free", *In Court and Kampong*, pp. 213—4.

[33] Proclamation to Bendahara Ahmad, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, 5 August 1889, C.O.273/161, f.214. Chieftains were also granted the *chop* so that they could exercise authority over the areas or districts which they controlled. To'

Gajah, for instance, was granted a *chop* of authority by Sultan Ahmad by which the gold mines around Penjum came under his control. See *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, account for Friday, 11 February 1887, p. 14.

34 Maharaja Perba Letters, Document V, enclosed in W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", pp. 213—4.

35 The term could vary according to language or district differences in various areas. For examples see S. Husin Ali, *Malay Peasant Society and Leadership*, Kuala Lumpur, 1975, p. 116.

36 Others included To' Muda Saleh of Kuala Kuantan, Tuan Muda of Beloh and Wan Long of Sungei Kechang. See Acting Collector Kuantan to Acting Resident Pahang, *KDOF* 43/91.

37 A distinction should be made between a *daerah* and a *mukim*. A *daerah* is a fraction of the *mukim*. See Acting Resident Pahang to District Officer Temerloh, 20 December 1895, *TDOF* 27/96.

38 Mat Akir of Gua was made Penghulu by Maharaja Perba of Jelai. See Maharaja Perba Letters, Document XIII, enclosed in W. Linehan, op. cit., p. 224. A good illustration of the loyalty which the Penghulus had for the Bendahara [the Sultan] in 1890, is the fact that the Penghulu of Besuh could not get over the idea that the Bendahara no longer had *perentah* or authority in Kuantan, since he had considered him as the overlord ever since his appointment. See Acting Collector Kuantan to Acting Resident Pahang, *ARKDO* 1890 and 1892. In the Lipis district, three Penghulus who were of importance were To' Bakar of Ulu Sungei; To' Kali of Seja and Mail of Tanjong Besar; but they were all under the control of the To' Kaya of Lipis. See Acting Collector Kuantan to Acting Resident Pahang, *ARKDO* 1893.

39 J. M. Gullick states that these Syeds were immigrants from the province of Atjeh in North Sumatra. See J. M. Gullick, *Indigenous Political Systems*, p. 67.

40 For further details, see Clifford to Rodger, instructions, 1 October 1888, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 15 October 1888, C.O.273/155, f. 112.

41 Clifford to Colonial Secretary, report, 1 October 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 15 October 1887, C.O.273/148, f. 245.

43 H. Clifford, "East Coast Etchings", *Singapore Straits Times Press*, 1896, f. 1.

44 See also C. C. Brown, "Sejarah Melayu or Malay Annals", pp. 26—7.

45 Term borrowed from J. M. Gullick, *Indigenous Political Systems*, p. 106.

46 Clifford to Colonial Secretary, report, 1 October 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 15 October 1887, C.O.273/148, f. 229.

47 J. M. Gullick, *Indigenous Political Systems*, p. 98. The fact that slaves were not set free at their own will was illustrated in the case of Go Hui's wife. On her husband's death she wished to leave for Singapore, but she could not be set free until the debt was liquidated (a sum of $2,000). Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 3 July 1888, C.O.273/154, f. 17.

48 Dato Mahmud bin Mat, "The passing of slavery in East Pahang", *Malayan Historical Journal*, I, i (1954), p. 8. See also Aminuddin Baki, "The instruction of debt slavery in Perak", *Peninjau Sejarah*, I, i (1966). See also *ARP* 1889, p. 7.

49 W. E. Maxwell, "The law relating to slavery among the Malays", *JSBRAS*, 22 (1890), p. 248.

50 Clifford to Colonial Secretary, report, 1 October 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 15 October 1887, C.O.273/148, f. 237. The same view was held by both W. E. Maxwell and Dato Mahmud, but this was not usually

the case. A contradiction is found in Clifford's *Malayan Monochromes*, where girls muster up courage to rebel against their masters. See H. Clifford, *Malayan Monochromes*, London, 1913, pp. 119—148.

51 Clifford's Memorandum, 3 August 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 3 August 1887, C.O.273/146, f. 96.

52 *ARP* 1889, p. 10. See also A. Wright and T. H. Reid, *The Malay Peninsula*, London, 1913, p. 173.

53 Clifford's Memorandum, 3 August 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 3 August 1887, C.O.273/146, f. 95. See also *ARP* 1891, p. 93.

54 H. Clifford, "The story of Bayan the Paroquet", *In Court and Kampong*, pp. 157—160. "The Weeding of the Tares", *Stories by H. Clifford*, W. R. Roff (ed.), Kuala Lumpur, 1966, pp. 135—143. See also Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 11 October 1887, C.O.273/148, f. 166, where he describes the tortures that were inflicted upon the peasants.

55 In treaty negotiations with the British in 1887, Ahmad reiterated that a letter of acceptance should come from his chiefs, namely, To' Gajah, Orang Kaya Bakti and Haji Muhammed Nor, which meant that the chief advisers had to be consulted. Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 11 October 1887, C.O.273/148, f. 163. See also Smith to Knutsford, report, 22 June 1888, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 3 July 1888, C.O.273/154, f. 37. See also J. M. Gullick, op. cit., p. 54.

56 Modelled on the Malacca Sultanate, the *adat* or customary law was very strong among the Malays of Pahang. See A. Wright and T. H. Reid, op. cit., p. 173.

57 Rodger to Colonial Secretary, report, 13 October 1888, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 15 October 1888, C.O.273/155, f. 77. Tuan Itam and Haji Muhammed Nor were so powerful that they carried out instructions between concessionaires as deputies of the Sultan, without having to go through him. See Mr. Fraser to Resident Pahang, report, 9 December 1888, *BROF*, 131/1888.

58 Clifford to Colonial Secretary, report, 1 October 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 15 October 1887, C.O.273/148, f. 229.

59 To' Bandar played a significant role as the Sultan's *wakil* (representative) during negotiations with the British with regard to the return of the Engku Muda of Pahang in 1885. See Bendahara Ahmad to Smith, despatch of 6 November 1884, *SSF* 746/85.

60 He was known as Tamby Chik. Interview with Encik Zakaria Hitam at Kuantan, 16 May 1875.

61 There were instances when he misread letters to the Bendahara, yet he was forgiven. Weld to Granville, Confidential, 15 June 1886, C.O.273/140, ff. 81—2; Clifford to Colonial Secretary, report, 1 October 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 15 October 1887, C.O.273/148, f. 231; Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 16 April 1887, C.O.273/144, f. 142.

62 Clifford to Colonial Secretary, report, 1 October 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 15 October 1887, C.O.273/148, f. 232.

63 Clifford's Memorandum, 3 August 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 3 August 1887, C.O.273/146, f. 98. The question of *droit du seigneur*, is also mentioned in the Annual Report of Pahang 1889. See *ARP* 1889, p. 10. See also H. Clifford, *The Further Side of Silence*, New York, 1922, pp. 65—77. During quarrels between chiefs, this was often used by the territorial

chiefs who were jealous of one another as a means to remove someone who had standing or who was in favour of the Raja [the Bendahara].

64 Journal of Clifford's mission to Pahang, 11 April 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 28 April 1887, C.O.273/144, f. 544.

65 This was in accordance with the Malacca Code whereby the ruler consulted his subordinates before framing any laws. See Alfred P. Rubin, *The International Personality of the Malay Peninsular*, Kuala Lumpur, 1974, p. 11.

66 *ARP* 1891, p. 93; *ARP* 1888, p. 1. See also Rodger to Colonial Secretary, 13 October 188, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 15 October 1888, C.O.273/155, f. 79.

67 *ARP* 1888, pp. 3, 11. See also Clifford's Memorandum, 3 August 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 3 August 1887, C.O.273/146, ff. 98—100.

68

Tobacco	—	$400 per month
Chandu	—	$200 per month
Salt	—	$ 80 per month
Oil	—	$ 50 per month
Goats	—	$ 20 per month
Total		$750 per month

See Clifford to Colonial Secretary, report, 1 October 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 15 October 1887, C.O.273/148, f. 237. For a discussion on duties imposed, see also F. A. Swettenham, "Journal kept during a journey across the Malay Peninsula", p. 10. However, the import duties were abolished in 1889. See *ARP* 1889, p. 6.

69 See "Geographical Notes", Chapter I; see also *ARP* 1890, p. 90.

70 *ARP* 1889, p. 6. See also H. Clifford, "British and Siamese Malaya", *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, Vol. 34, 1902—1903, p. 49. For a discussion on the various forms of taxes levied see Journal of Clifford's mission to Pahang, 11 April 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 28 April 1887, C.O.273/144, ff. 467—70. See also *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, accounts for Friday, 4 February to Sunday, 6 February 1887.

71 Journal of Clifford's mission to Pahang, 11 April 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 28 April 1887, C.O.273/144, f. 468; *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, account for 5 February, Saturday; Clifford's Memorandum, 3 August 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 3 August 1887, C.O.273/146, f. 100; Smith to Earl of Derby, Confidential, 23 May 1885, C.O.273/134, f. 287.

72 See F. A. Swettenham, *The Real Malay*, London, 1907, p. 143.

73 See *BROF* 1893, where chiefs of even smaller territorial districts exacted *serah*. For further details on *serah* and *kerah*, see Hugh Clifford, "Journal through the Malay States of Kelantan and Trengganu", *Geographical Journal*, IX, i (1897), pp. 6—7. See also *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, p. 8.

74 The peasants found that at Trusang, even their buffaloes were taxed at a rate of $3 per head, of which a part went to the To' Gajah. See *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, p. 8.

75 Haji Druman of Chenor came from Pekan and brought a written *titah* from the Bendahara. It was sanctioned that whoever was made the To' Kaya of Chenor had to pay to the Bendahara a sum of $600. See Haji Abdul Rahman to Resident Pahang, letter of 27 September 1896, *TDOF* 1896, 409/96.

[76] Clifford to Colonial Secretary, report 1 October 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 15 October 1887, C.O.273/148, f. 244. It was also seen that the Baloh concession had to pay a monthly payment of $100 to the Bendahara. See Bendahara to Resident Pahang, letter of 31 October 1889, *BROF* 1348/89.

[77] Mr. Fraser of the Pahang Corporation had to terminate his concession because he failed to pay $20,000 to the Sultan for an extension of its lease. See Smith to Knutsford, report, 22 June 1888, enclosure I in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 3 July 1888, C.O.273/154, f. 27.

[78] Clifford to Colonial Secretary, report, 1 October 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 15 October 1887, C.O.273/148, f. 238.

[79] Ibid., f. 237; Clifford's Memorandum, 3 August 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 3 August 1887, C.O.273/146, f. 97.

[80] Dato Mahmud bin Mat, "The passing of slavery in East Pahang", p. 9. See also W. E. Maxwell, "The law relating to slavery among the Malays", pp. 247—297.

[81] Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 16 April 1887, C.O.273/144, f. 139. There had been occasions when those found guilty were scalped alive. See British Resident Selangor to Governor, 7 August 1887, *SSF* 1970/87.

[82] *ARP* 1888, p. 1.

[83] Clifford's memorandum, 3 August 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 3 August 1887, C.O.273/146, ff. 86—7.

[84] *ARP* 1888, p. 1.

[85] H. Clifford, "In the days when the land was free", *In Court and Kampong*, p. 216.

[86] This was seen in the case of Tunku Andak's elopement with Sudin. See Clifford to Acting Resident Selangor, Letter of 30 June 1887, *SSF* 1929/87.

[87] Clifford's Memorandum, 3 August 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 3 August 1887, C.O.273/146, f. 96.

CHAPTER III
EXTERNAL FACTORS AFFECTING INTERNAL POLITICS (1880—1888)[1]

At the dawn of 1880, Bendahara Wan Ahmad, who had been at the pinnacle of power, began to lose grip over his country. It was over the disputes among his chiefs, his heavy reliance upon his chief advisors and his generally 'weak' political leadership during the latter part of his rule which finally admitted foreign intervention into domestic politics.

The civil war of 1856—63 was the crucial factor which led to the rise in dissension among members of the ruling class and the various territorial chiefs. Although it laid the foundations for the rise of men of humble origins to the higher echelon of the political hierarchy, it also indirectly sowed the seeds of conflict[2] among the chiefs who were henceforth divided into factions — one group supporting the ruler and another opposing him. The discontented held the Bendahara responsible for their loss in prestige and autonomy. They exhibited their frustrations towards Wan Ahmad in the face of the internal feuds which were now brewing. These internal feuds had indirect repercussions on the political system of Pahang. Naturally the presence of internal conflicts within the political system was bound to weaken or strengthen the position of one chief vis-a-vis that of other chiefs.[3]

The constant strife among the territorial chiefs, which had dominated the political scene as early as the 1870s,[4] gradually deepened the fissures between the various groups. It was further increased by the Bendahara's quarrels with his chiefs, namely the Jelai chief (To' Raja) Wan Muhammad,[5] who had offended Bendahara Ahmad by not sharing the spoils which he had gained in the Selangor War. Bendahara Ahmad's hatred for the To' Raja of Jelai had begun when Wan Bong (To' Raja's brother) decided to secure the broad valleys of Pahang in the 1870s as a form of inheritance. Bendahara Ahmad's position was further threatened when the To' Raja challenged his authority by his insolent behaviour, wearing the "proudest privileges of royalties"[6] after the civil war, displayed these by "wearing shoes and walking down the principal street of the town with an umbrella carried by one of his henchmen and he ascended into the king's Balai with his kris uncovered by the folds of sarong".[7] Bendahara Ahmad's resentment towards the To' Raja

Sultan Ahmad and his personal staff at Pekan in about 1885

increased over the years because of the fact that he (To' Raja) was able to gain the popularity, respect[8] and be acknowledged as Bendahara Ahmad's equal by his followers. Bendahara Ahmad considered this treasonable. He therefore began to devise plans to oust the To' Raja. His schemes attracted the envious To' Gajah,[9] who devised new strategies for the Bendahara, with the hope of gaining the upper hand in the power struggle.

According to Clifford, Wan Lingga[10] of Lipis soon became an instrument in To' Gajah's hands. The latter wished to establish himself as the Dato Kaya Setia Wangsa of the Lipis district.[11] To' Gajah devised a plan whereby a conflict between the To' Raja of Jelai and Wan Lingga of Lipis would arise, leaving him to be the master over the Lipis valley. However, such a strategy could only materialize with Bendahara Ahmad's sanction. Wan Ahmad was immensely attracted by the plan of ousting the To' Raja. With this aim in mind, he enlisted the aid of Wan Lingga and To' Muda Sentul to kill To' Raja.[12] They agreed to his plan, but were prevented from waging war against the To' Raja by the intervention of the old To' Kaya. He insisted that the men from Jelai and Lipis were of one clan and that it was improper for them to be at war with one another. The old To' Kaya refused to succumb to Bendahara Ahmad's warlike plan proved to be detrimental to him. Wan Ahmad carefully manipulated To' Gajah and Wan Lingga into staging a joint attack on the To' Raja and the To' Kaya who was now categorized as Wan Ahmad's enemy. However, these squabbles were inconsequential, as To' Gajah's harsh methods compelled many chiefs to oppose him. Their refusal to co-operate with To' Gajah was a disappointment to Bendahara Ahmad, who now took on a new role — that of peace-maker between To' Gajah and his opponents.

By this time, Wan Lingga's fate had been sealed. Being an instrument in Bendahara Ahmad's hands, he was compelled to kill the old To' Kaya, who had failed to comply with Wan Ahmad's orders. Wan Lingga was loyal to his lawful master and so, obeying his orders, he burnt down To' Kaya's house at Panjum. Although To' Kaya escaped with his son, To' Sentul, they finally surrendered to Bendahara Ahmad at Pekan, where they were retained for two years. It was during this interim period that the To' Kaya's position at Lipis was usurped by Tuan Sheikh Kechil, who emerged as one of the Bendahara's favourites. Acting on the advice of the Bendahara, he controlled the administration of the Lipis district[13] thereby gaining a share in the revenues of the Lipis district. Wan Lingga, how-

ever, was punished by being deprived of his allowances for having failed to obey the Bendahara's instructions.

By 1880, Bendahara Ahmad's policy had become clear. Those obnoxious to him were punished either by war or death. Fines were imposed on those who contravened his orders. Resentment flowed from all quarters in the *ulu* districts. Bendahara Ahmad's popularity was gradually declining. Tension within the political framework was heightening and the stage was set for a new turn of events. Chiefs like the To' Raja and the To' Kaya, who in the earlier decades, had had important roles to play in the governmental machinery and who had supported the Bendahara[14] now began to show signs of disaffection.

In spite of this predicament, Bendahara Ahmad (who had toured the *ulu* districts) aspired to be the Sultan in 1881.[15] This unprecedented move is of great significance to the political history of Pahang. It was the first attempt by a Bendahara in Pahang to establish himself as Sultan.[16] Personal reasons could have motivated Wan Ahmad to resort to this move. His visit to Singapore in 1881[17] added weight to his demands to be called a Sultan. That visit made him realize that the institution of the Sultanate signified independence and sovereignty — while the title of Bendahara implied that "the owner was subject to a superior".[18] The idea of a dominant and powerful role loomed in Bendahara Ahmad's mind. Although he was illiterate, neither the concept nor the significance of the institution of kingship was foreign to him. He began to trace his genealogy from the time of Sultan Abdul Jalil, from whom he claimed his descent.[19] (See chart below).



Governor Weld felt that the assumption of the title could have been motivated by Maharaja Abu Bakar of Johor who was related to Bendahara Ahmad through marriage.[20] The title of "Maharaja" signified a Sultan of non-royal blood — Abu Bakar hoped that if Bendahara Ahmad was acknowledged as the Sultan of Pahang, he himself could not be refused the title of the Sultan of Johor in due course.[21]

Bendahara Ahmad could, therefore, have been used as an instrument by the Maharaja of Johor.[22]

Wan Ahmad found himself in a precarious political situation, and it can be reasonably construed that he felt that the title was necessary to shore up his slowly sagging authority. Secondly, the title was needed to boost the prestige and dignity of his position in his own country. Thirdly, he wished to be on par with his counterparts in the Western Malay states. He, therefore, needed the support of his chiefs to become Sultan. With this in mind, he began to placate his embittered vassals, hoping to win their confidence and favour. His first task was to pardon the To' Raja of Jelai. It is rather surprising that he wished to resume friendship with a chief of whom he was so envious; but it was a calculated move on the part of the shrewd Bendahara Ahmad. He realized that the To' Raja was a powerful vassal who wielded wide powers over his subjects and other major chiefs.[23] He hoped that the To' Raja's influence could be used to further his aim of becoming a Sultan. He proceeded to confer the title of 'Maharaja Perba' on the To' Raja Wan Muhammed. Similarly, the Orang Kaya of Lipis was pardoned and sent back to Lipis. The steps taken by Bendahara Ahmad clearly indicated his desire to be recognized as Sultan. On 12 December 1884, Bendahara Ahmad's goal materialized when his chiefs formally proclaimed him Sultan Ahmad Muazam Shah of Pahang.[24] The Maharaja Perba To' Raja of Jelai was also, in due course, recognized as the representative of Sultan Ahmad who also appointed his relative, Abdul Rahman, as the Bendahara.[25]

As Sultan of Pahang, Wan Ahmad faced new problems. The domestic turmoil, much to his disappointment, was not resolved. The Orang Kaya Lipis was the most disgruntled person of the day. His autonomy and prestige were being challenged by the To' Gajah, who had become the Sultan's right-hand man. The Sultan's decision to place the Orang Kaya's district of Budu under To' Gajah's jurisdiction was an added aggravation. The Sultan's proclamation read as follows:[26]

> We hand over entirely all the inhabitants of Budu to the aforesaid Imam Perang...

and the preamble which went along with it:

> Should any of the said inhabitants disregard or fail to observe Our aforesaid Command they shall be guilty of a grave offence against Us and We shall inflict upon them the severest penalties...

The people of Budu resented the transfer of authority "as the orders of the headmen were hurtful and people would suffer".[27] More lands and areas came under the control of To' Gajah. One such area was Trusang[28] which had belonged to To' Bakar (a *penghulu*) who owed nominal allegiance to the Orang Kaya of Lipis. The Imam Perang Penghulu also began to show signs of discontent over the appointment of To' Gajah. Although stationed at Kuala Lipis, he had in the earlier decades accepted the overlordship of the Orang Kaya Lipis. Now he was under the jurisdiction of To' Gajah,[29] of whom he highly disapproved. To' Gajah thus emerged as an eminent chief in the power struggles, but his cruel administration did not win him a large following. In 1885, Swettenham had observed that To' Gajah "was greatly feared by the dissatisfied faction in the upper country and was greatly trusted by the Yam Tuan [the Sultan]".[30] Two years later, Hugh Clifford had similar views:[31]

> To' Gajah is very hard on all his people and among other things will allow none of his people to marry unless they gave a feast and killed a buffalo, the head of which he claims. This comes very hard on some of the poorer classes, but if they disregard this order, he fines them heavily. If they do not pay he makes a raid on their houses and property taking away their wives and daughters. If they resist, he kills them. There is no redress as the Sultan will hear nothing against To' Gajah and supports him in all he does.

As mentioned earlier, he even became a rival to the To' Raja of Jelai. The To' Raja was unwilling to give up his status as the most powerful chief among the territorial vassals.

It is to be noted that by this time the newly elected chiefs were not favoured by the older chiefs, who severely criticized the appointment of To' Gajah. The Sultan's favouritism towards the newly elected chiefs. His favouritism towards the Orang Kaya Semantan was equally resented. Being one of his chiefs of the Temerloh

district, the Orang Kaya Semantan was respected by the Sultan and it is said that:[32]

> ...in the days of Malay rule when no other chief in Pahang dreamed of resisting a royal order, he once defied the Sultan and flatly refused to obey him and refrained from collecting taxes and dues of all kinds. But the Sultan had a certain affection for him.

Another reason for the rise in the number of dissidents among the territorial chiefs was the fact that they lost some of their power and authority in exerting control over revenues which they had previously had access to. In the present situation, most of the revenue found its way to Pekan. According to the To' Muda Long, son of the Orang Kaya Lipis, his allowances and revenues were meagre because such a large share went to the Sultan.[33] The total receipts amounted to more than $500 or $600. It was the diversion of this revenue to Pekan which he claimed was resented by the Orang Kaya Lipis and the other major chiefs.

During this period, there were many attempts by members within the royal household to gain wider territorial authority and to assert their autonomy. The attempt by Wan Da, Wan Abdul Rahman and Wan Abdullah[34] to usurp the royal Bendaharaship (now the royal title) in the 1860s and 1870s was revived. Sultan Ahmad's only recourse was politically to pacify the contenders. The fear of being ousted led him to grant titles and amnesty to many of his relatives. He appointed a Bendahara, and conferred the title of the Temenggong on Wan Ahmad. However, the struggles did not end there. Sultan Ahmad's reign was further complicated by fresh waves of disputes with his half-brother Engku Muda Wan Mansur who also laid claim to the throne and who challenged Sultan Ahmad's sudden decision to deny his appointment as heir to the throne. Wan Mansur's dissatisfaction was further aggravated when he was deprived of his allowances. Sultan Ahmad's sudden attitude in appointing his son Tengku Mahmud as heir to the throne[35] was motivated by his desire to preserve his power. Sultan Ahmad feared that Wan Mansur, being a half-brother,[36] could prove a threat to the continuity of his (Ahmad's) rule. Furthermore, Wan Mansur could influence the dissidents in the inland areas to rise in arms against the Sultan. Essentially, it was political phobia which influenced Sultan Ahmad to appoint his son as the heir apparent. What he did not realise was that his decision was going to provide an opening for foreign forces to step in and settle his disputes with the members of the royal household.

Bahamah, Orang Kaya Semantan, c 1887

In a letter to W.H.M. Read,[37] a member of the Singapore Legislative Council, Wan Mansur listed various complaints against what he termed the inefficient rule of Sultan Ahmad. These complaints filed by his (Wan Mansur's) subjects showed a deplorable lack of justice. For petty cases of theft, misbehaviour etc. fines and death penalties were imposed. Complaints of this nature flowed from various ranks of society. Wan Mansur had a wide range of supporters, including minor chieftains such as Raja Impeh, Raja Ismail of Raub, the discontented Wan Lingga, Wan Chik and Tuan Lebir. It was generally the chiefs of the inland districts who were devoted to the interests of the Engku Muda.[38] Wan Mansur's ability to capitalize on their dissatisfaction was detrimental to Sultan Ahmad. This dissatisfaction was apparent in the case of the Chief of Temerloh who was antagonized by Sultan Ahmad's refusal to appoint him as successor to the Orang Kaya Temerloh. Sultan Ahmad was only prepared to appoint a successor, if the latter would agree to pay a total sum of $1,000 for the vacant seat.[39] To some extent, it could be said that Sultan Ahmad's materialistic designs and ambitions brought about negative results. Four or five men paid small sums for the Temerloh seat and in return were conferred the title of *To' Muda* by Sultan Ahmad, but this did not please the inheritors. With regard to Sultan Ahmad's materialistic predilections, Clifford further observed that when the Orang Kaya Chenor died, anyone wishing to be the successor had to pay the Sultan a fixed sum of $600.[40] These payments led to petty quarrels resulting from the jealousies among the various chiefs. They, therefore, threw in their support behind Wan Mansur.

The supporters of Wan Mansur argued that as "Sultan Ahmad had turned out the rightful chief by force of arms, so may they in justice adopt the same course if he [the Sultan] did not rule his country to their satisfaction".[41] Sultan Ahmad began to face attacks from Wan Mansur who called him a "usurper" and who was determined to eradicate "the cruel administration and oppression"[42] which prevailed. Wan Mansur began to invite foreign aid by turning to Johor, but when his request was denied, sought British help to reinstate him as the rightful heir to the throne.[43] As early as 1884, he had planned on staging an attack on Pahang using Selangor as the base, but was deterred from doing so on the advice of the Acting Governor Cecil Smith.[44] Wan Mansur repeatedly reminded the British that the people desired to get rid of Sultan Ahmad and instal him (Mansur) as the next ruler, thus relieving them from Sultan

Ahmad's oppression. However, Wan Mansur's call for intervention by the British went unheeded. The British declared that they had no treaty rights to interfere in the affairs of Pahang.[45] Sultan Ahmad was notified by Governor Smith of Wan Mansur's intentions to wage war against him.[46] Finally, on the Governor's advice, Wan Mansur decided to return to Singapore and agreed that he would return to Pahang only on Sultan Ahmad's invitation.[47]

Sultan Ahmad was in a dilemma. The political turbulence did not simmer down and the problem of being challenged by his brother, which drew the attention of the British, injected a new sense of fear into him. His main aim, during this period, was to avoid British protection and in order to do this, he had to win the confidence of the British. Having watched with dismay the events which had occurred in Perak and Selangor which brought about the imposition of British rule, he feared that the internal disputes in Pahang would be used as *casus belli* by the British to enter Pahang. He also observed very closely the steps taken by Maharaja Abu Bakar of Johor, who managed to win the confidence of the British and thereby evade British rule. Sultan Ahmad, realised that the best course to take would be to develop his state, like Johor, and to have himself recognised as an enlightened ruler.[48] The enlightenment which he sought lay in developing his country and this he did by welcoming foreign investors. This policy paved the way for further internal problems.

Pahang's door was slowly being opened and one sees external forces coming into play with internal politics. Sultan Ahmad's move to welcome foreign investors brought about a deterioration in his position and relationship with his subjects and vassals. But the political situation was not the sole factor that compelled Sultan Ahmad to welcome the foreigners — the economic factor had greater significance. The royal coffers had been reduced to a state of bankruptcy as a result of the Civil War. These economic setbacks brought stress and strain upon him. The answer to overcoming the financial problem lay in opening up his country to foreign investors. His chiefs deplored the idea, as such a step would seriously reduce their power and their share of the revenue, leaving them in a somewhat precarious position.

Nevertheless, the Sultan gave large tracts of land to Europeans[49] and others without regard to his chiefs and subjects. The race for concession mongering began when in 1883 Sultan Ahmad granted 2,000 square miles to Lim Ah Sam from Biliton, Ho Ah Yun, Go Su

Sui and Louis Dekkar from Batavia who together formed the Pahang Company.[50] This Company initially clashed with a European called William Paterson (of Paterson, Simons & Co.) who, in 1862 had been given the rights by Bendahara Kuris to mine the Kuantan river basin. Paterson lost his claims and it was settled that he would receive 5,000 shares valued at £5,000. The Pahang Company soon turned into a Syndicate known as the Pahang Mining Company, formed on 27 April 1887. Finally, in December 1887, the Pahang Corporation took all rights from this Company.[51]

Sultan Ahmad was interested in the Pahang Corporation as it had promised him 10% of its revenue.[52] He realized that foreign capital would be rewarding since it would be possible for him to balance the deficits which he had incurred. He also discovered that it was remunerative to lease lands to these concessionaires. He demanded a monthly payment of $1,000[53] from each of the companies. The foreigners were under the illusion that Pahang was abundant in mineral wealth,[54] and thus enabled Sultan Ahmad to grant some mining concessions at Penjum to Mr. Scaife[55] on 1 May 1884. By granting this concession, Sultan Ahmad, in effect, turned away the Chinese who had been working on the concession previously.[56] The antagonism towards the Sultan was now directed towards the concessionaires too. Sultan Ahmad did not promise any form of protection to the foreigners and the British Colonial Office used this as a pretext to impose on Pahang a British Agent in 1887.[57]

The entry of foreign investors had a great impact on Sultan Ahmad's chiefs who watched with rage the slicing off of their lands. The establishment of the Penjum Company in 1884 aroused the anxiety and hatred of the Orang Kaya Lipis towards Sultan Ahmad. The Orang Kaya was disturbed by the fact that large areas around Lipis (Penjum) and a tract of land at Bentong in Semantan had been given to the Company without his consent. A similar case also occurred in November 1885 when the Sultan granted the Selensing concession to Knaggs, Cameron and Gowen. It included the Jelai Kechil district which was initially under the jurisdiction of the Maharaja Perba To' Raja of Jelai. His hatred for Sultan Ahmad increased when the revenue which he gained from the Telom and Tanum districts was taken away from him and given to Syed Mohammed Alsagoff of Johor in 1887. Alsagoff established the Tanom Company without the consent of the To' Raja. The To' Raja complained that the Tanum district belonged to Wan Koteh (brother of the To' Raja). The latter joined his brother, infuriated

by the alienation of this district to Alsagoff, since both (Wan Koteh and the To' Raja) were deprived of a share in his (Alsagoff's) Tanum Company.[58]

It is also significant to observe that, on several occasions Sultan Ahmad did not lease lands on his own accord, but was an instrument in the hands of his chief advisors, namely To' Gajah and Tuan Itam.[59] Often his *chop* was used as a *facsimile* to grant concessions. The advisers were keen to formulate plans for the Sultan, for they gained immensely from the concessionaires. It was seen that Tuan Itam, Orang Kaya Bakti, Sheikh Kecil and Tuan Imam Perang Indera Mahkota all had a share in Alsagoff's Tanum Company.[60] It was also on the advice of Tuan Itam and Haji Mat Nor that Sultan Ahmad was finally induced to put his seal on Knagg's concession. Another incident in which his favourite chiefs were responsible for the leasing of lands was in the case of Scaife in 1884. The concession treaty was not signed by Sultan Ahmad, but was agreed upon by Abdur Rahman bin Abu Syed, Imam Perang Indera Gajah, Orang Kaya Bakti, the Orang Kaya Pahlawan Chenor and Scaife who, together with Haji Mahmud Arshad and Inche Tahir bin Othman (both from Singapore) agreed to form a company known as the Sungei Dua Semantan and Mining Company to work tin, gold, mineral and other productive mines.[61]

However, Sultan Ahmad was not deterred from granting concessions for his own interests. He considered that to be an *a priori* recognition of his supremacy as the ruler. With this authority, he granted the Kuantan Rompin Coast rivers and Triang to the Kuantan Company in 1886. In the latter decades, this Company had to pay a fixed sum of $20,000 for an extension of the time period to mine the respective areas.[62] The Pahang Company similarly paid a royalty of 10% for the areas granted. With these gains, Sultan Ahmad granted Raub and Teras to the Maharaja of Johor,[63] although he had denied receiving this sum to Governor Weld as early as 1882.[64] Various individuals, too, held concessions — for example Watson who was leased the Bentong district and Davidson, the Telom area.[65] By 1887, most of the lands in Kuantan were held under concessions and nearly two-thirds of the *ulu* districts had been occupied by the concessionaires.[66] By 1887 the concessions granted were as follows:[67]

Penjum Company	—	100 sq. miles in Lipis
Penjum Company	—	100 sq. miles in Semantan

Knaggs, Gowen and Cameron	—	from the Penjum boundary to Kuala Telam
Mr. Davidson	—	Telom
Syed Muhammed Alsagoff	—	Tanum, Chika, Kichau, Raub
Syed Junid	—	a further concession in Jelai
Hae Sing	—	Bera and Trusang in Lipis
Mr. Watson	—	4 miles × 4 miles Semantan
Seah Song Seah	—	2 rivers in Semantan
Tuan Ho	—	2 rivers in Semantan
Tungku Usman	—	100 sq. miles to be selected

The major chiefs — namely the To' Raja and To' Kaya, who had flaunted their wealth at one time — resented Sultan Ahmad's new economic policy. With the influx of the foreign investors, they lost heavily in terms of revenue. The British, therefore, found a ready response from this class. Instead of being resentful of British policy, they played the part of informers to the British on the role of Sultan Ahmad and his policies. Their attitudes made Sultan Ahmad less assertive in his dealings with the foreign capitalists. The loss in capital was clearly seen in the case of the Orang Kaya of Lipis who lost as much as $17,500. Moreover, with the coming of the Europeans, work "came to a standstill at the mines and all labour was thrown away and people who had invested money paid *serah, banchi* and paid heavy duties on all."[68]

It was not just the chiefs, but also Sultan Ahmad's subjects who suffered from the effects of his economic policy. The *rakyat* were badly affected and, in practice, they suffered tremendously. The Chinese were robbed of their work. The Capitan China Lipis, Ah Poh, was opposed to the entry of European capital. He complained that the new powers had taken away his lands, that his work had been stopped for nearly two months and that all his coolies were thrown out of employment.[69] The establishment of the Penjum Company adversely affected the Chinese who had spent more than $30,000 working these mines. The Chinese remarked that:[70]

> ...the object of the Penjum Company now appears to be to show everyone that they are masters and that without their permission no one can work on the concessions. Although the Company decided to allow the Chinese to resume work and allowed to pay compensation at $700, the Chinese had lost ten thousands.

Finally, the Europeans agreed to pay the *Raja* (Sultan) the sum of

$200 per month in return for the right to eject the Chinese owners from the mines. However, they (the Europeans) neglected to honour their part of the contract and ended up owing as much as $5,000 in arrears.[71] Towards the end of 1887, several Chinese were in the employ of the Pahang Corporation and its subsidiary companies.

Grievances were voiced constantly in the hope that Sultan Ahmad would prohibit further leasing of lands, but he remained unaffected. Not only the Chinese, but also the Malays suffered as the Malay gold workings were taken over by the Company without any compensation. The Europeans, on the other hand, had tried to please the disgruntled subjects. Stuart of the Penjum Company, for instance, offered to employ the Chinese at a royalty tax of 10% — a move which was eventually accepted by the Chinese.

During the course of the century, Sultan Ahmad realized that the intervention of the Europeans, with their reputation for treating their coolies severely, had brought about undesirable effects upon his subjects. Frequent quarrels between the Europeans and the locals posed new problems for Sultan Ahmad. The Chinese refused to abide by the Europeans' terms and demanded that their lands be returned. Although some of the Chinese towkays were delighted to receive shares of a sum of $700 as compensation for their losses, the general feeling was one of hatred and dissatisfaction towards the Europeans. Sultan Ahmad was contented with the $300 per month which he gained from the concessionaires, but his refusal to share this amount with his major chiefs caused him to lose their support. In contrast, the To' Kaya's losses were compensated with a monthly payment of a mere $30, to his disappointment and anger. This the To' Kaya accepted as a form of tribute paid to a chief of the district in which the mines happened to be situated[72] rather than as a compensation. The To' Kaya also resented the attitude of some of the Europeans in their dealings with him. Clifford observed that on one occasion:[73]

> Mr. Haughton, manager of Penjum Company had a dispute with the To' Kaya about some land which the former claimed and which was disallowed by the To' Kaya and about some gold bearing quartz which Mr. Haughton wished to take and which the To' Kaya would not let them be removed. Mr. Haughton lost his temper and raising his pistol threatened to shoot if he made any further trouble. Considering that the To' Kaya is the man who holds the highest position of any Malay in Lipis, Mr.

Haughton's conduct towards him was inexcusable and if that is a sample of the way in which the Company's servant treats the natives, trouble will be the result.

Apprehensive of the influence which the malcontents had over the Engku Muda (who was popular with the British), Sultan Ahmad decided to reconcile his differences with his brother Wan Mansur, thus establishing peace and harmony in Pahang. He sought the advice and aid of the British to persuade Wan Mansur to return to Pahang. The negotiations of 1884[74]culminated, much to Smith's delight, in an agreement[75] between the Sultan and Wan Mansur. Sultan Ahmad anxiously awaited the return of Wan Mansur, whom he now recognized as the Engku Muda, providing him with a monthly maintenance of $200.[76] Since the revenue attained in Pahang was only sufficient to cover the expenditure, it was agreed that the sum of $200 would be paid as a loan to Sultan Ahmad from the Selangor Treasury.[77] Sultan Ahmad's desire to renew his relationship with Wan Mansur sprang mainly from a wish to preserve his integrity and power in the face of increasing internal problems. Early evidence of Sultan Ahmad's request for foreign aid must be seen in this light. On another occasion, towards the end of 1884, when it was known that Raja Impeh (one of the sons of the discontented Wan Lingga) was trying to gather forces to rebel against Sultan Ahmad in the district of Raub, the ruler tried to secure British aid, as shown in this letter:[78]

We hope our friend will assist us in this matter. Thus our country will be at peace.

Sultan Ahmad sought foreign assistance as a last resort, when he could not solve the internal problems confronting him on his own. The Pahang-Jelebu boundary dispute set another precedent related to requests for foreign intervention. Pahang's claim that Jelebu had always been part of her territory brought about intrigues with the Jelebu chief over the limitation of their boundary in 1883. Sultan Ahmad's desire that the boundary should be fixed at Kenabui[79] was overlooked and with the intervention of Smith it was fixed at Sungei Dua in May 1885.[80]

Sultan Ahmad did not, however, suspect that these pretences of foreign assistance carried with them their own demands, as seen during Swettenham's visit to Pahang in 1885. The mission, ostensibly to instal Wan Mansur to the throne and reunite the two brothers, had the covert motive of implanting a British Adviser.[81] Sultan Ahmad was prepared for this move. Being calculating, he was

intelligent enough to ignore Swettenham's proposals to accept British administration.[82] His obvious reluctance and often his flippant answers to Swettenham indicated that he would not accept a Resident through force.[83] He employed a delaying tactic, centering his excuses around his chiefs. He stressed that their opinions were of prime importance with regard to the implementation of British administration, thus keeping the British waiting for an answer. The chiefs, on the other hand, were surprised at Sultan Ahmad's excuse. They emphasized that as *de facto* ruler he "could do whatever he liked"[84] without their consent. Such a delaying tactic had been successfully employed as early as 1875, when Jervois proposed an adviser.[85] For four months the game was played until Sultan Ahmad gave an irrevocable answer, refusing to accept a British Resident:[86]

> As long as we and our children are still living, they will not have the hearts to have an officer of government, that is, a British Resident in Pahang.

Sultan Ahmad's fear of losing his sovereignty was not the main factor causing him to refuse British rule. His heavy dependence on Maharaja abu Bakar of Johor influenced him to prevent a British take-over. This factor then contributed to the failure of the Swettenham mission. Sultan Ahmad had informed Abu Bakar that he was being pressured by Swettenham.[87] His announcement was in compliance with the written agreement between Johor and Pahang secured in 1862, in which the third clause stipulated that the Maharaja was entitled to "assist the Bendahara if he was attacked by his enemies either from within or without".[88] Another reason for the failure of the Swettenham mission was the fact that Sultan Ahmad was under the guidance of Tuan Itam (his Secretary), the Dato Mentri of Johor,[90] and Jaffar (a Johor man who had stayed in Pahang), all of whom had supported him in opposing the extension of British influence in Pahang.[91] Sultan Ahmad had a personal reason for his dependence on Johor, besides the treaty negotiations of 1862. The marriage bond between Johor and Pahang entitled him to seek Abu Bakar's advice.

Abu Bakar had his own reasons for protecting Sultan Ahmad. His reluctance in persuading Sultan Ahmad to accept a British Resident was not totally based on their personal relationship but was also connected to the gold mining concessions which he had acquired at Raub.[92] Swettenham stated that, apart from the gold mining concessions at Raub, the Dato Mentri of Johor also had a

concession "over the right to all the wood in Pahang".[93] Johor's vested interests in Pahang induced Abu Bakar to maintain his rights there. Furthermore, Abu Bakar was affected by the 1885 Government notification of 6 February which allowed the British Government 'liberty of action' with regard to recognition of concessions granted by native rulers in the Malay states.[94] Abu Bakar feared that this action would endanger his position and economic gains in Pahang. These factors,[95] then, saved Sultan Ahmad from conceding to British demands. Continuous British pressure as well as the indiscreet conduct of Swettenham instilled hatred in Sultan Ahmad towards the British in general and to Swettenham in particular. [96]

Sultan Ahmad's attitude was inconsistent. At times he was aggressive, and at other times passive. The aggressive tone was evident in his dealings with Governor Weld in May 1886, following the failure of the Swettenham mission. He appeared more adamant in refusing British protection. He turned down Weld's suggestion of an Agent rather than a Resident.[97] Neither was he persuaded by Weld's second suggestion that "without any treaty the British could not consider him to be under British protection and that he might be too late, when with a treaty, he might have been safe".[98] He appeared to sympathise with Weld, while using his old tactic of wishing to consult with his chiefs.

Once more the Pahang-Johor alliance helped Sultan Ahmad to keep the British at bay. At this point he was also supported by various Company promoters, brokers and agents. These included Abu Bakar's legal advisors, Rodyk and Davidson, Syed Mohammed Alsagoff, Patterson Simon and Company (Johor's commercial agent) and Mr. William Hole.[99] The speculators (within the Johor circle) feared that the appointment of a Resident would interfere with the terms of their concessions. Sultan Ahmad, together with these supporters, was prepared to obstruct any move made by Weld to impose a Resident. Weld had been hounding him with this idea ever since 1881, when a treaty of friendship with the British Government had been proposed. Weld claimed that such a treaty would enable the British to recognize the heir to the throne. The treaty was to be commercial and political in nature.[100] The proposal was once again put forward in 1886, but Weld was disappointed at Sultan Ahmad's persistence in refusing it. Sultan Ahmad's strategy was to pacify the British, yet keep them at a distance. When negotiations for the appointment of a British agent failed, Weld began to resort to 'harsh methods' so as to force Sultan Ahmad into accepting an

Agent. However, his tactics proved to be futile. Weld raised the issue of licentiousness and cruelty, highlighting Sultan Ahmad's immorality in order to pressure him. He was accused of abducting a Chinese woman, Tan Lai Kim, wife of a Chinese trader called Yeo Pan.[101] His cruelty was emphasised when it became known that he had killed the infant belonging to the couple with his bare hands.[102] Such acts, weld claimed, discouraged many Chinese from going into Pahang. Furthermore, Weld stated that many Chinese coolies had left Singapore for Pahang and he sought redress for them.[103] Sultan Ahmad, on his part, was able to defend himself against these allegations. On the question of the abduction of Yeo Pan's wife, Sultan Ahmad reiterated that the woman had come to him of her own accord, converted to Islam and called herself Che Bedah.[104] As for his cruel deeds, he defended himself by stating that it was not his intention to treat the inhabitants cruelly and he confessed to the Colonial authorities that:

> ...without any proper investigation our friend will forever be troubled about us.[105]

However, the British realized that they could not pressure Sultan Ahmad over the question of Yeo Pan's wife, as she was not a British subject.[106]

The only fear which the British had during this time (1886) had to do with Sultan Ahmad's concession policy towards other foreigners. It was reported that two French emissaries had visited Pahang with letters from Sultan Ahmad.[107] The ruler, however, attempted to placate the British by promising them that "if any foreign nation came to see me or foreign companies I should refer them to you. I am entirely in your hands".[108] Yet, when the occasion arose, he went against these promises and granted concessions to the European companies without consulting the British.[109] When this promise was broken, British fears began to increase. The British immediately devised new strategies to deal with the situation. They tried to cultivate closer relations with Sultan Ahmad and to persuade him to sign a treaty. Priority was to be given to the inclusion of a clause pertaining to foreign relations, similar to that signed with the ruler of Johor in 1885. With this stipulation foreigners would have to deal directly with the British.

A wider study of the process of British imperialism falls outside the scope of the present work. Apart from the humanitarian considerations,[110] imperialistic rivalry among the European nations[111] forced the British to watch Sultan Ahmad even more cautiously.

The fact that the British were trying to find excuses to intervene in Pahang forced Sultan Ahmad to resort to a new approach. At the beginning of 1887, Sultan Ahmad appeared to be a docile ruler, preferring passive resistance. Several factors contributed to his change in attitude. His desire to appoint his son, Tengku Mahmud, as the heir apparent had been opposed by the British who favoured Wan Mansur. He realized his ambitions in this direction were being checked. This realization coupled with the fact that he faced increasing opposition from his vassals and subjects eventually prompted Sultan Ahmad to welcome Wan Mansur.[112] He also agreed to Hugh Clifford's accompanying Wan Mansur. Sultan Ahmad's decision was a blow to his own power, for he did not anticipate the consequences that would stem from the entry of Hugh Clifford into Pahang. He did not sense that his sovereignty would be seriously jeopardized. His first task upon taking his course was to inform his inland chiefs of Wan Mansur's projected return. He was still unsure as to whether his brother would return in peace. His announcement to the Maharaja Perba of Jelai indicates his apprehension over Wan Mansur's return:

> We inform you that Our Brother Engku Muda has written to us announcing his intention of returning to the hinterland and of regulating affairs in the interior... We are only too pleased that our brother should work in our service. That is our constant desire... Furthermore, if Our brother does not come down to meet Us first, he is not affected towards us and if you love us, you will abet or approve any action that savours of disloyalty to us... If Engku Muda does not go down to Pekan, it will be proof that he is not well affected.[113]

Wan Mansur returned to Pahang on 18 March 1887 with Hugh Clifford, in accordance with the agreement of 1885, in which Sultan Ahmad had consented to the latter's return. Nevertheless, the rift which existed between the two brothers continued and did not heal. This was expressed by Sultan Ahmad "biar puteh tulang, jangan puteh mata"[114] [Better to die than suffer humiliation]. This meant that he was determined to eliminate the Engku Muda, as Sultan Ahmad was tired of the continued ill-feeling that existed between them. Sultan Ahmad's plan to remove Wan Mansur from the political scene would have succeeded if the latter had not been escorted by Clifford. It was feared that Tuan Itam would have influenced the Sultan to kill Wan Mansur by laying a trap, but he failed in this attempt.

The return of the Engku Muda Wan Mansur heralded a new phase in Pahang-British relations, for it was during this period that Sultan Ahmad was forced to sign the treaty with the British. Although the British had been trying to lure him into signing a treaty ever since 1885, he had consistently resisted them. He was equally obstinate in 1887 when Clifford tried to negotiate a treaty. He insisted that Clifford should return to Singapore as a bearer of a friendly letter from him. But a new turn of events changed his mind. At this critical point when the Clifford mission would have proved a failure, Sultan Ahmad's attitude changed towards the British. Developments within and without Pahang influenced him to adopt a new policy which produced consequences that were adverse to him. He agreed to sign a treaty "similar to that of Johor".[115] It is rather surprising to note that a ruler who till 1887 had steadfastly refused to sign a treaty, now requested one. Sultan Ahmad's decision was influenced by the political developments in Johor. Firstly, when Johor signed a treaty with the British in 1885, Sultan Ahmad began to follow in Johor's footsteps. Secondly, Sultan Ahmad was being influenced by members of his own household. Sultan Ahmad had sent his son, Tengku Mahmud, to Singapore for his education and the latter was closely associated with the British.[116] He in return, influenced his father into accepting a more cordial relationship with the British. Thirdly, and even more important than the above two reasons, was the question of sovereignty. Abu Bakar had stressed to Sultan Ahmad that the only way the latter could preserve his sovereignty was through the acceptance of a British Agent.[117] Sultan Ahmad accepted Abu Bakar's advice. The Johor ruler realized that if the native rulers did not toe the British line, they could be easily deposed, as evidenced by the Pangkor Engagement and the subsequent developments in Perak. This would ultimately apply to the other Malay states and Pahang would be no exception. For Sultan Ahmad, the question of survival was important. He hoped to survive through the office of the Sultanate. Therefore, the idea of being recognized as the Sultan of Pahang tempted him to a great extent into accepting the treaty. He watched Abu Bakar's steps very closely. The fact that Maharaja Abu Bakar was called the Sultan of Johor and was independent in the internal affairs of Johor was due to a convention.[118] Sultan Ahmad was further warned by the British that he would lose materially if he leased concessions without any advice.[119] The Johor incident in which a treaty was signed was an example of how the British would react in the event that Ahmad

failed to comply with their requirements. Lastly, the arrival of Syed Mohammed Alsagoff and the Dato Mentri of Johor helped to ease the dadlock between Sultan Ahmad and the British. Acting under the orders of Sultan Abu Bakar, they influenced Sultan Ahmad into accepting the treaty.[120]

It is, however, interesting to consider Johor's change of attitude towards Pahang. Sultan Abu Bakar, who had in earlier times influenced Sultan Ahmad not to concede to any treaty obligations now began to tip the scales in favour of the British. His sudden switch in attitude was largely due to the treaty limitations which had been imposed on him by the agreement of 1885. Clause six of the treaty denied him the right to interfere in any of the native states without the knowledge and consent of the British Government.[121] Of even greater importance were his investments in Pahang. The friction that existed between the Europeans and natives working the mines in Pahang made him realize that the Residential system would ultimately be imposed. He was also indebted to Mohammed Alsagoff who had obtained the concessions covering the Raub, Tanum, Chika and Nichau areas.[122] Sultan Abu Bakar, to his regret had accepted a British agent in 1885. He agreed to advise Sultan Ahmad, so as to turn the attention of the British away from Johor.[123] His remarks to the British delighted them. He said:

> If I saw a thing as clearly as the sun in the heavens and you saw differently, I would yield [my opinion] to you. You are my Father and I wish always to take advice from you.[124]

Apart from these reasons, the concessionaires themselves sought protection and hoped to gain from British intervention. Their earlier opposition to British rule had by now virtually disappeared. The change in attitude was clearly seen in the case of William Fraser, manager of the Pahang Mining Company. He convinced Sultan Ahmad to accept a British Resident by revealing the advantages that would result from British rule.[125]

These factors finally forced Sultan Ahmad to secure a treaty. As seen earlier, circumstances rather than free choice forced him to accept this move, which took place on 10 April 1887. He wrote to Governor Weld stating "We should like to make with the English Government an agreement concerning Pahang similar to that made with the Sultan of Johor".[126] It was a sad move as observed by Clifford:

> He asked for a treaty with the English government... It has evidently been written against his wish and was almost in tears.[127]

Indeed, Sultan Ahmad's "reluctance" to sign the treaty was shown by his frequent remonstrances over the clauses in the treaty negotiations. His stubborn determination to include what was contained in clause one of the Johor Agreement[128] delayed the signing of the treaty. He found himself quarrelling with the British over the wording of article one which read "...and in the joint defence of these territories from external hostile attacks". Sultan Ahmad hoped to retain this article but the British disagreed. They wanted the article to be altered and hence to be read as "...and in the settlement of a peaceful population and in the preservation of peace and settled government in their respective territories".[129] However, Sultan Ahmad unswervingly insisted on the same article as found in the treaty of Johor.[130]

However, the problems did not end here for Sultan Ahmad. New complications arose. The continued granting of more concessions by him without British consent provided the excuse for the British to intervene. He granted the concessions of Cherang Yang, Beratime and Trusang on 4 June and 21 July 1887[131] to Tan Hay Seng and Seah Song Seah despite warnings from Clifford. Sultan Ahmad played the game of turning the tables on the British. He emphasized that the concessions had been leased on the grounds that the concessionaires who came were recommended by the Governor. Governor Smith, taken aback, reiterated that recommended concessionaires would be bearers of a letter from the Governor himself. To avoid any accusations, Sultan Ahmad pointed out that only one concessionaire called Fraser had brought such a letter.[132] In this regard he was supported by Johor, now manifesting its dual policy — in this case supporting him against the British by refuting Clifford's decisions over the size of the concessions to be granted to Seah Song Seah, who apparently was in the favour of the Dato Mentri of Johor.[133] Seah's agent opposed the negotiations between Clifford and the Sultan. Clifford realized that:

> ...the Sultan of Johore and his advisers Syed Mohammed Alsagoff and Tuan Itan of Singapore... soon it is likely we shall be made fools of... these speculators have since been working against us... it probably will turn out that throughout the business they have worked for or against us as it suited their own ends.[134]

The change in Johor's policy towards Pahang did not last long, for Clifford denounced Sultan Abu Bakar's interference on the grounds of the sixth clause of the treaty of 1885. Sultan Abu Bakar temporarily abstained from further interference in Pahang's

internal affairs, while Sultan Ahmad persisted in annoying the British by granting further concessions. He felt that compliance with British orders would undermine his position as a sovereign. He therefore became more belligerent when Weld arrived in Pahang in July 1887.

Sultan Ahmad began to bargain with the British over the other clauses in the proposed treaty, apart from clause one. He realized that the British would not recognize his son Tengku Mahmud as the heir. In retaliation, he demanded that he should have "the right to appoint and to dismiss the British agent who should never hear any complaints from natives or advise upon them or upon any matter concerning land concessions and that he should be acknowledged the Sultan".[135] These modifications were rejected by the British; Weld's counter proposals[136] were likewise turned down by Sultan Ahmad. Ultimately, Sultan Ahmad found that he had no alternative but to accept the terms of the Johor Agreement. His resistance strengthened while his supporters, at this crucial moment comprised only Tuan Itam and the Orang Kaya Bakti,[137] who had been severely affected by British interference. They feared that, with British rule, they would be deprived of the right to levy taxes on European speculators.[138] Sultan Ahmad still refused to sign the agreement, although the British had conceded to adhere to clause one as favoured by him. He even advised his people and chiefs not to have an audience with Clifford. He summoned the Chenor chiefs of Jelai and Semantan, To' Gajah and others to a council,[139] instigating them to oppose any proposals and to offer armed resistance as a final resort. This indicated his resentment of the British for hoisting the flag on Pahang soil.

But he found little support, and had to abandon any further form of resistance. He turned once more to Johor on the question of the advisability of signing a treaty with the British. He also wanted to know whether he would be insulting British dignity by refusing to sign the treaty.[140] He did not suspect that Johor's advice would soon prove detrimental to his position as the Sultan of Pahang. His refusal to sign the treaty, despite British acceptance of clause one was looked upon as a breach of promise by the British. Weld issued an ultimatum through Sultan Abu Bakar which read:

> ...any overturn must come from Pahang and that it was my intention to report the case home... if he wrote me a letter expressing his regrets at the folly of his relative and asking for leniency I should consider his request favourably... if the Rajah

> of Pahang sent me by the hands of chiefs of rank a letter of submissive apology promising on condition of his conduct being overlooked to hoist the British flag... I would allow him to sign the agreement at once but I would submit to no delay...[141]

Sultan Abu Bakar once again played the role of mediator, advising Sultan Ahmad to apologise and submit to British demands.[142] Sultan Ahmad, who realised that he had lost the battle, silently accepted the advice. He subsequently sent his officers — Dato Imam Perang Penghulu Balai, and Haji Muhammad Nor — with a letter of apology[143] to Governor Weld on October 3, 1887. The treaty was finally signed on 10 October and in effect Sultan Ahmad signed away his independence off to the British.

Governor Smith thought that Sultan Ahmad lost most of his local supporters because "he was surrounded by a lot of scoundrels who were not natives of the country who pander to his passions and his vices. Several of his best chiefs had already intimated to Clifford that they would welcome the introduction of the Residential System".[144] Sultan Ahmad therefore bowed to the British when he was in danger of losing control over his country. The consolation which he gained from the British was their recognition of his position as the Sultan. This had been, to some extent, his desire since 1882, but it became a reality only in 1887.

Thus, in October 1887, Sultan Ahmad accepted a British Agent, Hugh Clifford, whose duties were to be similar to that of a consular officer.[145] As agreed, Clifford promised not to assume the administration of the country. Theoretically, Sultan Ahmad's political position was not undermined. He continued to have the privilege of granting concessions according to clause six of the 1887 agreement. He could lease lands or grant concessions independent of the Governor (except to non-English Europeans). With this assurance, he entered into a new phase of political rule. Ahmad did not anticipate that in the future, his political position would be merely that of a figurehead under the wings of the British Agent. He had learnt from developments in Selangor and Perak that British protection would eventually lead to *de facto* British rule. His hope was that this would never happen to Pahang and he tried to convince the Colonial Office that he did not require the services of a Resident. Developments in Pahang towards the end of 1887 and the beginning of 1888, however, proved that he would have to accept the same fate as his counterparts in the Western Malay States.

At this juncture, economic factors began to weigh against him. The concessionaires who in earlier decades had supported him in rejecting British rule now worked against him. The granting of concessions was a folly which Sultan Ahmad regretted. The concessionaires were dissatisfied with the limitations of their properties. The case of the Pahang Corporation's claims in the Kenabui valley which had been granted to Lim Ah Sam in 1883 by Sultan Ahmad, was a good example. When the valley was transferred to the Company, the corporation felt that the claims in the Kenabui valley should belong to them, in light of the fact that the "river Kenabui and the districts through which it flowed was within the territory of Pahang".[146] The issue was brought to the attention of the Straits Government by the Company's local solicitors, Messrs. Rodyk and Davidson who stressed that the Resident of Sungei Ujong had promised a mining concession to Edwin Watson, another concessionaire[147] in the Kenabui region which was being claimed by the Pahang Corporation. Smith declared that Watson's concession was *ultra vires* since the 1885 notification, which did not recognize concessions obtained from independent Malay rulers, was still held valid. Disappointed, the Company resorted to seeking the advice of the more sympathetic Colonial Office. Their promise to help the Company made Sultan Ahmad realize that more claims would be made by various other concessionaires over their boundary limitations. Finding himself in a dilemma, he decided to curtail the powers of the concessionaires — a move which caught them by surprise. The Pahang Corporation's constant demands for their rights compelled Sultan Ahmad to prevent the Company from seeking colonial support. He therefore decided to cancel the concession to the Corporation in April 1888.[148] It was alleged by Sultan Ahmad that Fraser, the Corporation's manager had promised him a sum of $20,000 to be paid within three months, a fixed sum of $1,200 to the Bendahara and $1,000 to the Temenggong. Furthermore, Fraser was to transfer to the Sultan 400 fully paid-up shares.[149] When Fraser failed to comply with the transactions, Sultan Ahmad terminated the concession to the Corporation. He defended his decision on the grounds that he had given Fraser ample warning and subject to the cancellation of the concessions, he would have the right to take over the land.[150] Fraser's statement, however, differed from that of Sultan Ahmad's. He pointed out that the sum of $20,000 was due for another concession in Kuantan, at Sungei Gemiliang which had been leased to him by the Sultan.[151] Sultan Ahmad professed

ignorance of this agreement, which had been written in Jawi. Sultan Ahmad's attempt to thwart Fraser's intention of seeking British aid proved to be a failure. Fraser, however, was supported by other European concessionaires who urged the Colonial Office to prevent Sultan Ahmad from cancelling other concessions. They feared that the Sultan might grant concessions to foreigners who could outbid the original concessionaires. Sultan Ahmad's frequent suspicion of their activities forced these concessionaires to seek British aid. Their move was a threat to Sultan Ahmad's interests since it would lead to direct British intervention in the internal administration of the state, and this intervention would curtail his powers. He feared the introduction of the Residential system, but the situation was beyond his control. The general administration of the country was deteriorating.[152] Oppression was rife and murders and pilfering became rampant. This situation was to the advantage of the Colonial Office, for according to the Treaty of 1887, the Residential System could be inaugurated if the Agent's position was insecure, or in the event of any British subjects being murdered.[153]

In February 1888, Go Hui, a British subject, was murdered — now, there was a legitimate opportunity for the imposition of British administration. For Sultan Ahmad, this was the end of his independence, even though he continued to resist British control. Go Hui, who was stabbed on 4 February, died on 3 March.[154] The British government demanded redress because he was apparently a British subject.[155] Sultan Ahmad promised to help the British Government in tracing the murderers, although he denied knowledge of them.[156] The British Government, on the other hand, accused Sultan Ahmad of causing the death of Go Hui, since he had revealed a strong desire for Go Hui's wife, Ah Chu, it was said that:

> ...it is not by reason of her beauty that the desire of the King is so hot for her. There be many others as good to look upon as her, but a madness is kindled within him because she alone of all the people in this land dares to deny herself to him.[157]

Sultan Ahmad denied this accusation and defended his honour by stating that he could have possessed her if he wished. He was trying to avoid the label of maladministration which the British had used as an excuse to interfere in the other Malay states. As early as 1883, one could see how Sultan Ahmad tried to counter the accusation of maladministration over, for example, the murder of Syed Salim bin Akil.[158] Sultan Ahmad was entreated to accept a British Resident

then, but he resisted[159] since it was reported that Akil was not a British subject.

The issue of maladministration in the late 1880s would not have been brought against Sultan Ahmad had it not been for the death in January 1888 of Su Kim, who was a British subject. It was alleged that Su Kim was poisoned by the Sultan. The Orang Kaya Bakti had demanded that Su Kim's wife hand over some properties which were in her possession so that they could distribute them among Su Kim's family.[160] These properties were, however, confiscated on the grounds that Su Kim owed a sum total of $4,000 to Sultan Ahmad and $1,200 to the Orang Kaya Bakti. The British Government demanded redress and retribution for the two murders of Syed Salim and Su Kim. Sultan Ahmad, who was averse to any form of pressure, resorted to the excuse that Su Kim was not a British subject. He was proved wrong.[161] He finally acknowledged that the state was weakly administered and admitted that it had been possible for the murders to occur because "my country has not yet all the machinery of government".[162] He therefore decided to pay compensation for the two murders rather than accept a Resident.

Sultan Ahmad's fears mounted as British harassment with regard to the appointment of a Resident increased. He insisted on reverting to his old tactic of wishing to consult with his chiefs. His answer to Smith was that:

> ...he thought the Governor's advice was good, he himself was but the Queen's servant, but he himself could not accept the proposal, however, much it were pressed upon him, *but if he were forced he could not resist.*[163]

The belief that the establishment of a Resident would bring about peace and order was also shared by several investors.

Governor Smith's letter of 29 June 1888[164] obliged Sultan Ahmad to seek the advice of the Sultan of Johor,[165] and once again to succumb to British demands. The letter clearly indicated the unswerving attitude of the Colonial Office towards the establishment of a Resident. On the basis of Johor's advice, and following Johor's example, Sultan Ahmad reluctantly agreed to accept an advisor. Perak and Selangor served as examples to convince Sultan Ahmad that malpractice could be eradicated with the appointment of a Resident. He therefore bowed to British pressure by 'requesting' the services of a full Resident on 24 August 1888. His desire to retain his privileges was emphasised in this letter:

We had time to consult with our relation His Highness the Sultan of Johor. Our friend will remember that we have already acknowledged our responsibility for the murder of Go Hui... Her Majesty the Queen should send us a British officer in order that he may assist us in matters relating to the government of our country on a similar system to that existing in the Malay States under English protection. In asking this, we trust that the British Government will assure to us and our successors all our proper privileges and powers according to our system of government and will undertake that they will not interfere with the old customs of our country, which have good and proper reasons and also with all matters relating to our religion.[166]

The letter of 24 August 1888 signified the end of Sultan Ahmad's "supremacy" over Pahang, for the centre of effective political power now began to move from the Sultan to the British Government. The introduction of the Residential system forced Sultan Ahmad to seek other ways to preserve his political supremacy. The Resident proved to be a sad reminder of the absolute power which he had once held. It was this power which he began to seek once more alter the establishment of British administration.

CHAPTER III
NOTES

1 This era coincided with the Governorship, in the Straits Settlements, of Sir Frederick Weld, an empire builder who aimed at the further extension of British influence in the Malay states particularly Pahang. For details, see E. Thio, "The extension of British control to Pahang", *JMBRAS*, XXX, i (1957), pp. 46—74; E. Thio, *British Policy in the Malay Peninsula 1880—1910*, Vol. I, Kuala Lumpur, 1969, and Lady Alice Lovat, *The Life of Sir Frederick Weld: A Pioneer of Empire*, London, 1924.

2 The mere granting of titles was not the major cause of friction, but the conflict should be seen in the light of the economic benefits which could be derived from these new honours bestowed on ordinary members. Interview with Encik Zakaria Hitam, 16 May 1975, at Kuantan. For an account of the traditional economic system and the privileges of the territorial chiefs, see Chapter II.

3 This is especially seen in the case of To' Gajah and Wan Lingga of the Lipis district. Details are discussed in the following pages.

4 These developments had their origins as the Selangor war. See W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", *JMBRAS*, XIV, ii (1936), Chapter VII. See also "History Background", Chapter I.

5 He was known as Panglima Perang Mamat by the court faction. For further details, see H. Clifford, "The vaulting ambition", *In Court and Kampong*, London, 1927, pp. 112—133. He was commonly called the To' Raja of Jelai.

He belonged to the first class of the traditional chiefs in the political hierarchy. For details see Chapter II.

6 H. Clifford, "In the days when the land was free", *In Court and Kampong*, p. 211.

7 *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, account for Thursday, 17 February, p. 20.

8 H. Clifford, "In the days when the land was free", p. 217.

9 He was known as the Imam Rasu bin Shahrom or Khatib Rasu, but the title of Dato Imam Perang Indera Gajah was conferred on him by Bendahara Ahmad after the civil war. For further details on him see Chapter II.

10 Wan Lingga was the eldest son of the Maharaja Setia Raja Haji Wan Daud, the latter being a cousin of the To' Raja.

12 To' Muda Sentul was the son of the Orang Kaya of Lipis, the latter being one of the chiefs of the second class in the political hierarchy. For details on the Orang Kaya of Lipis (To' Kaya), see Chapter II.

13 For a fuller account, see W. Linehan, *A History of Pahang*, pp. 102—3. See also *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, account for Thursday, 17 April, p. 20.

14 See Chapter II.

15 W. Linehan states that Bendahara Ahmad assumed the title on 6 August 1882. See W. Linehan, *A History of Pahang*, p. 104. However in a letter to Governor Weld, Bendahara Ahmad informed him that he was elected Sultan by his chiefs on 14 October 1881. See Sultan Ahmad Shah to Weld, copy, 26 October 1881, C.O. 273/113, f. 148. This was further confirmed by Governor Weld. See Weld to Kimberley, Confidential, 23 January 1882, C.O. 273/113, f. 128. Henceforth, in his correspondence with the Colonial Office, Wan Ahmad referred to himself as the Sultan, but the British did not recognize this title till 1887. In their correspondence with Wan Ahmad, therefore, they still addressed him as the Bendahara.

16 Although it contradicts the view that it was not his wish to assume the title, he did so at the request of his chiefs and people, who if they wished would be able to depose him. Weld to Kimberley, Confidential, 23 January 1882, C.O. 273/113, f. 131.

17 Weld to Kimberley, Confidential, 19 April 1882, C.O. 273/114, f. 144.

18 Sultan Ahmad to Weld, copy, 26 October 1881, C.O. 273/113, f. 148.

19 Ibid., f. 150.

20 Maharaja Abu Bakar of Johor was married to Che Engku Chik, Wan Mutahir's daughter.

21 Weld to Kimberley, Confidential, 23 January 1882, C.O. 273/113, f. 128; see also Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 3 August 1887, C.O. 273/146, f. 84.

22 Weld's memorandum, enclosure in Smith to Derby, Confidential, 23 June 1884, C.O. 273/128, f. 155.

23 Even the Lipis chief owed allegiance to the To' Raja. Clifford to Rodger, instructions, 1 October 1888, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 15 October 1888, C.O. 273/155, f. 107.

24 W. Linehan, *A History of Pahang*, p. 104.

25 Weld to Granville, Confidential, 15 June 1886, C.O. 273/140, f. 81.

26 Documents VIII, Maharaja Perba Letters, enclosure in W. Linehan, op. cit., p. 217.

27 Document XI, ibid., p. 221.

28 F.A. Swettenham, "Journal kept during a journey across the Malay Peninsula", *JMBRAS*, 15 (1885), p. 6.

29 Clifford to Colonial Secretary, report, 1 October 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 15 October 1887, C.O. 273/148, f. 246.

30 F. A. Swettenham, "Journal kept during a Journey & c", p. 19.

31 *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, account for Thursday, 24 February, p. 25. For a discussion of the taxes imposed, see ibid., account for Saturday, 5 February, p. 9.

32 *ARP* 1891, p. 93.

33 *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, account for Thursday, 3 February, p. 6.

34 These were the sons of Wan Mutahir who secured the help from the Selangor chiefs Raja Dollah and Raja Mahdi. For further details see W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", pp. 92—100. See also H. Clifford, "The Vaulting Ambition", pp. 112—133.

35 It was when he aspired to be Sultan, that Wan Ahmad decided to appoint his son, Tengku Mahmud, as heir to the throne, and it was then that he announced this decision to the Colonial authorities. Weld to Kimberley, Confidential, 19 April 1882, C.O.273/114, f. 146. See also Smith to Derby, 28 June 1884, C.O.273/128, f. 159. On the other hand, Wan Mansur was elected the Engku Muda when Wan Ahmad was elected the Bendahara after his victory in the Civil War. See Wan Mansur to W.H.M. Read, Memorandum, 26 May 1884 enclosure in Smith to Derby, Confidential, 23 June 1884, C.O. 273/128, ff. 163—4.

36 Rodger to Colonial Secretary, report, 13 October 1888, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 15 October 1888, C.O. 273/155, f. 85. W. Linehan states that Wan Mansur was Sultan Ahmad's *favourite* brother. See W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 104.

37 See Appendix C.

38 Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 16 April 1887, C.O. 273/144, f. 140.

39 *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, account for Saturday, 12 March, p. 31.

40 Haji Abdul Rahman to British Resident, Pahang, 27 September 1896, *TDOF* 1896, 409/96.

41 Smith to Derby, Confidential, 28 June 1884, C.O. 273/128, f. 158.

42 Wan Mansur to W.H.M. Read, Memorandum, 26 May 1884, enclosure to Smith to Derby, Confidential, 23 June 1884, C.O. 273/128, f. 165.

43 Smith to Derby, Confidential, 17 November 1884, C.O. 273/130, f. 361.

44 Document IX, Maharaja Perba Letters, enclosure in W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 218.

45 Smith to Derby, Confidential, 23 June 1884, C.O. 273/128, p. 157.

46 Document IX, Maharaja Perba Letters, enclosure in W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 218.

47 Smith to Derby, Confidential, 17 November 1884, C.O. 273/130, f. 360.

48 For details of how Maharaja Abu Bakar of Johor was able to forestall British plans by developing his state, thus earning the title of an enlightened ruler, see Nesamalar Nadarajah, "Johore: Origins of British Control, 1895—1914 (unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of History, University of Malaya, 1972), pp. 30—45.

49 Smith to Derby, Confidential, 1 October 1884, C.O. 273/130, f. 11.

50 For terms of the agreement see N. S. Maskelyne to Knutsford, report, 3 May

1887, C.O. 273/157, ff. 346—50. See also copy of Kuantan Concession, *BROF* 1888, 5/88.

51 N. S. Maskelyne to Knutsford, report, 3 May 1887, C.O. 273/157, f. 375. See also William Fraser to Messrs. Rodyk and Davidson, report on Kuantan Concession 1888 — the Pahang Corporation Limited. *BROF* 1889, 7/1889.

52 Taxes were imposed on metals and crops. These included:

Copper per pikul	$1.50¢
Lead per pikul	.30¢
Tapioca per pikul	.20¢
Coffee per pikul	.80¢
Pepper per pikul	$1.00¢
Gambier per pikul	.30¢

Apart from these, gold, silver and tin were taxed at the rate of one-tenth of their value, to be paid to the Sultan. See William Fraser's report on Kuantan Concession, *BROF* 1888, 125/88.

53 William Fraser to Messrs Rodyk and Davidson, report, *BROF* 1888, 7/88. See also Bendahara Pahang to Rodger, 6 October 1889, *BROF* 1889, 1302/89.

54 For details of the mineral wealth of Pahang, see *ARP* 1888, p. 2.

55 Smith to Derby, Confidential, 1 October 1884, C.O. 273/130, f. 12.

56 Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 16 April 1887, C.O. 273/144, f. 141. This led to dissatisfaction, and dissension arose between the natives and the foreign investors. See Smith to Derby, Confidential, 1 October 1884, C.O. 273/130, f. 13.

57 Smith to Derby, Confidential, 1 October 1884, C.O. 273/130, f. 14.

58 Clifford's report, 3 August 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 3 August 1887, C.O. 273/146, f. 103. See also *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, account for Sunday, 26 February.

59 For details on him, see Chapter II.

60 Clifford's report, 3 August 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 3 August 1887, C.O. 273/146, f. 104.

61 For terms of the agreement see Agreement of 1 May 1884, enclosure in Smith to Derby, Confidential, 15 November 1884, C.O. 273/130, ff. 319—23.

62 Clifford to Colonial Secretary, report, 1 October 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 15 October 1887, C.O. 273/148, f. 244.

63 *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, account for Thursday, 15 February, p. 19.

64 Weld to Kimberley, Confidential, 19 April 1882, C.O. 273/114, f. 146; Smith to Derby, Confidential, 20 May 1885, C.O. 273/134, f. 257.

65 *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, item on Sunday, 26 February, p. 22.

66 Acting Collector Kuantan to Resident Pahang, report, *ARKDO* 1890, 43/91.

67 Clifford's report, 3 August 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 3 August 1887, C.O. 273/146, f. 192; see also Clifford to Colonial Secretary report, 1 October 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 15 October 1887, C.O. 273/148, f. 243. See also Wong Lin Ken, *The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914*, Tucson, 1965, p. 124.

68 *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, account for Friday, 11 February, p. 14.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid., account for Sunday, 13 February, p. 15.

71 Acting Collector Pahang to Resident Pahang, report, 1890, *ARKDO* 43/91.

72 *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, account for Sunday, 13 February, p. 16.

73 Ibid., account for Thursday, 3 February, p. 7.

74 Acting Colonial Secretary, Straits Settlement to Acting British Resident, Selangor, 12 January 1885, *SSF* 94/85. See also Bendahara Pahang to Smith, 6 November 1884, *SSF* 746/85.

75 W. Linehan mentions that an agreement had been secured in April 1885. (See W. Linehan, *A History of Pahang*, p. 106). Judging from Wan Ahmad's and A. M. Skinner's letters of 6 November 1884 and 23 January 1885 in which the former mentions his agreement with regard to the negotiations, it appears that the said agreement could have been signed between November 1884 and January 1885. For details on the above letters see Appendix D and E. However, E. Thio doubts the authenticity of this agreement, since Sultan Ahmad did not mention any agreement to his inland chiefs. See E. Thio, "The extension of British control to Pahang", *JMBRAS*, XXX, i (1959), fn. 39, p. 63. She also does not stress the importance of Sultan Ahmad's request for foreign aid.

76 This was suggested by Smith following Wan Mansur's return to Singapore in 1884. See Smith to Derby, Confidential, 17 November 1884, C.O. 273/130, f. 360; see also Raja Mansur to A. M. Skinner, 20 November 1885, *SSF* 643/85; Bendahara Pahang to Smith, 6 November 1884, *SSF* 746/86.

77 Colonial Secretary to Resident Selangor, 12 January 1885, *SSF* 94/85; see also Sultan Ahmad to Smith, 6 November 1884, enclosure in Smith to Derby, Confidential, 17 November 1884, C.O. 273/130, f. 364.

78 Bendahara Pahang to Smith, 6 November 1884, *SSF* 746/85.

79 Bendahara Pahang to Smith, 25 February 1885, *Treaties and other papers connected with the native states of the Malay Peninsula*, Singapore, 1888, p. 23.

80 Smith to Bendahara, 11 November 1884, ibid., p. 21. See also Smith to Bendahara Pahang, 23 May 1885, ibid., p. 24.

81 Swettenham took advantage of Sultan Ahmad's invitation to Pahang in 1881 when the latter visited Singapore. The idea of using Wan Mansur as the main instrument to establish British relations with Pahang was the prime motive behind the Swettenham mission. See Smith to Derby, Confidential, 23 May 1885, C.O. 273/134, f. 287.

82 Swettenham observed the undesirable conditions prevailing in the state under the inefficient rule of Sultan Ahmad. It was this which led him to conclude that Pahang would neither be developed nor better governed without British advice and assistance. For further details see F. A. Swettenham, "Journal kept during a journey across the Malay Peninsula", pp. 7—16.

83 Weld to Derby, Memorandum, 9 July 1885, C.O. 273/138, f. 361. See also Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 10 October 1888, C.O. 273/155, f. 38.

84 Smith to Derby, Confidential, 23 May 1885, C.O. 273/134, f. 289. See also Weld to Granville, Confidential, 15 June 1886, C.O. 273/140, f. 91; Swettenham to Smith, Memorandum, enclosure in Smith to Derby, Confidential, 23 May 1885, C.O. 273/134, f. 295.

85 See Introduction, "Historical Background", p. 48.

86 Bendahara Pahang to Smith 16 July 1885, enclosure in Smith to Derby, Confidential, 1 September 1885, C.O. 273/135, f. 266; Meade to Lucas, minutes, 3 July 1885, C.O. 273/134, f. 285. For British views on the introduction of the Residential System in Pahang, see Smith to Derby, Confidential, 23 May 1885, C.O. 273/134, f. 288.

87 Smith to Derby, Memorandum, 9 July 1885, C.O. 273/138, f. 361.

88 Smith to Derby, Confidential, 23 June 1884, C.O. 273/128, f. 361.

89 Weld to Edward Stanhope, Confidential, 3 December 1886, C.O. 273/141, f. 896. For treaty terms of 1862, see W. S. Gibson and W. G. Maxwell, *Treaties and Engagements affecting the Malay States and Borneo*, London, 1924, p. 209.

90 He was Abu Bakar's chief advisor.

91 Weld to Edward Stanhope, Confidential, 3 December 1886, C.O. 273/141, f. 896.

92 The British were bewildered about this. In fact one of Weld's prime concerns in 1886 was to investigate this rumour, which Sultan Ahmad had denied. Smith reiterated, "It was of great importance that the Maharaja should neither obtain nor be mixed up with concessions in Pahang". Smith to Derby, Confidential, 20 May 1885, C.O. 273/134, f. 257.

93 Swettenham to Smith, Memorandum, enclosure in Smith to Derby, Confidential, 23 May 1885, C.O. 273/134, f. 292.

94 Abu Bakar to Smith, 23 February 1885, *Maharaja's Letter Book 1885—1898*, Johore State Secretariat, f. 10. By this action, his concessions in Raub would not be recognized by the British.

95 Eunice Thio also mentions the personality of Sultan Ahmad as one of the reasons for the failure of the Swettenham mission. See E. Thio, "The extension of British control to Pahang", pp. 56—7.

96 Fraser to Robeck, private, 4 May 1885, C.O. 273/148, f. 249.

97 Weld was more cautious than Swettenham in his negotiations. See Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 16 April 1887, C.O. 273/144, ff. 139, 146. For further details on Weld's visit to Pahang, see Weld to Granville, Confidential, 15 June 1886, C.O. 273/148, ff. 78—86. See also Anon, *Hikayat Pahang*, p. 156.

98 Weld to Granville, Confidential, 15 June 1886, C.O. 273/140, f. 92.

99 He was Abu Bakar's private secretary and the local agent for several European companies in Pahang. It was reported that he had a gold mining concession of his own at Tembeling in Pahang. See Rodger to Colonial Secretary, report, 13 October 1888, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 15 October 1888, C.O. 273/155, f. 81.

100 Weld to Kimberley, Confidential, 19 April 1882, C.O. 273/114, f. 146. However, it was not accepted by Sultan Ahmad. See also E. Thio, "The extension of British control to Pahang", pp. 50—1.

101 Weld to Edward Stanhope, Confidential, 3 December 1886, C.O. 273/141, ff. 677—82.

102 Raja of Pahang [Bendahara] to Resident Selangor, enclosure in Resident Selangor to Clifford, 7 August 1887, *SSF* 1887, 1970/87.

103 Weld to Granville, Confidential, 15 June 1886, C.O. 273/141, ff. 686—690.

104 Weld to Edward Stanhope, Confidential, 3 December 1886, C.O. 273/141, f. 149. For contradictory views see Tan Lai Kim to Yeo Pan, 2 November 1886, enclosure in Yeo Pan to Weld, petition, June 1886, enclosure in Weld to Edward Stanhope, Confidential, 6 December 1886, C.O. 273/141, f. 704.

105 Bendahara Pahang to Weld, 2 October 1886, enclosure in Weld to Edward Stanhope, Confidential, 6 December 1886, C.O. 273/141, f. 706.

10 Weld to Edward Stanhope, Confidential, 6 December 1886, C.O. 273/141, f. 686.

107 Weld to Granville, Confidential, 15 June 1886, C.O. 273/140, f. 82.

108 Ibid., f. 83.

109 Weld to Edward Stanhope, Confidential, 6 December 1886, C.O. 273/141, f. 687.

110 For a study on humanitarism, see John Hobson, "The Scientific Basis of Imperialism", *Political Science Quarterly*, XVII, September 1902, f. 462; Lawson Walton, "Imperialism", *Contemporary Review*, LXXV, January-June 1899, pp. 305—310; Anon, "A Bibliographical view of our foreign policy", *Saturday Review*, 1 February 1896, p. 119.

111 Russia's entry into the Mediterranean, Germany's proclamation of an empire in Versailles and France's participation in the scramble for power forced Britain to join the race and ward off these powers. See A. P. Thornton, *The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies*, London, 1959, p. 17; E. Thio, *British Polity in the Malay Peninsula, 1880—1910*, Vol. I, Introduction and pp. 67—9. See also R. Robisnon, J. Gallagher and A. Denny, *Africa and the Victorians*, London, 1961, p. 8; W. D. MacIntyre, *The Imperial Frontier in the Tropics 1865—1875*, London, 1961.

112 With the failure of the Swettenham mission, Wan Mansur returned to Singapore realizing that the political atmosphere was still unhealthy.

113 Document IX, Maharaja Perba Letters, enclosure in W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 221. See also *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, account for Wednesday, 2 March, p. 27.

114 *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, /account for Tuesday, 22 February, p. 24. See also Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 15 October 1888, C.O. 273/155, f. 85.

115 Granville to Meade, minute, 18 May 1886, C.O. 273/142, f. 871. See also Abdul Rahman to Granville, 29 April 1886, C.O. 273/142, f. 873.

116 Abdul Talib bin Haji Ahmad, *Sejarah Dato Bahaman, Orang Kaya Semantan*, Kuala Lumpur, 1959, pp. 14—15.

117 Ibid., p. 20.

118 Weld to Clifford, 5 January 1887, enclosure in Weld to Edward Stanhope, Confidential, 5 January 1887, C.O. 273/143, f. 35. By the Treaty of 1885 with Johor, Abu Bakar was recognized as the Sultan.

119 Weld to Clifford, instructions, 23 April 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 28 April 1887, f. 561.

120 Sultan Ahmad to Weld, copy, 12 April 1887, C.O. 273/144, f. 151.

121 Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 16 April 1887, C.O. 273/144, ff. 144—8.

122 Clifford's report, 3 August 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 3 August 1887, C.O. 273/146, f. 101.

123 Eunice Thio mentions other reasons such as the financial factor, for it was known that Abu Bakar was indebted to the Colonial Office. See E. Thio, "The extension of British control to Pahang", p. 64.

124 Alice Lovat, *The Life of Sir Frederick Weld: A pioneer of Empire*, London, 1924, p. 318.

125 Fraser to Robeck, private, 4 May 1887, C.O. 273/148, ff. 248—255.

127 *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, account for Sunday, 10 April 1887, p. 44.

128 Article I of the Johor Agreement was follows: "The two Governments will at all times cordially co-operate in the settlement of a peaceful population in the respective neighbouring territories and in the joint defence of those territories from external hostile attacks and in the mutual surrender of persons accused

or convicted of any crime or offence, under such conditions as may be arranged between the two Governments." For other articles, see W. G. Maxwell and W. S. Gibson, *Treaties and Engagements Affecting the Malay States and Borneo*, London, 1924, p. 132.

129 For British views on this clause, see Weld to Clifford, instructions, 7 August 1887, enclosure in Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 9 August 1887, C.O. 273/146, f. 128.

130 Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 3 August 1887, C.O. 273/146, f. 91.

131 C. B. Mitchell to Secretary of State, London, 22 August 1896, *BROF* 1132/96.

132 Smith to Knutsford, report, 22 June 1888, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 3 July 1888, C.O. 273/154, f. 28.

133 Clifford wanted to reduce the size of the concessions offered to these 2 concessionaires, for it was alleged that both Seah Song Seah and Tan Hay Seng had spread rumours about the British and distributed articles as a form of protest against British designs. See Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 3 August 1887, C.O. 273/146, f. 91.

134 Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 3 August 1887, C.O. 273/146, f. 89.

135 Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 3 August 1887, C.O. 273/146, ff. 89—91.

136 For Weld's counter proposals, see Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 3 August 1887, C.O. 273/146, ff. 90—93.

137 For details on him, see Chapter II.

138 *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1887*, account for Tuesday, 29 March, p. 40.

139 For details on how the traditional council functioned, see Chapter II.

140 Fraser to Robeck, memorandum, 4 May 1887, C.O. 273/148, f. 250.

141 Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 11 October 1889, C.O. 273/148, f. 163.

142 Sultan Abu Bakar to Weld, 26 September 1886, *Maharaja's Letter Book 1885—1898*, f. 62.

143 Sultan Abu Bakar to Weld, 13 October 1887, ibid.

144 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 3 July 1888, C.O. 273/154, f. 24.

145 For agreement clauses, see Appendix F.

146 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 3 February 1888, C.O. 273/151, f. 461.

147 Messrs. Rodyk and Davidson to Knutsford, 24 August 1887, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 3 February, C.O. 273/151, f. 461.

148 *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1888*, account for Saturday, 31 March.

149 Mr. Hole to Messrs. Rodyk and Davidson and Burkinshaw, 5 October 1888, *BROF* 88/88. See also Rodger to Fraser, 1 January 1888, *BROF* 88/88.

150 Clifford to Knutsford, memorandum, 15 May 1888, *BROF* 5/88. See also Sultan of Pahang to Davidson, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 2 June 1888, C.O. 273/154, ff. 43—5.

151 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 2 June 1888, C.O. 273/153, f. 30. It was suspected that the Sultan of Johor had instigated Sultan Ahmad in the cancellation of the concession of the Corporation. This was denied by Sultan Ahmad. See Meade to Knutsford, minute, 19 April 1888, C.O. 273/157, f. 379.

152 Some reforms had taken place. See W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", pp. 118—122.

153 Smith to Sultan Ahmad, 29 June 1888, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, 3 June 1888, C.O. 273/154, f. 58.

154 *Hugh Clifford's Diary 1888*, items for 4 February and March. Clifford paid Go Hui a number of visits.

155 The *Hikayat Pahang* denies that Go Hui was a British subject. See Anon, *Hikayat Pahang*, p. 161.

156 Smith to Knutsford, report, 22 June 1888, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 3 July 1888, C.O. 273/154, f. 30. It was also suspected that Go Hui was murdered by Tuan Muda, a commander, under instructions from Sultan Ahmad. See W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 120.

CHAPTER IV

PAHANG UNDER THE RESIDENTIAL SYSTEM (1888 — 1895) INITIAL IMPACT

The period 1888—1895 witnessed the gradual transfer of power from indigenous hands to those of the colonial masters, a process which also marked the transformation of government. Sultan Ahmad's relentless moves to prevent British interference in Pahang finally collapsed, forcing him like the counterparts in the Western Malay States, to comply with British demands. However, his determination to regain his power continued and his search for autonomy once again became apparent.

The dissatisfied chiefs,[1] on the other hand, had looked upon the British as a source of hope. With the aid of an external agent, they hoped to oust their ruler and thereby gain from the rule of the new forces. Until 1887, their search for political survival was expressed in terms of removing traditional sovereignty and welcoming a foreign element. Whether the Residential system proved to be the answer to their problems was yet to be seen.

Pahang under the aegis of the Union flag in 1888 saw a number of political changes, and the subsequent developments had a tremendous impact on Sultan Ahmad and his chiefs. The new developments proved to be disastrous and more severe for them than they had anticipated.

The crystallization of the imposition of British administration was manifested in the appointment of John Pickersgill Rodger as the first Resident in October 1888. Sultan Ahmad feared that the appointment would jeopardize his political position. He showed his defiance by not cooperating with the Resident in laying the administrative groundwork. His dissident attitude was not a new phase in European-native relations. As stated by Sir Cecil Smith:

> The most important matter is to recognize that although the Sultan of Pahang has asked for a Resident, he has only done so to save himself... hence, although a Resident is placed in Pahang at his request, he is not likely to look upon such an official with any favour and there is every prospect of much passive resistance being shown in the introduction of reforms in the administration of the government of the state.[2]

Although Sultan Ahmad had anticipated a setback in his political position, he found that he was compensated in other ways. His role

Hugh Clifford, acting British Resident, Pahang, aged 29 in 1889

in the granting and cancellation of concessions was recognized as a *fait accompli,*[3] so that his supreme authority to cancel concessions was a fact still recognized by the concessionaires and the British officials. He had supported the British in welcoming more concessionaires to Pahang during this era, but he had done this only with the aim of "developing his state and preventing the large tracts of land being locked up".[4] Hoping that British intentions to develop Pahang were genuine, he gave in to their designs. His ideas of gaining from the concessionaires had not escaped his mind and this might have initially encouraged him to work with the British. Apart from his support for the concessionaires, there was hardly any trace of cooperation with the British to be observed during the 1880—95 period. He remained constantly aloof and refrained from assisting the Resident in carrying out the administrative reforms.[5] He realized that his assistance would affect the working of the government machinery in which he once was the sole authority.

Early signs of disagreement between Sultan Ahmad and the British had economic origins — Sultan Ahmad was dissatisfied with his allowance. Under the Residential System, his allowance was to be fixed at $18,000 per annum, similar to that of the Sultans of Perak and Selangor. In addition, he was to continue receiving the special sums viz. the Selangor war indemnity[6] and the concession payments.[7] The British proposed that the sum be remitted to the State Treasury. Sultan Ahmad opposed this move as his total income had by then amounted to about $29,520.[8] He objected to the sudden slash in his allowance which the British proposal would entail.

Sultan Ahmad's objections to the fixture of his allowance at $1,500 a month were expressed in an appeal to the Governor, in which he disapproved of the sum and demanded that the monthly salary be increased from $1,500 to $2,000. He supported his claim by stating that he had too many dependents and that the present sum would be insufficient.[9] Sultan Ahmad remarked that:

> If it is less than that, it will cause Us much trouble. In future We shall always be complaining of Our trouble to Our friend on this subject. This is the truth.[10]

The tone represented a protest as far as British administrators were concerned. Sultan Ahmad's previous position as a powerful ruler would influence the older and more senior chiefs to resist the British, as they still considered their ruler all powerful.[11] The non-cooperation of the loyal chiefs, Sultan Ahmad believed, would inevitably lead to the failure of the Residential System. It was the in-

Tengku Mahmud ibni Sultan Ahmad, after appointment as Tengku Mahkota, Pahang, in 1889

Sultan Abdullah ibni Sultan Ahmad, 1918

grained fear of such a situation arising which finally forced the British to increase the allowance to $2,000 a month. Sultan Ahmad had won his demands for the day. His frequent threats were an effective weapon with which to restrain the British, but their effectiveness was shortlived.

His proclamation of 22 July 1889 that his son Tengku Mahmud be appointed the Regent of Pahang dealt the death-blow to his forlorn quest for power:

> ...we have granted a titah of authority to our eldest son, Tengku Mahmud and whereas we feel the burden of increasing the age and infirmities and wish to rest (retire from the cares of government)... we have established and confirmed our said son as our representative in consultation with the British Resident to enact laws and issue regulations with reference to all matters concerning the administration of government and we acknowledge all acts in settling state affairs as if they were our own. And further we have granted a titah to our said son, conferring on him full and complete authority so that all our chiefs and headmen must absolutely obey whatever commands are issued by him, since they are in every respect the same as our own.[12]

This was a political blunder. Sultan Ahmad's authority was now to be transferred to Tengku Mahmud who easily played into the hands of the British. Tengku Mahmud's eagerness to win over British favours had once led him to be embittered towards his father. Tension between father and son had been brewing since 1887. It culminated in a skirmish on 8 May 1888, leading to the death of one person on each side.[13] The strained relations had pushed Tengku Mahmud to cooperate with the British. This, coupled with the facts of his early education at Singapore and his long acquaintance with the British, proved to be detrimental to Sultan Ahmad. Tengku Mahmud's anxiety and eagerness to aid the British was strengthened by Sultan Ahmad's letter of 30 July 1889 to the Governor:

> ...I have granted an authority on Mahmud, my son to empower him to act for me in ruling the country in a prosperous manner with the Resident of Pahang.[14]

Tengku Mahmud's support for the British enabled him to win their confidence; they in turn looked upon him as one who was loyal and able.[15]

It is to be noted that British policy towards Tengku Mahmud was

directly opposite to that implemented in the early 1880s. In 1885 when Sultan Ahmad had announced his desire to appoint Tengku Mahmud as heir to the throne, the decision was denounced by the British. At that time, they did not visualise Tengku Mahmud as a future ally of the British. A more likely candidate was the Engku Muda (Wan Mansur), who would have supported them.[16] The fear of losing the natives' support forced them at first to turn their attention towards Wan Mansur as their favoured candidate for the throne, but in 1888 the British realized that Tengku Mahmud's influence over the other territorial chiefs was very marked[17] — a factor which urged the British to win him to their side.

Unlike Sultan Ahmad, Tengku Mahmud was energetic, able and determined to improve the administration of the country — to Rodger's delight. The regent's competence was described by the latter in his 1889 Annual Report:

> The appointment of Tengku Mahmud has greatly facilitated the transactions of all public business and have much pleasure in bringing to His Excellency's notice the valuable services rendered by this young raja of whose character and ability I have a very high opinion.[18]

The appointment of Tengku Mahmud helped promote British interests. On the other hand, it had detrimental effects on some members of the royal household, i.e. on Sultan Ahmad and the Bendahara. Sultan Ahmad's power was being eroded and his activities were being subjected to British supervision.[19] Tengku Mahmud was recognized as the main medium through whom all procedures and matters of importance were to be passed, although it was accepted that important state matters would still require the Sultan's sanction.

Sultan Ahmad also realized that he was losing the support of the Bendahara. Formerly next to the Sultan in authority, the Bendahara now discovered that his position had been "usurped" by Tengku Mahmud. His bitterness towards Sultan Ahmad over the appointment diverted his attention to the British whom he had once defied.[20] This change at the Court level was only the prelude to the various predicaments which Sultan Ahmad and his chiefs were to encounter.

The period of the British Resident's administration saw a number of important developments. There were many administrative innovations which interfered the traditional practices. Western ideas were rapidly implemented. By 1 July 1889, British administra-

tion had taken full effect in Pahang. The state was sliced into the six districts of Pekan, Kuala Pahang, Kuantan, Rompin, Temerloh and Ulu Pahang, all placed under the jurisdiction of European collectors.[21] These collectors replaced the traditional headmen. Furthermore, the districts of Tras and Raub, which had originally been under the Malay supervision of Semantan or Temerloh, now came under the control of the superintendent of Ulu Pahang.[22]

The officer at Ulu Pahang was assisted by the Dato Maharaja Perba of Jelai and, according to Clifford, "there was an increasing inclination on the part of native chiefs and headmen to assist the collectors in carrying out administration of their districts".[23] However, Clifford's view at that point appeared to be more apparent than real. Cooperation from several headmen towards the Collectors did not come forth as voluntarily as supposed by Clifford. Apart from the Maharaja Perba of Jelai, only Wan Chad of Ulu Kuantan proved to be of any assistance to the Collector in 1892.[24] Others from the higher rungs of the political hierarchy gave no indication that they had any desire to serve the British collectors.

The uncooperative attitude of the chiefs was due to the fact that their traditional way of life had been disrupted by the establishment of the collectorate and its functionaries. The British had considered the chiefs to be unsuitable, and felt that it would be absolutely impossible to allow them to administer the districts. They were regardas "an ignorant body of men who can only with difficulty be instructed in their duties".[25] On the pretext that the chiefs were inefficient, the British appointed young and inexperienced officers to the collectorates and District Offices,[26] but this move antagonized the territorial chiefs who regarded the new administration as usurping the powers they had once enjoyed. Rodger, however, did sense the antagonism towards the new regime. In 1889, he wrote:

> ...for sometime to come, the changes introduced into the administration of Pahang will be unreservedly welcomed by the great territorial chiefs whose former almost absolute authority in their responsible district had inevitably been somewhat diminished.[27]

Dissensions were further heightened with the creation of the District Offices in 1889. Early defiance of the British was initiated by the Orang Kaya Maharaja Setia Raja, Haji Wan Daud,[28] at Kuala Lipis. He clashed with the British over the establishment of the District Office at Kuala Lipis, which he claimed belonged to him. The British wanted this area because of its strategic position at

the confluence of the Jelai and Lipis rivers. They bought the land for $200 (being a compensation fee) from the sons of Haji Wan Daud. When W. C. Mitchell was appointed Superintendent of Ulu Pahang, he tried to establish himself there, but Haji Wan Daud refused to vacate the premises. In the ensuing conflict, Mitchell was killed by Haji Wan Daud, who was then described as suffering from "homicidal mania". On Tengku Mahmud's instructions, To' Gajah, To' Raja and the Orang Kaya of Lipis decided to capture Haji Wan Daud, who was eventually shot.[29] Sultan Ahmad, on hearing of the death of Haji Wan Daud was distressed, as the latter had proved himself to be one of his most loyal followers during the civil war. Nonetheless, the incident of the Orang Kaya Haji was a clear indication that there were signs of resistance among the discontented.

A similar situation also emerged in December 1890 in the case of the Orang Kaya Semantan whose hatred for the British was aroused at the erection of a police station in Lubuk Terua. He desired to administer his own district and resented the interference of the British officers.[30] However, the major threat which Sultan Ahmad and his chiefs faced was the establishment of the State Council in 1889. With the creation of this institution, the individual powers and privileges of the Sultan and his chiefs were defined and regulated.

The State Council was aimed "at bringing together the hereditary chiefs from the interior and allowing them to understand that under the new regime they were to take an active part in the general administration of the country."[31] As Emily Sadka states:

> ...it provided a constitutional basis for the government administered by British officers and the Council proceedings were to illuminate the relationship between the state and the government of the Straits Settlements. It was to provide an invaluable source for the study of the problems and procedures of government under the Residential system."[32]

With this aim, the State Council in Pahang was formed, comprising the Dato Bandar, Dato Raja, Orang Kaya Chenor, Tengku Mahmud, Raja Muda and Imam Perang Indera Mahkota, with the Sultan presiding over it.[33] The Resident acted as an ex-officio member.[34]

The State Councils of Perak and Selangor comprised seven and five members respectively, a large number of them being from the royal class.[35] In comparison, in Pahang, the major chieftains had a voice in the State Council. However, there was no Chinese representation, although it existed in the other two states. Although

the Resident was only placed as an ex-officio member, his power was greater than Sultan Ahmad's. His main concern centred around the interests of the Malay population, as well as economic progress.[36]

The new powers and functions of the State Council had far-reaching effect on Sultan Ahmad, his chiefs and the natives. It is ironical that a State Council comprising native members should produce results that were adverse to them. After the first session of the State Council held at Pekan in December 1889, Sultan Ahmad realized that his privileges were being limited. Although he presided over the Council, important regulations detrimental to his position were passed with respect to land mining, slavery, forced labour and the protection of Indian immigrants. Paradoxically Sultan Ahmad and his chiefs were affected by the new regulations passed with regard to two sensitive issues — slavery and forced labour. These had constituted an essential part of wealth in the traditional government for Sultan Ahmad and his chiefs, but the new laws were to act against their interests.

The system of forced labour or *kerah* was regulated and it was henceforth declared that no person would be compelled to work for a period of more than a month or two months in a year.[37] The *rakyat* were entitled to claim a daily payment of 10 cents or sufficient food, a privilege which they were denied during the pre-colonial era. In addition, a compound liability was enforced by a daily payment of 20 cents. It was declared that anyone who disobeyed these laws was liable to a fine not exceeding $25 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months. The question of payment was not favourable to the chiefs. To' Gajah, for instance, suggested that food should be supplied in lieu of money.[38] The idea appeared favourable to several other major chiefs.

With regard to slavery, it was legislated that every *abdi* who had been bought or sold would become a *hamba berutang*, and that the total amount of his debt would not exceed $100. Provisions were also made for the proper treatment of slaves and for the prohibition of any transfer. In due course it was hoped that the slaves would be set free.[39] In cases where support was given to the slaves' children, it was suggested that the master should receive some remuneration to be fixed by the British Collector.[40] As for the *hamba berutang*, they were entitled to a reduction of debt at the rate of $2 a month in the case of males and $1.50 a month in the case of females. They were to be clothed and fed at the owner's expense. Any employer who

forcibly detained a *hamba berutang* who had cleared his debts would be liable to a fine not exceeding $100 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months. With these stipulations, it was hoped that slavery as an established institution would be eradicated within a period of four years. In 1889 it was found that there were around 1,000 or 2,000 *abdi* present while the number of *hamba berutang* came to around 4,000 to 5,000.[41] The registration of slaves was an important issue in the Council proceedings at the second meeting of the State Council in December 1890.[42] Subsequently, the registration of slaves was carried out in the districts of Pekan and Kuala Pahang. However, according to To' Raja many of the chiefs had refused to register their slaves.[43] The district of Kuantan was an exception. In 1891 it was discovered that only five *hamba berutang* were registered. This was not due to the disinclination on the part of the people to register them, but to the fact that there were hardly any slaves to be registered.[44]

From here, it is possible to observe an erosion of the powers and rights which Sultan Ahmad and his chiefs once possessed. Wealth, which was an instrument of power, could not be measured now in terms of slaves. Sultan Ahmad, surprised by the new laws, accepted the reforms reluctantly. As for slavery, he stressed that he owned no *abdi* but only *hamba berutang*.[45] The success of the reforms of the New Order, carried out under the guidance of Rodger, could be attributed to the support of Tengku Mahmud and the Raja Muda. Sultan Ahmad realized that his position was being endangered by their intrigues with the British. His rule, being regarded as an oppressive one, now faced the prospect of being terminated. From 1 July 1889, Ahmad's revenue-seeking avenues, i.e. from import and export duties were foreclosed. He had further to reduce the tin duty from 10% to 8% while that of gold fell from 10% to 5%.[46] The duties (at one time enjoyed by the chiefs) on salt, tobacco, oil, matches and cloths[47] were abolished. The duties on opium,[48] spirit, minerals and jungle produce[49] were, however, retained. With the entry of the British, revenue ceased to be a profit-seeking venture. It was henceforth collected by the Resident assisted by European officers in the name of the Sultan.[50]

By 1890, it could be noticed that Sultan Ahmad's position was merely that of a figurehead. His powers — political, economic and administrative — were now subject to British designs. His only achievement in the State Council was the guarantee that no member of the royal household would be sued in any courts and they would

Orang Kaya Indera Maharaja Perba Jelai, Orang Besar Empat. His son, Wan Chik standing; his grandson seated in about 1880

be immune from legal action with regard to debts.[51]

Sultan Ahmad was further bedevilled by the new measures in the administration of justice which caused him to lose heavily. In 1888 a stratified police force was introduced for the first time in Pahang's history. It consisted of 50 Sikhs and 150 Malays to be under the control of Syers.[52] The difficulty in raising a Malay contingent within Pahang forced the British to seek the help of the Sikhs. It was evident that the Malays were subject to their headmen and therefore could not undertake any police duty efficiently. Besides Sikhs, a large number of Malays from Kelantan and Trengganu were recruited.[53] Initially, Sultan Ahmad had resented the recruitment of Sikhs into the police force and he based his argument on the fact that they were of ruffianly character and could not speak the Malay language.[54] A more plausible reason was that the Sikhs have had longstanding relations with the British in India. Therefore, Sultan Ahmad feared that their loyalty would rest with the British rather than with him. He had been preoccupied with this fear ever since 1888.

Sultan Ahmad also realized his insignificance as the fountain of justice, as he was seldom consulted and cases were often reported to the police. As Lucas minuted:

> ...the establishment of the police force under British officers looked to the Resident as their chief. Thus, the Sultan says that his authority is comparatively shattered.[55]

He was further deprived of a place in the Supreme Court[56] which was established in 1888. It was composed of Tengku Mahmud, the Bendahara, the Temenggong and Rodger, the British Resident. Neither Sultan Ahmad nor his favourites were appointed; only those who favoured the British were appointed.[57] Sultan Ahmad's frustrations with the British increased when he was deprived of his royal prerogative of the *droit du seigneur*.[58] With British entry into Pahang, the periodical raids on girls and women ceased.[59]

Bewildered at the new developments, Sultan Ahmad was furious with the British. His anger was revealed by his quiet retreat to Pulau Tawar in December 1889. Thenceforth, he seldom paid any visits to the capital. Rodger observed that during the entire year of 1890, the Sultan was at Pulau Tawar.[60] Sultan Ahmad's retreat was a sign of disapproval. His passive resistance proved again to the British that he did not wish to cooperate while it spoke to the chiefs of his dissatisfaction with the new administration. Thus they (the chiefs) were able to conclude that their ruler would not disapprove of any

Istana Sri Terentang, Pekan, 1908

actions taken against the New Order. Cecil Smith, in his correspondence with the Colonial Secretary noted that:

> ...the fact of his [the Sultan] residing so far away from the capital has been evidence to the country at large that he does not approve of, but is antagonistic to the existing system of administration.[61]

Sultan Ahmad's resistance proved to be hazardous to the British. It made the task of administration difficult, as matters of state had to be taken occasionally to Pulau Tawar to be deliberated upon and sanctioned.[62]

Meanwhile, reactions from the chiefs over the curtailment of their privileges were directed towards the British. Their hereditary rights were compensated by stipends which were not to their satisfaction.[63] At the second meeting of the State Council held on 11 December 1890 at Pekan under the chairmanship of Hugh Clifford, the inadequacy of the allowances to the principal chiefs — To' Raja, To' Gajah, Orang Kaya Temerloh, Chenor and Lipis — was considered.[64] As representatives, they presented the list of headmen whose inadequate allowances were to be reviewed. The list appeared as follows:[65]

Maharaja Perba of Jelai	To' Muda of Telang
	Wan Tanjong of Telang
	To' Muda Kiri of Kuah
	To' Muda Abas of Jeran Besar
	To' Muda Usop of Perlak
	To' Mamat of Kechau
	Penghulu Teh of Rantau Panjang
	To' Muda Rahmat of Cheka
The Shahbandar	Tuan Haji Andak
	Che Mat Bontal
	Che Musa of Tanjong Medang
	Che Mat Abas of Langgar
	Che Mamat of Pulau Keladi
	Haji Jenal of Blukar Acheh
The Orang Kaya of Chenor	Che Tunus of Kertau
	Panglima Kuala Kunyit
	To' Muda Awang Chut
	Panglima Kaman of Sekara
	To' Mamat of Chenor
	To' Muda Ambong of Sentong

The Orang Kaya of Temerloh	(Imam Teh of Senggang (To' Muda Draman (To' Mamat of Tengoh
To' Gajah	(Khatib Aris of Budu (Mohammed Kilau of Kedondong (Che Ahmad Buruk of Budu (To' Jenang of Kangsa (To' Muda Sajak of Budu (Che Rendan of Kangsa (To' Muda Mat Sat (To' Muda Usop
	(To' Muda Setia of Tanjong Besar (Mentri Dollah of Penjum (To' Keli of Sega (To' Bakar of Batu Dalam (Penghulu Dagang of Sementan (To' Muda Long

Upon receipt of this list, Clifford expressed his disapproval. His argument was based on the fact that it would be impossible to provide allowances until the State revenue had increased.[66] He suggested that only two important headmen in a major chief's district be selected and allowances be granted to them. His view was largely supported by Tengku Mahmud, while the other chiefs denounced it as unjust. On the other hand, To' Raja suggested that an increase be made in the annual allowances of the major chiefs, so that they would be able to transfer a part of their allowances to the respective headmen in their district. This proposal was supported by To' Gajah. A *modus vivendi* was sought. The annual allowances of the Orang Besar Berempat and the To' Gajah's were increased to $1,200 each while the Orang Kaya Lipis and the Orang Kaya Semantan both received a sum of $840 annually. A new list[67] was then drawn up. In effect, allowances ranging from $120 to $240 per annum were also granted to several headmen (*Ketuan*) and *To' Muda* who were subordinate to the principal chiefs.[68] Furthermore, the rights and duties of the headmen were defined.[69] They were henceforth to have limited jurisdictional powers over the inhabitants of their districts, and were subject to the District Collector. The headmen were empowered to settle civil as well as other petty cases in their mukims and they were to notify the District Collector of any

incidents of illicit gambling, pawning and manufacturing of spirits. Any headman who illegally collected revenue without the knowledge of the Collector or oppressed his people would be punished. A breach of the regulations would bind the headman liable to pay a tax not exceeding $100 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. The headmen were also subject to the land regulations of 1889, whereby their holdings had to be registered by the District Collector. Lands under the Malay system of tenure were not exceeding one year. The headmen were also subject to the land regulations of 1889, whereby their holdings had to be registered by the District Collector. Lands under the Malay system of tenure were not subjected to the payment of quit rents.[70] Many of the regulations introduced brought about settlements of the frequent disputes that occurred between the headmen over their lands. In 1890 an order was passed in Council which defined the rights of padi planters and owners of buffaloes.[71]

The Orders in Council did not serve to remove the chiefs' and headmen's dissatisfaction completely. They were unhappy over the meagre allowances which they were given as a compensation for the removal of the rights which they had exercised during the traditional era. Political-cum-economic power could not be achieved under the new regime. The Orang Kaya Semantan highlighted the general feelings of resentment. He was the prime offender of the New Order and the small pensions. He yearned for a return of the former measures, which had brought him money.[72] His revenue seeking outlets were closed with the implementation of the mining regulations on December 1889. Concessions now had to be registered.[73] Paragraph 20 stated that "every concession or document of title must be registered",[74] while paragraphs 23—6 required the registration of every transfer, sub-division, mortgage etc. of any mining area.[75] The regulations further emphasized that unregistered lands would not be recognized. A registration fee of $5 was collected for each concession. Under the new regulations, twelve concessions[76] were known to have been registered in 1890 alone. By 1892 the number had increased to around forty.[77] Soon the major chiefs, like the sultan, began to see the State Council and the Resident as threats to their political survival. They even referred to the Council as "Your Council"[78] indicating that the Resident was the sole legislative and executive authority and was above the Sultan. It proved that the Resident was the independent ruler and had undermined the Sultan's sovereignty. Although the establishment of the State

Council was a compromise between the British and the natives, it served only the interests of the British.

In 1890 the chiefs — To' Raja, To' Gajah, the chiefs of Chenor and Temerloh, Orang Kaya Semantan, the Shahbandar and Encik Abdullah of Bera issued an ultimatum expressing their refusal to obey these laws unless they were reviewed,[79] but they were threatened with punishment for non-compliance with the new laws. It is doubtful whether the new threats by the British deterred the chiefs. The Orang Kaya Semantan, for instance, did not adhere to them, continuing instead to levy taxes on boats passing along the Semantan river in 1889.[80] It was due to the un-cooperative attitude of the chiefs that stricter measures were enforced to curtail their individual powers. The Orang Besar Berempat and Delapan became even more furious when limitations with respect to their boundaries were enforced at the fifth meeting of the State Council, in October 1891.[81] Further restraints which prohibited the collection of land rents came into effect from 11 January 1892. The presence of British officers had checked and drastically diminished the importance of their roles as headmen.[82] Sultan Ahmad and his chiefs were prohibited from receiving the concession payments which they had been used to procure during the pre-colonial days. Prior to the establishment of the British protectorate in Pahang, Sultan Ahmad had granted about thirty-nine concessions to several concessionaires for mining, planting and the cutting of timber. A royalty of 10% was to be reserved to Ahmad in the case of mining.[83] When the British established their control in the state, the above concessions were recognized but with the understanding that if no work was carried out, the concessions would be cancelled. Concessionaires were given a time limit of five years, within which they had to prove their ability to work their respective concessions.[84] Sultan Ahmad realized that he could not secure any exemption fees from the concessionaires. To be exempted from cancellations, the companies had now to pay an exemption fee of $500 to the British and not to Sultan Ahmad. For instance, the Pahang Corporation had to pay $1,000 per annum for an extension of their time clause for prospecting within the Kuantan district.[85] The Selensing Company ha to pay $500 annually for similar privileges.[86] These sums were usually paid under threats of confiscation. In 1893 the Pahang Exploration and Development Company was warned that in order to retain its concession at Cherang Yang, it would have to pay an annual rent of $500 in advance to the British Government.[87] This

was disastrous news for both the concessionaires and Sultan Ahmad, who had hoped to gain from the royalties that would ensue, especially with regard to the gold and tin mines. Despite British threats of cancellation, several concessionaires did not pay the required sums and many of their time clauses expired in 1894. Sultan Ahmad was therefore put in an embarrassing situation when he was asked to cancel these concessions on the advice of the British Resident.[88] He reluctantly consented. In 1893, twenty-four mines were closed.[89] In 1894, the mining concessions for Tras, Selensing, and Pahang were cancelled (to the disappointment of Sultan Ahmad), despite the fact that in 1890 the success of the state as a mining country had been assured.[90] By 1895, only six mines were recognized. These monetary and economic setbacks suffered by Sultan Ahmad and his chiefs were some of the major effects of the Residential System. The administrative reforms eroded the base of the political and economic power which the Sultan and his chiefs had hitherto enjoyed.

The Residential System, although abhorrent to those on the higher rungs of the native political hierarchy was received favourably by the lower levels of the traditional bureaucracy represented by the penghulus and the petty headmen. With these new developments, Pahang could be said to have entered the phase of modernization.

According to British reports, the Malay peasant welcomed the British as liberators from th despotic rule of arbitrary chiefs.[91] To them, British protection represented economic salvation, liberating them from the social traumas of *kerah* (corvee) and slavery. They now enjoyed the security and justice which had been absent during the despotic era.[92] Disputes between the padi planters and buffalo owners, which had been common during the traditional period, came to a halt with the new regulations of 1890.[93]

In the political hierarchy, according to the British it was the *penghulus* and the petty headmen who benefitted from the rule of the new masters. They now obtained fixed allowances and complete protection of life and property. This came about through the passing of land laws which safeguarded land owned by the natives although they had to pay a quit rent.[94] Registered land that lay fallow for a term of four years was protected and reserved for the holder. With this law, Malay land tenure ceased to exist, as land owned had to be registered.[95] By 1895, it was noted that the lands owned by native headmen were free from the control of the concessionaires.

The penghulus felt that their administrative powers were being preserved with regard to Islamic laws. In Kuala Lipis, for instance, the custom that the *penghulus* should settle disputes and cases continued. They also administered the estates of deceased natives, subject to the approval of the District Officer.[96]

In the administration of justice, participation from the local *penghulus* was confined to the district of Pekan. For example, the Kathi Habib Amir and Tuan Hakim sat with the magistrate in all cases. In no other districts had native magistrates habitually sat with European officers.[97] It was these *penghulus*, then, who showed an inclination to help the British administrators. In 1888 Clifford observed that To' Bakar of Ulu Lipis, To' Keli of Lega, Penghulu Teh of the lower Jelai and Tengku Samat of Durian Sebatang were predisposed towards the British.[98] In 1890, he further reported that "an increasing confidence and goodwill between the natives and European officers was noticeable and formed a marked contrast to the feeling which existed among most influential natives in the years 1887 and 1888.[99]

Generally the response from the lower strata of society towards the British was better. At the village of Nipah, for example, it was observed by Clementi Smith during his visit in August 1889 that the headmen and the people residing there had benefitted from the introduction of the Residential System, which had led to the cessation of the heavy taxation under which they had previously laboured.[100] For this reason, they were pleased by the inauguration of the new administration.

There was a general influx of people of different races into the state in 1889. Smith observed that:

> Klings from India have entered the state and are taking up all kinds of work. Half a dozen Sinhalese have settled down in Pekan as carpenters and are fully employed. Even a couple of Chetties — the great money-lending class from Southern India were to be seen walking in the streets.[101]

The increase in the Chinese community was also apparent. With the coming of the Chinese, the secret society law of 1890[102] was introduced to prohibit any such illegal associations as were found in the Western Malay States. It was noted by Rodger that, in contrast to the period 1891, great difficulties had been encountered in inducing the Chinese to undertake mining operations in Pahang. Such benefits as protection, transport facilities and other amenities diverted their attention to the more prosperous states of Perak and Selangor.[103]

TABLE I
POLITICAL STATISTICS IN VARIOUS DISTRICTS IN 1892

	Malays	Europeans	Klings	Eurasians	Javanese	Arabs	Bugis	Singhalese	Bengalis	Sikhs	Japanese	Siamese	Africans	Dyaks	Chinese	
District																Total
Pekan	8731	15	151	18	93	125	17	15	96	25	6	3	3	4	790	10,092
Kuala Pahang	1879	4	35	—	1	91	1	—	5	7	—	—	—	—	28	2,069
Rompin	2828	4	—	—	3	&	9	—	—	58	—	—	—	—	10	2,913
Kuantan	2923	31	132	17	169	1	—	7	29	152	—	—	—	—	1248	4,711
Temerloh	14592	7	13	—	7	80	256	1	35	—	—	—	—	—	256	15,247
Ulu Pahang	19556	41	25	6	—	32	—	9	62	1790	—	—	—	—	909	22,430
Total	58527	102	356	41	273	329	283	32	227	2032	6	3	3	4	3241	57,462

See *A.R.P.* 1891, p. 92

Nevertheless, Sultan Ahmad could not arrest the economic developments that resulted from British intervention in Pahang. Railways were constructed to link Sungei Ujong and the Western states with Pahang. Neither Sultan Ahmad nor his chiefs suspected the underlying motives for the construction of transportation lines between Pahang and the Western Malay States. Economically, Pahang had been regarded as a rich country with varied sources of wealth and the construction of railways would yield sizeable returns. Intercourse with the interior would be beneficial and remunerative as evidenced in India and Burma.[104] Politically, it was hoped that the Southern part of the Malay Peninsula could be connected with the East and West. This would help British officers to administer Pahang without undue difficulties. Railway lines were looked upon as a tool to integrate Pahang's economy with that of the other Malay states.[105] The idea had proved feasible in Johor during the 1870—1890 period.[106]

Besides railways, road construction was also undertaken to connect the mines. New town sites were planned and in 1888, Pekan was established as the new headquarters "with some brickshop houses and several bungalows and public houses erected by the government".[107] The townships of Kuala Lipis, Kuala Pahang, Kuantan, and Rompin were similarly established in 1890. The capital was initially located at Temerloh which also functioned as the terminal station on the Western seaboard. It was selected because of its geographical position, but in 1893 it was decided that Kuala Lipis would be more appropriate as the mining areas of Raub, Penjum and Selinsing were centred around it.[108] Since it was more centrally located than Temerloh or Pekan, the Resident (Clifford) decided to have his Residency transferred there in due course. It was hoped that the more Ulu Pahang was opened up, the more steadily Pekan would lose its significance. Public works, therefore, were discontinued at Pekan. Its position as the headquarters eventually declined. In 1890, Sultan Ahmad paid a friendly visit to Kuala Lipis and expressed his surprise and pleasure at the improvements that had taken place.[109]

One of the improvements that Sultan Ahmad witnessed was the introduction of medical services in 1889. Government hospitals were established at Pekan and Penjum and private hospitals were erected at Kuantan, Bentong and Sungei Dua. A daily average of ten patients was treated in the hospitals at Pekan and the death-rate was estimated at 6%.[110] But the Malays were still prejudiced to-

wards western medicine. This prejudice held sway in the minds of the *rakyat* even as late as 1895. Their preference for treatment by their own medicine men was strongly affirmed.[111]

However, the modernization programme did upset the traditional chiefs, because the construction of public works further limited their revenue seeking outlets.[112] Sultan Ahmad joined the category of the discontented, and as early as 1 July 1889 there were widespread rumours of impending trouble. It was these rumours that prompted the Acting Collector of Selangor, Arthur Keyser, who then lived at Kuala Kubu (at the boundary of Selangor and Pahang) to ask H. C. Birch (the then Acting Resident of Selangor) about the necessity of strengthening their defences in the wake of sporadic uprisings in Pahang.[113] Clifford did not foresee the rise of a native resistance as revealed in his account for 1890:

> ...although 1890 was considered to be a year of unbroken peace and although from time to time rumours of intended rising among the Malays in Pahang have been organized and circulated, there are no more dangers to be apprehended of such a rising occurring in Pahang than maybe supposed to exist in the old established states of Perak and Selangor.[114]

But Clifford was proved wrong. The resistance of the Orang Kaya Haji had signalled the antagonism of the discontented towards the foreign elements. The incident did not initially appear to have any political overtones, but it constituted an outlet into which others could channel their grievances. Their dissatisfaction was expressed in the murder of Chunda Singh (a Sikh policeman) by a native at Pekan in 1890[115] — clearly an offshoot of the Orang Kaya Haji incident. These two incidents had far reaching consequences for Sultan Ahmad and his major chiefs.

The turn of events at this critical juncture did not surprise Sultan Ahmad. His status and that of his chiefs had been affected by the New Order. Their quest for political survival had been interrupted by the new developments. Their efforts to deal with the foreign elements in order to maintain power now took a new direction. These efforts soon became apparent in the action of Sultan Ahmad's henchmen to whom British intervention had been anathema — they adopted resistance (by force of arms) to foreign domination. The traditional authorities had to develop new techniques of maintaining their power and interests which were jeopardized by foreign administration.[116]

NOTES

1 For details on this group, see Chapter III, pp. 110—112.

2 Clifford to Rodger, Instructions, 1 October 1888, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 15 October 1888, C.O. 273/155, f. 98; see also Legislative Council Proceedings, 12 November 1892, enclosure in Smith toi Ripon, Confidential, 29 November 1892, C.O. 273/183, f. 476.

3 Lucas to Meade, minute, 15 July 1889, C.O. 273/160, f. 336.

4 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 10 June 1889, C.O. 273/160, f. 338.

5 Ibid.

6 This was in agreement with the terms agreed upon with Tengku Dziauddin at the end of the Selangor war in 1873. For details, see "Historical Background", Chapter I.

7 The Selangor war indemnity totalled about $37,920, while that of the concession payments amounted to approximately $3,600.

8 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 10 June 1889, C.O. 273/160, f. 340.

9 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 5 August 1889, C.O. 273/161, f. 210.

10 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 5 August 1889, C.O. 273/161, ff. 210—211.

11 Although the senior and older chiefs had constituted the dissatisfied group under the pre-colonial era, they still regarded the Sultan as the sole supreme ruler.

12 Sultan Ahmad to Smith, copy, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 5 August 1889, C.O. 273/161, f. 251.

13 W. Linehan, "A history of Pahang", *JMBRAS*, XIV, ii (1936), p. 123.

14 Sultan Ahmad to Smith, 30 July 1889, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 12 August 1889, C.O. 273/161, f. 251.

15 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 5 August 1889, C.O. 273/161, f. 213; Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 10 June 1889, C.O. 273/160, f. 338; Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 17 January 1890, C.O. 273/165, f. 84.

16 Weld to Sir Henry Holland, Confidential, 3 August 1887, C.O. 273/146, f. 89.

17 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 10 June 1889, C.O. 273/160, f. 345.

18 *ARP* 1889, p. 10. See also Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 12 August 1889, C.O. 273/161, f. 417; Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 21 August 1891, C.O. 273/174, f. 296. The *Hikayat Pahang* further states that Rodger loved Tengku Mahmud and regarded him as his own son. See Anon, *Hikayat Pahang*, cerita 37.

19 The *Hikayat Pahang* states that even in the hunting of *seladangs* (wild buffaloes) which was one of Sultan Ahmad's hobbies, he needed British approval. See ibid.

20 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 12 August 1889, C.O. 273/161, f. 417.

21 *ARP* 1889, p. 6. The European appointments in the various collectorates were as follows:

F. Belfield	..	Acting Collector (Pekan)
W. C. Mitchell	..	Acting Superintendent (Ulu Pahang)
A. H. Wall	..	Acting Collector & Magistrate (Kuantan)
E. A. Wise	..	Acting Collector & Magistrate (Temerloh)
G. F. Owen	..	Acting Collector & Magistrate (Tampin)
W. W. Mitchell	..	Acting Collector & Magistrate (Kuala Pahang)

22 *ARP* 1889, p. 6; *ARP* 1890, p. 90.

23 *ARP* 1890, p. 91, Clifford was the Acting British Resident for the year 1890.

24 Wan Chad replaced Wan Andah as headman of Ulu Kuantan during the latter's absence from that district. See Acting Collector and Magistrate, Ulu Kuantan, to Rodger, 25 January 1893, *ARKDO* 1893, K45/93.

25 *ARP* 1896, p. 3.

26 Legislative Council Proceedings, 12 November 1892, enclosure in Smith to Ripon, Confidential, 29 November 1892, C.O. 273/183, f. 480.

27 *ARP* 1889, p. 10.

28 Wan Daud was a cousin of the To' Raja of Jelai and an ardent supporter of Sultan Ahmad. The latter gave him with jurisdictional powers over the Lipis valley. For further details see W. Linehan, op. cit., p. 130.

29 For further details see Abdul Talib bin Haji Ahmad, *Sejarah Dato Bahaman, Orang Kaya Semantan*, Kuala Lumpur, 1959, pp. 25—6.

30 Legislative Council Proceedings, 12 November 1892, enclosure in Smith to Ripon, Confidential, 29 November 1892, C.O. 273/183, f. 477.

31 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 12 August 1889, C.O. 273/161, f. 417.

32 E. Sadka, "The State Councils in Perak and Selangor 1877—1895", K. G. Tregonning (ed.), *Papers on Malayan History*, Singapore, 1962, p. 89.

33 Apart from the Sultan, only Tengku Mahmud and the Raja Muda were from the royal household. The Orang Kaya Temerloh and the Orang Kaya Chenor, the Dato Bandar and Dato Raja were the major chiefs from the Council of Four. The Imam Perang Indera Mahkota was a close associate of the Sultan.

34 *ARP* 1888, p. 1; see also Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 28 August 1889, C.O. 273/161, f. 423.

35 E. Sadka, "The State Councils in Perak & Selangor & c", pp. 96—100; see also E. Chew, "The first State Council in the Protected Malay States", *JMBRAS*, XXIX, i (1966), pp. 182—3.

36 E. Sadka, "The State Councils in Perak & Selangor & c", p. 102. The Resident's role was also similar in Perak and Selangor.

37 *ARP* 1889, p. 7; see also State Council Minutes, 31 December 1889, enclosure in Smith in Knutsford, Confidential, 17 January 1890, C.O. 273/165, ff. 89—100, Rodger to Knutsford, report, 8 January 1890, *KDOF* 1890, K.153/90. See also Pahang Laws passed by the State Council between 31 December 1889 and 8 January 1896, Kuala Lumpur, 1897, p. 19. (Henceforth referred to as the *Pahang Laws*).

38 State Council Minutes, 31 December 1889, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 17 January 1890, C.O. 273/165, f. 98; see also Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 12 August 1889, C.O. 273/161, f. 418.

39 State Council Minutes, 31 December 1889, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 17 January 1890, C.O. 273/165, f. 89. For details on other clauses, see ff. 89—94. There was also a clause which stipulated that the purchase or acquisition of slaves would be forbidden. See Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 12 August 1889, C.O. 273/161, f. 418.

40 Rodger to Acting Collector, Pekan, 25 February 1890, *KDOF* 1890, K.186/90.

41 *ARP* 1889, p. 6.

42 *ARP* 1890, p. 92.

43 Loh Fook Seng, *The Malay States 1877—1895*, Kuala Lumpur, 1969, p. 192. For details of an appraisal of British policy towards slavery in the Malay States, see ibid., pp. 183—99.

44 Acting Collector Kuantan to Rodger, report, 20 March 1891, *ARKDO* 1891, 43/91. Slavery was only abolished in 1906, see *ARP* 1906, p. 20.

45 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 17 January 1890, C.O. 273/165, f. 84.

46 Ibid.

47 *ARP* 1889, p. 6.

48 The price of opium was fixed at $200 a chest. See Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 10 June 1889, C.O. 273/160, f. 344.

49 The export duty on all jungle produce such as rattan, gutta, gharuwood and timber was 10% while that on plantation products was valued at 12%. See Rodger to Wall, instructions, 24 June 1889, *BROF* 491/1889. In 1895 the working of all forms of getah was prohibited. See *Pahang Laws*, 1897, p. 66.

50 *ARP* 1888, p. 1.

51 Rodger to Colonial Secretary, 17 December 1890, *KDOF* 1893, 294/93.

52 *ARP* 1888, p. 1.

53 The Pahang Malays looked down on the new recruits, since they held the old belief that one should belong only to one state.

54 Rodger to Colonial Secretary, report, 13 October 1888, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 15 October 1888, C.O. 273/155, f. 85.

55 Lucas to Fairfield, minute, 30 September 1892, C.O. 273/182, f. 632.

56 It was the only Court of Appeal and the only court where prisoners sentenced in the lower Courts (police courts) were tried. All cases of importance were tried here. See *ARP* 1888, p. 1; *ARP* 1890, p. 107. In the lower Courts, the Residency Surgeon performed the duties of magistrate, in addition to his duties as head of the Medical Department. *ARP* 1890, p. 97.

57 *ARP* 1888, p. 1.

58 For details, see Chapter I.

59 *ARP* 1889, p. 10. From 1890 onwards, the *budak raja* class ceased to function and they sought refuge with the Sultan at Pulau Tawar. See *ARP* 1889, p. 10.

60 *ARP* 1890, p. 100.

61 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 29 August 1892, C.O. 273/182, f. 642.

62 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 21 August 1891, C.O. 273/174, f. 296.

63 The *Hikayat Pahang* states how Penghulu Che Bakar of Balai drafted the list. He inserted the names of his friends and omitted those of his enemies. Sultan Ahmad, who had initially wanted to revise this list, forgot to do so. The original list was therefore confirmed by the Resident and pensions were allocated. See Anon, *Hikayat Pahang*, cerita 37.

64 W. Linehan, *A History of Pahang*, pp. 132—3.

65 Ibid. The various headmen under Maharaja Perba, the Shahbandar, the Orang Kaya of Chenor, the Orang Kaya of Temerloh and To' Gajah were in charge of the various districts under their jurisdiction, but they were responsible to their major chieftain. E.g. To' Muda administered the Telang district but was responsible to the Maharaja Perba of Jelai.

66 There was always a deficit in the revenue from 1889 to 1895:

Year	Revenue $	Expenditure $
1889	30,390.95	142,620.88
1890	62,071.01	297,702.15
1891	71,386.50	238,174.22
1892	50,044.34	255,706.21
1893	83,688.47	278,392.71
1894	100,220.43	207,514.27
1895	106,743.80	231,915.90

See *ARP* 1893, p. 93; *ARP* 1894, p. 62. In 1890 allowances alone amounted to $58,605 of the expenditure. *ARP* 1890, p. 90.

67 See Appendix H.

68 *ARP* 1890, p. 14.

69 *Pahang Laws 1889—1896*, Kuala Lumpur, 1897, pp. 47—8. See also Pahang Government regulations for headmen passed by the State Council, *KDOF* 1890, K192/90.

70 *ARP* 1889, p. 6.

71 *Pahang Laws 1889—1896*, p. 49.

72 Meade to Butler, private, 21 May 1892, C.O. 273/180, f. 381.

73 *ARP* 1891, p. 86. See also *Pahang Laws 1889—1896*, pp. 28—43.

74 William Maxwell to Ripon, 4 September 1893, C.O. 273/189, f. 318.

75 Ibid.

76 *ARP* 1890, p. 94.

77 *ARP* 1892, p. 93.

78 W. Linehan, *A History of Pahang*, p. 134.

79 Ibid.

80 J. H. M. Robson, *Records and Recollections 1889—1934*, Kuala Lumpur, 1934, p. 154.

81 See Appendix I; *ARP* 1893, pp. 97—8.

82 *ARP* 1896, p. 3.

83 Smith to Ripon, Confidential, 30 September 1892, C.O. 273/183, ff. 223—4.

84 Ibid. See also Lucas to Fairfield, minute, 14 November 1893, C.O. 273/183, f. 214.

85 William Maxwell to Ripon, 4 September 1893, C.O. 273/189, f. 320.

86 Ibid.

87 Wilkinson to Fairfield, 20 July 1893, C.O. 273/191, f. 454.

88 *ARP* 1894, p. 67; *ARP* 1893, pp. 97—8.

89 *Clifford's Diary 1893*, conclusion.

90 *ARP* 1890, p. 101.

91 W. R. Roff (ed.), *Stories by Hugh Clifford*, Kuala Lumpur, 1966, p. xvii. See Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 10 June 1889, C.O. 273/160, f. 349.

92 *ARP* 1889, p. 10; *ARP* 1893, pp. 108—9.

93 *Pahang Laws 1889—1896*, K.L., 1897, p. 49.

94 Rodger to Smith, report, 14 February 1890, *KDOF* 1890, K186/90.

95 It was found that the registration of land held under Malay tenure was non-effective, since registration was not made compulsory. See Acting Collector Kuantan to Resident Pahang, report, 26 March 1891, *KDOF* K43/91.

[96] Acting District Officer Kuantan to Resident Pahang, report, 28 January 1897, *ARKDO* 1896. The British also had a policy of non-interference from the British in cases involving religious questions (e.g. divorce). Rodger to Wall, instructions, 24 June 1889, *BROF* 1889, 491/89.

[97] *ARP* 1890, p. 97. See also Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 10 June 1889, C.O. 273/160, f. 339.

[98] Clifford to Rodger, 1 October 1888, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 15 October 1888, C.O. 273/155, f. 113.

[99] *ARP* 1890, p. 101.

[100] Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 28 August 1889, C.O. 273/161, f. 412.

[101] Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 28 August 1889, C.O. 273/161, ff. 415—16. This delighted Roger since his objectives were being fulfilled. In his early instructions to Mr. Wall, who was appointed Collector and Magistrate of Temerloh in 1889, he advised him to: "Try and make friends with the Chinese, Malay *rakyat* and Sakai who will be the chief gainer by British intervention. Let them learn that a British District Officer is ready to act as their friend and adviser and is not merely a police magistrate and tax collector for the general improvement and development of the district". Rodger to Wall, instructions, 24 June 1889, *BROF* 1889, 49/89.

[102] *Pahang Laws 1889—1896*, Kuala Lumpur, 1897, p. 49.

[103] See Table I.

[104] Maxwell to Smith, Memorandum, enclosure in Dickson to Knutsford, Confidential, 31 October 1890, C.O. 273/168, f. 791. See also Josef Silverstein, "Politics and railroads in Burma and India", *JSEAH*, Vol. I, March 1964, pp. 17—28.

[105] Lucas to Meade, minute, 25 March 1892, C.O. 273/165, f. 501. See also Lucas to Captain Ommaney, minute, 9 January 1890, C.O. 273/162, f. 384. For a discussion on the railway negotiations see Willink to Sutton and Ommaney, 14 June 1891, enclosure in Ommaney to Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 18 June 1890, C.O. 273/170, f. 98, ff. 114—15. Hill and Rathbone to Knutsford, 21 February 1890, enclosure in Martin Lister to Weld, 30 November 1889, C.O. 273/171, ff. 229—33. Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 16 June 1891, C.O. 273/174, ff. 565—8. In Pahang itself, negotiations were carried on with the Pahang Corporation for the construction of a line from the Kuala to Ulu Kuantan. This would benefit the Corporation, but by facilitating the general mining and planting operations, it was hoped that it would also be useful to the state. *ARP* 1889, p. 10. In addition, private enterprise was also encouraged. See Fairfield to Lucas, minute, 23 July 1890, C.O. 273/173, f. 559.

[106] Keith Sinclair, "Hobson and Lenin in Johore: Colonial Office polity towards British Concessionaires and Investors, 1878—1907", *Modern Asian Studies*, I, iv (1967), pp. 335—52.

[107] Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 21 August 1891, C.O. 273/174, f. 295.

[108] Superintendent of Ulu Pahang to Resident Pahang, report, 1893, *KDOF* 1893, K744/93; see also *ARP* 1893, pp. 96, 103—5.

[109] *ARP* 1890, p. 92.

[110] *ARP* 1890, pp. 92—3; *ARP* 1894, p. 68.

[111] *ARP* 1894, p. 68.

[112] With the development of roads and railways, the rivers were seldom used. *Kuala* duties, therefore, could not be levied. For details on how the chiefs

benefitted from this system during the traditional era, see Chapter II.

113 Keyser to H. C. Birch, letter, 4 July 1889, *SSF* 2210/89.

114 *ARP* 1890, p. 100.

115 *ARP* 1890, p. 96.

116 The initial reaction to the establishment of contact (and control) is simplistically traditional. The purpose or reaction is to retain (rather than restore), the status quo ante and to expel foreign interference. Leadership remains with traditional authorities and the forms of reaction are traditional. W. H. Friedland, "Traditionalism and modernization movements and ideologies", *Journal of Social Issues*, XXIV, iv (1968), p. 16.

CHAPTER V
THE PAHANG RISING OF 1891—1895

On 18 October 1891 at the fourth meeting of the State Council, Sultan Ahmad issued an Order in Council depriving Dato Bahaman, the Orang Kaya Setia Perkasa Pahlawan of Semantan, of his title. He also circulated the *chop* throughout the Semantan district, thereby withdrawing the authority of the Semantan chief.[1] This was the first time that the formal act of deprivation was imposed by Sultan Ahmad on one of his favourites. The act sparked off an open *initial resistance*[2] towards the Colonial Order by a native bureaucrat. Such resistance was not new to the Malayan political scene — opposition to British rule had been recorded in Naning in the early 1830s, as well as in Perak and Selangor in 1875. The British had forced Sultan Ahmad to take the drastic step of denouncing Bahaman, but it would be interesting to assess Bahaman's attitudes during this period when the British considered him a threat to their policies. Bahaman's early refusal to abide by the mining regulations of 1889 indicated to the British that he would be a strong opponent of their administration. His opposition was reflected by his continued levying of taxes on boats passing along the Semantan river, but his actions did not bring forth any formal complaints. Many of those affected were petty Chinese or Malay traders who refused to prosecute an "influential" chief to whom they owed allegiance.[3] At this point, Bahaman was attributed with more prestige and status than he actually had. The Resident of Selangor said that "...anyone would suppose that the Orang Kaya was really a man of influence with the Sultan and the ruler of a large tract of country, whereas he is one of the most unpopular and least influential of all the minor chiefs in Pahang".[4]

His resentment of the British became more intense and he ignored British demands to cease taxation. He therefore wrote an "exceedingly insulting and threatening letter"[5] to the magistrate at Temerloh (Mr. E. A. Wise) stating his dissatisfaction over the creation of the police station at Lubuk Terua. He further demonstrated his defiance of British rule when he wrote a letter to W. E. Maxwell, the Resident of Selangor, in which he demanded that his district be attached to Selangor's, his own personal allowance be increased, and each of the village headmen in the Semantan be given a substantial wage.[6] He even described the other chiefs in Pahang as traitors to the Sultan, and declared that he alone

would not submit to the British Government. The fear that he would not be recognized as a dominant chief by the British forced him to write those letters. His prestige was declining in the eyes of the natives, and coupled with the new developments, his total loss in terms of power and privileges was apparent. Thus his suggestion that his political pension be raised to $6,000 per annum was really a demand for a form of compensation.[7] He reckoned this sum to be the value of the taxes he was being deprived of by the "absurd" new British laws which forbade him to levy dues. His dissatisfaction with the creation of the police station at Lubuk Terua was only used as an argument to strengthen his demands.

However, when his requests were ignored, his realization that his rights had been endangered encouraged him to continue making demands on the people in contravention of British laws. He was aware of the fact that the British could not arrest him on their own accord, since they had to recognize him as one who held a letter of authority from Sultan Ahmad.[8] A curtailment of Bahaman's powers would require the sanction from Sultan Ahmad. His case was therefore presented before Sultan Ahmad, who was disturbed by Bahaman's attitude. Bahaman, however, denied having written both the letters and Sultan Ahmad ordered him to proceed from Pulau Tawar to Pekan, where a full investigation into his conduct was to be carried out by Tengku Mahmud and the Acting Resident. Initially, Sultan Ahmad did not believe that Bahaman had written the letters, but he was proved wrong when the latter fled from Pulau Tawar into the jungle. His flight convinced Sultan Ahmad of his guilt. The Maharaja Perba To' Raja of Jelai was soon despatched to bring Bahaman to Pulau Tawar in February 1891, but the mission was a failure. Bahaman escaped to Kelantan via the Tembeling. He eventually returned to Semantan, but remained adamant about resisting British orders. He further "incited his people to resist government regulations and threatened them with condign punishment if they complied with them".[9] He even prevented the enumeration of his people when the census was taken in Pahang in 1891.[10] Because of his continued recalcitrance, the British felt it was necessary to curtail his powers and suppress his authority. Sultan Ahmad was therefore requested to deprive him of his title. At the Council meeting in October 1891, Hugh Clifford expressed his view (which was the general view held by the British then) that:

> This recalcitrant chief has been repeatedly warned and hitherto treated with the greatest clemency, but it is clear that

any person disobeying Your Highness' Government is guilty of treason and merits punishment. I propose that he be deprived his office and forbidden to return to the Semantan district.[11]

Without delay, Sultan Ahmad, on the advice of Tengku Mahmud, issued his *chop* depriving Bahaman of his authority.[12]

An examination of Sultan Ahmad's reactions towards Bahaman during this period is pertinent. His sanction was seen as a form of co-operation with the British, but Ahmad had his own reasons for his action. He was greatly affected by Bahaman's letters to Maxwell. The matter was not referred to him and this forced him to consider Bahaman as one who had failed to adhere to the principles and terms of the promise which was secured at Pulau Tawar in 1891. It had been ascertained at Pulau Tawar, that any matter undertaken which related to the British would need the consent of the three members, namely Sultan Ahmad, the To' Raja of Jelai and Bahaman, before a decision could be arrived at.[13] Sultan Ahmad had to acknowledge that Bahaman, with his extravagant ways and personal methods of dealing with the British, had broken that initial promise. He also remembered that Bahaman had once defied him in the matter of the collection of taxes,[14] but here, Sultan Ahmad's ill-feeling towards Bahaman was purely personal. He did not want openly to show his chiefs that he desired to dismiss a member whom he himself had elevated to a position of supreme importance. He therefore gave Bahaman ample time to surrender before enforcing his order in October 1891. However, if one is to look closely into the concept of resistance, one finds that Sultan Ahmad's decision to dismiss Bahaman legally was *his* way of retaliating against the British. He was working for a way to resist them, as he felt deeply the loss of his privileges and powers. He hoped to regain both through force of arms. Bahaman provided the perfect opportunity for him to set his plans in motion. By denouncing Bahaman, Sultan Ahmad enabled him to openly declare resistance towards the British. Thus, while seeming to comply with British demands, he actually stepped up Bahaman's defiance of the British. He posted a placard in the streets of Pekan warning the people that "the Orang Kaya Pahlawan was a liar unworthy of belief".[15] The major chiefs also supported Ahmad and described Bahaman as "a man difficult to deal with from his gross stupidity".[16] As for Bahaman, his claim that he was a patriot while the other chiefs were traitors was unfounded. His appeal to the Resident of Selangor to have his district attached to Selangor, proved that he did not fully abide by his ruler.

At this point, it would be interesting to consider the question as to whether Bahaman's initial resistance was actually directed at Sultan Ahmad, for it cannot be denied that the stipends were fixed with the recommendations and approval of Sultan Ahmad and Tengku Mahmud.[17] Sultan Ahmad had always described himself as the sovereign ruler of Pahang even under the aegis of the British. However, although any form of resistance against the Pahang Government could in fact be understood as resistance against the ruler, the weakness (brought about by the introduction of the Residential System) of Sultan Ahmad's claim to sovereignty does not support the idea that Bahaman's early resistance was against traditional power.

The suspension of Bahaman's authority was advantageous to the British, since he was "no longer protected by the Sultan's Commission".[18] Bahaman, aware of this fact, tried to escape to Selangor but failed. It was much easier for the British to arrest him now. From this point on, one sees Bahaman embarking on an offensive role. His failure to secure protection and his fruitless escape into Selangor compelled him to retaliate against the British by force of arms. Although he was only equipped with a small force of about two hundred men, he was more than prepared to cause bloodshed, as can be seen from the incident of 16 December 1891.[19] His chance came when Mr. Desborough, the Acting Collector of Temerloh and the Inspector of Mines, went up-country with a party of Sikhs on his ordinary duty to station 10 Sikhs and 3 Malays at Lubuk Terua. In the course of the journey, they captured three of Bahaman's men who were bringing along jungle produce such as tin, rotan and kayu to Temerloh. The British considered this a trivial revenue offence[20] and the three were brought to Lubuk Terua. Bahaman regarded the expedition as undertaken in order to arrest him. Becoming aggressive, he "...captured the Lebuk Terua police station without resistance, seized the rice stored in the godowns of the Raub and Bentong Mining Companies and openly proclaimed [his] intention to resist the government by force of arms".[21] From that point, passive resistance became active and the outbreak started to take the shape of a rebellion. The first outbreak[22] was merely an example of armed resistance carried out by a discontented group under the leadership of Bahaman. The attack was not planned, nor did Bahaman intend to embark on a full scale campaign. It was the British who behaved irrationally in this case. Rodger was aware of this:

...but I consider that the actual outbreak was precipitated by

the manner in which the Acting Collector of Temerloh and Inspector of Mines commenced their progress up the Semantan river.[23]

Simple resistance was fast developing into popular revolt, as could be seen from the number of supporters Bahaman had. At the first outbreak, the followers did not exceed one hundred Malays, but the number soon increased to five hundred or six hundred when supporters from Bentong joined the force. The Desborough incident made the natives turn towards Bahaman. Rodger observed that:

...the local Malays most of whom subsequently joined the ex-orang Kaya could not be depended upon for loyal assistance.[24]

Bahaman also had the support of the Sakai aborigines, who acted as scouts.[25] With such a strong following, it was not difficult for Bahaman to stockade various points on the Semantan river and ransack Temerloh, the headquarters of the district. The dissidents showed their antagonism by robbing and murdering the chief Chinese shopkeeper at Temerloh, a Tamil contractor and three others who wanted to escape via the Pahang river.[26]

Up to this point, Sultan Ahmad's role in aiding the British had been negative. He made no attempt to suppress the dissidents. He constantly looked for excuses to avoid assisting the British. He used trivial reasons to convince them that he was not in favour of quelling the rebellion on his own. He was saved for a while when floods, which hampered movement, overcame Pahang in January 1892.[27] On one occasion it was observed that Sultan Ahmad refused to co-operate because of the interference of foreigners. This occurred when Rodger requested aid from the Selangor auxillaries to suppress the dissidents. The important personalities sent from Selangor by Maxwell were Sayid Masyhur[28] and Haji Mat Nusi who joined forces with Captain Syers. Sultan Ahmad resented the presence of Sayid Masyhur, for personal reasons that had their origins in the civil war days, and he used him as a pretext to reassert his policy of non-cooperation with the British. Rodger emphasized this point in his letter to the Governor:

I must regret however to learn that he has sent into Pahang a Malay named Saiyid Mashor since that Malay who was signally defeated at Kuala Selangor by the Pahang contingent during the civil war is as abnoxious to the Sultan and his people as was Raja Mahmud of Selangor and this continued employment may

gravely complicate my relations with the sultan, which have always hitherto been of the most friendly description.[29]

Maxwell was strongly of the opinion that Sultan Ahmad's stubbornness in objecting to foreign aid was an attempt to arouse hostility against the British:

...his objection to the employment of foreign Malays friendly to the British and the objection of Saiyid Mashor or to the employment of Rawa auxilaries may at any time be put forward as a reason for negation or even hostile action.[30]

Not only Sultan Ahmad, but also the Pahang Malays abhorred the presence of foreigners in their state. They were especially hostile towards the Rawa auxillaries, who were old enemies of the Pahang populace. However, the entry of Selangor men into Pahang was to the advantage of Bahaman. The dissidents had been sent by Banginda Muin,[31] ostensibly to sell buffaloes but in reality to help. Their main aim was to recruit the Selangor men into their army. Bahaman's association with the Selangor auxillaries was reported by Maxwell, the Acting Resident of Selangor, who wrote:

...heard from one Mat Yasin that the Orang Kaya had a letter from Baginda Muin at Lubuk Terua telling him that he was willing to assist in looting Kuala Lumpur and Baginda Muin proposed that the ex-Orang Kaya should send forty armed men from Pahang and that he would supplement them by hundred of his own people. Their plan was to set fire to some place so as to get the Europeans out of their house and then to stake them in the confusion.[32]

With the aid of the Selangor men, Bahaman hoped to capture all the important stations in Pahang. He tried to persuade the Penghulu of Bentong to attack the Bentong police station,[33] but the suggestion was declined — thereupon, Bahaman doubted the Penghulu's loyalty.[34] The Penghulu's non-cooperation did not prevent Bahaman and his party from carrying out their operations against the British. They succeeded in shooting Dr. Little, the District surgeon, as they passed through Bentong in May 1892.[35] This event forced the British to strengthen their forces by recruiting the Selangor police force.[36]

Meanwhile, Sultan Ahmad's dealings with the British remained rather negative. His passive attitude of non-involvement forced the British to conclude that he was not an active participant in the rebellion. As Rodger observed:

...I do not believe whatever a priori objections may be urged to

the contrary that the Sultan ever gave any encouragement, direct or indirect to the ex-Orang Kaya in the matter and I base this belief (which is shared by Mr. Clifford, the only European whose opinion is of much value on Malay matter in Pahang) not merely on my previous knowledge of the Sultan and my recent observations of his behaviour and that of his chiefs.[37]

Nevertheless, the British found Sultan Ahmad's early indications of non-cooperation with regard to Bahaman's initiation of open violence suspicious. In another statement, Rodger put forward a different view:

...there has so far been no kind of co-operation between the Sultan's forces on the Semantan and the combined Perak and Selangor expeditionary forces on the Bentong. No chief has been sent by the Sultan to co-operate with Captain Syers or to take any active measures in Ulu Pahang against the ex-Orang Kaya.[38]

Sultan Ahmad played his cards well. On 29 December 1891, in order to suppress British fears on the issue of his non-cooperation, he sent Tengku Mahmud and several headmen accompanied by two hundred followers with Mr. Clifford to Kuala Semantan.[39] He further showed his "interest" in aiding the British by advocating and offering monetary rewards for the capture of the dissidents. It was widely publicised that any dissidents who were caught would be executed.[40] By adopting this measure, Sultan Ahmad was trying to convince the British that the same principles which had succeeded in Perak[41] would prove beneficial in Pahang.[42] He hoped that this would keep the British happy temporarily, so that they would not condemn him or classify him as an indirect participant of the insurrection. This tactic caused the British to think that he might be loyal,[43] but they were not fully convinced. Realizing that victory would not be theirs unless the ruler himself participated, they compelled him to serve their interests by suppressing the dissidents. This was also a way to test whether or not Sultan Ahmad supported the dissidents. The opinion that Sultan Ahmad would be the person most capable of quelling the rebellion was based on the fact that he was "proficient in Malay warfare and he was a Sovereign to whom his chiefs and people were devoted... It would not be difficult [for him] to collect five thousand fighting men in Pahang".[44] A more important reason why Sultan Ahmad's services were essential was that the majority of the populace now realized the adverse effects of British domination. Sultan Ahmad having retained his prestige

among the people, was the only power who could check any threats from the natives. The British thought that only a very small proportion of the population might revolt against the Sultan.[45] With all this in mind, the British invited Sultan Ahmad to suppress the dissidents. He accepted the challenge. It was a way of proving that he was not an ardent supporter of the dissidents. Rather than face the consequences for not complying (the consequence being a loss of his suzerainty), he finally wrote to Governor Smith saying that he was *quite* prepared to suppress the Semantan outbreak with his own men, if he was supplied with ammunition.[46] It is not wrong to think that the Sultan never supported the British wholeheartedly. On no occasion did he state that he was *fully* prepared to aid the British.

With Sultan Ahmad's acceptance, the reins of authority passed from the hands of the British to the ruler. Sultan Ahmad came from Pulau Tawar on 14 January to take command of the expedition. He arrived at Temerloh[47] on 18 January 1892 and the movement of his men began on 22 January 1892. He was assisted by Tengku Ali, Rodger, Panglima Garang Yusof and Abdullah from Bera. His force was estimated to be around five hundred.[48] The Sultan's participation impressed British circles. Sultan Ahmad and Rodger reached Bentong on 21 January 1892 and wiped out twelve of Bahaman's stockadea. Bahaman fled into the jungle, where Sultan Ahmad pursued him.

Sultan Ahmad appeared to be "assisting" the British but his sympathies were for the dissidents. The chiefs saw Sultan Ahmad's compliance with British demands as a treacherous move, but the ruler was still able to maintain discipline among his henchmen. Smith assessed that:

> ...the Sultan was able to maintain order among the chiefs and their followers who are not favourable although several had condemned him as untrustworthy.[49]

The chiefs did not realize that Sultan Ahmad had a dual motive in dealing with the British. Sultan Ahmad was ready to help the British because he wanted to preserve his sovereignty.[50] He did not wish to be deposed for not conforming to treaty obligations and his diffident attitude was justified on this ground. It could be said that he was as anxious as Bahaman to get rid of the British. His desire to oust the British was well observed by British administrators. Smith noted that:

> It is not easy to gauge accurately the Sultan's attitude at the period. He felt keenly the loss of power and privileges which

the new regime and the appointment of Tengku Mahmud as regent involved and he had in his inner council, a war party led by To' Gajah who pressed hard to declare against the British.[51]

Up to January 1892, Sultan Ahmad had avoided cooperating with the British. As a sovereign he did not make any move to subdue the rebellion until he was requested. He adhered to the promise of 1891 at Pulau Tawar and had to please his chiefs according to its obligations.[52] British fears that the insurrection was instigated by the ruler were justified when Bahaman, in his capacity as Orang Kaya, was able to receive ammunition from Tengku Ali[53] and gather forces using the name of the Sultan. According to the General Officer of the Straits Settlements:

> ...the Sultan of Pahang and his son Tengku Mahmud know the intended rising of the Orang Kaya and that they are now in sympathy with him. But on account of the English government they do not wish this to be known. It was further said that the Orang Kaya had gone to the Sultan and told him of his intention to resist the English and that the Sultan replied "you may do what you want but do not let my name be mentioned."[54]

The fact that Bahaman did not implicate Sultan Ahmad[55] shows his faithfulness and obedience[56] to Sultan Ahmad. The Sultan himself had encouraged the dissidents and supported Bahaman throughout the country.[57] Owing to the co-operation between Sultan Ahmad and Bahaman, the Semantan district fell easily into the hands of the dissidents.[58]

Sultan Ahmad's desire to help Bahaman was typical of the relationship that existed between the natives. Their main aim at this critical point was to restore the pre-colonial powers which they were being deprived of. Sultan Ahmad, therefore, did not show any enthusiasm about putting an end to the resistance. His support for the dissidents was beyond doubt — he argued that since "the British took the reins of Government out of his hands and having got into a mess, it is not his business to help them out of it".[59] Sultan Ahmad's myriad excuses were effective weapons to convince the British that it was not possible for him to subdue totally the outbreak. He stressed that he could not get support from the other chiefs and that he no longer "received that prompt exhibition of loyalty to his commands"[60] which he claimed he had had before the introduction of the Residential System. Despite these excuses, he played the game well with the British, pretending that he was doing his utmost to prevent the dissidents from expanding their activities. He

listened carefully to British orders and adhered to them, as seen when he proclaimed amnesty for all those who had participated in the resistance, on condition that they returned to their villages within a period of a month.[61] The proclamation was made on the advice of Rodger, and by making it, Sultan Ahmad satisfied the British. By 2 February 1892, the chief dissidents were listed as:[62]

Si Bahaman bin To' Nok, ex-Orang Kaya Pahlawan of Semantan
To' Muda Drus) sons of Orang Kaya
Mat Lela)
Panglima Raja Awong Sahar bin Haji Daud
Panglima Besar Majid of Kuala Kepong
Imam Perang Yaman bin Sultan Mas
To' Muda Samat of Sabair
Mahmat Kelubi (alias Hitam)
To' Muda Nong bin Haji Ma Ali of Temerloh
To' Mamko of Bolo
Muhammed Merah of Lubuk Terua
Wan Usof of Sungei Dingin
Wan Draman, son of Wan Usof
Tengku Ahmad bin Tengku Samat
To' Muda Truman of Kuala Kangsar
Penghulu Mat Latib of Bentong
Je Ali (brother of Penghulu of Bentong)
Kathi Jaffier of Benus
Haji Sahor of Bentong (Sebok)
Abdullah of Bentong

A reward of $1,000 was also announced for the capture of the dissidents' leader,[63] in the hope that it would serve as an incentive for the dissidents to surrender the leader.[64]

Sultan Ahmad's cooperation with the British in this matter satisfied them. They anticipated an early end to the outbreak, and began to draw up arrangements for the future administration of Temerloh and Semantan. Tengku Ali was appointed to assist Captain Wise in his duties as District Officer and in the organising of scouting parties.[65] Furthermore, to induce the *rakyat* to return to their villages, the whole length of the Semantan river was provisioned and garrisoned solely by Pahang Malays who were entrusted to the charge of Encik Abdullah of Bera and Sayid Ali of Badoh, who stationed armed parties at points between Bentong and Temerloh.[66] The British hoped that, with these arrangements, the dissidents would be easily overcome. However, they did not antici-

pate that the appointment of some of the chiefs was going to be detrimental to their interests. For instance, the station at Lubuk Terua was under the jurisdiction of Che' Abdullah who allowed his men to return to Bera. They were, however, replaced by men from the villages of Chempaka and Bolo who sympathised with Bahaman, who, therefore, had no difficulty in capturing Lubuk Terua during his attack on 9 March 1892. Sultan Ahmad who had by then returned to Pulau Tawar, was requested once again to suppress the dissidents. This time, his excuse was that he could not continue operations during the fasting month of Ramadan, which incidentally began on 24 March 1892.[67] True to form, Sultan Ahmad showed no definite signs of suppressing the dissidents. He could have engaged *kerah*[68] as a means to summon the *rakyat* to come to his aid in overcoming the dissidents, but he refused to use this method.

Peace did not return to the state. Instead, minor resistance developed into wide-scale rebellion when Sultan Ahmad's major chiefs (such as the To' Raja of Jelai, To' Gajah, To' Bandar) and their followers began to turn their attention and loyalty towards Bahaman and his party. The native chiefs' intention in supporting Bahaman lay in ousting the British. The British were seen as a political menace against whom resistance was the only solution. It was mainly the political reforms of the nineteenth century, aimed at achieving greater administrative efficiency, which created the conditions necessary for the rise and development of a native anti-colonial movement. Disapproval of British administration was exhibited by the slaying of several European officers, which demonstrated the widespread hatred for the whiteman. On 5 April 1892, Stewart and Harris of the Pahang Exploration Company at Sungai Duri, were murdered by Panglima Muda of Jempul. The major reason for the murder was seen by Smith as being:

> ...general hatred of the whiteman or for the sake of robbery or from dislike of the woodcutting concession.[69]

Various allegations were made, implicating at several chiefs in the act. It was generally believed that the Panglima Muda had vowed to drive the Europeans out of the country.[70] In another report, it was believed that it was To' Gajah who had intended to murder Stewart and Harris, but had incited the Panglima Muda to do the deed.[71] On the other hand, the Panglima Muda alleged that the abominable act was carried out under the instructions of Sultan Ahmad.[72] He revealed the Sultan's *chop*[73] and confessed that the

To' Gajah had acted as the intermediary between him and the Sultan.

Sultan Ahmad feared that the British would accuse him of these allegations and that he would be held responsible for the murder. He therefore pretended to be unaware of the affair. He wrote:

> Furthermore it was not we ourselves who created this man to the Panglima Muda. It was our predecessors Marhum Kuris who gave him this title. During our reign we have not employed him nor have we permitted him to have the command of men or to exercise authority in any particular district. But he has been quite alone, living independent in this way; he has been in the habit of visiting all the minor rivers and seeking a livelihood in the country of the men of the aboriginal tribes (Sakai). Now he would come out on to the main river and then he would disappear again up somewhere the minor streams. As for his occupation, he used to trade with Malays and Chinese and those who were simple, he cheated...[74]

Sultan Ahmad's denial of support for the Panglima Muda could not be accepted since the latter had revealed the Sultan's *chop*. Furthermore, there was a suspicion that he had been supported by "powerful authority". For instance the Dato Bandar, who was the territorial chief of Pekan, had affiliations with the Panglima Muda.[75] Many of the native headmen were in favour of the dissidents; yet when the occasion arose, they played a dual role by obliging the British, while at the same time supporting the dissidents. A good example was Sultan Ahmad himself, as seen in his handling of the incident with the Panglima Muda. When Sultan Ahmad heard of the Panglima's actions, he sent the Orang Kaya of Chenor (to whose district the Panglima Muda belonged) to arrest that chieftain.[76] At the same time, a trial was held with regard to the murder of Harris and Stewart. It was conducted by native jurors before Tengku Mahmud and Rodger. Seventeen of the prisoners were acquitted, while ten of them were sentenced to imprisonment.[77] Sultan Ahmad further complied with British demands by organising a counter-attack against Bahaman under Tengku Ali's command.

As for Tengku Mahmud, his role in aiding the British was similarly 'negative'. In 1892 during the first expedition to Semantan, Tengku Mahmud tried to dissociate himself from the British by not proceeding to Pekan. He did not join his father's forces. The British were puzzled over the temperamental behaviour of the young

regent whom they had regarded as their firm and loyal friend. In a minute to the Colonial Office, Lucas pointed out:

> I think it is a serious matter that Tengku Mahmud, the future ruler of Pahang and hitherto the firm friend of the English backed out of the matter, but it is quite possible that there was some personal not political reason for his attitude.[78]

Yet Tengku Mahmud was able to convince the British that he was in favour of them, as seen in the Panglima Muda incident. He promised to help them with arms and men,[79] and also during the trial. The Raja Muda was the only person who remained loyal to the British during the entire period, but he had very little power.[80]

The To' Raja devised a scheme similar to Panglima Muda Jempul's attack on Pekan in April 1892, in order to attack Kuala Lipis. The To' Raja had opposed British protection for reasons of prestige. He realized that British administration was not the answer to his search for political survival. His disillusionment with and hatred for the British increased when in 1892 the Penjum Company discovered rich pockets of gold at Gubar near Kuala Lipis, which he claimed belonged to him. He wrote to Clifford stating that the boundaries of the Penjum Company's grant did not reach Gubar. He further refused to allow the natives to be employed by the Penjum Company. Fearing that he would join forces with the dissidents, the British adopted an attitude of compromise:

> But if it is true that the mines of Gubar are your ancestral property, and a place of livelihood for you and your people and have always been in your possession, and the possession of your people, and that you can no longer work there, when the Semantan affair is satisfactorily concluded with the counsel and assistance of you and of the other Chiefs, I shall be in position to deal with the matter; and if you cannot get back the Gubar mines, as they have been included in the Penjum Company's concession and have been worked by the Company, I shall help you to get a share or a profit from their working...[81]

The assurance was not pleasing to To' Raja. He conspired with To' Gajah and devised a plan through which the government forces in Ulu Pahang could be overwhelmed. It was planned that the Sultan was to hold Chenor, the Panglima Muda of Jempul to overrun Pekan district, and To' Gajah to mobilize the Tembeling men, while together with the united forces of Mat Kilau (To' Gajah's son), To' Raja was to attack Kuala Lipis.[82] Sultan Ahmad was aware of the plan as the To' Raja claimed that he had the ruler's authority to

attack Kuala Lipis in April 1892. Sultan Ahmad had realized that efforts to discourage the To' Raja would be fruitless, because of the strained relations that had existed between them from as early as 1880.[83] The To' Raja had suspected Sultan Ahmad of being closely associated with the British, and he joined the other chiefs in considering the sultan untrustworthy. This opinion was confirmed in February 1892, when Sultan Ahmad showed signs of positive co-operation with the British. Two signs were his letter of 23 February 1892 to the To' Raja requesting him to participate in the deliberations with the other chiefs in overcoming the dissidents and his declaration to his chiefs that he would not offer armed resistance to the British.[84] Hence the chiefs' conclusion that Sultan Ahmad was treacherous in his dealings with the natives.

On the question of the attack on Kuala Lipis, it should be noted that Sultan Ahmad was forced to issue instructions to the To' Raja to cancel the intended attack.[85] His mediator was Haji Muhammed Nor who was able to persuade the To' Raja to cancel his attack. Perhaps it was felt that the time was inappropriate, but of more importance was the question of diplomacy. Sultan Ahmad had been warned by the British that if no attempts were taken to capture the dissidents, he would be held responsible for the murders of Harris and Stewart and the attempted attack on Kuala Lipis.[86] The British hoped that by applying such pressure, they could force Sultan Ahmad to suppress the disturbances. At the same time it was a British tactic to use native leaders to subdue any forms of outbreak or to persuade the dissidents to retreat. It was to these demands, then, that Sultan Ahmad bowed. To an extent he was influenced by the Sultan of Johor who warned him of the dangers that he would face for his dilatory behaviour or for being inactive.[87] However, when incidents occurred, he held the British in suspense about the sincerity of his intentions to quell the disturbances. At times he was stubborn in ignoring British pressure, as could be seen during the murder incident at Sungai Duri. Although an ultimatum was issued,[88] he paid no heed to it.

During the period from April–June 1892, a more contentious personality, Mat Kilau, emerged.[89] His rise coincided with the To' Raja's plan to attack Kuala Lipis. Of the To' Raja it was reported that:

> ...he may be partly responsible for the disturbances which has afflicted the state but he must not be judged too strictly when others who are more responsible are not dealt with.[90]

It was Mat Kilau whom the British had in mind. His antagonism towards British administrators grew when his district, Budu, was burnt because he did not succumb to British demands after the shooting of Dr. Little. In reaction, he joined forces with Bahaman at Ulu Cheka.[91] He differed from To' Gajah's other sons in that he was believed to possess magical powers.[92] It was, therefore, not difficult for him to recruit members into his fold. He even incited his father to rebel against the British by highlighting the issue of his defeat at Budu.[93] The general uprising spearheaded by Mat Kilau reached its most dangerous point when he sacked Kuala Lipis and threatened the gold mines at Raub.[94] His activities gained momentum during the months of May and June 1892, when he began his skirmish at Bera. His force comprised Haji Ahmad, To' Muda Yusof, Haji Daud, Mat Aris Rofel and Mat Saleh.[95] Since Mat Kilau resided at the house of Wan Tanjong (To' Raja's son) at Bukit Betong, it was known that he was aided by the To' Kaya of Lipis and the To' Raja.[96]

Sultan Ahmad's efforts to persuade Mat Kilau to scrap his plans were futile. Mat Kilau refused to return to Pulau Tawar.[97] The major and minor chiefs began to play increasingly important roles in the attempt to get rid of the British, through their alliances with Bahaman. Sultan Ahmad was therefore forced to play a more dominant and positive role in the latter part of the first phase of the uprising. His fear that he would be accused of instigating the various skirmishes induced him to focus his attention on the To' Raja and Mat Kilau during the months of May and June. Sultan Ahmad also made efforts to capture Bahaman and the Panglima Muda by offering material rewards of $1,000, but this led to counter-attacks from the dissidents in April 1892. Two hundred of Sultan Ahmad's men who were employed to control the Semantan district retreated because of a shortage of food. During the retreat, three of them were shot by Bahaman.[98] The incident proved that the chiefs harboured antagonism towards Sultan Ahmad for complying with the British. The ruler, therefore, began to take measures to appease the dissidents, without terminating his aid to the British. Thus on 10 May 1892, he began his second movement to Semantan with a thousand men and was involved in a skirmish near Batu Ampar where he killed one of Bahaman's sons.[99] During the second phase of his movement, his dislike of Sikhs and Europeans became apparent. He insisted that neither Sikhs nor Europeans should follow him, since there was the possibility that their presence would keep away Baha-

man and his men, as had been the case during the first expedition.[100] This was merely an excuse — in actual fact, Sultan Ahmad was trying to aid the dissidents by keeping the Sikhs and Europeans away, as their loyalty towards the British would upset his plans. Accompanied by Tengku Ali, To' Gajah, Orang Kaya Chenor and Orang Kaya Temerloh, he reached Lubuk Terua. Here, he and several other chiefs came under suspicion of having provided food supplies to Bahaman,[101] who wrote a letter to the Sultan stating that the uprising had taken place owing to his (Sultan Ahmad's) orders.[102] Furthermore, he was supplied with arms by the To' Raja. These suspicious circumstances forced Rodger to believe that Sultan Ahmad was playing a double game. The failure of the second movement, therefore, was due to Sultan Ahmad's double-dealings with the dissidents and the British. As a result of this failure, he left Temerloh for Pulau Tawar with To' Gajah on 22 June to return to Pekan. However, he remained at Pulau Tawar till 2 August 1892.

A comparison of the two movements reveals that Sultan Ahmad was more persuasive in the second movement. He appeared eager to aid the British so as to pacify them — his sympathies really lay with the dissidents. However, because there was little co-operation between him and the dissidents, the disturbances were indirectly prolonged. There were queries among the chiefs over Sultan Ahmad's motives and policies. Owing to such apprehensions, the Orang Kaya of Chenor was killed by the Panglima Muda's men in June during the former's attempts to capture the murderer of Stewart and Harris. Sultan Ahmad, on hearing the news was distressed. He had to face greater setbacks when he was asked by the British to reside at Pekan, a decision brought about by rumours that he was aiding Bahaman with food supplies and ammunition. As observed by Smith:

> ...until the Sultan with his chiefs and household moves downriver to Pekan, I shall not be satisfied that the dissidents do not get support and it may be supplies from Pulau Tawar...[103]

It was hoped that, with his return to Pekan, Sultan Ahmad would be deprived of the influence of an associate "whose character caused all sorts of reports injurious to the Sultan",[104] and that his connection with the *ulu* chiefs would cease.[105] It was the To' Gajah whom the British feared. During the second Semantan expedition he had shown his support for the dissidents. Upon the outbreak of aggression by Mat Kilau at Budu, it was suspected that To' Gajah was in alliance with the former. He was to have been arrested, but Sultan

Ahmad prevented this, to To' Gajah's benefit. The ruler promised to bring him to Pekan and then send him to Mecca. The suggestion appeared satisfactory to the British, but Sultan Ahmad's plan was to allow To' Gajah to escape into Kelantan via the Tembeling, where he was later joined by Mat Kilau. Together, they attacked Kuala Atok and then fled to Ulu Lebir (Kelantan-Pahang boundary). They reached Pulai (Ulu Negiri) and remained for a while at Kuala Aring, but were eventually forced to leave under orders from the Raja of Kelantan. They then proceeded to Trengganu and stationed themselves at Kuala Ampul. Mat Kelubi (Panglima Kiri) resided at Besut. Simultaneously, to avoid any complications, Sultan Ahmad came to Pekn on 2 August 1892.[106] This was in compliance with his earlier statement that he would return to Pekan if he failed to suppress the dissidents "and then the government must act for itself with its own force".[107] Sultan Ahmad's return signified that he had submitted to British control and "the dissidents and disaffected would appreciate that he is no longer able to give them active or passive support".[108] Sultan Ahmad was partly influenced by the Dato Mentri of Johor (who had accompanied Maxwell to Pahang in July 1892)[109] in his decision to return to Pekan.

Sultan Ahmad instigated To' Gajah's retreat to the Tembeling. He was despatched to Kelantan in order to prevent the British from capturing one of Sultan Ahmad's few ardent supporters. To' Gajah's letter to the To' Raja on 28 August indicated Sultan Ahmad's desire to protect him:

> ...I have arrived safely in Kelantan. The Sultan told me that if you rose in the Jelei His Highness would take up arms at Chenor... In the meantime the British attacked me. I went to the Sultan and informed him of the attack. What was His Highness reply? 'You had better retire to the Tembeling first of all; I do not know whether you have friends here. I accordingly fled with my children... His Highness command was: If To' Raja takes up arms you must help him. If he remains quiet it would be folly for you to engage in operations single handed, for you have no men...'[110]

From the above letter it can be seen that Sultan Ahmad's entry into Pekan and To' Gajah's retreat were pre-planned. Sultan Ahmad's hostility was clearly indicated in his support for the plan of the major chiefs to take up arms. With his backing the dissidents began to seek aid from Kelantan. They realized that they could be safe in Kelantan as the royal family was split into factions and there-

fore supported them.[111] Even the To' Raja tried to secure aid from Kelantan, as could be seen in his letter of 12 September to Che Harun (of Sungei Galas, Kelantan), from whom he sought help.[112] In spite of all this, Sultan Ahmad was able to persuade the British that he was not responsible for To' Gajah's retreat into the Tembeling. Sultan Ahmad's positive actions convinced the British administrators that he was loyal to their interests.[113] To' Gajah's retreat was appreciated as it was hoepd that he would no longer influence the Sultan,[114] but the fear that he might instigate the other major chiefs to rise in arms was ever present. According to Rodger:

> ...the sudden disappearance of To' Gajah would prove to be an eyeopener to other dissident chiefs especially To' Raja of the avowed defection. To' Gajah, the Sultan's most intimate personal follower has altered the position of affairs in Pahang and as I think that there is every probability of his example being shortly followed by To' Raja the most important territorial chief in the state... both these chiefs must be dealt in the open and not merely as hitherto as the covert instigators and ringleaders of the Pahang disturbances, since I feel sure that there can be no final settlement so long as either of them be allowed to remain at large.[115]

With support from the To' Raja, To' Gajah and Bahaman, it would have been difficult for Sultan Ahmad to proclaim a general uprising against the British, but there were constraints. The issues which prevented him from declaring war, at this juncture, were the treaty obligations of 1888 and the fear of being deposed for not complying with British demands.[116] He therefore remained shrewd ad careful in his dealings with the British. However, his earlier non-cooperative stance had not been forgotten. Although he had returned to Pekan in August 1892, the British feared that he would once again return to Pulau Tawar. His palace at Pulau Tawar was therefore burnt at the Resident's command, and thenceforth, Sultan Ahmad resided at Lenyah.[117] From then on, he realized that he was compelled to listen to the British. He was asked to go to Singapore for negotiations. His efforts to evade this failed. He could no longer resist British demands by retreating to Pulau Tawar. Being "homeless", he was forced to go to Singapore in September 1892. Finally he conceded, partly because of the opportunity it would give him to assert his rights and privileges, but more because of the influence of Sultan Abu Bakar of Johor.[118] Sultan Abu Bakar's policy was to keep the British away from Johor; towards

this end, he pretended to be a close supporter of the British. In the eyes of the dissidents, Sultan Ahmad's arrival at Singapore on 1 September 1892[119] was seen as a form of surrender to the British. Apart from Sultan Ahmad, the To' Raja was also invited to Singapore to act as an intermediary between the British and the dissidents. The British hoped that he (To' Raja) would succeed in persuading the dissidents to surrender, but To' Raja accepted the invitation, at the urging of Saiyid Hassan bin Ahmad Al-Attas (a member of the Pahang-Arab family), in order to negotiate his own terms. In Singapore, he listed down his grievances, focussing on the inadequacy of allowances, the mining company's occupation of the ancestral lands of the chiefs, rumours of the chiefs' deposition for non-cooperation and the *kerah* regulations which pressurized the peasants. He also requested the release of six of his men who had been arrested on suspicion of assisting the dissidents.[120] By September 1892, with the departure of To' Gajah and To' Bahaman to Kelantan, all the dissidents who had taken up arms against the government were out of Pahang. With this, the first phase of the rebellion could be said to have ended. That phase also marked a change in the administrative structure and the emergence of new leaders. On the death of the Orang Kaya Chenor, the Ungku Temenggong was appointed to be in charge of the Chenor district. The Orang Kaya Temerloh was deprived of the greater part of his monthly allowances and ordered to remain at Pekan. The Panglima Garang Yusof of Kuala Tembeling was raised from the status of a penghulu earning $120 a year to that of headman, replacing To' Gajah of Pulau Tawar with an allowance of $729 a year. The Orang Kaya Shahbandar's allowance was reduced from $1200 to $720 per annum. The Temerloh district was under the jurisdiction of Tuan Chilo of Jenderah while the Semantan district, including Bentong, was under the control of Saiyid Ali of Badoh. The district of Budu was controlled by the To' Kaya of Lipis.[121] These changes made it even more difficult for the dissidents to establish a closer relationship with the respective headmen, many of whom (for example, the Panglima Garang Yusof) supported the British. An attempt was, however, made to recall the fugitives as evidenced by the peace talks of September 1892.

During the peace talks, the British persuaded Sultan Ahmad to grant amnesty to all the dissidents, except Rasu (To' Gajah) and Bahaman, with the assurance that their lives would be spared if they surrendered. Subsequently a proclamation regarding the amnesty

was issued by Sultan Abu Bakar of Johor on 24 October 1892. The dissidents' response was, however, negative for fear of being sentenced to death. Mat Kilau and Mat Lela (son of Bahaman), who had by then emerged as the chief dissidents' leaders, refused to surrender. Initially only Rasu (at the instance of his son, Haji Abdul Rauf) showed signs of enthusiasm for returning to Pahang.[122] His intentions were revealed in his letters of 9 January and 17 February 1893 to the To' Raja. In the former he stated that he had proceeded to Pahang to meet Wan Tanjong (To' Raja's son), but that his failing health had forced him to retreat. He implored To' Raja to inform Sultan Ahmad about his health and hoped that an official letter would arrive from the To' Raja stating that the Pahang Government would not hold him responsible for his actions. The second letter also emphasized his desire to be free from all accusations and expressed his support to the To' Raja over the latter's stand during the peace talks at Singapore. Furthermore he wanted to borrow a sum of $600 to repay the debts which he owed to some Kelantanese. His aim was to receive an official letter from the Resident assuring him that his former position would be considered, as expressed in his concluding paragraph:

> Jika permintaan-permintaan saya yang disebutkan di atas itu tidak dikabulkan, biarlah saya mati dalam hutan, kerana saya gentar hendak balek. Saya tidak akan percaya kepada pengakuan-pengakuan yang hanya dengan chakap mulut walau daripada siapa pun.[123]

Rasu's negotiations with the To' Raja temporarily assured the British that the total surrender of the chief dissident leaders was imminent. This hope was highlighted by Clifford who in 1893 stressed that:

> ...it is probable that before long both the ex-Datoh Gajah and the ex-Orang Kaya Pahlawan will surrender themselves to government. These chiefs have now been deserted by nearly all their followers, the people who left the state in their company having since come in large numbers and given themselves up to government and it is probable that they could not at the present time muster more than a dozen fighting men should they desire to create further trouble.[124]

But Clifford's prediction was not quite correct. By 1894 feelings of distrust compelled the dissident leaders to be more adamant over the question of surrender. Rasu regarded the Sultan of Johor's offer of amnesty as a scheme to trap and betray the dissidents.[125] There-

fore on 20 April 1894, Rasu and Bahaman wrote a letter to the To' Raja indicating their reasons for not returning to Pahang. It took more than a year, from 24 October 1892 to 20 April 1894 for the two leaders to realize that a surrender would be fruitless:

> We are afraid to return to Pahang as the place is full of rumours brought from Tembeling by way of Kuala Kelantan that the government has furnished Kelantan people with rifles to kill us. This is the reason why we have not yet returned and are living in the jungle... the government has issued instructions in all states that we are to be shot at sight and have offered a reward of $1000 for our capture. We cannot go anywhere to seek food because many people are awaiting the opportunity to betray us. We are deeply distressed for you had told us that the government had dropped proceedings against us and we were absolved... We do not fear the reports from the Tembeling for we are anxious to return to Pahang this very moment, but are delayed by the expected, confinement of the Orang Kaya's wife. We hope to return after her delivery. We solemnly swear it.[126]

The promise finally to return was only a pretense to uphold the To' Raja's belief that the dissidents would surrender, in fact, the desire to attack Pahang was still very much alive, and it was to this aid that they turned their attention.

In May 1894, a final attempt was made by the To' Raja to entreat the dissidents to return to Pahang — he despatched his headmen To' Muda Mat Akhir from Kampong Gua and To' Muda Awang Tanggah from Kechau to Ulu Tembeling and Ulu Lebir to meet Dato Bahaman and Rasu. However, the dissidents had by then fled to Trengganu and the mission was a failure.[127] Having dispersed into the northern Malay states where they were given political asylum,[128] they came into contact with a religious leader called Ungku Saiyid of Paloh[129] in Trengganu, whereupon the rebellion took a different pattern. Ungku Saiyid allowed Mat Kilau and Bahaman to reside at Besut and instructed the people to aid them.[130] He had been described by Clifford in his *Annual Report for 1894:* as:

> ...a man who enjoys a great reputation for sanctity and for the possession of supernatural attributes throughout the length and breadth of the East West of the peninsula... offerings are made to him if their desires are accomplished and health is restored and trouble averted.[131]

and in another tale, he described the Saiyid as:

...the saint [who] lives secluded in the retirement of a shady steeped village... [and] preaches the Friday congregational prayers to throngs of devotees.[132]

Mat Kilau's and Bahaman's hopes of raiding Pahang materialized when Ungku Saiyid supported them enabling them to raise a force of about one hundred men in Ulu Trengganu, Besut and the Lebir district of Kelantan.[133] They commenced a *jihad* (*perang sabil* or holy war) against the infidels, and here one sees the role of religion in uniting the natives against the British. The primary goal behind the uprising was to eradicate foreign rule, and Islam became a common bond for holding against all those who participated (and who did not participate) in the resistance movement. The dissidents realized that the cohesive force of Islam could enable them to achieve their aims. They were given *pelias* (charms against bullets) and *parangs* (long knives) with Quran texts inscribed on them by the Ungku Saiyid. Thus the second phase of the rebellion began under the banner of Islam. It became a popular mode of rebellion in several parts of Asia and Africa. Religion was used as a cause for opposition to colonial rule, with people claiming to be defendants of the traditional system.[134] The call of Islam began to draw the majority of the populace into the fold, as observed by Clifford:

In the benighted lands the marvelous cohesion of the Muhammed stand them in good stead. Islam sama Islam — we be Muhammeds against Muhammeds... great deeds which they have wrought against the infidels.'[135] Solidarity of Islam was a binding and uniting force... It is stated that the Sultan of Istanbul, King of Siam, Emperor of China and every other potentate, known to Malay tradition down to the King of the Budi himself are in league with the outlaws to drive the white-men screaming from the land to make universal the faith of the prophet throughout the world.'[136]

The dissidents' plans to raid Pahang, formed with the instigation of Ungku Saiyid, materialized when Mat Kilau and Bahaman attacked Kuala Tembeling on 14 June 1894.[137] The attack was not difficult. Ammunition was smuggled from Singapore by a Kelantanese named Awang Ngah[138] and, under attack from a reinforcement of 140 dissidents, the stockade fell. Kuala Tembeling was then guarded by only eleven Sikhs.[139] The dissidents attacked under the banner of religion, with Mat Kilau as their leader. He was supported by To' Bahaman, Rasu and Mat Kelubi. According to Clifford, Mat

Kilau was:

> ...personally known to every rebel in the land. It is their conviction that it is he who is warring with them... Oriental like they do not recognize the hand of the British Government, the man they know is their enemy. A price is set upon his head.[140]

After the victory, Mat Kelubi remained at Kuala Tembeling with a small force of 50 men, while the others moved downwards to Pulau Tawar to urge the To' Raja and the Panglima Garang Yusof to join the force. They invoked the name of Ungku Saiyid, hoping that a united force could be obtained by using a "saint's" name, but their endeavours to enlist the chiefs of the *ulu* districts were futile.[141] It is interesting to consider why the To' Raja did not join the dissidents, when during the first phase he had supported them. To' Raja felt that if he supported the dissidents at this point, the claims that he had put forward during the negotiations of October 1892 would be rejected. Therefore, he adopted the role of a *neutral* observer[142] of the rebellion. When Bahaman and his crew failed to get the support of the *ulu* chiefs, they decided to stockade at Jeram Ampai[143] which was situated 4 miles from Kuala Tembeling. Here they did not take any positive action and the delay enabled the British to muster sufficient strength to counter-attack the dissidents. The dissidents were defeated because they were poorly organized, as well as being somewhat overwhelmed by their victory at Kuala Tembeling. Informers such as the Chinese merchant Wee Lian Peh,[144] the Imam Perang Kassim[145] and Panglima Garang Yusof, who kept the British up-to-date on the dissidents' activities, told them about the dissidents' intention of totally deposing the British. The death of Mat Kelubi on 17 June 1894 when he was proceeding to Kampong Bandar could be directly attributed to the activities of these informers.[146] The victory enabled the British to reinforce their military strength for the attack on the dissidents' stronghold of Jeram Ampai on 29 June 1894.[147] During the surprise attack Mat Kilau, Teh Ibrahim and Awang Nong acted as defenders at the stockade. The imposing body of men supplied by the Panglima Garang Yusof was partly responsible for the British victory, but it has to be noted that not all the locals supported the British during their attack. This was clear in the case of the To' Raja's followers. Many of them played a dual role, as evidenced in the case of the Malay guides provided by the To' Raja who "intentionally misled Duff and prevented him from being at the strategic rear of the main stockade which was to be the dissidents' escape route."[148] Accord-

ing to Mitchell:

> ...all our movements are well-known to the dissidents while theirs through the inefficiency or unwillingness of our scouts are quite unknown to us.[149]

Nevertheless, the dissidents lost eleven lives, while Bahaman and Rasu managed to escape to Ulu Lebir in Ulu Kelantan. By 29 June 1894 the chief dissidents captured were as follows:[150]

Haji Draoh	—	To' Gajah's (Rasu's) son
Mat Dilu	—	Rasu's son-in-law
Oman	—	Rasu's son-in-law
Awang	—	Rasu's nephew
Ali	—	Rasu's son-in-law

By July 1894, those reported dead were Abdullah Gaja from Kelantan, Wan Chik and Cik Herera — the in-laws of the Penghulu Raja Tembeling.[151]

Meanwhile, Sultan Ahmad, on hearing of the victories of the dissidents at Kuala Tembeling and the British at Jeram Ampai, decided to intervene to convince the British of his interest in preserving peace. He was once again influenced by Sultan Abu Bakar of Joohr who in July 1894 advised Sultan Ahmad to support the British.[152] Sultan Ahmad agreed, but he was still watched by the British, who feared that although he co-operated with them, he would at the same time communicate with the dissidents and reveal British plans to capture them. They still regarded him as one who was intriguing with the dissidents, for it was a well known fact that Sultan Ahmad had every reason to be dissatisfied with the British. He had had to forego his allowances of $7,200 per annum which had to be forwarded to the Colonial Treasury as a result of the heavy expenditure incurred during the disturbances.[153] This meant that his support for the British during the rebellion was strongly suspect.

With the fall of Jeram Ampai it would appear that the British could have easily wiped out the dissidents; but they did not succeed. The dissidents were able to win a large following despite British attempts to frustrate their plans. They were supported to a large extent by the natives who sympathised with them,[154] and respected their prowess as warriors and traditional chiefs. Many of them had filial ties which even extended to Kelantan and Trengganu when the dissidents decided to seek refuge. Even the rulers of the two states were known to have aided the dissidents. For instance, the Sultan of Trengganu, Zainal Abidin III, had been aware of the dissidents' presence at Paloh but refused to pressure the Ungku Saiyid, who

was held in great esteem by the natives.[155] On religious grounds, he allowed the dissidents to use his state as a base for their operations.[156] His support for the dissidents was also based on marital grounds. He was married to Tengku Long (Sultan Ahmad's daughter) who in turn helped the dissidents.[157] As a result, one sees the suzerain power — Siam being compelled to act for the British,[158] since both Kelantan and Trengganu were feudatory states of Siam and the British could not justifiably meddle in affairs concerning these Siamese states. Siam was entreated to aid the British. The Siamese government promised to send instructions by a ship of war to the Sultans of Trengganu and Kelantan to prevent them from aiding the dissidents while Prince Devawongse (the Siamese foreign minister) promised to prevent the two states from becoming a shelter for the dissidents.[159] Along with a protest note Siam sent 120 Siamese soldiers to aid the British.[160]

The second phase comprised a series of attacks. The dissidents' determination to overrun Pahang by using Kelantan and Trengganu as bases failed. Since the debacle at Jeram Ampai, their movements were hampered and the British became even more cautious. Clifford later undertook an expedition to Kelantan and Trengganu on 17 July 1894,[161] with a force consisting of Imam Perang Panglima Kakap Husin, To' Pahlawan Lawi, Khatib Bakar of Kelola, To' Mukim Mat Ali from Budu, Che Dollah from Bera and Panglima Raja Mat Asin of Jelei.[162] The dissidents, being aware of Clifford's expeditions, left Ulu Lebir to settle at Kuala Atok and finally fled and hid in the jungles along Sungei Pertang. Meanwhile Sultan Zainal Abidin III of Trengganu and Sultan Mansur of Kelantan promised (because of pressure from Siam) to aid the British by issuing orders that the dissidents were to be captured dead or alive.[163] Their sincerity in aiding the British was always suspected by the latter, who feared that the two rulers would inform the dissidents of British plans to capture them. On 7 August 1894, for example, the Ungku Setia Raja and the Dato Panglima Dalam of Kelantan, who had been sent by Sultan Mansur to co-operate with Clifford, succeeded in preventing the British from capturing the dissidents. The sympathy of many of the chiefs and natives in Kelantan and Trengganu lay with the dissidents, which was naturally to the advantage of the dissidents.[164] This could be seen during Clifford's expedition to Kelantan and Trengganu.[165] Before proceeding to Telemong, Duff and Clifford had informed the headmen (Haji Ahmad and Bomoh Ali of Besut) that they were

SKETCH MAP OF THE MALAY STATES, KELANTAN AND TERENGGANU



To illustrate the paper by HUGH CLIFFORD

searching for the dissidents, Rasu and Bahaman, with the Sultan's authority — the headmen, however, refused to disclose their whereabouts. Many of the inhabitants of Stiu and Besut were hostile to the British and intended to nullify their efforts in tracing the dissidents. With regard to the Ungku Setia Raja and Panglima Dalam, Clifford remarked that: "...these chiefs I have no authority to punish".[166]

By the early part of 1895 the dissidents had already become inactive. Realizing that success was improbable they decided to surrender, except for Mat Kilau and Rasu who accompanied Ungku Setia Raja and the Panglima Dalam to the village of Kemuning in Kelantan. From there, they proceeded to Besut and then to Kampong Lubuk Gading where they lived with To' Mekong Kemia until May 1895.[167] The dissidents also witnessed the active participation of Siamese forces.[168] As early as April 1895 the British offered a free pardon to the dissidents if they surrendered within six months, otherwise a large reward was to be given for the leaders captured dead or alive. However, this had little effect on the insurgents. Finally through bribery[169] of the natives, the whereabouts of the dissidents became known. Two Arab residents of Pahang, Saiyid Husain and Saiyid Seman (Uthman), told Clifford the whereabouts of the dissidents at Sungei Kemia. The prolongation of the uprising and the accompanying hardships which the natives experienced forced them to surrender and betray the dissidents. Clifford's observation was very illustrative indeed:

> ...presently by this means a sense of unrest is made to pervade the land. Men look into their fellow eyes with suspicion and distrust. Will the temptation to sell information to the strangers prove too strong to be resisted...?[170]

On 24 May, seven dissidents viz. Rasu (To' Gajah), Mat Kilau, Awang Nong, Teh Ibrahim, 2 boys and a woman were reported to have surrendered in Pertang, but they managed to escape.[171] It was only during October-November 1895 that Bahaman, Awang Nong Yusoh, Teh Ibrahim, Haji Mat Wahid and Mat Lela were captured by the Siamese Commissioner Phya Dhib Kosa and were deported to Chiengmai.[172] The dissidents surrendered on the assurance that they would be safe at Chiengmai and be provided with clothes and money.[173] They were to be placed on parole and allowed to join the women and children of their families who had been brought to Bangkok in captivity in 1894.[174] The dissidents' realization that they were on the losing end persuaded them to surrender. As Teh Ibrahim stated:

...after the rebellion in Pahang, I and many others escaped into the jungle. On hearing of the proximity of the Siamese Commissioners in Kelantan, we wrote to them for protection and stayed with them for about a month...[175]

Bahaman was the first to surrender.[176] Both Rasu and Mat Kilau were recorded as dead.[177] With their exit the rebellion came to an end, but it was only in 1913[178] that the dissidents who had resided in Siam finally returned to Pahang. Their capture was possible because of the co-operation of Sultan Abidin III of Trengganu. Being distressed at the outcome of the rebellion, he granted a *chop* to the British empowering them to punish the dissidents, though his sympathies till then had always remained with the dissidents.

From a different perspective it might be surmised that the uprising exposed the desires of Sultan Ahmad and his chiefs to regain their traditional powers. Though they failed to achieve this during the Residential era, they adequately revealed to the British their capacity to resist by force of arms. They exhibited signs of a nationalistic fervour, and the uprising illustrated the old Confucian saying that "if the people have no confidence in the government, the state cannot stand."[179] Disillusioned at the failure of the rebellion, Sultan Ahmad and his chiefs looked forward to the great plans of the British to draw Pahang into the Malay States.

NOTES

1 *ARP* 1891, p. 94.

2 Term borrowed from J. de V. Allen where resistance is represented "as being exclusively the work of leaders — chiefs etc. — making a last ditch stand against the loss of their privileges. They are instrumental in recruiting the masses who follow and obey them through customary obedience or because they are misled and know no better." See J. de V. Allen, "The Kelantan Rising of 1915: Some thoughts on the concept of resistance in British Malayan History", *JSEAH*, IX, ii, September 1968, p. 242.

3 *ARP* 1891, p. 93.

4 Resident Selangor (Maxwell) to Acting Colonial Secretary, 4 January 1892, *SSF* 1692. See also Legislative Council Proceedings, 7 January 1892, enclosure in Senior Officer Straits of Malacca to Secretary of Admiralty, 12 January 1892, enclosure in Evan MacGregor to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 12 February 1892, C.O. 273/184, f. 223.

5 *ARP* 1891, p. 93.

6 Ibid. He received a monthly allowance of $72. See *Hugh Clifford Files, The Straits Times*, 3 January 1970.

7 *Hugh Clifford Files, The Straits Times*, 1 May 1962. See also Darus Ahmad, *Orang Kaya Bahaman, Orang Besar Tanah Ayer*, 1958, p. 52; and Anon, *Hikayat Pahang*, cerita 38, p. 171.

8 *ARP* 1891, p. 93.
9 *ARP* 1891, p. 94.
10 Ibid.
11 *Hugh Clifford Files, The Straits Times*, 1 May 1962; see also Legislative Council Proceedings, 7 January 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 12 January 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 20.
12 Legislative Council Proceedings, 7 January 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 12 January 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 20.
13 Abdul Talib bin Haji Ahmad, *Sejarah Dato Bahaman, Orang Kaya Semantan*, Kuala Lumpur, 1959, p. 23.
14 W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", *JMBRAS*, XIV, ii (1936), p. 139.
15 *ARP* 1891, p. 93; see also Legislative Council Proceedings, 7 January 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 12 January 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 20.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 *ARP* 1891, p. 93.
19 Clifford states that the incident occurred on 17 December 1891. See *Hugh Clifford Diary 1893*, account for 17 Sunday, December 1893. Jang Aisyah terms this incident as the *causus belli* for the rebellion, but to my mind the *causus belli* began on 8 October 1891. The December incident only intensified Bahaman's determination to resist the British more forcefully. See Jang Aisyah Muttalib, *Pemberontakan Pahang 1891—5, Kelantan, 1974*, p. 264. For details on the expedition, see *ARP* 1891, p. 94.
20 *ARP* 1891, p. 94. Legislative Council Proceedings, 7 January 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 12 January 1892, C.O. 273/179, ff. 20—1; see also Anon, *Hikayat Pahang*, cerita 38, p. 172.
21 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 29 March 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 556. See also Acting Collector Temerloh to British Resident Pahang, report, 30 April 1892, *TDOF* 154/92.
22 J.H.M. Robson, *Records and Recollections 1889—1934*, Kuala Lumpur, 1934, p. 154. See also Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 23 March 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 495.
23 *ARP* 1891, p. 98.
24 *ARP* 1891, p. 95.
25 There were around one hundred aborigines. See *ARP* 1891, p. 95.
26 *ARP* 1891, p. 95.
27 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 26 January 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 159.
28 For details, see S. M. Middlebrook, "Yap Ah Loy 1837—1885", *JMBRAS*, XXIV, ii (1951), pp. 51—68.
29 Rodger to Smith, 19 January 1892, enclosure in Rodger to Maxwell *SSF* 118/92. For reasons why the Selangor men joined forces with the British, see Jang Aisyah, op. cit., p. 172.
30 Maxwell (Resident Selangor) to Acting Colonial Secretary, 25 January 1892, *SSF* 103/92.
31 Baginda Muin was the Penghulu of Ulu Klang. He was the father-in-law of Raja Lahab whose other wife was the daughter of Bahaman. See Resident Selangor to Governor, 26 January 1892, *SSF* 109/92; see also Acting British Resident Perak to Maxwell, 5 January 1892, *SSF* 332/92.

[32] Resident Selangor (Maxwell) to Colonial Secretary, 29 March 1892, *SSF* 331/92A. See also Maxwell to Acting Colonial Secretary, 25 January 1892, *SSF* 103/92. However, Baginda Muin was arrested in March 1892 and taken to Teluk Anson for detention until a trial was to be held at Selangor for his treasonable correspondence and acquaintance with Bahaman. See Maxwell to Acting Resident Perak, 29 March 1892, *SSF* 331/92.

[33] Penghulu Bentong to Syers, letter, 24 December 1891 enclosure in Maxwell to Colonial Secretary, 28 December 1891, *SSF* 100/91.

[34] Maxwell to Colonial Secretary, 4 January 1892, *SSF* 9/92.

[35] Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 5 January 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 6.

[36] Berrington to Colonial Secretary, Singapore, 15 March 1892, *SSF* 252/92.

[37] Rodger to Governor, 19 January 1892, *SSF* 118/92.

[38] Maxwell to Acting Colonial Secretary, 25 January 1892, *SSF* 103/92; see also Maxwell to Colonial Secretary, 18 February 1892, *SSF* 157/92.

[39] *ARP* 1891, p. 95. They were joined by Inspector Sumner and sixty Sikhs.

[40] Maxwell to Acting Colonial Secretary, report, *SSF* 157/92.

[41] Following the murder of Birch, monetary rewards were offered to capture Sultan Ismail and Maharaja Lela.

[42] Many of the natives were paid to act as informers and spies with regard to Bahaman's plans. See McCallum to E. A. Wise, 29 January 1892, enclosure in McCallum to Governor, report, 30 January 1892, *SSF* 132/92.

[43] Legislative Council Proceedings, 21 January 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 26 January 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 163; see also Lucas to Fairfield, minute, 26 January 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 210; Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 19 January 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 77.

[44] W. Linehan, op. cit., pp. 143—4. See also *ARP* 1891, p. 98. The British hoped that with the capture, they would be relieved of expenses and worries.

[45] Rodger to Governor, 19 January 1892, *SSF* 118/92.

[46] British Resident to Colonial Secretary, 25 March 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 561; *ARP* 1891, p. 95. W. Linehan states that Sultan Ahmad *offered* to suppress the rebellion. See W. Linehan, *A History of Pahang*, p. 142. He could have based his conclusion on Sultan Ahmad's letter to Smith where he stated that the Governor could depend on him in suppressing the rebels. See Sultan Ahmad to Smith, 8 January 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 19 January 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 79. In his letter to Smith of 10 Ramathan

[45] Rodger to Governor, 19 January 1892, *SSF* 118/92.

[46] British Resident to Colonial Secretary, 25 March 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 561; *ARP* 1891, p. 95. W. Linehan states that Sultan Ahmad *offered* to suppress the rebellion. See W. Linehan, *A History of Pahang*, p. 142. He could have based his conclusion on Sultan Ahmad's letter to Smith where he stated that the Governor could depend on him in suppressing the rebels. See Sultan Ahmad to Smith, 8 January 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 19 January 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 79. In his letter to Smith of 10 Ramathan 1309 (16 August 1891), he stated that he "would go to the River Semantan and remain there until the disturbances were over", but he pointed out his apprehension over the Ramadan fast and the requirement of a large force. See Sultan Ahmad to Smith, 10 Ramadan 1309 (16 August 1891), enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 19 April 1892, C.O. 273/180, ff. 129—31. Thus Sultan Ahmad's offer to squash the rebellion is doubtful. He did not take any

positive steps until he was requested. On the issue of Sultan Ahmad's anxiety to aid the British, see Governor to Colonial Secretary, 14 March 1892, *SSF* 157/92; Resident Selangor to Acting Colonial Secretary, 25 January 1892, *SSF* 103/92; *ARP* 1891, p. 95.

47 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 26 January 1892, C.O. 273/179, ff. 159—60.

48 Ibid. Among the five hundred, one hundred and forty of them possessed ammunition.

49 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 2 February 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 212.

50 'Sovereignty' in this context is taken to mean a centralized power that exercised its law making and law enforcing authority within a definite territory.

51 W. Linehan, *A History of Pahang*, p. 147. See also Cragie to Secretary of Admiralty, 10 May 1892, C.O. 273/184, f. 276.

52 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 29 August 1892, C.O. 273/182, f. 640.

53 Maxwell to Colonial Secretary, 4 January 1892, *SSF* 9/92.

54 Warren to Smith, 8 January 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 12 January 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 35. See also Maxwell to Colonial Secretary, 4 January 1892, *SSF* 9/92.

55 Harry Lake to Fielding, letter, 29 August 1892, C.O. 273/182, f. 640; see also Proceedings on *Sea Belle*, 23 August 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 29 August 1892, C.O. 273/182, f. 651.

56 Smith to Fairfield, Confidential, 29 June 1892, C.O. 273/181, f. 442.

57 Legislative Council Proceedings, 21 January 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, 26 January 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 168; see also Warren to Smith, 8 January 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 12 January 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 35.

58 Maxwell to Colonial Secretary, 11 January 1892, *SSF* 48/92.

59 Legislative Council Proceedings, 12 November 1892, enclosure in Smith to Ripon, Confidential, 29 November 1892, C.O. 273/183, f. 76. See also Lucas to Fairfield, minute, 27 July 1892, C.O. 273/181, f. 426.

60 Smith to Knutsford, 10 May 1897, C.O. 273/180, f. 356. See also Proceedings of meeting held at Pekan Residency, 24 August 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 29 August 1892, C.O. 273/182, f. 669. On the other hand, the British realized that Sultan Ahmad's influence over the chiefs was not great because of his old age. Hence he pretended to favour the British. See Granville to Fairfield, minute, 29 September 1892. C.O. 273/182, f. 631.

61 W. Linehan, *A History of Pahang*, p. 143; *ARP* 1891, p. 96.

62 Rodger to Colonial Secretary, 7 February 1892, *BROSUF* 1800—1896, Negeri Sembilan Secretariat Files, F235/92; Clifford to Colonial Secretary, 7 February 1892, *KDOF* 25/92. See also Resident Selangor to Colonial Secretary, 7 February 1892, *SSF* 386/92.

63 Rodger to Acting Superintendent of Police and District Officers, minute, 21 April 1892, *KDOF* 87/92.

64 *ARP* 1891, p. 98.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid. There were police forces stationed at several points under British officers:

Town	Officer	Sikhs
Kuala Pahang	Mr. Desborough	10
Pekan	Mr. Duff	67
Temerloh	Mr. Sumner	40

Kuala Lipis	Mr. Fleming	30
Kuala Kuantan	Mr. Owen	7
Ulu Kuantan	not known	10

67 Lucas to Fairfield, minute, 14 April 1892, C.O. 273/180, f. 42.

68 It was an effective way of gathering forces as seen in Kelantan. See J. de V. Allen, op. cit., . 246. In Pahang, although *kerah* had been regulated, it was held that only Malay headmen could exercise it. European officers were deprived of using *kerah*. See Rodger to District Officers, 8 August 1890, *KDOF* K198/90.

69 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 19 April 1892, C.O. 273/180, f. 141.

70 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 12 April 1892, C.O. 273/180, f. 34.

71 Maxwell to Smith, memorandum, August 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 22 August 1892, C.O. 273/182, f. 593.

72 Proceedings on Sea Belle, 23 August 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 29 August 1892, C.O. 273/182, ff. 661—2.

73 The *chop* appointed the Panglima Muda's father as headman of Jempul. The Panglima Muda made use of the *chop* effectively to impose his authority on his illiterate followers. See extract from *Annual Report 1892* enclosure in Smith to Ripon, Confidential, 15 April 1893, C.O. 273/187, f. 101.

74 Sultan Ahmad to Smith, 2 May 1892, enclosure in Smith to Colonial Office, 10 May 1892, C.O. 273/180, ff. 369—70.

75 Smith to Colonial Office, Confidential, 14 April 1892, C.O. 273/180, f. 35; Cragie to Admiralty, 10 April 1892, enclosure in Vice Admiral Sir Frederick Richards to Colonial Office, 19 May 1892, C.O. 273/184, f. 236; see also "Latest Intelligence of further troubles", extract, *Straits Times*, Singapore, 8 April 1892, C.O. 273/185, f. 28; extract from *Annual Report 1892*, enclosure in Smith to Ripon, Confidential, 15 April 1893, C.O. 273/187, f. 98.

76 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 3 May 1892, C.O. 273/180, f. 316. However, the Orang Kaya Chenor was killed by the Panglima's men. It was only in October 1892 that the Panglima Muda was finally captured and killed by Tengku Mahmud's party. See Tengku Mahmud to Smith, 31 October 1892, enclosure in Smith to Ripon, 3 November 1892, C.O. 273/183, f. 342.

77 Rodger to Smith, minute, 26 August 1892, C.O. 273/182, f. 697.

78 Lucas to Fairfield, minute, 26 February 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 219; see also Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 2 February 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 213.

79 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 25 March 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 562; see also Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 12 April 1892, C.O. 273/180, f. 36.

80 Cragie to Admiralty, 13 April 1892, enclosure in Vice Admiral Frederick Richards to Colonial Office, 19 May 1892, C.O. 273/184, f. 244.

81 W. Linehan, *A History of Pahang*, p. 146. The British were conciliatory in their relationship with the To' Raja. They recognized the fact that he was the most important chief, besides the Sultan, and was capable of arousing the natives to rise in arms. They, therefore, did not wish to antagonize the To' Raja. This attitude was seen to prevail even as late as 1891, as seen during the To' Raja's dispute with the Malayan (Pahang) Concession company over a tract of land in the Anak Jelai watershed. For details on this dispute, see Mitchell to Chamberlain, Confidential, 2 December 1895, C.O. 273/207, ff. 427—30.

82 Kuala Lipis was the British headquarters in Pahang. Thus it was hoped that

with its capture, the British would retreat.

83 Maxwell to Smith, memorandum, August 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 22 August 1892, C.O. 273/182, ff. 590, 597.

84 W. Linehan, op. cit., p. 147.

85 Anon, *Hikayat Pahang*, pp. 176—78.

86 Sultan Ahmad to Rodger, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 3 May 1892, C.O. 273/180, f. 317; see also extract from *Annual Report 1892*, enclosure in Smith to Ripon, Confidential, 15 April 1893, C.O. 273/187, f. 102.

87 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 19 April 1892, C.O. 273/180, f. 124.

88 Smith to Sultan Ahmad, 14 April 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 19 April 1892, C.O. 273/180, ff. 126—9. See also Cragie to Admiralty, 21 April 1892, enclosure in Admiralty to Colonial Office, 26 May 1892, C.O. 273/184, f. 280.

89 He was the son of To' Gajah and was born in 1847. During the uprising he was about 44 years old. For a description on his personality, see Aebe Maura, *Mat Kilau — satu curat curit ke arah pengesahannya*, Singapore, 1970, p. 26; see also *Berita Harian*, 29 December 1969.

90 Maxwell to Smith, memorandum, August 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 22 August 1892, C.O. 273/182, ff. 597—601.

91 Aebe Maura, op. cit., p. 10; see also *Berita Harian*, 6 January 1970.

92 He could kill people with his bare hands; could lift a cow; could eat fish with its bones and drink poisoned waters. During the uprising, he fought the British using only sticks and bamboo poles. See *Laporan Jawatanuasa Menyiasat Munculnya Mat Kilau*, p. 17; Aebe Maura, op. cit., p. 44. Interview with Zakaria Hitam, Kuantan, 16 May 1975. He was respected and feared by the people for his prowess. See *Berita Harian*, 29 December 1969.

93 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 1 June 1892, C.O. 273/181, f. 13.

94 Raja Impeh to Acting British Resident Selangor, 3 May 1892, *SSF* 423/92. He killed some Chinese traders and Sikh escorts and instilled fear among the natives. Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 1 June 1892, C.O. 273/181, f. 13.

95 Walker to Acting Resident Selangor, report, 11 June 1892, enclosure in Acting Resident Selangor to Smith, 16 June 1892, *SSF* 635/92.

96 Clifford to Walker, 30 May 1892, enclosure in Walker to Acting Resident Selangor, report, 4 June 1892, enclosure in Acting Resident Selangor to Smith, 9 June 1892, *SSF* 616/92.

97 Chief Magistrate Kuala Lumpur to Colonial Secretary, telegram, 5 May 1892, enclosure in Clifford to Colonial Secretary, telegram, 3 May 1892, *SSF* 453/92.

98 The incident forced the British to strengthen their forces at Ulu Pahang under the command of Lt. Colonel Walker. They also turned towards Johor, "although an element of personal risk was inhibited". Lucas to Fairfield, minute, 16 May 1892, C.O. 273/180, f. 118.

99 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 17 May 1892, C.O. 273/180, f. 523; Cragie to Admiralty, 25 May 1892, enclosure in Admiralty to Colonial Office, 28 June 1892, C.O. 273/184, f. 284.

100 Smith to Ripon, Confidential, 15 April 1893, C.O. 273/187, f. 383.

101 Smith to Fairfield, private, 29 June 1892, C.O. 273/181, f. 441.

102 Ibid.

103 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 27 July 1892, C.O. 273/182, f. 383; see also Cragie to Admiralty, 14 April 1892, enclosure in Admiralty to Colonial Office, 19 May 1892, C.O. 273/184, f. 249.

104 Maxwell to Smith, memorandum, August 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 22 August 1892, C.O. 273/182, f. 598.

105 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 13 July 1892, C.O. 273/182, f. 205.

106 In the *Annual Report of Pahang for 1893*, Clifford states that Sultan Ahmad returned to Pekan on 28 May 1892. See *ARP* 1893, p. 108.

107 Cragie to Admiralty, 10 May 1892, enclosure in Admiralty to Colonial Office, 9 June 1892, C.O. 273/184, f. 276.

108 Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 22 August 1892, C.O. 273/182, f. 590; Cragie to Admiralty, 25 April 1892, C.O. 273/184, f. 269.

109 Sultan Ahmad to Smith, 16 July 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 27 July 1892, C.O. 273/182, ff. 384—85; Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 13 July 1892, C.O. 273/182, f. 204. The Dato Mentri was held in high esteem by the Pahang people; hence his presence was of crucial importance for Sultan Ahmad's decision.

110 W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", pp. 154—55; see also Smith to Ripon, Confidential, 10 October 1892, C.O. 273/183, f. 260.

111 Senior Naval Officer to Admiralty, 6 August 1892, enclosure in Cragie to Admiralty, 10 September 1892, C.O. 273/184, f. 292.

112 W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 155.

113 Rodger to Smith, 6 August 1892, enclosure in Smith to Fairfield, private, 16 August 1892, C.O. 273/182, f. 669.

114 Proceedings on *Sea Belle*, 23 August 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 29 August 1892, C.O. 273/182, f. 651.

115 Rodger to Smith, 6 August 1892, enclosure in Smith to Fairfield, private, 16 August 1892, C.O. 273/182, f. 670. With To' Gajah's retreat into the Tembeling he was stripped of his title and he was known as Rasu. [Hereafter, referred to as Rasu.]

116 See Appendix J.

117 Harry Lake to Fielding, letter, 26 August 1892, C.O. 273/182, f. 637.

118 Sultan Abu Bakar's advice was closely adhered to by Smith. During Smith's visit to Pahang in August 1892, Abu Bakar was responsible for Smith laying down his four points which Sultan Ahmad had to follow. For discussion on the points see Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 29 August 1892, C.O. 273/182, ff. 639—45. For Johor's influence, see also Fielding to Meade, 26 August 1892, C.O. 273/182, ff. 635—37.

119 Smith to Ripon, Confidential, 7 September 1892, C.O. 273/183, f. 370; see also extract of Captain of Mercury, Charles Balfour's letter, 3 September 1892, enclosure in Balfour to Colonial Office, 5 October 1892, C.O. 273/184, f. 295. The main aim of the British was to divorce Sultan Ahmad and Tengku Ali from the rebels. The Sultan of Johor was simultaneously invited to the peace talks at Singapore.

120 W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", pp. 156—57.

121 *ARP* 1892, p. 93; Anon, *Hikayat Pahang*, p. 207; cerita 38.

122 Lapuran Jawatankuasa Menyiasat Mat Kilau, p. 14.

123 Haji Buyong Adil, *Sejarah Pahang*, Kuala Lumpur, 1972, p. 293. Translated it means: "If my requests above-mentioned are not acceded to, let me die in the jungle for I am afraid to return. I will attach no credence to mere verbal assurances no matter by whom given". See W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 158.

124 *ARP* 1893, p. 108.

125 H. Clifford, "Report on the expedition recently led into Kelantan and Trengganu on the East Coast of the Malay Peninsula", *JMBRAS*, XXXIV, i. (1961), p. 156. (Hereafter referred to as "Report on the Expedition").

126 W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", pp. 160—61. See also Rasu and Bahaman to To' Raja of Jelai, 19 April 1894, enclosure in Wise to Egerton, 10 June 1894, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 19 June 1894, C.O. 273/196, ff. 281—82.

127 Wise to Egerton, 10 June 1894, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, 19 June 1894, C.O. 273/196, f. 279.

128 Smith to Ripon, Confidential, 10 October 1892, C.O. 273/183, f. 260; see also Pattrick Morrah, "A History of the Malayan Police", *JMBRAS*, XXVI, ii (1968), p. 83.

129 Sultan of Trengganu to Mitchell, 3 June 1894, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 26 June 1894, C.O. 273/196, f. 359.

130 H. Clifford, "Report on the Expedition", pp. 3, 15.

131 *ARP* 1894, p. 74.

132 H. Clifford, *Bushwacking and other Asiatic Tales and Memories*, London, 1929, pp. 78—79.

133 H. Clifford, "Report on the Expedition", p. 8.

134 For details on the role of Islam in resistance movements, see Anthony Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2, February 1967, pp. 267—83. For details on the expansion and influence of Islam in Malaysia, see Cesar Adib Majul, "Theories on the introduction and expansion of Islam in Malaysia", International Association of Historians of Asia, *Bienniel Conference Proceedings*, Vol. II, 1962, pp. 339—97; S.Q. Fatimi (ed.), Shirle Gordon, *Islam Comes to Malaysia*, Singapore, 1963, pp. 4—71.

135 H. Clifford, *Bushwacking*, p. 76.

136 Ibid., p. 78.

137 Egerton to Colonial Secretary, Singapore, 16 June 1894, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 9 June 1894, C.O. 273/196, f. 264; Mitchell to Sultan of Trengganu, 25 June 1896, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 7 July 1896, C.O. 273/196, ff. 504—9.

138 Wise to Egerton, report, 10 June 1894, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 19 June 1894, C.O. 273/196, ff. 270—78.

139 Only one Sikh, Ram Singh escaped and was able to inform To' Garang Yusof about the attack. For details on Ram Singh's description, see W. R. Roff (ed.), "The Story of Ram Singh", *Stories by Hugh Clifford*, Kuala Lumpur, 1966, pp. 93—109. For details on the attack on Sungai Tembeling, see Fleming to Egerton, 15 June 1894, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 19 June 1894, C.O. 273/196, f. 266. Panglima Garang Yusof of Pulau Tawar to Fleming, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 19 June 1894, C.O. 273/196, ff. 269—70; Sultan Ahmad to Mitchell, 17 June 1894, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 19 June 1894, C.O. 273/196, f. 271.

140 H. Clifford, *Bushwacking*, p. 92.

141 *ARP* 1894, p. 74.

142 According to Wee Bian Peh, a Chinese shopkeeper, the To' Raja was uncertain as to whom he should support — the rebels or the British. See Wise to Egerton,

10 June 1894, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, 19 June 1894, C.O. 273/196, f. 284.

143 William Maxwell to the Officer Commanding Field Force Pahang, 23 June 1894, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, 25 June 1894, C.O. 273/196, f. 321. See also Acting Resident, Jeram Ampai to Fleming, 6 July 1894, *TDOF* 185/94.

144 He was a Hokkien Chinese shopkeeper who informed the British that he was robbed of $700 and clothes by the dissidents at Tanjong Jelai. See Wise to Egerton, 10 June 1894, enclosure 7, in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 19 June 1894, C.O. 273/196, f. 284.

145 He was a petty headman of Pulau Tawar who informed the British that according to his son Ismail (while he was at Dungun) he heard that Bahaman and Mat Kilau intended to raid Pahang with forces from Kelantan and Trengganu. See Wise to Egerton, 10 June 1894, enclosure 6 in Mitchell to Ripon, 19 June 1894, C.O. 273/196, f. 280.

146 Panglima Garang Yusof to Clifford, 17 June 1894, enclosure 2 in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 2 July 1894, C.O. 273/196, f. 440.

147 For details on the movement of British forces, see *ARP* 1894, pp. 75—76.

148 Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 2 July 1894, C.O. 273/196, f. 443.

149 Resident Selangor to Colonial Secretary, 13 July 1894, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 17 July 1894, C.O. 273/196, f. 656. Due to the incompetence of the British forces, they lost Mr. Wise, but the attack at Jeram Ampai indicated that the British were prepared to pursue the rebels.

150 Egerton to Colonial Secretary, 26 June 1894, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 10 July 1894, C.O. 273/196, f. 564.

151 W. H. Treacher to Colonial Secretary, 1 July 1894, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 2 July 1894, C.O. 273/196, f. 476.

152 Abu Bakar's advice was: "Now is the opportunity to open your heart to the Governor as he had opened his heart to you", to which Ahmad replied, "I am ready to do anything". See Conversation between Mitchell and Sultan Ahmad at Istana Johor, 23 July 1894, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 24 July 1894, C.O. 273/196, ff. 738—40. For British reasons and justifications in aiding Sultan Ahmad, see ff. 732—48.

153 Smith to Ripon, Confidential, 27 December 1892, C.O. 273/184, ff. 194—96; see also Clifford to Mitchell, memorandum 1893, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 12 June 1894, C.O. 273/196, ff. 60—63. For details on the expenditure incurred, see Appendix K.

154 Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 9 July 1894, C.O. 273/196, f. 512.

155 Clifford to Colonial Secretary, Confidential, 5 September 1895, enclosure 1 in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 9 September 1895, C.O. 273/206, f. 95. See also Meade to Foreign Office, 10 October 1895, *FOCP* Part 7, No. 76, p. 213.

156 Fairfield to Foreign Office, 23 June 1894, *FOCP* Part 4, No. 114; Earl of Kimberley to J. G. Scott, 26 June 1894, telegram, *FOCP* Part 4, No. 122. See also Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 19 June 1894, C.O. 273/196, f. 262; Mitchell to Sultan of Trengganu, 25 June 1894, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 7 July 1894, C.O. 273/196, ff. 499, 502.

157 Sultan of Trengganu to Mitchell, 17 July 1895, enclosure in Mitchell to Chamberlain, Confidential, 26 August 1895, C.O. 273/204, f. 490; Bunsen to Kimberley, Confidential, 16 April 1895, C.O. 273/209, f. 160.

158 Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 17 July 1894, C.O. 273/196, ff. 656—7. See

also J. G. Scott to Kimberley, 29 June 1894, *FOCP* Part 4, No. 128, p. 152.

159 J. G. Scott to Kimberley, 20 July 1894, C.O. 273/200, f. 294; J. G. Scott to Governor, 31 August 1894, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 2 October 1894, C.O. 273/198, f. 662. The Siamese agreed that in the event they failed to capture the rebels, the British would be able to send their forces to Kelantan and Trengganu.

160 J. G. Scott to Kimberley, 29 July 1894, *FOCP* Part 5, No. 33, p. 44. Siamese interference was not so much to aid the British suppression of the rebels, but in order to have a better *locus standi* in the Northern Malay States.

161 Mitchell to Ripon, 25 March 1895, C.O. 273/202, f. 647. For details on Clifford's journey, see attached map.

162 Clifford to Mitchell, report, 14 August 1894, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 28 August 1894, C.O. 273/197, f. 306.

163 See correspondence between Mitchell to Sultan of Trengganu, 26 June 1894, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, 26 June 1894, C.O. 273/196, ff. 356—58; Sultan of Trengganu to Mitchell, 3 June 1894, C.O. 273/196, ff. 359—60; Sultan of Trengganu to Mitchell, 18 July 1894, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 25 July 1894, C.O. 273/196; f. 752; W. E. Maxwell to Sultan of Kelantan, 30 June 1894, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, 7 July 1894, C.O. 273/196, ff. 504—8.

164 Governor of Straits Settlements to Beckett, 2 November 1894, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 26 November 1894, C.O. 273/198, f. 669.

165 For details on the expedition see Clifford to Mitchell, report, 7 August 1895, enclosure in Mitchell to Chamberlain, Confidential, 5 November 1895, C.O. 273/207, ff. 75—122. For Clifford's opinions and proposals for undertaking the expedition see Clifford to Colonial Secretary, 14 April 1895, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 17 April 1895, C.O. 273/203, ff. 115—8. See also *Hugh Clifford Files, The Straits Times*, 26 January 1970; Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 25 March 1895, C.O. 273/202, ff. 647—50. In British view the expedition was a failure and agreeable to Siam's intervention in offering free pardon and rewards for the capture of the rebels. See Lucas to Fairfield, minute, 20 April 1895, C.O. 273/203, f. 175.

166 *ARP* 1894, p. 75.

167 H. Clifford, "Report on the expedition", pp. 158—159.

168 The Siamese Commission led by Phya Dhip Kosa sent Luang Visudh Panihar and Luang Swasti Boorow to justify Siam's march into Siamese territory and to prove that they had sanctioned British armed resistance. See Bunsen to Kimberley, 24 April 1895, C.O. 273/209, ff. 176—177.

169 It included a sum of $500 to the informer. See Duff to Clifford, 12 May 1895, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 27 May 1895, C.O. 273/104, f. 129; H. Clifford, "Report on expedition", pp. 141—143. Many declined to disclose information since they would be punished by mutilation of the nose. See Clifford to Colonial Secretary, 5 September 1895, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 9 September 1895, C.O. 273/206, f. 93; see also Clifford to Colonial Secretary, 5 September 1895, enclosure No. 2 in r. H. Meade to Foreign Office, 10 October 1895, *FOCP* Part 7, No. 76, p. 213.

170 H. Clifford, *Bushwacking*, p. 122.

171 Acting Resident Selangor to Colonial Secretary, telegram, 1 June 1895, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 3 June 1895, C.O. 273/204, f. 200.

See also *Utusan Melayu*, 10 January 1970.

172 *ARP* 1895, p. 8, *The Free Press*, 22 October 1895; see also Vice Consul Archer to Bunsen, 6 May 1896, enclosure 1 in Bunsen to Marquis of Salisbury, 30 May 1896, *FOCP* Part 8, No. 99, p. 98.

173 Bunsen to Marquis of Salisbury, 2 November 1895, C.O. 273/209 ff. 500—501. See also Bunsen to marquis of Salisbury, 28 May 1896, *FOCP* Part 8, No. 95, p. 98. A different account is given by Duff — the dissidents were apparently captured by force during a banquet. See Bunsen to Mitchell, enclosure 2, in R. H. Meade to Foreign Office, 30 October 1896, *FOCP* part 8, No. 122, p. 144. See also Fleming to Clifford, letter, 18 November 1895, C.O. 273/222, f. 279. *Berita Harian*, 3 January 1970.

174 Bunsen to Marquis of Salisbury, 2 November 1895, C.O. 273/209, ff. 500—501.

175 Teh Ibrahim's statement to Tabok (a forester), in Tabok to Vice Consul Archer, 16 July 1896, enclosure in Mitchell to Chamberlain, Confidential, 29 September 1896, C.O. 273/217, f. 437.

176 Straits Settlements Legislative Council Proceedings, 25 November 1895, C.O. 273/222, f. 286. See also Appendix M for details of the others who surrendered to the Siamese. In 1970 there were claims that To' Bahaman was still alive. See *Berita Harian*, 3 January 1970. To' Guru Peramu who resided at Kuantan was said to be To' Bahaman. One of the firm believers of this view was Encik Zakaria bin Hitam who believes (from his own investigations) that the To' Guru was indeed Bahaman. Interview with Zakaria Hitam, Kuantan, 16 May 1975. See also *Hugh Clifford Files*, *The Sunday Mail*, 20 February 1972; *The Straits Times*, 17 April 1972; *The Sunday Mail*, 20 February 1972. There was, however, another view which stated that the To' Guru Peramu was Mat Kelubi. Mat Kelubi was another chief who was also bestowed with magical powers. See *Berita Harian*, 7 January 1970 and subsequent controversies in *Berita Harian*, 8 January 1970; 9 January 1970.

177 Mitchell to Chamberlain, Confidential, 28 October 1895, C.O. 273/206, f. 572; Bunsen to Marquis of Salisbury, letter, 22 October 1895, C.O. 273/209, f. 457; Bunsen to Mitchell, copy, enclosure in Mitchell to Chamberlain, Confidential, 29 September 1891, C.O. 273/217, f. 435; *Berita Harian*, 28 December 1969, 30 December 1969, 11 January 1970. As for the ex-To' Gajah, he was known to be alive and seen at Kuala Tembeling together with Mat Kilau in 1896, but Fleming believed Mat Kilau to be dead. See Fleming to Clifford, letter, 18 November 1895, C.O. 273/222, f. 281. Another reference stated that the ex-To' Gajah died at Pak Nam Po in Thailand. See *Berita Harian*, 12 January 1970. With reference to Mat Kilau's "death" there are two versions. In one it was reported that he was killed during a banquet at Kelantan. See Bunsen to Mitchell, enclosure 2 in Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 30 October 1896, *FOCP* Part 8, No. 122, p. 144. The other reported that he died while on his way to the coast at Kuala Reh. See Bunsen to Marquis of Salisbury, 21 October 1895, *FOCP* Part 7, No. 124, p. 251; W. Linehan stated that Mat Kilau died in Trengganu. See W. Linehan, op. cit., p. 168. This was the view held by historians and the public till 26 December 1969, when Mat Kilau was said to have reappeared at Pulau Tawar. See Appendix N.

178 See Appendix M.

179 S. J. Horacio de la Costa, *Asia and the Philippines*, collected History Papers, Manila, p. 162.

CHAPTER VI
STRUGGLE AND FAILURE 1896—1914

In July 1895, Sultan Ahmad witnessed a restructuring of Pahang's political system. The brave resistance of the natives during the four crucial years of 1891—1895, apart from displaying native valour, had had the effect of drawing Pahang into political association with the native states of Perak, Selangor and Sungei Ujong.[1] It could be deduced from his correspondence with the British that Sultan Ahmad's efforts to join the Federated Malay States[2] were aimed mainly at regaining his authority and autonomy — this time by peaceful methods. He hoped that his aims would agree with those of the Sultans of the respective states.

It is interesting to consider seriously why Sultan Ahmad was favourably disposed to the idea of the Federated Malay States (FMS). He realized that Pahang had proved to be a failure financially when compared to Perak and Selangor. As far as the Colonial authorities were concerned, the only solution to the economic problems was to unify the various states so as to achieve a more efficient and economical administration. The unofficial members of the Straits Settlements Legislative Council did not agree to the proposal that the Colonial Office finance Pahang by borrowing from the richer states of Perak and Selangor. Furthermore, they refused to be taxed in order to finance Pahang.[3] Another alternative which lay open was to withdraw[4] British administration from Pahang and to revert to the old system of advice under Weld's treaty of October 1887. A complete withdrawal, except from Raub (which was the only area in Pahang where European mining had shown some signs of success), was suggested. However, it was felt that Raub should be annexed to Selangor rather than left on its own.[5]

Sultan Ahmad, aware of these suggestions knew that the British would not withdraw from Pahang totally. To return to a system of advice would mean throwing away all that they had achieved. Furthermore the British had justified their entry into the Malay states on the grounds that they were interested in improving the welfare of the natives. They were still bound by the concept of moral obligation to the natives; hence they were not in any position to surrender all that they had accomplished. A more personal reason for Sultan Ahmad's agreement to the idea of the FMS was that it appeared to be the most feasible pathway to attaining his ends. His interests were still political-cum-economic. He knew that Pahang's

debt to the colonies at the end of 1894 had amounted to more than $1,000,000.[6] Sultan Ahmad knew that British proposals to withdraw British administration from any part of Pahang would mean a termination of allowances to native chiefs.[7] This would inevitably lead to discontentment and loss of lives resulting from a resurgence of chaos. Sultan Ahmad felt that it would not be possible for him to control his chiefs, since those chiefs who had suffered during his regime might still have felt loyal to the British. In some cases there was a feeling of enmity between the chiefs and the British. The dissatisfied group felt that, as a consequence of British administration, their incomes were not rising unlike the incomes of their counterparts in Selangor and Sungei Ujong.[8] It was this group which was interested in the discontinuance of British administration. Sultan Ahmad could only get their support if he agreed to the question of withdrawal, although this would inevitably be interpreted as a form of weakness on the part of the British to administer Pahang. Sultan Ahmad further realized that there was no other avenue or outlet from which he could secure economic grants. He could not forget that the economic strain had worked against his interests, since concessionaires who had not justified their existence by 1896 had had their concessions cancelled.[9] Moreover the Chinese population had declined to move into Pahang, preferring to settle in the Western Malay States. Any chance of amassing economic power from concessionaires was virtually impossible. Sultan Ahmad's allowances at that juncture stood at $24,000 per annum, but he was painfully aware that he could have secured much more if he had been the sole ruler. He would have gained the 10% royalty on all gold exported from Pahang which would have amounted to not less than $40,000 per annum.[10] Now, however, he feared the prospect of being deprived of his allowance as a consequence of British withdrawal from Pahang.

The second issue, that is, the British proposal to annex Raub to Selangor,[11] did not seem favourable to Sultan Ahmad either. His old animosity towards Selangor did not subside and the idea of being placed under the control of another native state was humiliating. He resented deeply any encroachment into the boundaries of Pahang. He therefore did not support this idea although Perak's administration of the Dindings was an example often cited in their favour.

It was only in the area of economic grants that the FMS idea appeared particularly attractive to Sultan Ahmad. Sultan Ahmad's

apprehension when signing the Agreement centred around one issue: "Whether the treaty would in any way prevent him from making a direct reference to the Governor or the Secretary of State".[12] He was taken aback when F. A. Swettenham replied that the Governor and the Secretary of State "would be the last to consent to any such proposal".[13] It is to be noted that Sultan Ahmad was the only one of the three native rulers who took a long time to agree to the terms when signing the Agreement. He wanted to clarify the above point, but finally he conceded, due to Swettenham's assurance that by accepting the Agreement he and the other rulers would neither lose their powers and privileges, nor be deprived of the right of "self government" which they at present enjoyed. Each state, Swettenham stressed, would not be denied its right to pass its own laws, and the separate state treasuries would be retained. All the four states had to contribute a proportion of their revenue for expenses incurred in implementing the scheme. Swettenham reaffirmed that the object of the British in proposing a change in the *status quo* was for the common good of the states as a whole. As a union the four states would receive more consideration economically and administratively, while the Resident-General would act as a representative with greater authority than the respective Residents. The Resident-General would support their interests and plead their cause against any authority, "a friend whose voice would be heard further and carry more weight than that of any Resident or of all residents acting independently."[14] Finally reassured, Sultan Ahmad welcomed the scheme and put his seal on it. Hence Swettenham could report that:

> All the rulers and chiefs who had attached his seal to the Federation Agreement gave his full consent to and expressed his approval of the treaty.[15]

When signing the Federation Agreement of 1895, Sultan Ahmad was silent, and did not pose any obstacles to the British. His attitude had been very different in 1888 when, on the pretext of wishing to consult his chiefs he had dragged his feet about signing the Pahang treaty. He consulted neither his chiefs nor the State Council but went ahead and signed the Agreement. His change in attitude was largely due to the confidence which he had gained from the rulers of the FMS, in particular from Sultan Idris of Perak who, being the best informed among the Malay rulers, often acted as the spokesman for his counterparts. Sultan Ahmad hoped, then, that Pahang's affiliation with the more prosperous states of Perak, Selangor and

Sungei Ujong[16] would be a means for him to resume his traditional powers of authority wih the support of the three Malay rulers of the FMS. Unfortunately, his hopes never materialised.

With the acceptance of the Agreement, Sultan Ahmad and his subjects entered a new political phase. Tengku Mahmud wanted to test the British to see whether they would listen to the demands of the natives of those states which had been after being accepted as members of the FMS. In March 1897, therefore, he claimed the $600 monthly allowance from the Klang payments which had been forfeited during the disturbances. This sum was the amount of money allotted to Sultan Ahmad by the Selangor Government for services rendered during the days of the Selangor civil war. The Pahang disturbances of 1891—5 led to heavy expenditure for the Straits Settlements Government. In effect, Sultan Ahmad was forced to contribute towards the suppression of the rebels. The Selangor contribution was capitalized to a sum total covering eight years and Sultan Ahmad was directed to pay the amount to the Straits Settlements Government as a single payment. Tengku Mahmud claimed that on 23 October 1891, he had been granted the allowance from Selangor by his father with the approval of the Resident.[17] Tengku Mahmud was entitled to claim a sum of $35,100 from the Klang payments for fifty-three months i.e. from 1 January 1893 to 1 June 1897 (the years that he had been deprived from securing the amount). Tengku Mahmud was shocked by Clifford's decision that if he received the Klang payments, he would lose the increase in his monthly allowance.[18] At that point he received a monthly allowance of $100. Tengku Mahmud could not understand why he was being deprived of the payments in spite of his loyalty to the British during the Pahang disturbances. Tengku Mahmud had incurred some small expenses, having purchased a house and spent some thousands of dollars on renovations. He argued that, with the cessation of the Klang payments, he "would be unable to complete the work and the house uncompleted would be in ruins."[19] On the other hand, Sultan Ahmad had declined to transfer a part of his monthly allowance to his son to compensate the loss. Finally, Tengku Mahmud emerged as the victor since neither the Resident nor the Resident-General agreed to the suggestion that a sufficient sum be deducted from the Sultan's allowance. Both sympathised with Tengku Mahmud, so despite the many economic pitfalls, his allowance was raised to $300 per mensem to commence from 1 June 1897.[20] Tengku Mahmud also succeeded in procuring

the sum of $600 per month from the Klang payments as he was able to produce the 23 October 1891 document which assigned him the claim.[21] Sultan Ahmad, encouraged by the positive steps taken by the British to raise Tengku Mahmud's income, anticipated that his objectives of acquiring economic power could soon be realized.

From 1889 Sultan Ahmad deliberately used Tengku Mahmud as an instrument to advance his objectives. As early as the 1880s, he had observed that the British had a harmonious relationship with Tengku Mahmud. Survival to Sultan Ahmad in the late 1890s meant convincing the British of his "support" for them, so that they would have no cause to distrust or dislike him. It was only through peaceful and diplomatic moves that his interests could be enhanced. He therefore set his plans for securing his ends in motion by raising Tengku Mahmud to the status of the Tengku Besar of Pahang in 1897.[22] Sultan Ahmad hoped that this would lead the British to recognise and support Tengku Mahmud. At the same time, he intended to appoint Tengku Ali as the Raja Muda.[23] The position of the Tengku Besar signified his right of succession to the Sultanate — a right which was recognized by the British in 1891.[24] In the event of the latter being unable to provide an heir, the Raja Muda had the right to succeed him. Having created these two royal appointments, Sultan Ahmad hoped that his aims would materialize more swiftly, but later developments did not satisfy him fully. He once more looked towards Johor, which had been his guiding star since the 1880s. Having observed that Sultan Abu Bakar of Johor was a close ally of the British, Sultan Ahmad was forced to strengthen his ties with the Johor ruler. He co-operated with Sultan Abu Bakar with the object of establishing a "conciliatory" relationship with the British administrators. The second step to survival lay in forging ties with "native powers" through of marriage. Once again Tengku Mahmud fell into the clutches of his old father and in September 1897, the marriage between Tengku Mahmud and Tengku Mariam (a sister of Sultan Abu Bakar) was solemnised.[25] Similarly in 1899, Sultan Ahmad's daughter Tengku Nong, was married to Raja Alang Iskandar, the second son of Sultan Idris of Perak.[26] Sultan Ahmad hoped that these political marriages would forge unity among the Malay rulers, but he did not suspect that his plans would cause new problems with his new neighbours, namely Johor and Trengganu. Tension was brewing between Johor and Pahang and Sultan Ahmad's hope of gaining support from his newly acquired relatives was now temporarily suspended.

The conflict flared up when both Pahang and Johor staked a claim on Pulau Aur. The dispute was over the boundary between Pahang and Johor which had been defined on 17 June 1862 by Governor Ord.[27] The declaration then read as follows:

> It is hereby declared that the River Indau [Endau] has been heretofore and shall continue hereafter to be the boundary on the mainland and that the islands of Pulau Tioman and all islands to the South of the latitude of its Southern extremity are and shall be portions of the territory of Johore and all islets to the North of that latitude are and shall be portions of the territory of Pahang.[28]

Johor claimed that Pulau Aur had been given to her by Che Wan Long prior to Sultan Ahmad's ascendance to the Bendaharaship of Pahang and the drafting of the 1862 Agreement.[29] The inhabitants of Johor regarded Pulau Aur as their possession, since it formed part of the area ceded by Bendahara Kuris to the Johor Temenggong in 1862. The people of Pulau Aur, however, objected to the arrangement, since they had been paying taxes as subjects of the Pahang rulers. When Johor began exacting taxes, they refused to pay allegiance, deciding instead to resist by force of arms.[30] It was further feared that in the event of the island being declared a part of Johor, the population of Pulau Aur would shift to Pahang and give their loyalty to the Pahang ruler.[31]

Sultan Ahmad realized that these confusing disputes could only be solved through the intervention of the British. To a certain extent he was disappointed with his own inability to settle the internal disputes on his own accord. Ever since the British took control of Pahang, he was no longer in a position to determine the direction and depth of change in domestic affairs. He saw this as a loss of his power to pacify opponents in earlier times. His political survival at that moment was being jeopardized by boundary disputes which necessitated the services of the British to settle matters. It could not be denied that the British administration of Pahang had deprived of his political supremacy. Sultan Ahmad was aware that he was, unavoidably, losing the battle for survival. Eventually, the British thus intervened to settle the dispute between Pahang and Johor, and decided to fix the boundary after a thorough survey of the whole territory had been carried out. It was hoped that both Pahang and Johor would share the cost of the survey.[32] Sultan Ahmad, on the advice of the British, approved the appointment of a Boundary Commission comprising of Sir Cecil Smith with either F. A.

Swettenham or Mr. Hervey as arbitrators. The Resident General F. A. Swettenham was appointed in place of J. A. Swettenham.[33] Johor also appointed two delegates namely Abdul Rahman and Sir R. Herbert. Sultan Ahmad, had stamped his *chop* of approval on the appointment of this Commission.[34]

As a result of investigations, the Commission ratified that the Endau was the Semberong, and that the boundary fixed by Governor Ord in 1868 was still valid.[35] The Commission had also to consider the 1862 boundary which, prior to Pahang's aliance with Johor had run as follows:

> On the coast Tanjong Leman; thence inland along the watershed which divides Endau and Kratong river basins from that of the Sedili and Johore rivers; thence still following the watershed dividing the Endau, Kratong and Rompin river basins from those of Johore and Muar until the Johol-Johore boundary was reached... Turning from the mainland to the islands the line should run out to sea from Tanjong Leman due East.[36]

Hugh Clifford suggested that, following native custom, the watershed of rivers and not the banks of streams which should be regarded as boundaries between states of the Peninsula.[37] With the Commission's report, Johor was allotted both rivers — Upper Endau and Semberong — while Pahang was allotted both banks of the Kratong and its tributary, the Pukim.[38] The Commission's decision was accepted by both Pahang and Johor.

Pahang's problems were further complicated by its relations with Trengganu in October 1897.[39] The issue centred around a Pahang subject named Che Da, who, in 1891, had contracted to supply timber to a Trengganu trader named Nakhoda Mammat. The former had received in advance a sum of $150, but the place of delivery was not specified in their dealings. The timber was not delivered, and Nakhoda Mammat demanded that it be delivered at Kuala Kemaman, Che Da apparently refused. In 1894 Che Da went to Kemaman and sold other types of timber for a sum of $20, which apparently Nakhoda Mammat claimed. In 1897 Che Da went back to Kemaman, where he was imprisoned. His relatives had him released by paying a sum of $100, although the Kemaman authorities actually claimed a sum of $150. The tension between the two parties concerned forced the Resident of Pahang, H. Clifford, to direct the Trengganu Government to refund the sums taken from Che Da, and advised Nakhoda Mammat to sue Che Da in Pahang courts of law if he wished to prosecute his claims. Clifford further


TRACING TO ACCOMPANY PAHANG COMMISSIONER'S REPORT ON PAHANG-TRENGGANU BOUNDARY
KUALA KEMAMAN
KEMAMAN
S. Kemaman
Bt. Mento
Bt. Besar
Sandy Beach
T. Diderat
T. Lipat
T. Geliga
T. Chendat
K. MALAGAN
K.CHENDAR
S. Berat
SWAMPS
SWAMPS
Sandy Beach
Sandy Beach
FOOT PATH
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emphasized that if Pahang subjects were imprisoned for debts in Trengganu, the Pahang Government could claim damages from the Sultan of Trengganu.[40] However, the situation deteriorated when it was realized that no direct communication could be had with the governments of any of the Northern Malay States, as Siam was their suzerain.

The second problem arose when Yusof, a Trengganu subject, was accused of murder and handed over to the Trengganu authorities in Pahang.[40] He was not brought to trial, but was ordered to be imprisoned pending a payment of a fine of $500. Yusof managed to escape and was not captured. It seemed, therefore, that it was impossible to inflict punishment on murderers in Trengganu. Pahang, similarly, refused to extradite criminals. As a result of friction over petty matters, Siam was invited to mediate and help settle differences. It was hoped that, with Siamese intervention, trade and commerce between the two states would resume and a satisfactory relationship develop. Sultan Zainal Abidin III of Trengganu was requested to assure the Government of Pahang that in future all prisoners would be immediately and properly tried. Trengganu also pledged that murderers who had been proven guilty would not be allowed to escape with nothing more than a price on their heads. The Government of Pahang, meanwhile, was to ensure that, in future, criminals would not be surrendered to Trengganu officers in Pahang. These assurances were needed to stabilize diplomatic relations between the two native states. Sultan Ahmad was now in a situation in which another alien power (Siam) was drawn in to settle the inter-state conflicts in which Pahang was involved.

The two cases of extradition were a prelude to more serious problems Sultan Ahmad. His hopes of establishing a closer relationship with Trengganu were dashed when the question of extradition required clarifications over the boundary in 1900.[42] Both Siam and Pahang had agreed that the demarcation of the boundary would follow the natural landmarks, so that the Eastern extremity of Tanjung Glugor (Guliga) formed the line dividing the two states.[43] Siam was invited by the British to superintend the marking of the boundary with a cairn of stones, the presence of H. W. Thomson, the District Officer of Kuantan. Pahang then appointed Mr. A. Butler, the British Resident of Pahang, to be Pahang's Commissioner for the delimitation of the Eastern extremity of the boundary between Pahang and the Siamese dependencies.[44] There was no

MAP SHOWING APPROXIMATELY THE DISPUTED AREA BETWEEN PAHANG AND JOHOR



solution which appeared to be satisfactory to both parties and the problem was temporarily shelved. In 1903—5 both parties agreed to a rectification of the Pahang-Trengganu boundary. Sultan Ahmad had to invite the British and the Siamese authorities to settle the differences. The problem lay with Sultan Zainal Abidin III of Trengganu who refused to consent to the agreement of 1902 with Siam,[45] whereby Trengganu was acknowledged as a dependency of Siam. The question had to be settled between the two native rulers, but nevertheless both Sultan Ahmad and Sultan Zainal Abidin III had to take into account the Anglo Siamese Agreement of 29 November 1899[46] which fixed the boundary between Trengganu and Pahang as:

(a) the main watershed;
(b) then the Southern drainage of the Kemaman river until it meets the watershed of the Chendar river;
(c) then the Northern drainage of the Chendar river to Tanjung Glugor (Tanjung Guliga) on the sea coast.[47]

Pahang and Trengganu had to observe the rules so as not to offend Siam, since the Anglo-Siamese Agreement "[would] not meet either the justice of the case or the intentions of the contracting parties".[48]

One could observe during the negotiations with Trengganu that Sultan Ahmad's position as the ruler of a native state in the traditional sense was respected by the British. His authority to decide matters with Trengganu was upheld when the British recognized the fact that the conflict was to be settled by him and Sultan Zainal Abidin III of Trengganu, but it was Sultan Ahmad who was forced to seek the help of the British in defining the boundary. It was finally agreed that the boundary was to be fixed, with the aid of surveyors, by the contending parties. F. A. Swettenham suggested that:

> Where the land is flat and no water parting exist, the surveyors on both sides should endeavour to find a line midway between the Chendar and Kemaman river which shall be fair to both the interested parties.[49]

Upon further investigation, it became known that the boundary line at Tanjung Guliga cut off a large portion of the Southern drainage of the Kemaman river, thereby assigning it to Pahang rather than to Trengganu. The Gabok river appeared to rise only about five miles north of the town of Kuantan. According to the terms of the Agreement with Siam in 1899, "one hundred and thirty-five square miles of the country assigned to Pahang was to be allocated to Trengganu,

thus leasing Kuantan as a strip of land between three to five miles of width along the coasts".[50] Sultan Ahmad was dissatisfied over the 1903—5 rectification and on consultation with Ralph Paget, the Charge d'Affaires, referred the latter to Imam Indera Mahkota who had lived in the locality of Kemaman for several years.[51] But the Imam Mahkota could not say anything definite about the *ulu* areas of the Gabok river. The British feared that the proposed rectification of the boundary would not be satisfactory, since the Siamese Government abided by the principles of 1899 and "would not allow the matter to pass easily".[52]

The Siamese Government, incidentally, had shown no inclination to interfere in Trengganu's problems, and Lord Landsdowne of the Colonial Office was disposed to think that Sultan Zainal Abidin III of Trengganu and Sultan Ahmad of Pahang (without any considerable risk of objections being raised by Siam) could come to a practical arrangement with regard to the delimitation of the boundary.[52] The British were concerned that in the event of intervention by the Siamese Government, they themselves would not be able to dispute the issue, as the 1899 agreements had to be adhered to. In 1906, the question of the readjustment of the Pahang-Trengganu boundary emerged once again and on the advice of Scrivenor, a geologist, and Bryne (who had surveyed the area in 1900), it was fixed at Tanjung Guliga. From Scrivenor's report it was decided to fix:

> ...the line of boundary from Tanjung Guliga over Bukit Besar to a small tributary of some convenient spot and the Kemaman river near Agusmati.[53]

Both Pahang and Trengganu agreed that Tanjung Guliga Besar and not Tanjung Tengah was the correct boundary. According to Owen, the Acting District Officer of Kuantan, the district of Kemaman had originally been part of the state of Pahang, and had been ceded to Trengganu during the reign of Bendahara Ali (1806—57).[54]

Sultan Zainal Abidin III of Trengganu's hesitation in taking any action about the readjustment of the boundary was due to fear of Siamese action. He felt that since the boundary question had been settled by the British and the Siamese in 1899, it was fruitless for him to interfere. He was content to leave the matter as it was, and thus managed not to offend either power.[56] Sultan Ahmad, on the other hand, had supported the British in altering the existing line on the pretext that he did not wish to see a large portion of his state being handed over to Trengganu. He wrote a letter to Sultan Zainal

Abidin III of Trengganu on 27 April 1906, stating his wishes and deputising his son, Tengku Mahmud, and the British Resident, Cecil Wray, to act as mediators on his behalf.[57] Sultan Zainal Abidin expressed his dissatisfaction, *inter alia* that, under the 1906 rectification, he was asked "to surrender a large tract of country".[58] The Pahang representatives reassured the Trengganu ruler that it was not intended by any party that the boundary be carried close to the town of Kuala Kuantan and that the earlier error had risen due to ignorance of the true course of the Gabok river. Pahang was prepared to pay pecuniary compensation to Trengganu for the loss of territories brought about by this error.[59] In return, Pahang was to have the right to export timber to Trengganu via the Kemaman river, duty free. Finally, Sultan Zainal Abidin agreed that the boundary between Pahang and Trengganu "shall run along the summits of the hills forming the main watershed between the states of Trengganu and Pahang... consider the matter as permanently settled and unalterable forever".[60]

During the negotiations of 1900—6, it could be seen that Sultan Ahmad was deeply interested in redefining the boundary; yet he refrained from being an active participant. His role now was passive when compared to his role in the 1880s. Moreover, a large part of the proceedings was undertaken by his son[61] and the British. However, he began to be suspicious of British interference in Pahang affairs. He could not forget the fact that British intervention thus far had had a great impact on his political position. He had lost much of his law-enforcing authority. Besides, continued British interference in the domestic affairs of Pahang prompted him to question whether political interference would lead to interference in native religion and customs. This concern induced him to ponder over the wording of the 1888 Treaty which he had signed with the British, especially with reference to "the powers and non-interference of the customs of the country and matters relating to religion".[62] It is surprising to note that Sultan Ahmad decided to delve into these issues only in 1900, after a lapse of twelve years. He feared that a total erosion of his political power would lead to a loss of his traditional authority in matters relating to religion and customs. Since these two issues had not been defined and answered in his letter of 24 August 1888 to the British, he feared British interference in this area. As he was old and had "surrendered" his powers to his son (who could be easily won over by the British), Sultan Ahmad wanted a reassurance that the traditional interests

and welfare of his state would not be seriously threatened. The main issue which played on his mind was:

> ...that the British Government [should] assure to us and our successors all our proper powers according to our system of government and will undertake that they will not interfere with old customs of our country which have good and proper reasons and also with all matters relating to our religion.[63]

Although the Durbar Conference or Conference of Chiefs held in Perak in 1897 had stressed and confirmed that the independence of each ruler in his state would not be affected,[64] Sultan Ahmad was not convinced. He wanted British assurance of non-interference in matters pertaining to religion and customs. The British assured him that neither the customs nor the religion of the country had been or ever would be interfered with, provided they were "compatible with an enlightened and right form of Government".[65] As to religion, they assured him that:

> ...special legislation had been prepared to provide punishments for non-observance of certain of the Muhammedan law. The delay in legislation was attributed to the various rulers of the Federated Malay States being unable to agree to the nature and extent of the punishment to be provided in each case.[66]

The British were quite puzzled over Sultan Ahmad's queries. A. Butler, the British Resident, believed that Sultan Ahmad was not seriously concerned over the issue, but was being pressured by members of his establishment.[66] Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that Sultan Ahmad was particularly interested in determining the extent of British interest in native affairs, especially since he had noted the increasingly greater degree of British involvement in domestic politics.

To compensate Sultan Ahmad's loss of his autocratic powers and to remove any form of anxiety that he might have led with regard to British administration, the British decided to honour him in 1902.[67] They admitted that with their entry into Pahang there resulted:

> ...a great loss of power to the Sultan, a considerable loss of income and a consequent reduction of state, of following and prestige. The loss of power was a necessity and a boon to Pahang, the loss of income was a misfortune due to the fact that Pahang was undeveloped and yielded but a small revenue and nearly all of it went to the Sultan, practically none being expended on the country. The State has gained what the Sultan lost and has also had the very generous assistance of its neighbours, but

this does not make the Sultan's personal loss less easy for him to bear.[69]

The British had always borne in mind that Sultan Ahmad's role throughout his reign had been "dormant". Apart from the "rebellion" in which he had supported "the rebels", he had not taken up open violence in opposing the British. Sultan Ahmad's support for "the rebels" was regarded by F. A. Swettenham as an instance of nationalistic phenomenon, since "the altered circumstances had embittered his life".[70] Sultan Ahmad's qualms over British rule had been compensated with a better income and "the introduction of all forms of civilized government",[71] but this did not lessen his dissatisfaction over the limitations in the extent of his legislative power. His old age and "good" conduct were two features which moved the British to honour him with some distinction. Apart from these factors, the constant pressure from the Pahang Malays to confer an honour on their ruler was considered. Accordingly, in 1902, Sultan Ahmad was made an Honorary Member of the Second Class or Knight Commander of the Order of Saint Michael and Saint George (K.C.M.G.),[72] in recognition of his role and relationship with the British. It was a British tactic to restrain the native rulers from embarking upon any offensive path. The aged Sultan Ahmad appreciated the honour,[73] but did not discern the motives underlying the British decision to confer the honour upon him. He was temporarily satisfied, but was still obliged to succumb to British demands.

Sultan Ahmad realized at this point that the federal system of government was not the answer to his desire for political survival. Politically, his position was worse than it had been under the Residential System. Although the British had claimed to safeguard the Sultan's prestige and dignity, the Federation of 1895 had reduced the latter's position, powers and authority. This was apparent by 1903, when Sultan Ahmad and his counterparts felt that they had no direct authority in the ruling of their states. The Resident and Resident-General collected and spent the revenue of the FMS with supreme authority, while the Resident, Resident-General and the High Commissioner were vested with powers in the granting of state lands and in the recommendation of appointments etc. Sultan Ahmad and his fellow rulers received salaries fixed by the High Commissioner, but subject to the approval of the Colonial Office. Thus at the second conference of chiefs held at Kuala Lumpur, in July 1903, Sultan Ahmad supported Sultan Idris of Perak in his

The Second Durbar, in Kuala Lumpur, in 1903.Sultan Ahmad seated on the left of the High Commissioner, Sir Frank Swettenham

protest against the trend towards bureaucratic amalgamation. They wished to loosen the bonds of the Federation, with Sultan Idris referring to a Malay proverb which stated that "there could not be two helmsmen in one vessel; neither could there be four rulers over one country".[74] Sultan Ahmad supported Sultan Idris solely because he wanted to diminish the British officials' authority in the states. Sultan Idris and the richer states of Selangor and Sungei Ujong were interested in having their governments function as separate entities, so that the affairs of each state might be managed by its own officers. They preferred the Residential System of government which called for a Resident and not a Resident General who had more administrative power than both the Sultan and the Resident. In matters of public policy the Residents were not consulted and in many important matters they could not express their views to the High Commissioner.[75] The Resident-General furthermore did not live up to the expectations of the rulers — he was not really an advocate of their needs, as Swettenham had said he would be when he proposed the Federation in 1895.

Disappointed with the existing system of government, Sultan Ahmad's fear that the rulers of the richer states in the FMS would not support him in his bid for autonomy became more intense. His attempts to regain political power — legislative and executive — had failed at every stage. This became more apparent with the creation of the Federal Council in 1909.

The objective of the Federal Council was to centralize the executive and legislative duties in the four states.[76] It was discovered that in 1904, one hundred and two enactments were passed by the four State Councils. The State Councils acted as registering and advisory bodies[77] and often did not have any time to discuss each Enactment. If one Council had a strong desire and reason for an amendment, it required the High Commissioner's approval. Only with the latter's assent could the amendment be passed as a subsequent amendment in each of the four State Councils and at different times. The procedure was cumbersome,[78] and as early as December 1907 John Anderson, the High Commissioner proposed the idea of a Federal Council, emphasizing administrative convenience as a major advantage. He further argued that a central body was necessary to control the finances and to direct the courses of legislation since there had been a rapid increase in the commercial, mining and planting communities in the four states.[79] As a result of these considerations, an Agreement for the Constitution of a Federal

Council was drawn up in 1909[80] and signed by the four rulers. The Council was composed of the High Commissioner, the Resident General, the Sultans of Perak, Selangor, and Pahang, the Yam Tuan of Negri Sembilan, the Residents of Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negeri Sembilan as well as four unofficial members.

Sultan Ahmad and his counterparts approved of the formation of the Federal Council on the condition that the proposed Central Legislature would not deprive the State Councils of their existing powers and privileges.[81] They stressed that there should be no interference with the existing jurisdiction of the State Councils over issues such as Malay religion, mosques, political pensions, penghulus and concessions of agricultural and mining lands. Sultan Ahmad supported Sultan Idris over the stipulation that every draft enactment should be first submitted to the State Council and only when it had been fully discussed, should it be passed by the Federal Council. The Constitution of the 1909 Federal Council like the FMS treaty, reassured the four rulers that their powers and authority would not be curtailed and that they would be "left undisturbed in the complete sovereignty which they expressed on the advice of their Residents".[82] However, it was soon realized that with the inauguration of the Federal Council, the power of the Sultans and State Councils was greatly undermined, and that the executive and legislative functions of the State Councils became more and more nominal. The Sultans did not possess any jurisdictional powers since the High Commissioner, and not the rulers, presided at meetings. Neither did they have a say in the nomination of members to the Council or in changes in its composition. The Sultans had no veto power, nor did their absence affect the legality of the Council.[83] They became ordinary members of the Central Legislature. As for the Resident General, his position and powers were not reduced and he still took precedence over the Malay rulers. It was for this reason that the title of the Resident-General was changed to that of the Chief Secretary to government, despite protests from the unofficials of the Council.[84] By 1910, Sultan Ahmad was aware that the constitutional changes only reduced further whatever power he had previously held and that he had lost his individuality.

Taking into consideration the period from 1898 to 1905, Sultan Ahmad can be seen to have been equally unfortunate in his attempts to secure economic power — an important element in his political survival. These attempts were also marked by failure. He had repeatedly pressured the British with his demands for an increase in

his allowances to convince himself that his economic interests were being looked after. His demands had been a regular feature since 1889 but at that time, they had been voiced in the form of threats. From 1898 onwards it took the form of compromise. In 1898 the Resident General, F. A. Swettenham, had recommended that:

> ...a moderate area of mining land should be granted to the Sultan in lieu of an increase in salary... the Sultan has less money and far more expenses than he need to have.[84]

Initially, Sultan Ahmad was not impressed by the proposal, but the idea that he would gain materially by leasing the land to concessionaires probably prompted him to take an interest in the bargain and to accede to British suggestions. The British reminded him that if the land was left idle, it would be forfeited. Moreover, Sultan Ahmad had to make an application to secure the land.[86] Here one sees that Sultan Ahmad was being treated as an ordinary subject before the law. He could not take control of lands as had been the practice in pre-colonial days. Under the rule of law his royal personage did not always elevate him above the others; so he was not given preferential treatment. Rather, in the eyes of the law, he was practically on par with his subjects. The British view of Sultan Ahmad can be better understood if it is seen in the context of the approval given to an application by Loke Yew, a Chinese of considerable wealth, for mining land at Bentong.[86] Both Loke Yew and Sultan Ahmad were given the same treatment because both had to apply individually for lands. However, Sultan Ahmad was dissatisfied with the grant. He regarded it as a mere compensation for all that he had lost. He therefore continued to harass the British with his demands for an increase in his allowances. In 1893 he had requested that his allowance of $2,000 a month be raised by another $1,500. He put forward his reasons as follows:

> Our trouble is that the allowance of $2,000 granted by the Pahang Government is quite insufficient to which we have had to add every month from our own money kept from the former time. Now it was all finished in ten years and owing to this we are in great distress. We now hope very much and beg to ask our friend to take this matter into his consideration so that the government of our country may grant a further sum of $1,500.88.

He overtly praised the British in order to convince them of his goodwill and dependence on them, saying:

> ...the Government of the British has been widely known to other governments as a just, rich and liberal one and one

which others cannot compare in its kindness and favour to those who are under its protection... As our country and kingdom is held by the Government and when our maintenance is unsufficient it is lawful and right for us to ask for assistance and it should be unlawful for us to ask for assistance from others than the British Government to whom we surrendered our rights.[88]

Despite these words of praise, the British response was not in Sultan Ahmad's favour. On the grounds that Pahang was indebted to the other states to the amount of $2 million, his request was rejected but it did not deter Sultan Ahmad from voicing his demands from time to time.

In 1900, he requested the British Government to increase the allowances of his favourites, Che Gadoh and Haji Mat Nur, from a sum of $30 to $60 per mensem. He argued that both men had served him as private employees of the state rather than as government servants and had always supported him.[90] He emphasized that the $30 per month was insufficient for their daily needs. But by 1900, most of his followers had deserted him as they were incapacitated by illness. Only the above two remained loyal to him, and Sultan Ahmad claimed that they were being overburdened with work.[91] The British agreed to the raise in their allowances. Having met with success on this issue, Sultan Ahmad began once more to demand for increments in allowances for him and his court officials. He regretted bitterly that he could not raise the allowances on his own authority; he had instead to rely on the British for he realized that it was they, not he who controlled the finances. Politically weak and economically impotent, his continued belligerence towards the British could only be understood in terms of psychological compensation for his material losses.

In 1904, he had requested that the allowances of three of his sons — Tengku Suleiman, Tengku Jusoh and Tengku Umar — e raised by a sum of $25 a month. In September 1904, the Tengku Ampuan made similar claims for an increase in her allowance from $25 to $100[92] a month, but they were not entertained. As early as 1898, she had pressured the British to increase the sum from $25 to $75 a month, claiming that she needed it because of the "distressful" period that she was going through.[93] She mentioned that she was even compelled to sell her property to cover her expenses on a month to month basis. Being old she expected the British Government's support since she said:

Our country was taken away from us and that we should suffer this great hardship in respect of our maintenance.[94]

Tengku Long of Pahang (who was married to Sultan Abidin of Trengganu) had also asked for a similar raise in 1898:

I now suffer by means of maintenance and expenses. I was born rich and I used to spend plentifully but now is quite different than those days. At present I have to deny myself in all things.[95]

The British usually ignored these demands, but Sultan Ahmad was determined to focus his attention on the issue of allowances so as to compel the British to reconsider his economic status.

In 1905, Sultan Ahmad once again demanded an increase in the allowances of his three daughters — Tengku Kelsom, Tengku Long and Tengku Miriam — and Tengku Mohamed, a little boy.[96] Earlier in 1904, Sultan Ahmad's request for the increment in the allowances to his three sons was approved, but the High Commissioner replied that:

...no more such allowances will be granted and in the case of all Sultans they must make out of their allowances such provision as they think proper for their children.[97]

Sultan Ahmad was not deterred by the new instructions. He argued that since the British took over the administration of his state, "his hands had been tied and having merely a fixed allowance was unable to provide for his children".[98] He stressed that he had no private property, unlike Sultan Idris of Perak, and was therefore dependent on the British Government. During the same period, Sultan Ahmad supported Tengku Mahmud's proposal to raise the allowances of Imam Perang Mahkota and Ungku Andak on the grounds that "they were both old and faithful servants and had done good work",[90] but the proposal was denied.

Disappointed at the negative attitudes of the British, Sultan Ahmad, in his capacity as the "ruler" of Pahang, insisted in 1906 that the British increase his personal allowance to $3,000 per month. He emphasized that:

...his children were all grown up and were always asking him money as his allowance was insufficient to meet the demand.[100]

In addition he requested for a contribution towards the expenses of the fasting month,[101] as he was anxious to conduct prayers in his *balai* and had to pay the people to attend the meetings. Even this request was not looked into by the British, because they felt that Pahang's contribution to the Federal Government in 1906 was too meagre for attention.[101]

Sultan Mahmud ibni Sultan Ahmad, 1903

From 1898—1906, Sultan Ahmad's efforts to draw British attention to his financial problems were futile. If the British had listened to his demands, he would have been quite contented that he succeeded, to a certain extent, in gaining economic power. However, the only gains which he could not be denied were the Penjum Company's grant of emoluments to him. From 1888, i.e. with the introduction of the Residential System in Pahang, payments from the Penjum Company towards Sultan Ahmad and the Orang Kaya Lipis were considered to be part of a private agreement between the parties concerned.[103] The payments were made to the recipients instead of being forwarded to the Treasury. When a new lease was being prepared, Hugh Clifford suggested that the old payments be surrendered, but an omission of such a clause in the original agreement forced the British to continue paying both recipients their due. Sultan Ahmad, therefore, benefitted from the Penjum Company. However, it was proposed by W. H. Treacher, the Resident General, that the payments should not be paid beyond the lifetime of Sultan Ahmad or the Orang Kaya Lipis.[104] The British frequently referred to these gains to restrain Sultan Ahmad from further harassment over his allowances. Their blunt answers and cold relations with Sultan Ahmad made him aware that he had lost the struggle for power. Furthermore, from 1708 onwards, his old age became a *dominant* factor preventing him from being actively involved in the struggle. He became increasingly docile. Being seventy-eight years of age in 1909, he was unable to walk and his general health was impaired. For these reasons, he decided to hand over the reins of government to his son, Tengku Mahmud. On 10 December 1909, Sultan Ahmad wrote a letter to the Resident of Pahang informing him of his *formal delegation* of authority to Tengku Mahmud[105] On 3 April 1909, by the Regency Enactment, the British proclaimed Tengku Mahmud the Regent of Pahang by the British.[105] The Act of 1909 signified the last traces of Sultan Ahmad's efforts at regaining power. Although he had proclaimed Tengku Mahmud as the Regent in 1889, it took him twenty years finally to delegate his mandate. He had hoped that during the twenty years, he would be able to resume his authority. His obdurate personality caused him to continue using Tengku Mahmud as a *pawn* in the struggle, but his old age eventually forced him to abdicate. Since 1899 it had prevented himn from participating actively in the affairs of the state, so Tengku Mahmud had become the new participant.[107]



Sultan Mahmud, with his Consort in London in 1903

Sultan Ahmad's abdication was favourable to the British as Tengku Mahmud had had a long standing relationship with them. In British eyes the Tengku Besar and his wife had been very loyal and "were accustomed to the society of the Europeans".[108] Tengku Mahmud's early arrival in Singapore in 1900[109] further strengthened his ties with the British, but his failing health had compelled him to go to Europe in 1903 to seek medical advice.[110] His medical expenses were met by the British partly to win him over to their side. Tengku Mahmud was more pragmatic than Sultan Ahmad, and often welcomed British ideas. In return, the Regent's requests were given more sympathetic consideration as seen in the case when he demanded that Mr. Wise and not Mr. Fleming should accompany him during his European tour.[111] To convince further Tengku Mahmud of their support for him, the British Government conferred on him the Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George (C.M.G.) in 1907. The presentation was made by John Anderson, the High Commissioner, during his visit to Pahang.[111]

In the final analysis Sultan Ahmad's attempts to seek power had failed as noted earlier. He "hated" the British and more specifically Hugh Clifford as he could not forget the rigid policies introduced by the latter, which had jeopardised his political status as a sovereign. As early as 1901, his dislike for Clifford had been apparent. The latter was recommended to be the new Resident of Pahang, replacing A. Butler. Sultan Ahmad preferred Wise to Clifford. He was highly disappointed when Clifford was reappointed.[113] Once he had delegated his mandate to Tengku Mahmud, he made no further attempts to clash with the British. In his later years he required the personal attention of British medical officers. In 1912, he was reported to be seriously ill suffering from chronic bronchitis, asthma and had a bad hernia.[114] In the last years of his life, Sultan Ahmad saw many of his supporters and collaborators pass from the scene. In 1900, the Orang Kaya Setiawangsa of Lipis died and no successor was appointed.[115] Similarly, in 1913, Ungku Andak died, while in 1914 Tuan Itam passed away.[116] With the demise of his right-hand men, Sultan Ahmad's search for power faded completely, for he had no more advisors to lean on.

By 1914, Sultan Ahmad's health worsened. His addiction to opium further undermined his health and on 10 May 1914, he died, aged 83[116] after a long and eventful reign. The Regent, Tengku Mahmud was declared the new ruler on 29 May 1914.[118] With Sultan

Ahmad's death, Pahang came completely under the control of British administration. Thereafter, no more confrontation occurred between the sovereign and the British until World War II.

NOTES

1 Very little is known regarding Sultan Ahmad's views on the Federation movement owing to the paucity of source materials.

2 The Federation movement had been the crux of the discussions among British administrators. For details on the correspondence from May 1892 and December 1895, see Mitchell to Chamberlain, Confidential, 16 March 1896, C.O. 273/213, ff. 113—129. F. A. Swettenham claimed that the Federation scheme was his idea, but various opinions were expressed by the respective Residents as to the validity of this claim. See F. A. Swettenham, *Footprints in Malaya*, London, 1942, p. 106; F. A. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, London, 1908, pp. 363—4. For further details on the Federation Movement, see R. Emerson, *Malaysia, A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule*, Kuala Lumpur, 1969, pp. 135—8; Chai Hon Chan, *The Development of British Malaya 1896—1909* Kuala Lumpur, 1964, pp. 28—37; E. Thio, *British Policy in the Malay Peninsula 1880—1910*, Vol. I, Kuala Lumpur, 1969, Chapters V and VI; E. Chew, "Sir Frank Swettenham and the Federation of the Malay States", *Modern Asian Studies*, II, i (1968), pp. 51—69; Khoo Kay Kim. "The Federation of 1896: Its Origins", *Peninjau Sejarah*, Vol. I, ii (1966), pp. 6—23.

3 E. Thio, *British Policy in the Malay Peninsula 1880—1910*, p. 148.

4 Edward Fairfield, the Assistant Under Secretary in the Colonial Office was in favour of a gradual withdrawal of British administration from Pahang. For the pros and cons of withdrawal of British administration from Pahang, see E. Chew, "Swettenham and British Residential Rule in West Malaya", *JSEAH*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (September 1975), pp. 166—178.

5 Ibid., p. 173. For views on Ripon's suggestion that Pahang be administered by Selangor, see Ripon to Governor, 19 May 1893, *Straits Settlements Legislative Council Proceedings 1893*, p. 217. See also Meade to Buxton, Minute, 10 January 1893, C.O. 273/183, f. 463.

6 Mitchell to Ripon, Report, 24 June 1895, C.O. 273/204, f. 415. The rebellion of 1891—5 had further increased Pahang's debt to the colonies to a sum of $57,000, and $100,000 had to be repaid to Selangor and Perak for costs had incurred in sending assistance to Pahang. See E. Sadka, *The Protected Malay States, 1874—1895*, Kuala Lumpur, 1968, p. 336.

7 Lucas' Minute, 14 July 1894, C.O. 273/196, f. 48.

8 In Selangor, the chiefs were compensated for their monetary benefits which they formerly enjoyed and they were also paid for labour. In Negri Sembilan, payments were paid to chiefs for their labour services and a percentage from the revenue such as tin was paid to the representatives of the *waris* or inheriting class. In both cases, the emoluments were raised as the prosperity of the state increased. See Mitchell to Ripon, Report, 24 June 1895, C.O. 273/204, f. 415.

9 E. Thio, *British Policy in the Malay Peninsula*, p. 148; see also E. Sadka, *The Protected Malay States*, p. 358. Sydney Buxton, the Parliamentary Under Secretary was in favour of the cancellation of concessions. See Buxton's Minute, 30 January 1893, C.O. 273/183, f. 468.

10 Buxton's Minute, 10 January 1893, C.O. 273/183, f. 469.

11 The British later regarded the idea of annexation as unjustifiable since Selangor would have to shoulder the heavy responsibility of maintaining the heavy burden. Lucas to Fairfield, Minute, 14 November 1892, C.O. 273/183, f. 213. See also Lucas to Meade, Minute, 4 May 1892, C.O. 273/179, f. 513.

12 Frank Swettenham to Mitchell, Report, 24 June 1895, enclosure in Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 24 June 1895, C.O. 273/204, f. 450.

13 Ibid.

14 F. A. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, p. 24.

15 Frank Swettenham to Mitchell, Report, 28 July 1895, enclosure in Mitchell to Chamberlain, Confidential, 7 August 1895, C.O. 273/205, f. 371. For a text of the Federation Agreement in Jawi (Perjanjian Persekutuan Tanah Melayu 1895), see Mitchell to Chamberlain, Confidential, 13 August 1895, C.O. 273/205, ff. 408—9. For an English version of the text, see Appendix O.

16 1894 proved to be a year of prosperity for the Western states, since revenue exceeded expenditure. See Mitchell to Ripon, Confidential, 24 June 1895, C.O. 273/204, f. 431. For further details on the attitudes of the other rulers with regard to the Federation agreement, see E. Thio, *British Policy in the Malay Peninsula 1880—1910*, pp. 163—5.

17 Mitchell to Chamberlain, Confidential, 9 March 1897, C.O. 273/228, ff. 292—3. See also Resident General (Perak Office) to Hugh Commissioner, 24 December 1896, *H.C.O.F.* 686/96.

18 It was also pointed out that on the death of his father, his payments from the Ulu Klang district would cease.

19 Tengku Mahmud to F. A. Swettenham, 7 October 1896, enclosure in F. A. Swettenham to High Commissioner, *H.C.O.F.* 686/96.

20 Chamber to Mitchell, 6 August 1897, *H.C.O.F.* 704/97; Chamberlain to Mitchell, 11 May 1897, *H.C.O.F.* 454/97.

21 Oliver Marks to Acting High Commissioner, 21 January 1901, *H.C.O.F.* 139/1901. The British promised Tengku Mahmud that only if he could provide a document of the 23 October 1891 assignment, would he be granted the Klang payments.

22 F. A. Swettenham to High Commissioner, 15 April 1897, *H.C.O.F.* 327/97; Ungku Bendahara to Resident Pahang, Report, 12 April 1897, *T.D.O.F.* 164/97, *A.R.P.*, 1897, p. 22. Several headmen joined in the celebration which was conducted on a grand scale.

23 F. A. Swettenham to High Commissioner, 15 April 1897, *H.C.O.F.* 327/97.

24 During to the disturbances in the 1890s, the appointment was not carried out.

25 Mitchell to Chamberlain, Confidential, 2 November 1897, C.O. 273/230, f. 203. See also British Resident Pahang to High Commissioner, 13 August 1897, *H.C.O.F.* 639/97; Dato Mentri to Secretary of High Commissioner, 26 August 1897, *H.C.O.F.* 683/97. See also *A.R.P.* 1897, p. 23. As a result of the marriage, the title of the Order of the Dato Kerabat Johor was conferred on Tengku Mahmud. The title was usually reserved for members of the royal family. See *A.R.P.* 1897, p. 23.

26 *A.R.P.* 1899, p. 25. See also British Resident Pahang to *penghulus* in Kuantan, 1 March 1906, *K.D.O.F.* 79/1906, His Highness the Sultan of Pahang to F. A. Swettenham, 29 January 1906, *K.D.O.F.* 46/1906. In July 1913, the marriage of Tengku Suleiman, the son of Sultan Abidin III of Trengganu, with Tengku

Meriam the daughter of Sultan Ahmad of Pahang was conducted. *A.R.P.* 1913, p.25

27 for details on the friction and the 1862 Boundary Agreement, see enclosure I-VIII in Hugh Clifford to Resident General, 27 September 1896, enclosure in Resident General to High Commissioner, 5 October 1897, *H.C.O.F.* 843/97.

28 Resident General (Perak Office) to High Commissioner, Report, 21 November 1896, *H.C.O.F.* 575/96.

29 H. Clifford to Resident General, 27 October 1896, *H.C.O.F.* 575/96.

30 H. Clifford to Resident-General, 27 October 1896, *H.C.O.F.* 575/96; see also Resident-General (Perak Office) to High Commissioner, Report, 21 November 1896, *H.C.O.F.* 575/96.

31 Resident Pahang and District Officer, Pekan, to Resident-General, Report, 27 September 1897, enclosure in Resident General to High Commissioner, 5 October 1897, *H.C.O.F.* 843/97.

32 Resident-General (Perak Office) to High Commissioner, 14 January 1897, *H.C.O.F.* 42/97.

33 Mitchell to Chamberlain, Confidential, 9 November 1897, C.O. 273/230, f. 232.

34 Sultan Ahmad's chop, enclosure in Secretary of State, London, to High Commissioner, 21 August 1897, *H.C.O.F.* 680/97.

35 For details on the Award of 1868, see Appendix B

36 Resident General (Singapore Office) to High Commissioner, Report, 5 October 1897, *H.C.O.F.* 843/97. See also map attached.

37 Clifford to Resident-General, 27 September 1897, enclosure in Resident-General (Singapore Office), 5 October 1897, *H.C.O.F.* 843/97.

38 Johore Boundaries Commission's Report 1898, 18 February 1898, *P.G.G.* No. 133, pp. 327—8. For details on the boundaries of Muar, Johore and Johol as recognized by Johore, see Dato Mentri Johore to British Resident Pahang, 29 June 1893, *Maharaja's Letter Book 1885—1898*, Johore State Secretariat, ff. 209—210.

39 Resident General (Selangor Office) to High Commissioner, 15 October 1897, *H.C.O.F.* 878/97.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Acting Resident General (Selangor Office) to H.B.M.S. Charge d'Affairs, 8 September 1900, *H.C.O.F.* 1902/1900.

43 Ibid., see also map attached.

44 W. H. Treacher to Acting High Commissioner, 11 December 1900, *H.C.O.F.* 1851/1900.

45 F. H. Vilids to the Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office, Confidential, 25 July 1904, C.O. 273/305, f. 176.

46 For further details on the 1899 Boundary Agreement, see J. Chandran, "British Policy towards Siam 1893—1902" (unpublished M.A. Thesis), Chap. IV. See also J. Chandran, "Three Agreements relating to the Northern Malay States concluded in 1896, 1897, 1899", *Peninjau Sejarah*, Vol. 3, No. 2, September 1968, pp. 52—62.

47 Pahang-Trengganu Boundary 1899, extract, *K.D.O.F.* 410/1900.

48 W. J. Taylor to Charge d'Affairs, 16 October 1903, C.O. 273/296, f. 764.

49 F. A. Swettenham to Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 10 January 1901,

H.C.O.D. No. 14.

50 Treacher to Ripon, Confidential, 10 September 1903, C.O. 273/296, f. 767.

51 Ibid., f. 768.

52 Treacher to Ripon, 10 September 1903, C.O. 273/296, f. 772.

53 F. H. Vilids to Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 25 July 1904, C.O. 273/305, ff. 176—7.

54 John Anderson to Earl of Elgin, Confidential, 12 December 1906, C.O. 273/321, f. 534.

55 Acting District Officer, Kuantan to Acting British Resident, 24 April 1896, *K.D.O.F.* 209/96. In effect the boundary at Kuantan was fixed between the Pahang Tua River and Penoh. See Acting District Officer, Kuantan to District Officer, Pekan, Minute, 19 January 1896, *K.D.O.F.* 10/97. See also *P.G.G.* No. 35, pp. 56—7.

56 A. R. Venning to High Commissioner, 23 November 1906, enclosure in John Anderson to Earl of Elgin, Confidential, 12 December 1906, C.O. 273/321, f. 536.

57 Cecil Wray to Resident General, 7 June 1906 sub-enclosure I in John Anderson to Earl of Elgin, Confidential, 12 December 1906, C.O. 273/321, f. 537.

58 Sultan of Trengganu to Sultan of Pahang, sub-enclosure II in John Anderson to Earl of Elgin, Confidential, 12 December 1906, C.O. 273/321, f. 540.

59 Pahang was prepared to pay a sum of $50,000 and $30,000 for the boundaries as marked in the map. See Cecil Wray to Resident General, 7 June 1906, sub-enclosure I in John Anderson to Earl of Elgin, Confidential, 12 December 1906, C.O. 273/321, f. 538. See also map attached for boundaries marked.

60 Sultan of Trengganu to Sultan of Pahang, sub-enclosure II in John Anderson to Earl of Elgin, Confidential, 12 December 1906, C.O. 273/321, f. 540.

61 Tengku Mahmud had been of great assistance to the British. See *A.R.P.* 1899, p. 28. He was also an active participant during the State Council Proceedings. See *A.R.P.* 1910, p. 17.

62 Mitchell to Lucas, Minute, 20 June 1900, C.O. 273/261, f. 607.

63 A. Butler to Resident General, 19 April 1900, enclosure III in Resident General to Joseph Chamberlain, Confidential, 17 May 1900, C.O. 273/261, f. 612.

64 *A.R.P.* 1897, p. 22.

65 A. Butler to Resident General, 19 April 1900, enclosure III in Resident General to Joseph Chamberlain, Confidential, 17 May 1900, C.O. 273/261, f. 613.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 F. A. Swettenham to Joseph Chamberlain, Confidential, 6 October 1902, C.O. 273/284, ff. 7—9.

69 F. A. Swettenham to Joseph Chamberlain, Confidential, 6 October 1902, C.O. 273/284, f. 7.

70 Ibid., f. 8.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid., ff. 6—9; see also F. A. Swettenham to Secretary of State, Report, 9 February 1902, *H.C.O.D.* No. 50; F. A. Swettenham to Secretary of State, 8 April 1903, *H.C.O.D.* No. 194; F. A. Swettenham to Secretary of State, 27 April 1903, *H.C.O.D.* No. 217.

73 *A.R.P.* 1903, p. 13.
74 E. Thio, op. cit., p. 183.
75 Short hand minutes, *Federal Council Proceedings*, Thursday, 19 January 1911, p. B7.
76 For further details, see John Anderson to Earl of Elgin, Confidential, 26 December 1907, C.O. 273/331, ff. 431—33. See also Colonial Office to John Anderson, Minute, 8 January 1909, C.O. 273/341, ff. 639—40.
77 Short hand minutes, *Federal Council Proceedings*, Saturday, 11 December 1909, p. B2.
78 John Anderson to Earl of Elgin, Confidential, 26 December 1907, C.O. 273/331, f. 431.
79 Ibid., p. B2.
80 For details on the Constitution, see Appendix Q.
81 E. L. Brockman to John Anderson, 4 December 1907, enclosure in John Anderson to Earl of Elgin, 26 December 1907, C.O. 273/331, f. 435.
82 R. Emerson, *Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule*, p. 148.
83 See Clause 2 of the Agreement of 1909.
84 Short hand minutes, *Federal Council Proceedings*, Thursday, 19 January 1911, pp. B3-B9.
85 Hugh Clifford to Acting Resident General, F.M.S., 4 June 1901, *H.C.O.F.* 1081/1901. In 1901 F. A. Swettenham became the new High Commissioner. The Acting Resident General was W. H. Treacher.
86 Another instance when Sultan Ahmad applied for land at Kuantan was in 1904. His reason, then, was to build a residence or "halting" bungalow. His request was granted and he was given an area of 350 acres. See District Officer, Kuantan report, 11 October 1904, *K.D.O.F.* 324/1904; Acting Resident Pahang to Sultan Ahmad, 10 October 1904, *K.D.O.F.* 324/1904.
87 A. Butler to High Commissioner, 6 March 1897, *T.D.O.F.* 162/99; Hugh Clifford to Resident General (Perak Office), 27 January 1897, *T.D.O.F.* 162/99. As a result of Loke Yew's mining interests, the Ulu Lepar and Kuantan tin fields progressed. See *A.R.P.* 1902, p. 8.
88 Sultan of Pahang to the Officer Administering the Government, 2 August 1898, *H.C.O.F.* 1081/98.
89 Ibid.
90 F. A. Swettenham to Acting High Commissioner, 11 January 1900, *H.C.O.F.* 89/1900.
91 The British hoped that the two would render services to them. See Sultan Ahmad to Resident General, 2 November 1899, enclosure in F. A. Swettenham to Acting High Commissioner, 11 January 1900, *H.C.O.F.* 89/1900.
92 W. H. Treacher to High Commissioner, 1 September 1904, *H.C.O.F.* 1650/1904.
93 Tengku Ampuan Pahang to the Officer Administering the Government, 6 Rejab 1316 (20 November 1898), *H.C.O.F.* 1096/98.
94 Ibid.
95 Tengku Long, Pahang to the Officer administering the Government, 5 Rejab 1316 (19 November 1898), *H.C.O.F.* 1097/98.
96 Cecil Wray to Resident General, F.M.S., 4 August 1905, enclosure in Resident General, F.M.S., to High Commissioner, 12 August 1905, *H.C.O.F.* 1108/1905.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid.

99 N. I. Taylor to High Commissioner, 19 August 1905, *H.C.O.F.* 981/1905.

100 Oliver Marks to High Commissioner, Minute, 16 November 1906, *H.C.O.F.* 1440/1906.

101 John Anderson to Resident General, 20 November 1906, *H.C.O.F.* 1440/1906.

102 In 1906, the Revenue for the four states were as follows:

Federal receipts	$ 6,506,160.00
Perak collections	$16,572,072.00
Selangor collections	$ 7,304,148.00
Negri Sembilan collections	$ 2,279,957.00
Pahang collections	$ 561,134.00
Total	$27,223,475.00

See Resident General's report, 9 May 1907, *H.C.O.F.* 1070/1907.

103 Hugh Clifford to Acting High Commissioner, 20 April 1900, *H.C.O.F.* 609/1900.

104 W. H. Treacher to High Commissioner, 8 August 1900, *H.C.O.F.* 1100/1900.

105 John Anderson to Earl of Crewe, 27 January 1909, C.O. 273/349, f. 116. Hugh Clifford to District Officer, Temerloh, Minute, 26 April 1897, *T.D.O.F.* 174/97; *A.R.P.* 1909, p. 17.

106 The Regency Enactment was passed in 1909. See British Resident Pahang to District Officer Kuantan, 1 May 1909, *K.D.O.F.* 421/1909. For an account of the text of the proclamation in Jawi, see Appendix P. See also short hand minutes, *Federal Council Proceedings*, Saturday, 11 December 1909, p. B1.

107 *A.R.P.* 1899, p. 28.

108 F. A. Swettenham to Secretary of State, 14 May 1903, *H.C.O.D.* No. 257.

109 Tengku Besar to F. A. Swettenham, 27 October 1900, *H.C.O.D.* No. 257.

110 H. Clifford to Lucas, 6 September 1903, C.O. 273/298, f. 65.

111 During his stay in Europe, his expenses were to be met by the Crown Agent and the Government. It shows that Pahang was indebted to the British. *A.R.P.* 1903, p. 13. See also Resident General to District Officer, Kuantan, Minute, 16 May 1902, *K.D.O.F.* 135/1902.

112 *A.R.P.* 1907, p. 19. Several chiefs from the *ulu* districts were present for the ceremony. See also Tengku Mahmud to John Anderson, 31 October 1907, *H.C.O.F.* 1644/1907; C. Severn to High Commissioner, 5 November 1907, *H.C.O.F.* 1644/1907.

113 To the British administrators, Hugh Clifford was regarded as the best administrator for native affairs. With his guidance, British interests could be easily secured. Over Clifford's reappointment, F. A. Swettenham in 1901 remarked: "Mr Clifford was one of his (Sultan's) best friends; he was only too pleased to have him as Resident of Pahang." See F. A. Swettenham to Joseph Chamberlain, Confidential, 29 April 1901, C.O. 273/272, f. 824.

114 F. B. Croucher to the Principal Chief Medical Officer, 24 October 1912, *H.C.O.F.* 1490/1912; see also W. Gilmore to Colonial Secretary, 24 October 1912, *H.C.O.F.* 1490/1912.

115 *A.R.P.* 1900, p. 76.

116 *A.R.P.* 1914, p. 32.

117 Arthur Young to Secretary of State, 14 May 1914, *H.C.O.F.* 695/1914, and

subsequent enclosures. Sultan Ahmad was buried in state at Kampong Merhun on 10 May 1914. The funeral was very grand and was conducted in dead silence. Malays throughout the state paid their respects. See *A.R.P.* 1914, p. 32. W. Linehan, however, states that Sultan Ahmad died at the age of 78. See W. Linehan, "A History of Pahang", p. 68.

118 British Resident Pahang to District Officer Temerloh, 29 May 1914, *K.D.O.F.* 488/1914.

EPILOGUE

There were several changes in the political environment of Pahang during the reigns of Sultan Ahmad's successors, making the period between 1915 and the installation of Sultan Abu Bakar in 1933 comparatively less eventful. An attempt is made in this chapter to appraise the primary features of Pahang's political history between 1915 and 1933 and to compare them with Sultan Ahmad's political machinations during the earlier period.

It must be stated at the outset that unlike Sultan Ahmad, his successors reigned for extremely short periods of time. This meant that none of the rulers, even if they wished to do so, were able to consolidate their power and make their presence felt fully in either the traditional or the British domains. Secondly, it must be noted as a general point that the increasing power of the British in administrating the affairs of Pahang had begun even before Sultan Ahmad had departed from the scene. Sultan Ahmad had been able to do little to regain his former status. As noted earlier, from 1888 to 1914, he had intensified his efforts to gain power through threats and orders, and had used his charismatic influence over his people, but he failed. The non-cooperation of his fellowmen, the strife and suspicion among his court officials, his close affiliation with Johor and the appointment of Tengku Mahmud as the Regent had been factors in undermining his political and economic power. His many attempts ensure his survival by toeing the line of British policies had also resulted in conflicts and frequent confrontation with the British. These elements that formed the keynote of Pahang's political development till 1914, were a heritage that Sultan Ahmad's successors had to contend with in one form or another.

Sultan Ahmad's decision to work closely with the British authorities was followed by his successors, creating a pattern of cordial Malay-British relations. In May 1915 when the Regent, Tengku Mahmud, was proclaimed successor to Sultan Ahmad, the British were indeed appointing a person they recognized for strength of character, intelligence, ability and a vast knowledge of local affairs.[1] It was perhaps even more important to the British that the new ruler had been consistently friendly to them during the Pahang disturbances of 1891—2 and that he had declined to be formally installed as Sultan.[2]

Tengku Mahmud had been proclaimed as Regent by his father Sultan Ahmad, in 1889, primarily on account of his good relations

Sultan Abu Bakar with Sir Cecil Clementi, the High Commissioner, at Pekan 1932

with the British. But the move was also motivated by Sultan Ahmad's desire, from 1888 onwards, to regain his autocratic powers. The chiefs at that time also hoped to regain the privileges which they had lost under Sultan Ahmad's arbitrary rule. Sultan Ahmad was to discover that with the inauguration of the Residential System in 1888, real political control had effectively begun to shift from the ruler to the Resident. Defining power in legal terms, and with the creation of a State Council and Courts of law which effectively passed laws and regulations, the Resident appeared to be the new law-enforcing authority. With the establishment of a Supreme Court, Sultan Ahmad lost legal, executive and legislative powers and he was bypassed as the fountain of justice. It was to safeguard his position that he had proclaimed his son, Tengku Mahmud, as the Regent. As it turned out, however, the Regent became the new advisor to the British and Sultan Ahmad was reduced to a mere figurehead.

Tengku Mahmud's standing with the *rakyat* is not altogether clear. However, it is reported that during the First World War, he showed much sympathy for the men who went on military service from the Federated Malay States. He gave them silver mounted tinder lighters[3] through the good offices of Sir William Taylor.

At any rate, it is difficult to evaluate the significance of his reign as he did not live long enough to have the opportunity to chalk up any major achievements. His health precluded him from taking an active part in the affairs of the state, and he died in 1917.

As Sultan Mahmud left no issue, Tengku Abdullah, the next eldest surviving son of Sultan Ahmad, succeeded to the throne. Prior to Sultan Mahmud's funeral, Tengku Abdullah was proclaimed the ruler in accordance with the ceremonies and customs of the state of Pahang, members of the State Council, Chiefs and a large concourse of people. But Tengku Abdullah was only installed as the Sultan, with the title of Sultan Almoktasam Billah Sultan Abdullah, on 12 May 1919 in Pekan in the presence of the Chief Secretary to the FMS Government, the British Resident, many officials and all the principal chiefs of the state.[4]

In the year of the new Sultan's ascension to the throne, several of the formerly influential Malay dignitaries passed from the scene. Of importance were the deaths of two chiefs and two district officers. Wan Mohammed bin Wan Idris, the Dato Maharaja Perba, chief of the Jelai region and a member of the State Council, died on 4 January 1919. The Maharaja Perba, who had exercised considera-

ble authority during the pre-colonial days, had been an invalid for years. His death severed another link with pre-protection days. The Maharaja Perba's younger son, Wan Chik, who had been a member of the State Council, survived his father by a few days. He had been of assistance to the British government in his capacity as a penghulu of Batu Yon in the Lipis district.[5]

When Tengku Abdullah was elevated to the position of Sultan, his former office of Tengku Besar fell vacant. In 1920 this position was filled by Tengku Suleiman ibni Almarhum Sultan Ahmad Muadzam Shah, a brother of Tengku Abdullah.[6] He was appointed the Tengku Besar by the High Commissioner during the latter's ceremonial visit to Pekan on 27 October 1920.

Tengku Suleiman's appointment worked to the advantage of the British officials. For many years, prior to his installation, he had proved an extremely useful Assistant Malay Officer in the Pekan district. The British Resident, W. D. Scott, realized that the position vacated by Tengku Suleiman as the Assistant Malay Officer would not be easily filled. But it was hoped that as the Tengku Besar, Suleiman would be able to assist Sultan Abdullah in the control of state affairs.

The years that followed were to witness the deaths or resignations of others who had served the British administration, and their replacement by the British with new persons whom the British could count on for cooperation. In January 1922, Che Usuf bin Che Tukang, the Dato Imam Perang Indera Setia Raja of Pulau Tawar, died. His demise was a great loss to the British, as he had been an old and trusted official. The British held in high esteem his services during the Pahang disturbances of 1894 in the Tembeling district and throughout the early days of British rule in Pahang.[7] He was also remembered for his great valour and for his active participation, as a member of the State Council, where his opinions had often carried great weight. During the same year, the Assistant Penghulu Ulu Jelai, Che Buang bin Busu, also died. The Penghulu of Ulu Kelantan, Wan Majid bin Wan Andak, and the Assistant Penghulu of Cheka, Che Man bin Rahmat, both resigned from their appointments on the grounds that they were too old (they died at the end of the year). The British decided against appointing successors to these offices and instead placed Kuantan under the administration of the Penghulu of Kuala Kuantan. In 1924, further deaths robbed Pahang of persons who had played important roles in the earlier decades. Raja Impeh bin Raja Abdullah and Tengku Samat bin

Tengku Muda died in September and November respectively.[8] Raja Impeh who was related to the royal family of Selangor, had settled in Raub several years ago. The British were grateful to him for his allegiance to them, and for his administration of Raub during the Pahang disturbances of 1891. Tengku Samat, the ex-Penghulu of Gali, was succeeded upon his death by his son, Tengku Kudin, as Penghulu. This was in line with the FMS government's policy of recruiting more Malays into the administration of the smaller districts or *mukim(s)*.[9]

Sultan Abdullah's reign witnessed a number of social and economic changes. One of his first official acts was the abolition of the modified form of *kerah* (corvee), regulated by an Order in Council No. 5 of 1889.[10] He advised the headmen to improve the hygiene in the *kampong(s)*, following what the High Commissioner told him during his state visit.

Economically, the fortunes of Pahang varied from one sector to another. The price of tin stimulated a search for and numerous applications for mining land.[11] The price of padi rose by leaps and bounds in the earlier part of 1919, but the harvest reaped was poor, thus bringing distress to the padi planters. As a result, the FMS government had to impose a price control in July of that year. Rubber prices fell towards the end of 1919, leading to a decrease in the demand for land to plant more rubber.

An important development was the opening of Malay reservation areas in 1919. In that year, a declaration of policy was made in respect of the opening up of the Pekan Reservation, covering 135,040 acres, and the extension of the Benus Reservation, which covered 950 acres in Bentong. Agriculturally, the acreage under rice cultivation decreased as a result of drought and floods. This was apparent in both the districts of Pekan and Kuantan where a poor acreage was reaped during the harvest season.

In September 1923, Sultan Abdullah paid official visits to Kuala Lipis and Raub on the occasion of the agri-horticultural shows. It was the first time in several years that the Malays in Ulu Pahang had a chance of seeing their ruler, so large crowds turned out to greet him at various points on the road.[12] The hope was expressed that the Sultan would make more frequent visits in the future, to forge closer relations with his subjects.

In 1923, Malay reservations were also inaugurated at Gali and Dong in the Raub district. In the Temerloh district, a new reservation, known as the Bera Malay Reservation, was established.[13] In

Tengku Abu Bakar ibni Sultan Abdullah, on the occasion of his proclamation as Tengku Mahkota, in 1930

effect a continuous strip of Malay reservations was established from Kuala Krau to the Pekan district boundary. A proposal was also made to open up a new settlement in the Bentong district. In 1927, a new Malay reservation, called the Semantan Malay Reservation was created in the Temerloh district.[14] Similarly, in the Lipis district, the Kampong Bahru Malay Reservation and Sungei Tempoian Reservation were created. All these developments arose from the realization that more Malay reservations were required if the land was to be kept primarily for the people of the state.[15]

It was rather fortunate that, despite the various attempts made to create Malay reservations, not all the districts in Pahang were able to take advantage of this programme. Certain districts were prone to floods and hence had to be isolated from the rest.

This was particularly so in 1923 when heavy floods destroyed large tracts of land in the districts of Lipis, Temerloh, Kuantan and Pekan. The floods continued in 1924, and Pekan was cordoned off. These natural disasters also accounted for the serious shortages of rice. The government took steps to avoid economic problems by purchasing the rice and sending it to Mentakab and thence to Pekan by rail. There was also considerable loss of lives among the Malays along the Pahang river in the Pekan district. In 1924 further floods ravaged the state. Flooding occurred again at the end of 1926 when one of the worst disasters caused by floods was recorded. All districts, with the exception of Raub and Bentong, suffered severely and residents had to be evacuated to higher ground. Communication by roads and railway was totally disrupted, and telegraphs and telephones were put out of operation. Many stations were entirely isolated. The material damage to public and private property was enormous. Many houses were destroyed, and when the river receded, it left a thick deposit of silt in some places and sand in others, thus hampering agricultural operations.[16] In the Ulu Tembeling district, for instance, the deposit was about 20 feet deep. Despite the damages and losses which the people experienced (such as destruction or loss of property, shortage of food and interruption of communication), they were calm and rendered assistance to the British authorities in the effort to re-establish normalcy in the state.

Repairs to damages were carried out in 1927. Widespread apprehension that another flood would set in that year resulted in measures being taken to meet the possibility of a catastrophe — for example, ample supplies of foodstuffs were stocked. As a result of the earlier floods, more than 300 acres of coconut plantations in the

Sultan Abu Bakar at Pekan, after his proclamation as Sultan in 1932

Kuantan district had been destroyed.[18]

In administrative and political terms, the end of the 1920s witnessed further changes among the holders of important offices. To the membership of the Federal Council was appointed Tengku Suleiman, the Tengku Besar. The membership of the State Council was increased in 1928 by the appointment of the Orang Kaya Indera Segera (Che Ungku Abdul Jamal bin Ungku Muda), and in 1929 by the appointment of Tengku Panglima Perang (Tengku Yusof ibni Al-marhum Sultan Ahmad). In 1930, the membership further increased with the appointment of Tengku Mahkota of Pahang and the Chief Kathi of the state.[19]

New titles were also created. It was only in 1930 that the title of the Tengku Mahkota was created. Other new Malay titles approved by the Secretary of State were the Tengku Arif Bendahara, Tengku Arif Temenggong, Tengku Panglima Besar and Ungku Muda. The first two titles were to be held by the second and third sons of the reigning Sultan. In addition, the former traditional offices of the subordinate chiefs, such as the Orang Besar Dilapan and Enam-belas, were approved once again.[20]

New rules regarding succession to the throne were also framed in view of the health of Sultan Abdullah, who had been indisposed since July 1928. The Secretary of State for the Colonies decided that the succession to the state of Pahang would be agnatic. Hence, the title Tengku Mahkota was bestowed on Sultan Abdullah's eldest son, Tengku Abu Bakar. He was installed at Pekan on 10 June and resided at Temerloh from November of that year.[21] A son, born to him at the end of the year, was recognised as the heir presumptive to the Sultanate.

In May 1930, Tengku Abu Bakar, in his capacity as the Tengku Mahkota, visited England and had the honour of being presented to the King and Queen of England. He returned to Pekan in November of 1930.

By 1931, Sultan Abdullah's health began to fail; he had been frequently ill, and in October 1930 had a serious attack of fever that was complicated by lung problems. Despite his ailing health, he attended the Durbar held at Sri Menanti in August 1931.[22] In May 1932 he became seriously indisposed, and despite intensive medical attention, passed away on 23 June. The Sultan was surrounded by all members of the royal family, major chiefs and the British Resident at the time of his death. On 24 June, following the customary proclamation of the heir to the throne, the Sultan was buried in

the royal burial grounds with full ceremonial and military honours.[23]

With Sultan Abdullah's death, the British lost a ruler who had been prepared to work closely with them and who had participated actively in the meetings of the Federal Council when his health permitted. As a token of appreciation for his co-operation with the British, he had been made an Honorary Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George in 1921 on the occasion of the birthday of King George V of England. On 29 March 1922, he was invested with the title of Insignia of the Order by the Prince of Wales[24] during the latter's visit to Kuala Lumpur.

Sultan Abdullah was succeeded by his eldest son, Tengku Abu Bakar, who was formally installed the new ruler on 28 May 1933. The economic conditions in Pahang did not show any marked improvement. Recurring floods continued to destroy unharvested padi crops and cultivated agricultural lands. No new economic activities could be carried out. As a result, a state of financial depression held back Pahang's economic development. Only a small area was under rubber cultivation, and despite the interest shown by agriculturists in cultivating padi and other foodstuff, living conditions were no better than they had been in of 1931.[25]

Thus it can be seen that during the period between 1915 to the installation of Sultan Abu Bakar (whose reign needs a separate study), Pahang experienced a succession of short reigns that were politically moderate compared to that of Sultan Ahmad. The stress was on economic development (through the opening up of agricultural land and tin mines) and the building of roads and schools.

With British rule established through the willing cooperation of the Sultans who followed Sultan Ahmad, there were fewer of the internal political strifes that had characterized the earlier decades. The primary reason for the difference can be attributed to the fact that Sultan Ahmad had operated in a political environment different from that in which his successors found themselves. Sultan Ahmad manoeuvred politically within the traditional and British administrative institutions and mores in order to rise from Bendahara to Sultan in 1881. He consolidated his power by trading on his reputation as a warrior, as well as on his close relationship with the men who had supported him during the civil war. The realized that it was necessary to earn the confidence and support of a powerful group. He had therefore conferred many titles, and had elevated his supporters to the position of chiefs of the first and second classes

in the political system. The elevation to power of several of his favourite men, such as the To' Gajah, To' Bahaman, Tuan Sheikh Kechil and the Orang Kaya Bakti, however, also led to rivalry with the older chiefs such as the To' Raja of Jelai and the To' Kaya of Lipis who felt that the new chiefs had been appointed only because they were the favourites of the Sultan. The older chiefs resented at being deprived of their political-cum-economic privileges. These privileges were lost when the jurisdictional powers they had had were passed on to the new chiefs. The new chiefs stood to gain from the taxes which they exacted from their subjects in the districts they controlled. The economic structure that led to different chiefs being able to accrue different amounts of wealth was a factor in the clash between the older and new chiefs.

Sultan Ahmad's political position was affected, since the major vassals began to voice their grievances and to seek help from external forces in order to regain their former rights. His political supremacy was jeopardized when the discontented chiefs from the inland areas supported the Engku Muda Wan Mansur. The latter, being deprived of his position as heir to the throne, began to capitalize on their support and solicited British assistance. Sultan Ahmad's wish for his son, Tengku Mahmud, to be appointed as heir to the throne was mainly to safeguard his own position. He realized that, since he had more influence over his son than over his half-brother, Wan Mansur, he would still be able to exert control over his chiefs and subjects with Tengku Mahmud as Regent. Moreover, the fact that Wan Mansur was seeking British aid instilled a sense of fear in Sultan Ahmad. He was afraid that the internal disturbances would be used as a pretext by the British to intervene in Pahang's affairs.

Sultan Ahmad thus began to adopt the role taken by Sultan Abu Bakar of Johor, that is he opened Pahang to foreign investors so as to be regarded as an enlightened ruler. He did not, however, suspect that his economic policy would be detrimental to his interests. His plan to grand lands to concessionaires was clear evidence of his search for economic power during the pre-colonial days. He hoped to gain materially by the collection of taxes and royalty from the concessionaires. Politically, he hoped that the presence of foreign investors in his state, and the additional support of the concessionaires, would deter the British from infringing upon his authority. However, his material designs and ambitions led to his having rather strained relations with his chiefs. They watched

with rage the bartering away of their lands. Their search for survival, then, lay in regaining the economic and political privileges which they had formerly enjoyed. This they hoped to gain by engaging the British and ousting their ruler. Their plans began to take shape when they found a leader in Wan Mansur. His appeal to the British to establish peace and order enabled them to use him as the wedge to open Pahang so that they could further their aims and interests. Sultan Ahmad had created a loophole which was being exploited by the British.

Meanwhile, to prevent another civil war and a British take-over of Pahang, Sultan Ahmad decided to reconcile his differences with his brother. He then sought the advice and assistance of the British to persuade Wan Mansur to return to Pahang. The negotiations of 1884 culminated in an agreement in which Sultan Ahmad recognized Wan Mansur as the Engku Muda, endowing him with a monthly allowance of $200. Sultan Ahmad's aim behing renewing his relationship with Wan Mansur was the preservation of his integrity and political power. Sultan Ahmad did not suspect that he would have to pay a price, as evidenced by the Swettenham (1885), Weld (1886) and Clifford (1887) missions to Pahang, for requesting foreign assistance. Although Sultan Ahmad had previously been able to rebuff British requests to allow the appointment of an advisor, he was forced in 1887 to sign a treaty with them, influenced as he was by developments in Johor. He saw that Abu Bakar had been recognized as Sultan of Johor because of the treaty he had signed with the British in 1885. To Sultan Ahmad, the question of survival was vital and he hoped to maintain it by attaining the office of the Sultanate. No doubt the acceptance of British rule by the neighbouring states also increased the pressure on Sultan Ahmad to conformn to British plans. Political survival, up to this point, should be seen as an attempt by Sultan Ahmad to retain his traditional powers and to obtain power as Sultan of Pahang.

It was on grounds of expediency, then, and following the advice of Abu Bakar, Sultan Ahmad signed the treaty. However, he was determined to adhere to Clause I as drafted in the Johor Agreement of 1885. The signing of the Pahang Agreement with the British in 1887 was a fatal blow to Sultan Ahmad's position, for he did not realize that the installation of a Consular Officer was the initial step in the establishment of British control. Theoretically, Sultan Ahmad's political power was not totally removed, for he still

continued to grant concessions to foreigners, and Hugh Clifford, as the Consular Officer, had promised not to meddle with the administration of the country. Nevertheless, the post-agreement period, with the economic problems weighed against Sultan Ahmad, did not seem favourable. The cancellation of the Pahang Corporation in 1887 created apprehension among the investors, who feared that their concessions might be cancelled next. These factors also undermined Sultan Ahmad's quest for survival. Finally, the British used the issue of maladministration and the deaths of Go Hui and Su Kim (British subjects residing in Pahang) to compel Sultan Ahmad to accept a British Resident. Sultan Ahmad's inability to defend himself forced him to seek advice from Abu Bakar and in August 1888, he wrote a letter to Governor Smith, accepting the Resident. This move was a severe blow to his independence.

Sultan Ahmad's successors, Tengku Mahmud, Tengku Abdullah and Tengku Abu Bakar, were thus left in no doubt as to where the source of effective power lay, and they did not seek to challenge it. The position of the chiefs during Sultan Ahmad's reign and the reigns of subsequent rulers also showed a marked difference. The traditional system of government was characterized by a large degree of arbitrary control not only by the ruler but also by territorial chiefs. With the introduction of effective British administration, with its system of land registration, moderately "impartial" courts, land tenure systems and regular salaries paid to the ruler and his chiefs, the personal, social and economic ties between the *rakyat* and his feudal lord disappeared. The transition from traditionalism to modernism was a discomforting process to the territorial chiefs. The British entry into Pahang had a detrimental effect on the traditional local bases of authority represented by the chiefs.

With the introduction of regulations passed by the State Council, the traditional rights of the chiefs were curtailed. Their areas of control were sharply defined and they were paid stipends in lieu of their former economic privileges. Revenues, which were now collected by the Resident, ceased to be a source of profit for the chiefs. The establishment of collectorates and district offices brought about changes in the status of the chiefs. The introduction of roads and modern communication facilities reduced the importance of the rivers to the livelihood of the *rakyat*. Because the rivers were less frequently used, the income that the chiefs had derived by *kuala* duties on boats which used the rivers as highways also decreased.

The chiefs, disgruntled by the strict limitations placed upon them in the exercise of their traditional powers and by the accompanying reduction in material benefits were prepared, during Sultan Ahmad's reign, to support the Sultan against the measures introduced by the new bureaucracy. Hoping to regain power by expelling the British, they launched into a sturdy resistance that rapidly developed into a full blown rebellion. Initiated by Dato Bahaman (who had been elevated to the position of a chief of the second class by Sultan Ahmad), the rebellion gradually gained the support of all the major chiefs who hoped to oust the foreign element. Sultan Ahmad's interests merged with those of the rebels, but he played a dual role by supporting both the British and the rebels. The question of honouring his treaty obligations with the British, without jeopardizing his sovereignty forced him to play the dualistic role during the 1891—1895 period. However, lack of co-operation among the rebels and between the ruler, and his chiefs arising from the latter's suspicions of Sultan Ahmad's machinations with the British contributed to the failure of the rebellion.

Under the reign of Sultan Ahmad's successors, the chiefs accommodated themselves to the new realities of British administration. Indeed, with many of them dying of old age, earlier expressions of resentment had given way to one of cooperation between the newer chiefs and the British. Both Sultans and chiefs found themselves entrenched in a new and radically altered power structure.

APPENDIX A

TRANSLATION OF AN AGREEMENT SIGNED BY DATU BENDAHARA TON KORIS, OF PAHANG, MADE AT PAHANG, ON THE 1ST OF THE MONTH JAMADIL AWAH, IN THE YEAR OF THE HEJIRA 1278 — (DATE CORRESPONDING WITH 5 NOVEMBER 1862)

Whereas we, Datu Bendahara Ton Koris, Sri Maharaja of Pahang, are desirous to give Mr. William Paterson, merchant of Singapore, the right and title to work Tin in our territory adjoining the River Quantan, and at workings there belonging to us. We willingly grant Mr. William Paterson the Tin workings of that river, because he has done many good acts for us and our country, and has brought peace to our subjects. He has also lent us money, and enabled us to settle a bond due on account of our grandfather, brothers, as well as ourselves, to Tan Kim Seng, of Singapore for the sum of $11,800 and interests.

Mr. William Paterson will pay us a duty of one-tenth part of the Tin procured from the different places in Quantan, whether from the hills or valleys, and this duty shall not be increased afterwards. We fix this small duty in the first place, because of the kindness of Mr. William Paterson towards us and our family; secondly, because much of the Tin in the Quantan country is found in blocks of stone.

Mr. William Paterson will pay us the above duty every six months upon all the produce of that place, whether in Tin, or Tin ore, one-tenth party, and should he wish to cease working these mines at the River Quantan he must give us six months previous notice.

Any machinery etc., which Mr. William Paterson may put in the district, as well as the people employed at the works, we promise to assist and protect from all dangers.

This agreement confirms to Mr. William Paterson or his partners the liberty to work all the Tin Mines at the River Quantan from this time and forever, according to the terms stated above and no other person will be permitted to work Tin at the River Quantan, unless Mr. William Paterson should give up working

there. In testimony we have placed our seal and signature hereto.

Dato Bendahara Ton Koris of Pahang

Source: Agreement of 5 November 1861 by Bendahara Kuris of Pahang, enclosure in Patterson and Simons to Governor, 23 October 1862, copy of papers connected with the attack upon Trengganu in November 1862, *S.S.R.*, India Office, 28 July 1863, p. 29.

APPENDIX B

PAHANG AND JOHORE, 1868

Award made by governor Sir H. St. George Ord, under the provisions of the Treaty between Pahang and Johore, of 17th June 1866.

H. ST. GEORGE ORD
Governor and Commander-in-Chief

Whereas by a Treaty entered into on the 17th day of June, 1862, between His Highness the Maharajah of Johore and His Highness the Bendaharah of Pahang it was agreed between the contracting parties that should any dispute or difference arise between them or their successors at any time thereafter, either with regard to the said Treaty or the matters contained in it, or with regard to any other matter or thing, whether national, political, or private, the same should be referred to the friendly mediation and settlement of the British Government whose award and decision was by the said Treaty declared to be final; and whereas differences had arisen between the said contracting parties relating to the boundary between the respective territories of Johore and Pahang and respecting the ownership of certain Islands lying off the East Coast of the Malayan Peninsula, and whereas the said differences were submitted and referred by the said contracting parties to the friendly mediation and settlement of His Excellency the Governor of the Straits Settlements.

Now these are to make known that I, Sir Harry St. George Ord, the said Governor, having taken into consideration and carefully and maturely weighed the evidence and statements laid before me by both the contracting parties relating to the respective differences and claims, do hereby award and decide as follows, that is to say, 1st, that the River Indow shall be the boundary on the Mainland between the territories of His Highness the Maharajah of Johore and His Highness the Bendaharah of Pahang, and that the islands of Tioman, Aor, Pulo Tingy, Siribuat and others lying off the East Coast of the Malayan Peninsula shall be divided by a direct line from the centre of the mouth of the River Indow to the Southern extreme of the Pulo Raban and thence due east along the north parallel of latitude of 2° 39′ 20″ and all the islands to the north of this line shall belong to Pahang and all to the south of this line to Johore as laid

down on the chart annexed to this aware.

Given at Singapore, this first day of September. 1368.

By His Excellency's Command
J. F. A. McNAIR
Acting Colonial Secretary, S.S.

Source: Enclosure VI in Hugh Clifford to Resident General Singapore, 27 September 1897, enclosure in Resident General Singapore to High Commissioner, 5 October 1897, *H.C.O.F.* 843/97.

APPENDIX C

MEMORANDUM BY UNGKU MUDA (ENGKU MUDA)

Complaints made to us by the men of Pahang:

1. To' Muda came and was fined for theft, his wife and father and brother were also punished — $700.
2. The son of Tuan Hitam was fined for being in love with a woman — $100.
3. Dato Bandar was fined for forgetting the Raja's kris — $200.
4. Wan Chintya was fined because he married without the knowledge of the Raja — $800.
5. To' Dol was fined for allowing a 'tekukor' (dove) that he was about to present to the Raja to escape — $80.
6. Inche Dollah of Trengganu had his property confiscated and was beaten owing to slander.
7. The 'Captain China' was fined because he gambled with the Raja who was beaten and stopped the play — $500.
8. Tuan Leber was fined because he and his wife committed theft — $100.
9. Nine young women, the children of three women were taken away by the Raja and locked up without means of escape.
10. Mat was put to death for stealing, his father and mother were separated.
11. Samat was put to death.
12. A stranger merchant was put to death. Inche Kechil's son-in-law brought the man from Ulu Pahang.
13. A boy Awang was killed for misbehaving with a woman.
14. Wan Tanjong was put to death, because Imang asked him to accompany his wife from the ulu to the Bazaar.
15. To' Pinang was put to death for having accompanied Ungku Muda.
16. To' Khatib was put to death owing to false witness to his having accompanied Ungku Muda.

Source: Ungku Muda to the Honourable Henry Read, member of the Legislative Council Singapore, Memorandum, 26 May 1884, enclosure in Smith to Derby, Confidential, 23 June 1884, C.O. 273/128, f. 167.

APPENDIX D

FROM BENDAHARA PAHANG TO SMITH — STATES THAT HE HAS APPROVED THE ARRANGEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY HIS WAKILS WITH REGARD TO THE RAJA MUDA AND RAJA IMPEH

(After Compliments)

We beg to inform our friend that we have received two letters from our friend dated 25 October 1884 and noted the contents viz. our friend has carried out our intention in getting our brothers Inche Wan Mansur to return to Pahang to advice as to the affairs of the country together with us that with the advice of our friend the return of Inche Wan Mansur has been fixed for the next monsoon when rivers mouth will be accessible and that our friend asks us to receive our brother Inche Wan Mansur according to our brother's rank and title and that arrangements have been made by our friend together with over three wakils for the maintenance of our brother at $200 a month to begin from the month of Muharram 1302. We were very much pleased on hearing of these arrangements and gave thanks to our friend for his assistance towards us which we are unable to return. The $200 is slightly heavy seeing that the revenue of the country only just covers the expenditure however. As the arrangement has been made by our friend and our wakils Tuan Kechil, Toh Bandar and Imam Perang Al-haj, we accept it and will give our brother the title of Engku Muda as formerly. Furthermore as to Raja Impeh who is now in our territory at Raub causing trouble amongst our subjects (at Ulu Pahang) and inciting them as though he were going to lead them in rebellion in our territory. We for our part never intend to create any disturbance out of respect and regard for the English Government. So we hope our friend will assist us in this matter thus our country will be at peace.

6 November 1884

Source: *S.S.F.* 746/85.

APPENDIX E

The Bendahara of Pahang

Colonial Secretary's Office
Singapore
23 January 1885

(After Compliments)

We inform our friend that we have received a letter from our friend's brother, the Ungku Muda, a copy of which we forward to our friend so that our friend may see himself how matters stand. We are much pleased at the happy result of the negotiations which will certainly increase the prosperity and welfare of our friend's country. As regards the monthly allowance of $200 to the Ungku Muda it is evidently desirable that so long as the Raja Muda continues in Singapore, he should receive it each month. We therefore propose to advance the $200 to him each month from 22nd October (1st Muharram). We would then be glad if our friend would either pay the money back to us himself or arrange that the Government of Singapore should repay us out of that which is now remitted to our friend on account of the war debts.

A. M. Skinner
Acting Colonial Secretary
Straits Settlements

Source: *S.S.F.* 94/85

APPENDIX F

TREATIES AND ENGAGEMENTS

Pahang Treaties
Pahang

Agreement on certain points touching the relations of Her Majesty's Government of the Straits Settlements with the Government of the Independent State of Pahang, made between His Excellency Sir Fred Aloysius Weld, K.G.C. of the most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, Governor of the Straits Settlements and His Highness, Raja Ahmad Yang di Pertuan of Pahang.

Act 1

The two governments will at all times cordially co-operate in the settlement of a peaceful population in their respective neighbouring territories, and in the joint defence of those territories from external hostile attack and in the mutual surrender of persons accused or convicted of any crime or offence under such conditions as may be arranged between the two governments.

Act 2

His Highness the Raja of Pahang undertakes if requested by the government of the Straits Settlements to co-operate in making arrangements for facilitating trade and transit communication overland through the State of Pahang with the State of Johore and other neighbouring states.

Act 3

If the Government of the Straits Settlements shall at any time desire to appoint a British officer as Agent to live within the State of Pahang having functions similar to those of a Consular Officer, His Highnes the Raja will be prepared to provide free of cost a suitable site within his territory whereon a residence may be erected for occupation by such officer.

Act 4

Any coinage in the currency of the Straits Settlements which may be required for the use of the government of Pahang shall be paid to

it by the government of the Straits Settlements at rates not higher than those at which similar coinage is supplied to the Governments of Malay Protected States, and under the same limitations as to the amount.

His Highness the Raja on his part undertakes that the applications of his government for subsidiary coinage shall be strictly limited by the legitimate requirements of the inhabitants of the State of Pahang and that the coinage so issued shall be subject to the same limitations as regards legal tender as are in force in the Straits Settlements.

Act 5

The Governor of the Straits Settlements will at all times to the utmost of his power take whatever steps may be necessary to protect the government and territory of Pahang from any external hostile attacks and for these or for similar purposes Her Majesty's officers shall at all times have free access to the waters of the State of Pahang, and it is agreed that those waters extend to 3 miles from the share of the State.

Act 6

The Raja of Pahang undertakes on his part that he will not without the knowledge and consent of Her Majesty's government negotiate any Treaty or enter into any engagement with any foreign state, or interfere in the politics of administration of any native state or make any grant or concession to other than British subjects or British Companies or persons of Chinese, Malay or other Oriental race, or enter into any political correspondence with any foreign state. It is further agreed that if occasion should arise for political correspondence between His Highness the Raja and any foreign state, such correspondence shall be conducted through Her Majesty's Government to whom His Highness makes over the guidance and control of his foreign relations.

Act 7

Whereas His Highness the Raja of Pahang has made known to the Governor of the Straits Settlements that it is the desire of his chiefs and people that he should assume the title of Sultan, it is further agreed that, in consideration of the loyal friendship and constant affection His Highness has shown to the government of Her Majesty the Queen and Empress and stipulations contained in

this Memorandum he and his heirs and successors lawfully succeeded according to Malay custom shall in future be acknowledged as His Highness the Sultan of Pahang and shall be so addressed.

In witness whereof the said Sir F. A. Weld and his said Highness the Raja of Pahang have signed this agreement the 8th day of October, the year of Christ 1887, answering to the 20th day of Muharram, the year of the Hedjira 1305.

(L. S.) Fred A. Weld

Governor Straits Settlements.

Witness by J. F. Dickson
Colonial Secretary
Straits Settlements.

Private Secretary to H. E.
the Governor.

(Chop of the Sultan of Pahang)

Witness to Chop

H. Clifford

Source: *Treaties and other papers connected with the native states of the Malay Peninsula*, Singapore, Government Printing Office, 1888, pp. 42—55.

APPENDIX G

TRANSLATION [OF A LETTER] FROM HIS EXCELLENCY, THE GOVERNOR TO SULTAN OF PAHANG

I have received my friend's letter of 19 Shawal and understand all its contents. Yesterday, when I met my friends, I told my friend that there was only one reply. I could accept from my friend i.e. my friend would receive an officer from me who should advice my friend how to govern his country with justice but my friend has not followed my advice. Now I am going to Singapore for I have nothing more to say to my friend except that a British subject had been murdered close to my friend's door and my friend has taken no steps whatever towards redress. Moreover, the lives and property of my people are no longer safe in Pahang. Thereupon I must inform Her Majesty the Queen and Empress that my friend does not wish to follow my advice. I am sorry for this, for in my opinion, it would have been better for my friend to settle this matter with me personally in order to avoid trouble in the future. Because of my regard for my friend, I will once more give my friend an opportunity of making proper satisfaction in the next few days. If in the next ten days I receive a letter from my friend with a promise in accordance with the advice I gave, I will see that nothing is done to my friend, but if I do not receive a letter in such terms I shall certainly demand full satisfaction. When that time comes my friend must not blame me because my friend has not followed my advice to secure prosperity and right and justice which will give peace and happiness to all the inhabitants of my friend's country.

Dated 19 Shawal
(29 June 1888)

True translation by F. A. Swettenham, 29 June 1888

Source: Smith to Sultan Ahmad, 29 June 1888, enclosure No. 7 in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 3 July 1888, C.O. 273/154, ff. 56—57.

APPENDIX H

LIST OF THE ALLOWANCES FOR THE TRADITIONAL RULERS AND HEADMEN IN PAHANG FOR THE YEAR 1892

1.	Sultan Ahmad (Pekan)	$24,000
2.	Tengku Mahmud (Pekan)	$ 6,000
3.	Tengku Ali	$ 2,400
4.	Raja Muda	$ 2,400
5.	Bendahara	$ 1,800
6.	Temenggong	$ 1,200
7.	Shahbandar	$ 1,200
8.	Dato Raja	$ 1,200
9.	Dato Gajah	$ 1,200
10.	Orang Kaya Chenor	$ 1,200
11.	Orang Kaya Temerloh	$ 1,200
12.	Orang Kaya Lipis	$ 840
13.	Orang Kaya Semantan	$ 840
14.	Ungku Andak	$ 720
15.	Imam Perang Mahkota	$ 720
16.	Orang Kaya Bhakti	$ 740
17.	Tuan Hitam	$ 720
18.	Dato Lela	$ 600
19.	Saiyid Amin, Kathi Pekan	$ 360
20.	Tuan Hakim	$ 360
21.	Penghulu Balai Muda	$ 360
22.	Panglima Dalam Muda	$ 360
23.	Ex-Captain China	$ 360
24.	Saiyid Ali Badoh	$ 360
25.	Abdullah Penghulu Bera	$ 360
26.	Haji Senik, Penghulu Beserah	$ 360
27.	Tuan Muda, Penghulu Baloh	$ 360
28.	Ahmad, Penghulu Tioman	$ 240
29.	To' Muda Mamat	$ 120
30.	Che Woh, Penghulu Kuala Rompin	$ 360
31.	Dato Jenang Logan, Penghulu K. Endau	$ 360
32.	Mat Labib, Penghulu Bentong	$ 360
33.	Penghulu Dalam Tua	$ 240
34.	Awang Benting, Pulau Penyor	$ 240
35.	Che Puan Tengah	$ 240

36.	To' Muda Yusof Telang	$	240
37.	To' Mail, Tanjong Besar	$	240
38.	To' Jenang, Kangsar	$	240
39.	Penghulu Raja, Ulu Tembeling	$	240
40.	Wan Husein	$	240
41.	Penghulu, Kuala Pahang	$	240
42.	Che Jornet, Kestou	$	240
43.	Pahlawan Dun, Bengau	$	240
44.	To' Muda Dollah Lipat Kajang	$	240
45.	Dato Umbi, Penghulu Triag	$	240
46.	To' Muda Dun, Penghulu Temerloh	$	240
47.	Che Mat Benta	$	180
48.	To' Mamat, Penghulu Luit	$	180
49.	To' Muda Kuantan	$	180
50.	Kean Chik, Penghulu Rasau	$	180
51.	Mat Akhir, Gua	$	180
52.	To' Keli, Sega	$	180
53.	Amat Burok, Budu	$	180
54.	Imam Prang, Penghulu Gali	$	180
55.	Tengku Samat, Durain Sebatang	$	180
56.	Panglima Garang Yusof, K. Tembeling	$	180
57.	Pahlawan Gendut, Penghulu Kelola	$	180
58.	Pahlawan Lawi, Penghulu Tebing Linggi	$	180
59.	Kathi Ibrahim	$	180
60.	To' Muda Ambong, Sentang	$	180
61.	Panglima Raya, Bentong	$	180
62.	To' Muda Saleh, Penghulu K. Kuantan	$	180
63.	Wan Andak, Penghulu Ulu Kuantan	$	180
64.	To' Muda Omor, Penghulu Lepar	$	120
65.	Dato Jenang, Penghulu Lepar	$	120
66.	To' Muda Dolah, Penghulu Lemai	$	120
67.	To' Muda Ali, Penghulu Temai	$	120
68.	Che Mahmud Kuala Terlang	$	120
69.	Penghulu Teh, Rantau Panjang	$	120
70.	To' Bakar, Batu Talam	$	120
71.	To' Muda Sajak, Burau	$	120
72.	To' Muda Hidun, Penghulu Pahang Tua	$	120
73.	To' Aris, Penghulu Lebak	$	120
74.	To' Aria, Temerloh	$	120
75.	To' Mamat Tengoh	$	120
76.	To' Pemangku, Buloh	$	120

77.	To' Jenang Suden, Penghulu Rompin	$ 120
78.	Panglima Kechil, Penghulu Rompin	$ 120
	TOTAL	$63,640

Source: Rodger to Smith, 17 March 1892, enclosure in Smith to Knutsford, Confidential, 25 March 1892, C.O. 273/179, ff. 544—545.

APPENDIX I

EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE STATE COUNCIL HELD AT PULAU TAWAR ON THURSDAY, 8 OCTOBER 1891

The Acting Resident in opening the proceedings informs the Council that the first matter to be brought before the members for decision is the question of the boundaries of the districts ruled over by the chiefs of the Council of Four (Orang-Besar Berempat), To' Gajah and the chiefs of the Council of Eight (Orang Besar Delapan). After a prolonged discussion in which His Highness the Sultan, the Regent and all the chiefs concerned take part, the following decisions were arrived at.

Boundaries of the district ruled over by the chiefs of the Council of Four (Orang Besar Berempat) To' Gajah and the chiefs of the Council of Eight (Orang Besar Delapan):

Dato Shahbandar: from Kuala Pahang along the right and left banks of the Pahang river going upstream to Kuala Lepar, also Sungei Bebah and its tributaries.

Dato Kaya Indera Pahlawan Chenor: from Kuala Luit on the mouth of the Luit river along the right and left banks of the Pahang river. Going upstream to the end of Pulau Kening with all streams falling into the river between those points; also Sungei Keran districts i.e. from Batu Wan Pak to Batu Dedap going upstream with its tributaries.

Dato Kaya Indera Segera Temerloh: from the mouth of Sungei Tokoh going upstream to Pasir Purian and the streams debouching between these points.

Imam Perang Indera Gajah Pahang: from Batu Redap (i.e. the boundary of the Dato Kaya Indera Pahlawan Chenor) along the right and left banks of the Pahang river going upstream to Kuala Pine from Tanjong Bakti to Kangsar and from Pedah to Tanjong Lindong and the stream debouching between any of the said points; also Sungei Budu in Lipis.

Dato Maharaja Perba Jelei: from Tanjong Lindong (i.e. the

boundary of Imam Perang Indera Gajah Pahang) along Sungei Jelei going upstream to the boundaries of Perak and Kelantan (excepting Sungei Lipis) and also from Sungei Tembeling to the end of Pasir Durian.

Orang Kaya Setia Wangsa Lipis: from the mouth of the Sungei Lipis, going upstream to its source with its tributaries excepting Sungei Budu.

To' Umbi Triang: from Kuala Belenges to Kuala Triang, going downstream and from the mouth of the Triang river to Sungei Dua, the Jelebu boundary with its tributary.

Penghulu Bentong: from Kuala Klan while going up the Bentong river to its sources with its tributaries.

Penghulu Raja Tembeling: from Pasir Durian (i.e. the boundary of Dato Maharaja Perba Jelei to Sungei Tembeling going upstream excepting the districts of Wan Hussein and Wan Ismail.

All minor headmen who are in charge of sub-districts shall continue to observe the boundaries mentioned in the chops which they at present hold; the Council being of opinion that owing to relations which exist between chiefs and people under their charges, it is not advisable to make any changes in the old custom in this respect.

Source: Acting Resident, Pekan, to Colonial Office, 16 November 1891, *K.D.O.F.* 1891, K 236/91.

APPENDIX J

"From the commencement and throughout the disturbances, the Sultan was the central point around which every intrigue revolved and in my opinion both the raid of the Panglima Muda of Jempul and the outbreak of Mat Kilau were intimately connected with the original outbreak of the ex-Orang Kaya of Semantan and all formed part of the general scheme of the ulu chiefs to compel the Sultan to join their league. By surrounding him with disturbances on every side they hoped so to work upon the fears and suspicions common to every Malay Raja that he would finally consent either to avowedly assist them or by retiring to one of the ulu areas to at least tacitly countenance their proceedings and in either of the above cases I believe that they would openly proclaim a general rising in Pahang. Such rising although it could have had but one termination would have been a far graver matter than is generally realized but it was fortunately averted by the Sultan's recognition of his treaty obligations and his confidence in the good faith of the British Government."

Source: Extract from Annual Report 1892, enclosure in Smith to Ripon, Confidential, 15 April 1893, C.O. 273/187, ff. 121—122.

APPENDIX K

EXPENDITURE INCURRED IN PAHANG FROM 1889—1895

Year	Revenue		Expenditure
1889 (half year)	$ 30,390.05	a.	$141,683.38
1890	$ 62,077.01	b.	$284.647.07
1891	$ 77,386.50	c.	$238,174.22
1892	$ 50,044.34	d.	$206,735.79
1893	$ 83,688.47	e.	$246,606.67
1894	$100,220.43	f.	$207,514.27
1895	$106,743.80	g.	$206,317.48
a. Exclusive of interest on loans (1899)			$937.50
b. Exclusive of interest on loans (1890)			$13,055.08
c. Exclusive of interest on loans (1890)			$13,055.08
d. Exclusive of special receipts contributed by H.H. the Sultan on account of Semantan outbreak expenditure			$57,600.00
d. Exclusive of interest on loans (1891—1892)			$48,970.42
e. Exclusive of interest on loans (1893)			$31,786.04
f. Exclusive of special expenditure, Semantan outbreak			$ 3,842.92
f. Exclusive of interest on loans (1894)			$36,145.19
f. Exclusive of special expenditure Tembeling raid			$17,236.19
g. Exclusive of special expenditure, Semantan outbreak			$ 1,184.90
g. Exclusive of special expenditure, expedition to Kelantan and Trengganu			$ 7,175.33

Source: *A.R.P.* 1895, p. 13

APPENDIX L

LIST OF THE NAMES OF THE PAHANG MEN, THEIR WIVES AND CHILDREN TO THE SIAMESE

Name of the head of family	Name of wife	Children		Village	District
		Male /	Female		
Si Bahaman	Chi	—	Muhas	Temantan	Pahang
Teh Ibrahim	—	—	—	P. Tawar	"
Yassouf (Che Yusoh)	—	—	—	Kg. Pakar	"
Matassan	Tujuh	—	—	Tomieng	"
Dorah	Masa	—	—	P. Tawar	"
Mah Noh	Mai	—	—		
Paki	Limah	Tanman	Yuen	P. Tawar	"
Gari	Kaso				
Pen Yong	Mukoh				
Mat Peran	Koboh	Yantan	—	P. Tawar	"
Amat	Amoh				
Tong					
Mat Lela	Yang Chilek			Temantan	"
Hadji Mat Hoket	Mung	Bira	Allinoh	P. Tawar	"
	Yang			Temantan	"
	Tko	—	Tomoh	Temantan	"
	Mala			Temantan	"
	Tabia		Tomoh	P. Tawar	"
	Lako				
	Poboh	Kayar	—	P. Tawar	"
	Bikoh	Taranan	—	P. Tawar	"
Hong Nung (Awang Nong)	Yan Chiyai	Tohit	Haliyoh	P. Tawar	"
	Kambang	—	Pio	P.Tawar	Died at Kampo Pahang
	Kio	Manik	—	P. Tawar	Pahang
	Talaboh	—	Yujioh	P. Tawar	"
	Manong	—	Yiboh	P. Tawar	"
Bukyai				P. Tawar	"
Mahomet				Temantan	"
Hassan				P. Tawar	"

Source: Phya Song Suradet to Vice Consul Archer, 30 April 1896, enclosure 3 in *F.O.C.P.* Part 8, No. 96, p. 99.

APPENDIX M

LIST OF PAHANG REBELS WHO WISH TO VISIT PAHANG

Teh Ibrahim	40 years	Insane
Nai Kawlet	28 years	—
Ahmat	50 years	—
Ayong	38 years	—
Sancen	31 years	
Me chi	38 years (sister of Teh Ibrahim)	
Salaludin	13 years	
Mahomet Mahiden	9 years	
Isa (girl)	5 years	

Source: J. H. Lyle to Peel, 4 June 1913, enclosure in Arthur Peel to Sir Edward Grey, 24 June 1913, C.O. 273/402, f. 444.

APPENDIX N

REAPPEARANCE OF MAT KILAU

On 26 December 1969, Mat Kilau reappeared before a Friday congregation (about 1000 people) at a mosque in Pulau Tawar had claimed that he was the legendary warrior who fought against the British. He was 122 years old, but resembled that of a man who was 60. Since the rebellion in 1895 he confessed he had led a fugitive's life in Trengganu, Kelantan and Southern Thailand and returned to Pahang only in 1926. From Thailand he went to Patani then to Kampong Sireh, Kota Bahru where he posed himself as a Kuran teacher. He was known as Mat Siam, Mat Dahan, Dat Dadu and Mat Din. He used these names to conceal his real identity during his last 70 years. According to him, he did not disclose his identity because of a vow he took before the late Sultan Abdullah (1917—1932) of Pahang. He had worked for two years as a labourer on an estate at Gambang but disappeared in 1922. In 1925 he returned to Tanjong Medang, seven miles from Pekan, while in 1927, he shifted to Batu Lima, Kuantan. From 1922-30 he worked in several rubber holdings in Tanjong Kedang, Kampung Baru, Ketapang and Kampung Mengkasar near Pekan before news of his real identity spread to his relatives in Kampung Pulau Tawar near Jerantut in December 1969. He had also spent a few years in Kampong Merimpoh and Kampong Buan near Rompin. During the Japanese Occupation he lived at Kampong Setongkol Paya Besar. His claim as the legendary hero was investigated by a Board of Inquiry set up by the Pahang Government. Three factors which helped the Board to reach its findings were that Mat Kilau did not publicly claim that he was the legendary warrior; the manner in which he answered questions, and bodily marks and his personal recollection of fighting the British in which he was involved from 1891—1895.

Regarding his "death" at Kelantan and his burial at Kampung Dalam Laman, Bunut Payong, Kelantan, Mat Kilau confessed that during the feast at Kelantan, he tried to attack the Siamese soldiers, but failed. He fell on the floor and pretended to be dead. The Siamese Government thinking that he was dead handed over the corpse to Sultan Mohammed of Kelantan. The Sultan was not prepared to transfer the body to Siam; hence he permitted Mat Kilau to escape and reminded him not to disclose his identity. To convince the British and the Siamese that Mat Kilau had actually died, the

Sultan replaced his body with a large piece of banana stem and placed it in the coffin. The coffin was then buried at Punut Payong, Kelantan.

Source: Aebe Muara, *Mat Kilau: Satu curat-curat ke arah pengesahannya*, Singapore, 1970, pp. 35—62; *Lapuran Jawatankuasa Menyiasat munculnya Mat Kilau*, Pahang, pp. 1—88; *Hugh Clifford Files; The Straits Times*, 3 January 1970, 10 August 1970, 8 February 1970, 31 December 1969; *Berita Minggu*, 28 December 1969; *Berita Harian*, 29 December 1969, 30 December 1969, 2 January 1970, 3 January 1970, 4 January 1970, 5 January 1970, 14 January 1970.

APPENDIX O

THE FEDERATION AGREEMENT 1895

Agreement between the Governor of the Straits Settlements, acting on behalf of the Government of Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India and the Rulers of the following Malay States: that is to say, Perak, Selangor, Pahang and the Negri Sembilan.

1. In confirmation of various previous Agreements, the Sultan of Perak, the Sultan of Selangor, the Sultan of Pahang and the chiefs of the States which form the territory known as the Negri Sembilan, hereby severally place themselves and their states under the protection of the British Government.
2. The above-named Rulers and chiefs of the respective states hereby agree to constitute their countries a Federation, to be known as the Protected Malay States, to be administered under the advice of the British Government.
3. It is to be understood that the arrangement hereby agreed upon does not imply that any one Ruler or Chief shall exercise any power or authority in respect of any state order than that which he now possesses in the state of which he is the recognized Ruler or chief.
4. The above-named Rulers agree to accept a British Officer to be styled the Resident-General as the agent and representative of the British Government under the Governor of the Straits Settlements. They undertake to provide him with suitable accommodation with such salary as is determined by Her Majesty's Government, and to follow his advice in all matters of administration other than those touching the Muhammedan religion. The appointment of the Resident General will not affect the obligations of the Malay Rulers towards the British Residents now existing or to be hereafter appointed to offices in the above-mentioned Protected States.
5. The above-named Rulers also agree to give to those states in the Federation which require it such assistance in men, money, or other respects as the British Government, through its duly appointed officers, may advice; and they further undertake, should war break out between Her Majesty's Government, and that of any other Power, to send, on the requisition of the Governor a body of armed and equipped

Indian troops for service in the Straits Settlements.

6. Nothing in this Agreement is intended to curtail any of the powers or authority now held by any of the above-named Rulers in their respective states nor does it alter the relations now existing between any of the States named and the British Empire.

C. B. H. MITCHELL
Governor and Commander-in-Chief
Straits Settlements

SEAL

21 June, 1895.

witness to the seal and signature of Sir C. B. H. Mitchell, Governor of the Straits Settlements, to the seal and signature of the Sultan of Perak; to the seals of the Sultans of Pahang and Selangor; to the seal and signature of the Yam Tuan Besar of Sri Menanti; to the seal of the Dato Klana of Sungei Ujong and signature of the Acting Dato Klana Ahmed; to the seal and signature of the Dato Bandar of Sungei Ujong, to the seal and signature of the Dato Penghulu of Jelebu; to the seal of the Dato of Johol and the signature of Dato Baginda Tan Mas; to the seal of the Dato of Rembau and the signature of Dato Mentri Lela Perkasa and to the seal and signature of Tunku Dewa of Timpin.

F. A. Swettenham

26 July 1895.

Source: Mitchell to Joseph Chamberlain, Confidential, 13 August 1895, C.O. 273/205, ff. 409—410.

APPENDIX P

PROCLAMATION OF TENGKU MAHMUD AS THE REGENT OF PAHANG BY SULTAN AHMAD 1909

Seal of H. H. the Sultan of Pahang.

قول الحق.

بهواسن ماک اداله نيت سري ڤادوک دولي يڠمها مليا سلطان سر
احمد معظم شاه ابن المرحوم علي کي. سي. ام. جي. يڠ ممرينته کراجاءن
نݢري ڤهڠ سرة دڠن تعلوق٢ جاجهنڽ تله مروليهکن هندق اکن مڽاتاکن کوامس کند
ڤادوک انقند کيت يڠ برنام ... محمود سي. ام. جي. تڠکو بسر ڤهڠ.

کمودين اوله سکلين اديندا دان عمر کيت سده تتڤ اڤابيل ڤدان لاله
... کيت ماله دڠن عقل فکيرن کيت ...
لاه دتنتوکن ڤادوک انقند کيت اين اکن ... ممکوکن کيت سده برسوارت
دڠن ليان اورڠ٢ رعيت ... دان اورڠ٢ دالم سکلين حال
ممرينتهکن اکن. مک سکل ... دان ... داداکن ... مغ
دان مڠاتورکن عادة٢ دالم نݢري ... کيت ... کڤد ... سمدري.

دالم ... تله ... ڤادوک انقند کيت اين دڠن ...
... سکل اورڠ٢ بسر دان ... ٢ اسيمڤوا لاکي
سکل ... دڠن ... دان ... کڤد ...
انقند کيت اين ... سکل ... کتاءن کيت سمدري.

... اداله ... اين دڠن ... اوان ...
رعيت ... دان ... تله ...
درڤد اين دالم ... (کاونسيل) کارن ... ٢ ...
... اين اداله.

تولوليس کند د ... ڤد اڤريل 1909.

برتوڤتن دڠن 11 هاري بولن ربيع الاول سنة ١٣٢٨.

Source: Enclosure in British Resident Pahang to District Officer Kuantan, 1 May 1909, *K.D.O.F.* 421/1909.

APPENDIX Q

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE HIGH COMMISSIONER OF THE FEDERATED MALAY STATES, ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF HIS MAJESTY THE KING, EMPEROR OF INDIA AND THE RULERS OF THE FEDERATED MALAY STATES OF PERAK, SELANGOR, PAHANG AND NEGRI SEMBILAN

Whereas by the Treaty entered into in July 1895 known as the Treaty of Federation the above-named Rulers agreed to constitute their countries a Federation to be known as the Protected Malay States to be administered, under the advice of the British Government and whereas the above-named Federation was duly constituted as provided in the above named Treaty and whereas the above-named Rulers further desire that means should be provided for the joint arrangement for all matters of common interest to the Federation, or affecting more than one state and for the proper enactment of all laws intended to have force throughout the Federation or in more than one state, it is hereby agreed:

1. That on and after a date to be fixed by His Majesty, a Council shall be established to be known as the Federal Council of the Federated Malay States.
2. In the first instance the following shall be members of the Council. The High Commissioner, the Resident General, Sultan of Pahang, Yam Tuan of Negri Sembilan, Resident of Perak, Resident of Selangor, Resident of Pahang, Resident of Negri Sembilan, four unofficial members to be nominated by the High Commissioner with the approval of His Majesty. The absence of any member shall not invalidate any proceedings of the Council at which he has not been present.
3. If hereafter it should in the opinion of the High Commissioner be desirable to add to the Council one or more of the heads of the various public departments, he may do so subject to the approval of His Majesty and may in such case also nominate not more than one additional unofficial member for every official member so added to the Council.
4. A head of a department who is nominated to the Council shall hold office so long as the High Commissioner thinks fit.

Unofficial members shall hold office for three years.

5. The High Commissioner shall be President of the Council and in his absence the Resident General shall be President.
6. If any of the Rulers above named is unable to be present he may nominate one of the members of his State Council to represent him.
7. The Council shall meet at least once in every year at a place to be appointed from time to time by the High Commissioner.
8. Unless the High Commissioner shall certify in writing that it is a matter of urgency every law proposed to be enacted by the Council shall be published in the Government gazette at least one month before being submitted to the Council.
9. Laws passed or which may hereafter be passed by the State Councils shall continue to have full force and effect in the State except in so far as they maybe repugnant to the provisions of any law passed by the Federal Council and questions connected with the Mohammedan religion, mosques, political pensions, native chiefs and penghulus and any other questions which in the opinion of the High Commissioner affect the rights and prerogatives of any of the above named rulers or which for other reasons he considers should properly be dealt with only by the State Councils shall be exclusively reserved to the State Councils.
10. The Draft estimates of revenue and expenditure of each state shall be considered by the Federal Council but shall immediately on publication be communicated to the State Councils.
11. The drafts of all laws intended and all resolutions or other business, proposed by the Government to be submitted to the Federal Council shall be considered previous to publication by an administrative Council concisting of the High Commissioner, the Resident General, the above named rulers and the British Resident in the several states and the draft Federal and State Estimates shall also be considered by this Council before publication.
12. Nothing in this Agreement is intended to curtail any of the powers or authority now held by any of the above named rulers in their respective states nor does it alter the relations now existing between any of the states named and the British empire as established by previous treaties.

Source: J. Anderson to Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, Confidential, 26 December 1907, C.O. 273/331, ff. 440—443.

GLOSSARY

abdi	— slave
adat	— Malay laws and customs
anak emas	— child of a slave who is adopted by the owner.
balai	— Council hall
banchi	— a form of tax
belukar	— secondary forest
Bendahara	— Prime Minister; traditionally the principal official of the kingdom of Melaka and Johor
budak raja	— page to a king
daerah	— district
Engku Muda/Raja Muda	— Heir presumptive
hasil banchi	— revenue from the official counting of all the people in a district/country
hulubalang	— warrior captain
Imam	— presiding Muslim leader of a congregation who leads the prayers at a Friday congregation.
jihad/perang sabil	— holy war
kampong	— village
kanun	— code of laws
kerah	— corvee
kayu	— wood
Maharaja/Raja	— Hindu term for a ruler/king
mukim	— parish
Orang Besar	— a great and/or major chief; a dignitary
Orang Besar Berempat	— Council of Four
Orang Besar Delapan	— Council of Eight
Orang Besar Raja	— the ruler's chief
orang berutang	— debt bondsman
panglima perang	— warrior chief
parang	— long knife
penghulu	— headman usually of a village or district
pelias	— charm against bullets
Raja Tua	— Bugis title given to Malay nobility which is equivalent to the title of the

	Bendahara
ra'ayat	— subject class
Sakai	— aborigines
sepak raga	— a Malay traditional game
Seri Nara diRaja	— Malay title for the chief treasurer
Seri Bija diRaja	— Deputy Admiral
Serah	— a form of tax
Sultan	— Arabic term for king or ruler, normally used as a honorific prefix denoting an independent ruler.
surat kuasa/surat tauliah	— letter of authority
titah	— royal command
Temenggong	— Military or Police officer
Tengku	— Prince
Tengku Besar	— regent
To' Muda/Ketuan	— headman of a parish
wakil	— representative
wakil mutallak	— accredited representative of the Sultan
Yang di Pertuan Muda	— junior king
Yang di Pertuan	— Malay designation for king or ruler; lit: He who is made Lord

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